India’s Nuclear-Weapons Program: 5 Things You Need to Know
Akhilesh Pillalamarri
April 22, 2015
India is one of the world’s greatest emerging powers today. Its
economy is growing rapidly and its military is one of the largest in the
world, with
over a million soldiers.
India sees its nuclear weapons capacity to be an integral part of its
vision as a great power, and its nuclear program is important for both
its prestige and security doctrine.
Yet, India’s nuclear weapons program has not been free of controversy and criticism.
India is not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and is not one of the five nuclear weapons powers the treaty recognizes. India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 led to criticism and even sanctions.
Since then however, sanctions have largely been lifted and the United
States had quietly accepted India’s possession of nuclear weapons so
long as India does not carry out further nuclear tests, though
officially, the United States has not recognized India as a nuclear
weapons state. This has also led to many claims of double standards on
the part of the United States for making exceptions for India—including
getting the Nuclear Suppliers Group to agree to a waiver on export
restrictions of nuclear materials for India—that have been granted to no
other countries. This demonstrates the strategic importance of India
for the West and the general global perception of its trustworthiness
and stability.
Here are five things you need to know about India’s interesting nuclear program.
Why did India build Nukes?
Indian nationalist leaders speculated about the possibility of
acquiring nuclear weapons even before its independence. India’s first
prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru justified this by arguing: “As long as
the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and
use the latest devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will
develop her scientific researches and I hope Indian scientists will use
the atomic force for constructive purposes. But if India is threatened,
she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.”
The main impetus for India going nuclear, however, was China, which tested a nuclear weapon in 1964.
Two years prior, China defeated India in a short but decisive border
conflict and relations between the two countries were subsequently
tense. Taken together, Indian leaders felt that India needed nuclear
weapons to counter China’s conventional superiority and defend Indian
territory, some of which China was perceived to have occupied.
Nonetheless, India and China both have nuclear no-first use doctrines
and it is highly unlikely that either would risk nuclear war over a
non-existential border dispute. This raises the question of why India
felt it needed a nuclear weapon to counter China, a luxury many other
countries with disputed borders with China forewent. Yet, India’s
nuclear program was not just about countering China, but being equal to
it, since Indian leaders believed that India and China were both
destined to be the leaders of Asia.
Today, India’s nuclear weapons are also important as a deterrent
toward Pakistan, though it developed them first and Pakistan only later
developed its weapons in response. However, given Pakistan’s military
stance and weapons, India’s continued possession of weapons is necessary
for its security vis-Ã -vis its western neighbor.
History
Nuclear research in India first began at the Institute of Fundamental
Research (IFR) from 1944 onward, and even prior to then, Indians had
access to some Western scientific journals, the result being that India
was theoretically more ahead on the path to a nuclear weapon that most
other developing countries at the time. In addition to enriching
plutonium and uranium, a unique component of India’s nuclear activity
has been thorium, as India contains twenty-five percent of the world’s
thorium deposits. Thorium is not ideal for weapons, but its use for
civilian power could free up virtually all of India’s uranium and
plutonium for military uses.
After India’s defeat by China in 1962, India moved toward the
construction of a nuclear weapon and design work began in 1965 under Dr.
Homi Bhabha. Development accelerated under Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi, who both wanted to accentuate her popularity and due to fears of
Chinese or American involvement in India’s 1971 war with Pakistan.
In 1974, India detonated its first plutonium device, although
it characterized it as a “peaceful nuclear explosive.” Because of this
characterization, India was able to avoid the worst of criticism
directed against it for alleged developing a nuclear weapon, though
independent observers maintained that it was part of a nuclear weapons
program and Indian scientists privately admitted as much.
After 1974, India continued to develop and improve upon its nuclear
weapons, experimenting with different types of designs and materials.
India officially went nuclear in 1998, conducting five nuclear tests (one fusion bomb, four fission bombs), a move met with high domestic approval.
Pakistan responded with its own nuclear tests, bringing South Asia’s nuclear-armed reality into the open.
The India Security Debate
While much criticism has been levied against the dangers of the
Pakistani nuclear weapons program, a valid debate can also be had over
whether the Indian nuclear weapons program actually improved or hurt
security and stability in South Asia. This point was debated right here
on The National Interest back in 2013 in a series of articles by Zachary
Keck and Dhruva Jaishankar.
Keck argues “Indian leaders built the bomb with a very specific
security threat in mind. Unfortunately, nuclear weapons have proven
ill-suited for addressing that security threat, while India’s pursuit of
atomic weaponry has opened up new challenges that wouldn’t have existed
otherwise.” In his view, China’s limited objectives toward its dispute
with India did not necessitate India getting a bomb in order to improve
its own security, as nuclear weapons are only useful as deterrents
against large-scale attacks.
On
the other hand, Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, a fact that
undermined India’s own security vis-Ã -vis to its prior position.
Jaishankar counters that China’s objectives are more expansive than
its seemingly limited border dispute with India and that China had in
fact been giving Pakistan aid to go nuclear long before India’s 1998
test in a bid to contain India.
In fact, according to Jaishankar, China conducted a test for Pakistan
in 1990, effectively making it a nuclear state. Combined with
Pakistan’s prior incursions into India, India’s development of a nuclear
weapon was an apt response for Chinese and Pakistani adventurism. In a
response, however, Keck points out that Pakistan continued to use
proxies after India’s acquisition of a nuke and that China seized some
640 kilometers of Indian territory.
The debate over whether or not India’s acquisition of nuclear
materials improved its security situation continues to remain
unresolved.
Capabilities
India has around 110 nuclear weapons,
which is actually slightly less than how many Pakistan has (120). This
is consistent with the amount of weapons-grade plutonium it has
previously produced.
India, along with China, the United States, and Russia, possesses a
full nuclear triad consisting of extensive air, sea, and land
capabilities.
India maintains multiple nuclear capable aircraft, including the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, the Mikoyan MiG-29, and the Dassault Mirage 2000, among others.
India also operates nuclear submarines
and has recently produced the indigenous INS Arihant. However, India’s
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) have limited range, and
Indian submarines would therefore have to creep fairly close to Chinese
shores before they would be able to deliver a nuclear weapon to the
mainland.
The Indian missile arsenal is large and will soon include an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In
fact, earlier this India successfully tested its Agni-V for the third
time. Although the Agni-V has a range of 5,000 kilometers, and is
therefore technically only an intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM), it is frequently referred to an ICBM in Indian media. In any
case, its range could be extended in later variants, and it is already
able to reach all of China. India is also developing the Agni-VI, which
may have a range of up to 10,000 kilometers.
While India is ahead of Pakistan in terms of the range of its weapons
and its delivery systems, its program is mostly geared towards the
nuclear threat of China rather than Pakistan.
Pakistan
has more smartly tailored its nuclear program to the geographical and
logistical characteristics of South Asian warfare by focusing on
battlefield nukes, something India has not done. However, India’s
nuclear strategy does not necessarily need battlefield nukes, because of
its no-first use policy; if a battlefield nuke were to be used on
India, India would retaliate much more massively with regular nukes.
Future
India is expanding its stock of nuclear weapons, but not as fast as Pakistan is, since
India’s has met the minimum needed for deterrent purposes while
Pakistan may intend to use its nuclear weapons for offensive or
battlefield purposes. India’s industrial base also enables it to build
more and different types of nuclear weapons at shorter notice than
Pakistan so it does not necessarily need to redirect its energies to
building more weapons unless it feels them necessary.
India is also less reliant on nuclear weapons for its security as
Pakistan and is focused on improving its military capabilities
elsewhere, especially naval and Himalayan-based land capabilities.
Additionally, India’s largest focus remains economic development and it
does not feel existentially threatened.
Nonetheless, India is developing its nuclear capabilities and
expanding its weapons, enriching uranium in addition to plutonium.
India’s nuclear deal with the United States and the granting of a waiver
for importing nuclear materials (which must be for non-military
purposes) allows it to use more of its indigenously produced nuclear
material for weapons. India is has also heavily invested in research on
using thorium in reactors (or even potentially weapons), which will free
up its other nuclear material for weapons. India hopes to soon operate
thorium reactors.
One problem India needs to resolve going into the future is how to
make its nuclear deterrent useful. The fact that Pakistan has nuclear
weapons makes it difficult for India to make good on its threats of
retaliation in the case of a terrorist attack originating from Pakistan
on Indian soil. Ultimately, no Indian leader wants to trigger a nuclear
war in South Asia, but no Indian leader wants to allow Pakistan to make
mischief in India. Obviously, India will not give up its nuclear weapons
to get Pakistan to do so, so a nuclear-armed South Asia is the premise
of any future discussion on the region. Figuring out a strategy to
handle this dilemma will be an important task for the Indian
establishment.
Akhilesh Pillalamarri is an assistant editor at the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter:@AkhiPill.
Moqtada al-Sadr warns European countries to stop propaganda against Islam
