Showing posts with label Arabia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arabia. Show all posts

Sunday, August 18, 2019

Shi’a Horn Targets Remote Saudi Oil Field



Yemen rebel drone attack targets remote Saudi oil field
By JON GAMBRELL, Associated Press
FILE – In this Monday, March 8, 2004 file photo, an industrial plant strips natural gas from freshly pumped crude oil is seen at Saudi Aramco’s Shaybah oil field at Shaybah in Saudi Arabia’s Rub al-Khali desert. Saudi state TV reported Saturday, Aug. 17, 2019, that a fire had been controlled at the…  (Associated Press)
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Drones launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels attacked a massive oil and gas field deep inside Saudi Arabia’s sprawling desert on Saturday, causing what the kingdom described as a “limited fire” in the second such recent attack on its crucial energy industry.
The attack on the Shaybah oil field, which produces some 1 million barrels of crude oil a day near the kingdom’s border with the United Arab Emirates, again shows the reach of the Houthis’ drone program. Shaybah sits some 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) from Houthi-controlled territory, underscoring the rebels’ ability to now strike at both nations, which are mired in Yemen’s yearslong war.
The drone assault also comes amid heightened tensions in the wider Mideast between the U.S. and Iran, whose supreme leader hosted a top Houthi official days earlier in Tehran.
State media in Saudi Arabia quoted Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih as saying production was not affected at the oil field and no one was wounded in the attack Saturday. The state-run Saudi Arabian Oil Co., known widely as Saudi Aramco, issued a terse statement acknowledging a “limited fire” at a liquid natural gas facility at Shaybah.
Their acknowledgement came hours after Yahia Sarie, a military spokesman for the Houthis, issued a video statement claiming the rebels launched 10 bomb-laden drones targeting the field in their “biggest-ever” operation. He threatened more attacks would be coming.
“This is in response to their aggression toward us and our people in Yemen,” Sarie said.
Al-Falih linked the attack to a May assault by Houthi drones that targeted the kingdom’s crucial East-West Pipeline, a 1,200-kilometer (746-mile) link between its eastern oil fields and the Red Sea. He also mentioned recent explosions on oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz that the U.S. blames on Iranian-planted limpet mines. Iran denies being behind those attacks.
“This act of terrorism and sabotage is only an extension of those acts that have recently targeted the global oil supply chains, including oil pipelines in the kingdom, and oil tankers,” al-Falih said. “This cowardly attack once again highlights the importance of the international community’s response to all terrorist actors who carry out such acts of sabotage, including the Houthi militias.”
The oil field at Shaybah is in the Arabian Peninsula’s Empty Quarter, a sea of sand where temperatures routinely hit 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit). Saudi Aramco on its website refers to the field as “the most remote treasure on Earth,” home to reserves of 14.3 billion barrels of oil and 25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
The field’s distance from rebel-held territory in Yemen demonstrates the range of the Houthis’ drones. U.N. investigators say the Houthis’ new UAV-X drone, found in recent months during the Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen, likely has a range of up to 1,500 kilometers (930 miles). That puts Saudi oil fields, an under-construction Emirati nuclear power plant and Dubai’s busy international airport within their range.
Unlike sophisticated drones that use satellites to allow pilots to remotely fly them, analysts believe Houthi drones are likely programmed to strike a specific latitude and longitude and cannot be controlled once out of radio range. The Houthis have used drones, which can be difficult to track by radar, to attack Saudi Patriot missile batteries, as well as enemy troops.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched their war against the Houthis in March 2015 to back the country’s internationally recognized government. The UAE recently began withdrawing troops from the conflict while UAE-allied separatists recently seized the city of Aden, further complicating a war seen as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
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Associated Press writer Samy Magdy in Cairo contributed to this report.
Copyright 2019 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Friday, August 16, 2019

Building Up the Nuclear Horns of Prophecy (Daniel)

by Luciano Zaccara
Over the past three months since the Trump administration imposed severe sanctions on Iran, which have significantly curbed its oil exports and exacerbated its economic crisis, tensions in the Gulf have escalated. Commercial vessels have been attacked, oil tankers seized and drones shot down. Despite these escalations, both sides are holding back and at least in the short-term, an open conflict so far seems unlikely.
In the long-term, however, the highly-problematic approach that the United States has adopted towards the nuclear issue could have devastating consequences. Two recent developments point in that direction.
First, the Trump administration has given a green light to US companies to work on nuclear projects in Saudi Arabia. According to a report recently released by the US Congress Oversight Committee, “with regard to Saudi Arabia, the Trump Administration has virtually obliterated the lines normally separating government policymaking from corporate and foreign interests.”
The report also stated that the evidence collected and analyzed “raise serious questions about whether the White House is willing to place the potential profits of the President’s friends above the national security of the American people and the universal objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.”
The White House seems committed to allowing the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology without demanding that Riyadh abide by US legal requirements not to engage in activities that can lead to nuclear proliferation.
Second, in response to mounting pressure from the US, Iran has announced that it is going to backtrack on a number of commitments made under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) if the international community does not take measures to ameliorate the effects of US sanctions on its economy.
Iran has already stopped complying with limits on the production of enriched uranium and heavy water, invoking articles 26 and 36 of the agreement, which entitle it to do so if the other parties reintroduce nuclear-related sanctions.
Thus, Washington’s incapacity to deal with the Iranian file in a coherent manner, and its erratic policies on nuclear proliferation, are pushing the Middle East towards a dangerous nuclear competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Nuclear ambitions
The nuclear aspirations of both countries are not new. Iran’s nuclear programme began during the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with the 1967 opening of the Center for Nuclear Research in Tehran along with an experimental 5 MW reactor built using US technology.
One year later, Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, in 1973, created the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, which drew the first nuclear programme and planned the first nuclear power plant in Bushehr with German technology. A broad nuclear cooperation memorandum between Iran and the US was signed in 1975.
Saudi Arabia’s interest in developing nuclear-related research also started in the 1960s but had modest potential until the late 1970s, when the King Abd Al-Aziz Center for Science and Technology (KAACST) was established in Riyadh and the kingdom started studying the possibility of opening nuclear plants. Saudi Arabia eventually signed the NPT in 1988.
In 2017, under the leadership of King Salman and his son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Riyadh became serious about building a nuclear reactor and started contemplating a tender, which the Americans are now hoping to win.
In the past, there have been allegations that both Iran and Saudi Arabia tried to illicitly acquire nuclear technology from the same provider – Pakistan. In 2007, Iran admitted it purchased blueprints from Pakistani scientist AQ Khan in the 1990s, Saudi Arabia continues to deny the accusation.
Because of these suspicions, both countries have been subjected to inspections by the IAEA. In the case of Saudi Arabia, however, due to the modest size of its nuclear programme, it has had to comply only with the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) during inspections.
By contrast, Iranian facilities have been under heavy scrutiny since the 1990s mainly by the US. This despite the fact that, at times, Iran voluntarily implemented the safeguard agreements reached during nuclear negotiations with the EU-3 between 2003 and 2005, as a confidence-building measure.
Under Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, nuclear research began again, which caused the United Nations Security Council to sanction Iran with several resolutions from 2006 to 2012. When President Hassan Rouhani took office in 2013, Iran’s approach to the nuclear issue changed drastically and it went back to serious negotiations with the US and the European Union.
Meanwhile, the Obama administration considered the possible transfer of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia but ultimately decided not to sign the 123 agreement with Riyadh, after it failed to agree to non-proliferation guarantees.
The success and failure of the Iran nuclear deal
The 2015 JCPOA was meant to dampen Iranian (and indirectly Saudi) nuclear ambitions and bring a peaceful solution to a long-term nuclear controversy through multilateral diplomacy. It, however, failed to reassure Saudi Arabia that the Iranian threat has been subdued.
Many officials, including high ranking members of the Saudi royal family such as the Prince Turki al Faisal, openly criticised the deal and warned that it could trigger a nuclear race in the region.
This narrative was reinforced by the new direction Trump imposed on US foreign policy, legitimising Saudi aspirations for a full nuclear programme and opening the doors for the transfer of sensitive technology that could be used to produce a nuclear device.
It is important to note that, while Iran always denied its interest in having nuclear weapons, despite any real external threat from neighbouring countries or the US, Saudi Arabia’s MBS and other high officials admitted that they would pursue a nuclear weapon if Tehran acquired one.
Iran has been careful about the declared goals of its nuclear programme and, as both the IAEA and US intelligence agencies have confirmed, it has not directed any part of its nuclear research to achieving military goals. However, it is possible that “maximum pressure” from the US and the possibility of a US nuclear technology transfer to Saudi Arabia could motivate some sectors of the political establishment to consider having a military nuclear capacity as a deterrent against any future foreign aggression.
A collapsing nonproliferation regime
With its ill-advised policies in the Gulf, the Trump administration is not only encouraging a nuclear race in the region by allowing Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear technology, but it is also undermining the international non-proliferation regime.
Since nuclear powers agreed in the 1960s to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, there have been a number of cases in which countries – including Israel, India, and Pakistan – have broken international rules in pursuit of nuclearisation and not faced serious consequences.
The double standards applied by the Trump administration have been particularly damaging to international nonproliferation agreements. Trump has pursued normalisation of relations with North Korea – a state that openly tested and detonated nuclear devices – while withdrawing from a nuclear deal with Iran, which was strictly abided by all provisions and was not working on developing a nuclear bomb.
Effectively, the US government destroyed a well-functioning agreement that enjoyed wide international support in order to satisfy the commercial interests of a few individuals close to the White House and give an advantage to one side in the growing regional rivalry in the Middle East.
These actions have thrown the international community into disarray, as now there appears to be no clear consensus on what nuclear activities can be considered a threat, what evidence state actors must present to be regarded as truly committed to nonproliferation and what instruments – legal, economic, or military – should be used to enforce the nonproliferation regulations.
Washington’s unilateral (mis)management of the nuclear issue is endangering the whole nonproliferation regime, weakening any multilateral agreement or negotiation, and leaving solely the White House to decide on how to deal with these abovementioned questions.
In the current volatile situation in the Middle East – with intensifying confrontation along religious, ethnic, territorial and ideological cleavages – the lack of a robust non-proliferation agreement will encourage a nuclear race in the region and increase the chances of pre-emptive military attacks that could lead to large-scale war
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Luciano Zaccara
Luciano Zaccara is professor of Gulf Politics at the Qatar University Gulf Studies Center.

Thursday, August 8, 2019

The Horns of Saudi Arabia Iran and Babylon the Great (Daniel 7)

Saudi Arabia, Iran and the US

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has, for many years, been a constant in the Middle East. It is a mix of geopolitics and religious sectarianism. Both countries vie for influence in their shared region, with religion and politics impacting on each other.
The 1979 Iranian revolution intensified this divide with a religious/revolutionary fervour added to it for the discomfort of the established order in the Sunni Arab countries. It didn’t, however, translate into any immediate threat to Arab monarchies as Iran-Iraq war engulfed these two countries for much of the eighties. It was, nevertheless, perceived as a potential threat.
The presence of a large Shia population in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province and their perceived susceptibility to Iran’s influence, as well as Shia majority in Bahrain’s Sunni-led monarchy, have often led to persecution and repression of the Shias; further embittering their relations.
After the fall of the Shah of Iran and the new clerical order in Iran, its relations with the US deteriorated sharply. Indeed, the US encouraged and equipped Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into attacking Iran to hopefully destroy the new political order in Iran.
But, despite the horrific Iran-Iraq war causing huge casualties in Iran and overall destruction, the clerical regime still survived.
Iraq was impoverished from the war. When some of its Arab lenders, like Kuwait, wanted repayment of their debts, Saddam Hussein sought to solve the problem forever by attacking Kuwait to annex this oil-rich country.
Having failed to make any headway against Iran, where the war ended in a stalemate, Saddam sought through seeking to annex Kuwait to become the dominant economic and political force in the Middle East.
Iran’s economic blockade fit into the US’s Middle Eastern strategy of prioritising Israel and Saudi Arabia
But the US didn’t want Saddam’s Iraq to control the Middle Eastern oil fields, which led them into the first Gulf War; resulting in Saddam Hussein’s comprehensive defeat, just short of his overthrow, probably because President George Bush (senior) hadn’t planned an alternative political order
Therefore, Saddam Hussein was just tolerated, with Iraqi people, especially children, suffering the most from international sanctions, including that on medical supplies.
As we know, the task of overthrowing Saddam was left to Bush senior’s son, President George Bush, who attacked Iraq in 2003. But that is a different story, opening another hornet’s nest, which is still being played out.
Under President Obama, an attempt was made to work out some sort of a breakthrough with Iran, while maintaining close political and security ties with traditional allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
As Iran’s nuclear program advanced, the Obama administration sought to limit it to peaceful research under the 2015 nuclear deal, signed by Iran with five permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia and China) plus Germany. And Iran adhered to its part of the deal.
While this was generally welcomed as a positive development, it was considered bad news in Saudi Arabia and Israel. There, the entire approach was in favour of continuing, and even ramping up further the international regime of international economic sanctions.
Iran’s economic blockade was supposed to bring down the clerical regime or bring it to a humiliating climb down so that it entirely gives up its nuclear program. This fit into the US’s Middle Eastern strategy of prioritising Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Under Obama, the broad strategy remained the same with Israel and Saudi Arabia as security partners, but to address the issue of Iran’s nuclear program to limit its weapons potential with very low enrichment capacity. This, Iran followed, as was attested by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
With Obama gone, Trump decided to undo much of his predecessor’s legacy, including the Iran nuclear deal. He described it as the worst ever deal and wanted it renegotiated. And to bring this about, Trump scrapped the 2015 nuclear agreement, re-imposed even more sanctions, sent a naval force threatening Iran and inviting it to re-negotiate without prior conditions.
In other words, Iran was offered the choice of accepting a new deal amounting to a virtual surrender of its sovereignty. Iran is refusing to accept the US dictation and the situation is combustible.
Saudi Arabia and Israel are pleased with the turn of events from Obama’s time and hope that US’ continued economic sanctions and warlike pressure will bring Iran to its knees and might even bring down the clerical regime.
At the same time, the US is pressuring Europe to be part of an international naval fleet to patrol the Persian Gulf, especially the Strait of Hormuz, in the wake of the seizure of a British oil tanker by Iran.
This was apparently as tit-for-tat for the British navy’s seizure of an Iranian oil tanker in the seas around Gibraltar, allegedly for breaking international sanctions to ferry oil to Syria.
It is a very tense situation and there is no knowing how it will end. Saudi Arabia (and Israel) will be very pleased with the turn of events under Trump. But things are not as rosy in the Saudi kingdom, which I might explore in a subsequent article.
The writer is a senior journalist and academic based in Sydney, Australia

Saturday, May 25, 2019

Trump Preps the Saudis for War (Daniel 7)

Trump cites Iran to bypass Congress on Saudi arms sales

(Newser) – The Trump administration on Friday invoked a rarely used provision in federal law to bypass congressional review of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, citing threats the kingdom faces from Iran. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo notified Congress of the decision to use an emergency loophole in the Arms Export Control Act to move ahead with sales of $7 billion in precision guided munitions, other bombs and ammunition and aircraft maintenance support to Saudi Arabia, along with the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, without lawmakers‘ approval. Pompeo said, the AP reports, „that an emergency exists which requires the immediate sale“ of the weapons „to deter further the malign influence of the government of Iran throughout the Middle East region.“ He said the transfers „must occur as quickly as possible in order to deter further Iranian adventurism.“
Pompeo’s move follows President Trump’s announcement that the U.S. will send 1,500 additional U.S. troops to the Middle East in response to an unspecified threat from Iran. Democratic critics of the Saudi campaign denounced Friday’s step. Sen. Bob Menendez of New Jersey said the administration did not cite a specific legal or practical reason for using the loophole other than Iran. Sen. Chris Murphy of Connecticut said the administration was only declaring an emergency because lawmakers would have blocked the transfers. „There is no new ‚emergency‘ reason to sell bombs to the Saudis,“ Murphy said. There is precedent for using the exemption for arms sales to Saudi Arabia: President Ronald Reagan and Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush invoked it.

Thursday, May 2, 2019

How the US is Building the Saudi Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)



Saudi-U.S. nuclear hypocrisy exposed
KASHMIR – According to author and radio host, Harvey Wasserman, U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent decision to infuse $3.7 billion dollars into Vogtle nuclear power plants is a criminal act.
The U.S. nuclear industry is facing stiff competition from cheap natural gas and renewable energy, so financial assistance is critical for the survival of the industry. Trump administration is not only infusing money into the troubled U.S. nuclear energy sector but strongly advocating the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to the regime in Riyadh. It has adopted a well-coordinated strategy to guarantee the survival of the U.S. nuclear industry.
The unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from JCPOA, malign interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex and a comprehensive plan to contain Iranian influence in the Middle East are some important links that can explain the Saudi-U.S. nuclear hypocrisy.
At the superficial level, Saudi regime considers itself a strong advocate of weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East but by praising the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. from JCPOA and an open admission to acquire nuclear weapons in case Iran undertakes a nuclear program is a testament to Saudi hypocrisy.
It seems logical to put deterrence against a rival but Saudi intentions to acquire nuclear weapons date back to the inception of Pakistan’s nuclear program.
The justification for deterrence against Iran is a fabricated story as we analyze the Iran nuclear deal which reduced the enriched uranium stockpile of Iran by 98% and the number of gas centrifuges reduced to two-thirds for 13 years.
Iran even agreed to halt building new heavy water facilities and enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Further it agreed on regular inspection of its nuclear program by international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
In this context, the statement of former UK ambassador to UN and IAEA, Peter Jenkins that “as long as Iran is complying with the JCPOA, the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia are deprived of any basis for claiming that Iran presents a nuclear threat which must be eliminated by use of force” sufficiently explains the Saudi nuclear hypocrisy.
Saudi criticism of Iran’s civilian nuclear program highlights its double standard as according to Abdul Hameed Nayyer, a Pakistani nuclear physicist, Saudi Arabia can demand nuclear weapons from Pakistan due to its generous investment in the country.
Additionally, Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan in his book “Eating Grass: The Making Of the Pakistani Bomb” also explains the Saudi ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons.
Considering the nuclear option from Pakistan and potentially a huge space to exploit solar energy for clean power renders the establishment of nuclear infrastructure by Saudi regime useless. But the report from investigative journalist Kim Kleppin has revealed how Saudi lobby is pushing Trump administration to transfer the sensitive nuclear technology to the regime. According to the report a U.S. law firm linked to Trump vigorously lobbied the U.S. administration for nuclear technology transfer and received half a million dollars within one month of its establishment.
The vested business interests in Saudi nuclear program were revealed on February 19, 2019, in a report by the ‘house oversight and reform committee’ that disclosed Trump administration’s plan to bypass U.S. Congress for nuclear technology transfer to Saudi Arabia.
The report of the committee highlights intentions of IP3 international, a consortium of nuclear power producers. IP3 was founded by retired army general Jack Keane and its proposal was presented to White House officials by Thomas Barrack. Barrack is a close friend of Trump who raised $107 million for Trump’s inaugural committee. Michael Flynn is another central figure to the report who has worked as a paid advisor to a subsidiary of IP3 while serving in Trump’s presidential campaign. Flynn promoted IP3’s intention to sell nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia to white house officials.
McFarlane, the former national security advisor to the U.S. and currently an advisor to IP3, compared the transfer of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia to the Marshall plan for the Middle East. According to the report, the founders of the IP3, McFarlane, and CEOs of Toshiba energy, GE power, Exelon Corporation Bechtel Corp and Siemens have promoted the plan to sell nuclear technology to Riyadh.
The retired generals who founded IP3 have always portrayed Iran as a nuclear threat but now their intentions to transfer such technology to Saudi regime is meant to serve their monetary interests. The house oversight committee quoting a senior Trumps official said “the proposal of IP3 is not a business plan but rather a scheme for these generals to make some money.”
In an interview with Sputnik, Tom Sauer of the University of Antwerp Belgium said the Saudi proposal to build about 40 nuclear reactors is a great business opportunity for troubled the U.S. nuclear industry and the Wall Street perceives peaceful Middle East as a nightmare for its military-industrial complex.
According to some experts, the nuclear technology transfer to Saudi Arabia will initiate an arms race in the Middle East that is what U.S. military-industrial complex wants.
According to Tom Collin, policy director at Ploughshares Fund, Saudis don’t require nuclear power and if the U.S. transfers such technology to the kingdom it will force Iran to restart its nuclear program.
The arms race will serve both the U.S. military industrial complex and the Saudi regime because Saudi regime wants to derail Iranian economy by draining its resources through arms race as they are frustrated by Iran’s influence and progress in the region.
It is similar to U.S. strategy to contain Russian influence by initiating arms race as the U.S. economy has an unlimited supply of petrodollars but Russian economy has limited options to finance its military and civilian projects.
IAEA has denied any military vector of Iran’s nuclear program but Saudi-U.S. hypocrisy to portray Iran as is a nuclear threat is meant to serve their vested interests. They consider nuclear arms race as a tool to serve private business interest and simultaneously a counterweight against Iran’s axis of resistance that consists of Iran, Assad government, Hezbollah and the alliance of Russia and China.
Mudasir Sheikh is a student and researcher based in Indian controlled Kashmir. 

Thursday, April 25, 2019

The Accelerating Saudi Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)



By Tim Lister and Tamara Qiblawi, CNN
Updated 3:09 AM EDT, Sun April 07, 2019
(CNN) On the outskirts of Riyadh, a building site is quickly being transformed into the birthplace of Saudi Arabia’s quest for nuclear power, a bid that has sparked concern in the US Congress and fury in Tehran.
New satellite imagery shows that construction on an experimental reactor is making „expeditious“ progress — just three months after the Kingdom announced plans to build it, according to former director for nuclear inspections at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Robert Kelley.
Kelley estimated that the reactor could be completed in „nine months to a year.“
The Kingdom has been open about its nuclear program with the IAEA, which sent a team to Saudi Arabia last July to check on building plans. It has repeatedly pledged that the program is peaceful. But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said last year that „without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.“
Also raising concern among industry experts and some in Congress is the Saudi insistence that it should be allowed to produce its own nuclear fuel, rather than import it under strict conditions.
In an interview last year, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al Falih said: „It’s not natural for us to bring enriched uranium from a foreign country to fuel our reactors,“ citing the country’s uranium reserves.
Vision 2030
Saudi Arabia went public with its nuclear ambitions nine years ago, but the plans have gone into overdrive as part of the Crown Prince’s „Vision 2030“ — a strategy to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and diversify both the economy and its energy mix.
It already consumes about one-quarter of its own oil production, and output is likely to remain roughly stable even as demand for energy is expected to triple by 2030. So the blueprint for Vision 2030 includes solar and wind power as well as a nuclear program in an effort to source one-third of energy needs from non-oil resources.
Longer-term, Saudi Arabia envisions 17 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2040, enough to provide 15% of its power needs.
Robert Kelley, former director for nuclear inspections at the IAEA, has said that Saudi Arabia’s nuclear reactor is designed for training scientists.
The experimental reactor under construction at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology is designed for training scientists, Kelley told CNN.
„It’s the size of a waste basket and has no strategic importance,“ he said, adding that it would take 100 years to process enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon.
Next, the Saudis want to build two commercial reactors and are shopping around for contractors. There are five finalists, according to the Saudis: Westinghouse from the US, as well as companies from China, Russia, France and South Korea. Saudi Arabia has also signed agreements with the China National Nuclear Corporation for exploring uranium reserves in the Kingdom.
The IAEA sent a team to Saudi Arabia in July last year to review the development of its nuclear power infrastructure. That mission concluded that the Kingdom is „well placed to finalize its plans for construction of its first nuclear power plant“ through partnerships with countries that have nuclear power industries.
Saudi Arabia consumes around one quarter of its own yearly oil production.
In a visit to Riyadh in January, Mikhail Chudakov, IAEA Deputy Director General, confirmed Saudi Arabia had „made significant progress in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure.“
But when the Saudis want to move to the next stage — fueling the reactor at King Abdulaziz City and any commercial plants — they will have to submit to more intrusive IAEA involvement.
„They’ve been exempt for 30 years since they signed a non-proliferation treaty,“ said Kelley. „Now they’re going to have to make some serious paperwork and agree to inspections,“ if they want to acquire nuclear fuel.
US concerns
Skepticism in the US Congress over whether Saudi Arabia can be a trusted partner has grown since the gruesome murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul last year. That’s now manifested itself in critical scrutiny of the Saudi nuclear program — and especially whether the Trump Administration is doing enough to ensure non-proliferation.
Asked whether it was acceptable for Saudi Arabia to become a nuclear power, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was unequivocal in a TV interview on Friday.
„We will not permit that to happen. We will not permit that to happen anywhere in the world,“ Pompeo told CBS. „The President understands the threat of proliferation. We will never write a $150 million check to the Saudis and hand them over the capacity to threaten Israel and the United States with nuclear weapons, never.“
A bipartisan resolution introduced in the Senate in February demanded that the use of any US nuclear power technology in Saudi Arabia must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure Saudi Arabia cannot enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel.
„The last thing America should do is inadvertently help develop nuclear weapons for a bad actor on the world stage,“ said Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley, one of the resolution’s sponsors.
US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry has warned that Saudi Arabia will look to China or Russia to develop its nuclear industry if the US fails to cooperate.
House Democrats in February claimed that in 2017 White House officials had pushed the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia despite warnings from National Security Council officials. A spokesman for Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee, said the report amounted to „a ridiculous conspiracy theory.“
In heated exchanges at the Senate Armed Services committee at the end of March, US Energy Secretary Rick Perry said that if the United States did not cooperate with the Saudis, they would look to Russia or China to develop their nuclear industry.
„I can assure you that those two countries don’t give a tinker’s damn about non-proliferation,“ Perry said.
„That’s why we continue to work very, very diligently to try to bring those countries that want to develop civil nuclear programs into the sphere of the United States, because we are committed to non-proliferation.“
Perry said his department had approved several applications for US companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to Saudi Arabia. However, they do not allow the transfer of nuclear material, equipment or components.
Iran claims that the Trump Administration plans to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology without sufficient safeguards. „First a dismembered journalist; now illicit sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia fully expose #USHypocrisy,“ Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted in February.
And in March, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, accused unnamed regional states of developing „suspicious nuclear projects,“ which would force Tehran to revise its defense strategy. Quoted by Iranian news agencies, Shamkhani said such plans would „force us to revise our strategy.“
Whatever Saudi Arabia’s energy strategy, and however sincere its pledge that it has no wish to develop nuclear weapons, the mere existence of a nuclear program is bound to inflame tensions across the Gulf.

Friday, April 19, 2019

Trump is Helping the Saudi Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)



Is the Trump Administration Helping the Saudis Build a Bomb?
The crown prince can’t be trusted with a bone saw, let alone nuclear weapons.
By Doug Bandow • April 18, 2019
President Donald Trump went dancing with the Saudi royals in Riyadh, where he tried to sell America’s principles in exchange for a mess of weapons contracts. Since then, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has become Saudi Arabia’s lead PR counsel in America. The Pentagon is the Saudi regime’s premier armorer.
Now Energy Secretary Rick Perry is acting as chief nuclear procurer for the Saudis. “By ramming through the sale of as much as $80 billion in nuclear power plants,” The New York Times warned recently, “the Trump administration would provide sensitive knowhow and materials to a government whose de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has suggested that he may eventually want a nuclear weapon as a hedge against Iran and has shown little concern for what the rest of the world thinks.”
Obviously, Trump has not endorsed a Saudi nuclear weapon. However, his administration’s ongoing attempt to provide the Kingdom with nuclear technology raises serious questions about U.S. policy.
America’s relationship with Riyadh has long been fraught with tension, inconsistency, and hypocrisy. The faux friendship revolves around oil, the lifeblood of the Western economy. However, the fracking revolution turned the U.S. into an energy super-supplier, and other hydrocarbon sources have since emerged. And if Washington stopped routinely sanctioning other governments for not following its dictates, oil producers such as Iran, Russia, and Venezuela would be supplying international markets, further reducing Riyadh’s importance.
American officials like to promote the Saudis’ antediluvian absolute monarchy as the foundation for Middle East stability. Alas, the price is unrivaled repression. Despite the crown prince’s reputation as a social reformer, he so far has not relaxed the Kingdom’s totalitarian political or religious controls one bit.
And that brutality has not guaranteed stability. Saudi Arabia looks brittle, an artificial, antiquated governing structure held together by tyranny and bribery. In time, it will likely lose to demands for justice, equality, and democracy, which have doomed a host of other corrupt, brutal, Mideast dictatorships, most recently Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir.
Outside of the country, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has pursued a wild and reckless strategy of regional domination. Even Senator Lindsey Graham, perhaps the United States’ most war-happy lawmaker, has called MbS “crazy,” “dangerous,” and a “wrecking ball.”
The KSA has backed radical Islamists in Syria, subsidized the al-Sisi dictatorship in Egypt, kidnapped Lebanon’s prime minister, used troops to sustain Bahrain’s dictatorial Sunni monarchy, isolated Qatar, kidnapped and murdered Saudi critics in foreign nations, invaded Yemen, intensified the Mideast’s long-running sectarian conflict, and promoted General Khalifa Haftar’s attack on Libya’s internationally recognized government. MbS is even willing to court war with Iran if he believes it’s necessary for regional domination.
Moreover, the Saudi royals are not Westerners in different dress. They have poured $100 billion into the promotion of intolerant fundamentalist Wahhabism around the world, including in Yemen, where a Saudi-Emirati coalition has allied with radical jihadists against the Houthis, who had opposed al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Nuclear weapons would further embolden MbS. Currently there is no active nuclear program. Nevertheless, suspicions about Riyadh’s intentions are legion. A decade ago, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz told U.S. officials that if Iran acquired a nuke, “we will get nuclear weapons.” Last year, MbS said, “If Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
Nevertheless, the Trump administration is pushing the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. And no one seems to know what safeguards will be imposed and whether MbS will abide by those limits. “There’s a legitimate question over whether such a government could be trusted with nuclear energy and the potential weaponization of it,” worries Senator Marco Rubio. Senator Jeff Merkley agrees: “The last thing America should do is inadvertently help develop nuclear weapons for a bad actor on the world stage.” The two are pushing legislation that would give Congress the final say over any sale.
The transfer of nuclear reactors is usually not controversial, so long as it’s accompanied by a cooperation agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. Deputy Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette insists, “We won’t allow them to bypass 123 if they want to have civilian nuclear power that includes U.S. nuclear technologies.” Legislators remain wary, however, complaining that seven permits, called “Part 810 authorizations,” have been issued to firms to provide nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia without notification to Congress. “I believe the Saudis saw an opportunity with Trump and [son-in-law Jared] Kushner to conclude this rapidly on their terms, holding out the promise of major purchases,” charges Thomas Countryman, head of the Arms Control Association.
In fact, the Saudis, in contrast to the Emiratis, want to enrich uranium, which offers a principal opportunity to divert nuclear materials for military use. And Riyadh hasn’t agreed to any weapons inspections. As a result, if the Saudis come to believe they “need” a bomb—and their criteria might broaden over time—any peacetime program could automatically be turned into one for military development.
Admittedly, America’s refusal to deal might not stop Riyadh. Prince Turki al-Faisal has pointed to China, France, Pakistan, and Russia as other options, a point that’s been echoed by administration officials. Even so, Washington should not aid, even inadvertently, another nation, especially such a repressive and aggressive power, in acquiring nuclear weapons. The consequences would be grave, including to America’s nonproliferation credentials.
Prince al-Faisal also pointedly included “our friends in Pakistan” as a nuclear power option. But Islamabad could provide more than peaceful energy. Riyadh might purchase weapons directly from the cash-strapped and unstable Pakistan government—especially since the Saudis financed the Pakistani nuclear program. Doing so would cause an international furor, but for years, A.Q. Khan, father of the Pakistani bomb, has essentially operated a Nukes “R” Us open to the world. When confronted, Islamabad closed down Khan’s market, but with the right incentives it might be convinced to accept another client.
Six years ago, Israel’s former head of military intelligence, Amos Yadlin, claimed that Pakistan had already produced and set aside weapons for Riyadh. Gary Samore, who advised President Barack Obama on nonproliferation, observes, “I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan.”
The Trump administration’s fixation on Iran has malformed American policy towards the rest of the Mideast, including Saudi Arabia. The United States should not take sides in the bitter Sunni-Shia rivalry that lies beneath the Saudi-Iran conflict. It certainly shouldn’t treat Saudi Arabia as a permanent and trusted ally. The latter shares neither values nor interests with the United States, and is aggressively pursuing dangerous imperial ambitions.
Washington should drop its support for MbS’s irresponsible policies and be on guard against the Kingdom’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons. A Saudi bomb would unsettle the region, guarantee a Middle Eastern nuclear arms race, and encourage sectarian conflict. MbS can’t be trusted with a bone saw, let alone nukes.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.

Wednesday, April 10, 2019

Middle East Worries about the Saudi Arabia Nuclear Horn



Middle East Worries about Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Project
Beirut, Apr 9 (Prensa Latina) Experts from the Middle East on Tuesday expressed concern about the Saudi nuclear project that is still outside the safeguards stipulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano made public that he asked Riyadh for its commitment to join the regulations to purchase fissionable material destined for his first atomic reactor.
Amano said that Saudi Arabia could import that material in late 2019 for a plant that is being built with Argentine assistance.
According to the IAEA chief, the Saudis were called upon to put in force an agreement, by virtue of which the agency can guarantee the peaceful nature of the project.
Saudi Arabia signed a small-scale protocol in 2005 that exempts countries with minimal or no nuclear programs from inspections.
Riyadh announced plans to invest about $80 billion USD in the construction of 16 nuclear power stations in the next two decades.
The project reportedly raises concerns about the risks of a race for nuclear weapon in the Middle East.
mh/iff/oda/arc/gdc

Monday, April 8, 2019

The Growing Saudi Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)



Saudi nuclear program accelerates, raising tensions in a volatile region
On the outskirts of Riyadh, a building site is quickly being transformed into the birthplace of Saudi Arabia’s quest for nuclear power, a bid that has sparked concern in the US Congress and fury in Tehran.
New satellite imagery shows that construction on an experimental reactor is making “expeditious” progress — just three months after the Kingdom announced plans to build it, according to former director for nuclear inspections at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Robert Kelley.
Kelley estimated that the reactor could be completed in “nine months to a year.”
The Kingdom has been open about its nuclear program with the IAEA, which sent a team to Saudi Arabia last July to check on building plans. It has repeatedly pledged that the program is peaceful. But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said last year that “without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
Also raising concern among industry experts and some in Congress is the Saudi insistence that it should be allowed to produce its own nuclear fuel, rather than import it under strict conditions.
In an interview last year, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al Falih said: “It’s not natural for us to bring enriched uranium from a foreign country to fuel our reactors,” citing the country’s uranium reserves.
Vision 2030
Saudi Arabia went public with its nuclear ambitions nine years ago, but the plans have gone into overdrive as part of the Crown Prince’s “Vision 2030” — a strategy to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and diversify both the economy and its energy mix.
It already consumes about one-quarter of its own oil production, and output is likely to remain roughly stable even as demand for energy is expected to triple by 2030. So the blueprint for Vision 2030 includes solar and wind power as well as a nuclear program in an effort to source one-third of energy needs from non-oil resources.
Longer-term, Saudi Arabia envisions 17 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2040, enough to provide 15% of its power needs.
The experimental reactor under construction at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology is designed for training scientists, Kelley told CNN.
“It’s the size of a waste basket and has no strategic importance,” he said, adding that it would take 100 years to process enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon.
Next, the Saudis want to build two commercial reactors and are shopping around for contractors. There are five finalists, according to the Saudis: Westinghouse from the US, as well as companies from China, Russia, France and South Korea. Saudi Arabia has also signed agreements with the China National Nuclear Corporation for exploring uranium reserves in the Kingdom.
The IAEA sent a team to Saudi Arabia in July last year to review the development of its nuclear power infrastructure. That mission concluded that the Kingdom is “well placed to finalize its plans for construction of its first nuclear power plant” through partnerships with countries that have nuclear power industries.
In a visit to Riyadh in January, Mikhail Chudakov, IAEA Deputy Director General, confirmed Saudi Arabia had “made significant progress in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure.”
But when the Saudis want to move to the next stage — fueling the reactor at King Abdulaziz City and any commercial plants — they will have to submit to more intrusive IAEA involvement.
“They’ve been exempt for 30 years since they signed a non-proliferation treaty,” said Kelley. “Now they’re going to have to make some serious paperwork and agree to inspections,” if they want to acquire nuclear fuel.
US concerns
Skepticism in the US Congress over whether Saudi Arabia can be a trusted partner has grown since the gruesome murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul last year. That’s now manifested itself in critical scrutiny of the Saudi nuclear program — and especially whether the Trump Administration is doing enough to ensure non-proliferation.
Asked whether it was acceptable for Saudi Arabia to become a nuclear power, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was unequivocal in a TV interview on Friday.
“We will not permit that to happen. We will not permit that to happen anywhere in the world,” Pompeo told CBS. “The President understands the threat of proliferation. We will never write a $150 million check to the Saudis and hand them over the capacity to threaten Israel and the United States with nuclear weapons, never.”
A bipartisan resolution introduced in the Senate in February demanded that the use of any US nuclear power technology in Saudi Arabia must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure Saudi Arabia cannot enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel.
“The last thing America should do is inadvertently help develop nuclear weapons for a bad actor on the world stage,” said Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley, one of the resolution’s sponsors.
House Democrats in February claimed that in 2017 White House officials had pushed the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia despite warnings from National Security Council officialshttp://www.andrewtheprophet.com/. A spokesman for Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee, said the report amounted to “a ridiculous conspiracy theory.”
In heated exchanges at the Senate Armed Services committee at the end of March, US Energy Secretary Rick Perry said that if the United States did not cooperate with the Saudis, they would look to Russia or China to develop their nuclear industry.
“I can assure you that those two countries don’t give a tinker’s damn about non-proliferation,” Perry said.
“That’s why we continue to work very, very diligently to try to bring those countries that want to develop civil nuclear programs into the sphere of the United States, because we are committed to non-proliferation.”
Perry said his department had approved several applications for US companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to Saudi Arabia. However, they do not allow the transfer of nuclear material, equipment or components.
Iran claims that the Trump Administration plans to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology without sufficient safeguards. “First a dismembered journalist; now illicit sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia fully expose #USHypocrisy,” Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted in February.
And in March, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, accused unnamed regional states of developing “suspicious nuclear projects,” which would force Tehran to revise its defense strategy. Quoted by Iranian news agencies, Shamkhani said such plans would “force us to revise our strategy.”
Whatever Saudi Arabia’s energy strategy, and however sincere its pledge that it has no wish to develop nuclear weapons, the mere existence of a nuclear program is bound to inflame tensions across the Gulf.

Sunday, April 7, 2019

Acceleration of the Saudi Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)


Saudi Arabia's first nuclear reactor is located in the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology in Riyadh.Saudi nuclear program accelerates, raising tensions in a volatile region





New satellite imagery shows that construction on an experimental reactor is making „expeditious“ progress — just three months after the Kingdom announced plans to build it, according to former director for nuclear inspections at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Robert Kelley.
Kelley estimated that the reactor could be completed in „nine months to a year.“
The Kingdom has been open about its nuclear program with the IAEA, which sent a team to Saudi Arabia last July to check on building plans. It has repeatedly pledged that the program is peaceful. But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said last year that „without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.“
Also raising concern among industry experts and some in Congress is the Saudi insistence that it should be allowed to produce its own nuclear fuel, rather than import it under strict conditions.
In an interview last year, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al Falih said: „It’s not natural for us to bring enriched uranium from a foreign country to fuel our reactors,“ citing the country’s uranium reserves.

Vision 2030

Saudi Arabia went public with its nuclear ambitions nine years ago, but the plans have gone into overdrive as part of the Crown Prince’s „Vision 2030“ — a strategy to wean Saudi Arabia off its reliance on oil and diversify both the economy and its energy mix.
It already consumes about one-quarter of its own oil production, and output is likely to remain roughly stable even as demand for energy is expected to triple by 2030. So the blueprint for Vision 2030 includes solar and wind power as well as a nuclear program in an effort to source one-third of energy needs from non-oil resources.
Longer-term, Saudi Arabia envisions 17 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2040, enough to provide 15% of its power needs.
Robert Kelley, former director for nuclear inspections at the IAEA, has said that Saudi Arabia's nuclear reactor is designed for training scientists.
The experimental reactor under construction at the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology is designed for training scientists, Kelley told CNN.
„It’s the size of a waste basket and has no strategic importance,“ he said, adding that it would take 100 years to process enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon.
Next, the Saudis want to build two commercial reactors and are shopping around for contractors. There are five finalists, according to the Saudis: Westinghouse from the US, as well as companies from China, Russia, France and South Korea. Saudi Arabia has also signed agreements with the China National Nuclear Corporation for exploring uranium reserves in the Kingdom.
The IAEA sent a team to Saudi Arabia in July last year to review the development of its nuclear power infrastructure. That mission concluded that the Kingdom is „well placed to finalize its plans for construction of its first nuclear power plant“ through partnerships with countries that have nuclear power industries.
Saudi Arabia consumes around one quarter of its own yearly oil production.
In a visit to Riyadh in January, Mikhail Chudakov, IAEA Deputy Director General, confirmed Saudi Arabia had „made significant progress in the development of its nuclear power infrastructure.“
But when the Saudis want to move to the next stage — fueling the reactor at King Abdulaziz City and any commercial plants — they will have to submit to more intrusive IAEA involvement.
„They’ve been exempt for 30 years since they signed a non-proliferation treaty,“ said Kelley. „Now they’re going to have to make some serious paperwork and agree to inspections,“ if they want to acquire nuclear fuel.

US concerns

Skepticism in the US Congress over whether Saudi Arabia can be a trusted partner has grown since the gruesome murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul last year. That’s now manifested itself in critical scrutiny of the Saudi nuclear program — and especially whether the Trump Administration is doing enough to ensure non-proliferation.
Asked whether it was acceptable for Saudi Arabia to become a nuclear power, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was unequivocal in a TV interview on Friday.
„We will not permit that to happen. We will not permit that to happen anywhere in the world,“ Pompeo told CBS. „The President understands the threat of proliferation. We will never write a $150 million check to the Saudis and hand them over the capacity to threaten Israel and the United States with nuclear weapons, never.“
A bipartisan resolution introduced in the Senate in February demanded that the use of any US nuclear power technology in Saudi Arabia must be accompanied by safeguards to ensure Saudi Arabia cannot enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel.
„The last thing America should do is inadvertently help develop nuclear weapons for a bad actor on the world stage,“ said Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley, one of the resolution’s sponsors.
US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry has warned that Saudi Arabia will look to China or Russia to develop its nuclear industry if the US fails to cooperate.
House Democrats in February claimed that in 2017 White House officials had pushed the sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia despite warnings from National Security Council officials. A spokesman for Republicans on the House Intelligence Committee, said the report amounted to „a ridiculous conspiracy theory.“
In heated exchanges at the Senate Armed Services committee at the end of March, US Energy Secretary Rick Perry said that if the United States did not cooperate with the Saudis, they would look to Russia or China to develop their nuclear industry.
„I can assure you that those two countries don’t give a tinker’s damn about non-proliferation,“ Perry said.
„That’s why we continue to work very, very diligently to try to bring those countries that want to develop civil nuclear programs into the sphere of the United States, because we are committed to non-proliferation.“
Perry said his department had approved several applications for US companies to sell nuclear power technology and assistance to Saudi Arabia. However, they do not allow the transfer of nuclear material, equipment or components.
Iran claims that the Trump Administration plans to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear technology without sufficient safeguards. „First a dismembered journalist; now illicit sale of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia fully expose #USHypocrisy,“ Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted in February.
And in March, Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, accused unnamed regional states of developing „suspicious nuclear projects,“ which would force Tehran to revise its defense strategy. Quoted by Iranian news agencies, Shamkhani said such plans would „force us to revise our strategy.“
Whatever Saudi Arabia’s energy strategy, and however sincere its pledge that it has no wish to develop nuclear weapons, the mere existence of a nuclear program is bound to inflame tensions across the Gulf.

Friday, April 5, 2019

Building up the Saudi Nuclear Horn



Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear reactor nearly finished, sparking fears over safeguards
Riyadh has so far resisted international watchdog’s requests to accept a strict inspection regime
Julian Borger
Last modified on Thu 4 Apr 2019 07.54 EDT
Saudi Arabia is within months of completing its first nuclear reactor, new satellite images show, but it has yet to show any readiness to abide by safeguards that would prevent it making a bomb.
The reactor site is in the King Abdulaziz city for science and technology on the outskirts of Riyadh. The site was identified by Robert Kelley, a former director for nuclear inspections at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who said it was very small 30-kilowatt research reactor, not far from completion.
“I would guess they could have it all done, with the roof in place and the electricity turned on, within a year,” said Kelley, who worked for more than three decades in research and engineering in the US nuclear weapons complex.
The satellite photos show that a 10-metre high steel tubular vessel, which will contain the nuclear fuel, has been erected, and construction work is under way on the surrounding concrete building.
Kelley said the main practical purpose of the research reactor would be to train nuclear technicians, but it also marked the crossing of a nuclear threshold. Before inserting nuclear fuel into the reactor, Saudi Arabia would have to implement a comprehensive set of rules and procedures, including IAEA inspections, designed to ensure no fissile material was diverted for use in weapons – something it has so far avoided.
The reactor has been designed by an Argentinian state-owned company, Invap SE.
“This reactor should be operational by the end of the year roughly,” Rafael Mariano Grossi, Argentina’s envoy to the IAEA, confirmed. “It depends on a number of factors. Invap is in charge of design. They are directing all the operations. But the local engineering is being done by the Saudis.”
The emergence of the satellite images, first published by Bloomberg, comes in the midst of a struggle between the Trump White House and Congress over the sale of nuclear technology to Riyadh, after it emerged that the US department of energy had granted seven permits for the transfer of sensitive nuclear information by US businesses to the Saudi government.
The secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, and the energy secretary, Rick Perry, have both stonewalled congressional committees demanding to know what the authorisations were for, and which companies were involved.
On Tuesday, the head of the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Kristine Svinicki, and her fellow commissioners remained silent when repeatedly asked by Democratic senator Chris Van Hollen, whether the commission had been consulted on the nuclear permits.
Tempers flared last week in a confrontation between Pompeo and the Democrat-run House foreign affairs committee, when legislators demanded to know why the administration appeared to be shielding a Saudi regime responsible for wholesale human rights abuses, mass civilian deaths in Yemen and the murder and dismemberment of Washington Post columnist and dissident Jamal Khashoggi.
Brad Sherman, a California Democrat, told Pompeo: “If you cannot trust a regime with a bone saw, you should not them with nuclear weapons.”
Sherman said the issuance of the seven permits, known as Part 810 authorisations, represented an effort by Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner to bypass Congress, and spare the Saudi monarchy the need to accept a formal agreement that would put strict limits on its nuclear programme.
“It tells the country that if Jared and Donald Trump can transfer nuclear technology to the Saudis on seven occasions and not reveal the details to members of Congress with the highest national security clearance, even in special classified rooms – what are they hiding?” Sherman said in a telephone interview.
He said there was a bipartisan majority in Congress that would insist Saudi Arabia could buy US nuclear technology only if it agreed to the “gold standard”: no enrichment of uranium and no reprocessing of plutonium, and the acceptance of intrusive IAEA inspections.
But Sherman was less sure Congress could overcome a presidential veto. “The cards are stacked against us,” he said. “We would need a two-thirds vote and the country has gotten so partisan, Congress is no longer independent.”
A report in February by the House oversight committee cited evidence from whistleblowers that senior White House political appointees, had repeatedly pushed for a quick deal to sell nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia, without non-proliferation safeguards.
According to the report, the campaign was led initially by Trump’s first national security adviser, Michael Flynn, who had close ties to one of the companies pushing the scheme, IP3 International, but it was pursued after Flynn was fired, by Kushner, Perry and a Trump friend, Tom Barrack.
Saudi Arabia joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1988 but signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA only in 2005, and at the same time exempted itself from regular inspections, by signing a “small quantities protocol” (SQP), designed for countries with negligible quantities of nuclear material.
Largely because of controversy over Riyadh being shielded from scrutiny under these rules, the IAEA made the SQP more rigorous, but the Saudis resisted making changes.
“Saudi Arabia was the last country allowed to sign the old SQP. And they never agreed to adjust or rescind it,” said Laura Rockwood, a former senior official in the IAEA’s legal affairs office, now head of the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.
Thomas Countryman, who was assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation in the Obama administration, said his negotiations with Saudi officials stalled over their resistance to accepting prohibitions on enrichment or reprocessing, as well as a strict IAEA inspections protocol.
“I believe the Saudis saw an opportunity with Trump and Kushner to conclude this rapidly on their terms, holding out the promise of major purchases,” Countryman, now board chairman of the Arms Control Association, said.
He thought it unlikely the seven export permits issued by the administration would be any help to Saudi Arabia in developing nuclear weapons, but he questioned the lack of transparency involved.
“The unusual level of secrecy surrounding these approvals will only add to Congress’s suspicion of the intentions of both the administration and of Saudi Arabia,” Countryman said. “If there is a deal to be made for US reactor sales to Saudi Arabia, it can only be achieved, and supported by Congress, through transparency and not through secrecy.”
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