The prophecy is more than seeing into the future. For the prophecy sees without the element of time. For the prophecy sees things as they were, as they are, and as they always shall be.
Britain’s official National Security Advisor has warned that the risk of nuclear escalation is greater today than it was during the Cold War, particularly with respect to China.
29 Jul 2022Britain’s official National Security Advisor, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, has warned that the risk of nuclear escalation is greater today than it was during the Cold War, particularly with respect to China.Speaking to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C., the former top bureaucrat at the Ministry of Defence
China’s ‘breathtaking’ nuclear arms push a rising challenge, Stratcom chief saysChina is expanding its nuclear forces at a “breathtaking” pace, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command warned in urging for strengthened U.S. nuclear deterrence against the danger.
Jack Montgomery 29 Jul 2022 Britain’s official National Security Advisor, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, has warned that the risk of nuclear escalation is greater today than it was during the Cold War, particularly with respect to China.”likely succeeded in making tactical advances in the Donbas around the Vuhlehirska Power Plant,” adding that some Ukrainian forces have”likely withdrawn from the area.“We must acknowledge that existing nuclear states are investing in novel nuclear technologies and developing new warfighting nuclear systems, which they are integrating into their military strategies and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others,” U.Follow Us.
Speaking to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. — Blinken to speak with Russian counterpart about Brittney Griner and Paul Whelan release Jim Watson | AFP | Getty Images US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks about US policy towards China during an event hosted by the Asia Society Policy Institute at George Washington University in Washington, DC, on May 26, 2022., the former top bureaucrat at the Ministry of Defence argued that the West “face[s] a much broader range of strategic risks and pathways to escalation” than during the Cold War, not least because, during that long-simmering conflict, the Soviet Union and its satellites reached something of a “shared understanding of doctrine” which made the threat of nuclear conflict more manageable — some notable flirtations with destruction notwithstanding. “For example, we have clear concerns about China’s nuclear modernization program that will increase both the number and types of nuclear weapon systems in its arsenal. He highlighted both “Russia’s repeated violations of its treaty commitments” and, perhaps more significantly, “the pace and scale with which China is expanding its nuclear and conventional arsenals and the disdain it has shown for engaging with any arms control agreements” as particularly dangerous, saying that nuclear doctrine today “is opaque in Moscow and Beijing, let alone Pyongyang or Tehran” — referring to the capitals of North Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran.S. A report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said China is pursuing a “substantial expansion” of its nuclear arsenal, including the development of new delivery systems and the construction of hundreds of additional missile silos.
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers his speech during a ceremony to mark the 69th anniversary of the signing of the ceasefire armistice that ends the fighting in the Korean War, in Pyongyang, North Korea Wednesday, July 27, 2022. Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
“If the south Korean regime and military ruffians think about confronting us militarily and that they can neutralize or destroy some parts of our military forces preemptively by resorting to some special military means and methods, they are grossly mistaken!” the North’s state-controlled media Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) quoted Kim as saying in his speech at the 69th anniversary of the armistice for the 1950-53 Korean War.
Since he took office in May, Yoon has reiterated the importance of strengthening military ties with the United States and its allies to cope with North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. During his presidential campaign, Yoon brought up the possibility of striking North Korea preemptively when there is an explicit sign of Pyongyang launching missiles toward the South’s soil. Also, he once said that he would ask the U.S. to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea or sign a nuclear-sharing agreement. However, Washington killed this initiative right away and Yoon has not spoken about tactical nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing again.
Such remarks were interpreted as political rhetoric to garner support from South Korean conservatives as the U.S. has not supported such moves on the basis of its extended deterrence policy. Also, it is impossible for South Korea to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or develop its own indigenous nuclear programs as it is a member state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
However, Yoon’s military has been working to readopt the “three-axis” defense system, which includes preemptive strike scenarios against North Korea. Kim directly called this a “very dangerous self-destructive action.”
“Such a dangerous attempt will be punished at once by a powerful force and Yoon Suk Yeol regime and its army will be annihilated,” Kim said.
Hours after KCNA published the transcript of Kim’s speech, the South Korean Presidential Office of National Security expressed “deep regret” over Kim’s direct criticism of Yoon, saying that the government is holding a strong and effective readiness posture against any provocation from North Korea. While reiterating its stance to strengthen its self-defense under the ironclad military alliance with the United States, Seoul urged Pyongyang to return to dialogue for denuclearization and peace construction.
Washington and Seoul have not ruled out diplomatic overtures on North Korea issues. However, since then-U.S. President Donald Trump walked out of his 2019 summit with Kim in Hanoi, North Korea has been crystal clear that it will only consider returning to the negotiating table once Washington makes concessions first.
However, Kim likely views denuclearization as a suicidal move, as there is no reason to fear a Pyongyang with no nuclear weapons. Kim has never expressed interest in Yoon’s “audacious plan” but ignored it by continuing the power game.
American and South Korean negotiators urged Pyongyang to return to the table without any conditions, but the leaders of the two countries have implied that the dovish overtures could be made when North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons – which is the old school policy that has long failed to entice North Korean leaders to denuclearize the country.
Kim pointed to the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises as proof of the so-called “double standard” of the United States. He also accused the U.S. of demonizing his country to justify its “hostile” policies toward his country.
The South Korea-U.S. joint military drills, one of the “hostile” policies that North Korea has demanded Washington withdraw, are expected to be held in late August. Compared with the previous military drills for the past few years, the upcoming military drills are going to be conducted on a larger scale. Both Seoul and Washington have raised the necessity of reinvigorating the drills in a bid to respond to the unprecedented spate of the North’s missile tests this year.
Months ago, U.S. F-35 stealth fighter jets were deployed in the region and conducted drills with the South Korean military. As more and more powerful U.S. weapons are expected to be deployed for the joint military drills, even while North Korea is preparing to conduct its seventh nuclear test, the arms race on the Korean Peninsula will intensify in the coming months.Authors
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is Chief Koreas Correspondent for The Diplomat and a non-resident Research Fellow of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm Korea Center.
Off-peninsula developments are equally sobering. Russia has successfully ring-fenced its February invasion of Ukraine by threatening nuclear use against any nation that dares to cross its red lines. As a result, while Kiev receives moral, financial and arms support from Western partners, it stands alone on the battlefield.
South Korea, unlike Ukraine, has a national insurance policy: The US is treaty-bound to defend it. However, there is the question of US resolution: The credibility of that insurance is untested in the face of real-world nuclear aggression.
Some fret that – if push came to shove – Washington would be unwilling to risk losing one or more of its cities to a North Korean reprisal, leaving South Korea exposed to potential perdition.
One of the highest-profile proponents of that possibility put a stark question to Asia Times on the sidelines of a recent conference. “How can we sleep at night?” asked political heavyweight and Hyundai Heavy Chairman Chung Mong-joon.
Currently, institutes are churning out research showing that the public overwhelmingly supports the national acquisition of nuclear arms. It is increasingly a hot topic at conferences and in media.
But with the Yoon Suk-yeol administration cleaving tightly to a US that is still strongly attached to non-proliferation, there is no tangible momentum. And any South Korean leader who decided to go critical would need to first answer the multiple questions that hang over the issue.
Technically: Is South Korea capable of creating both nuclear arms and their delivery systems? And if it built a nuclear weapon, where would it test it?Intercontinental ballistic missiles at a military parade celebrating the 70th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army in Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a key – but not the only – issue prodding South Korea to follow suit. Photo: KCNA via Reuters
The case for going nuclear
That the Korean public is in favor of a domestic nuclear deterrent is clear.
The matter was in the open at this month’s Asian Leadership Conference 2022 in Seoul, with a dedicated discussion panel.
“People are talking about this now,” said panelist Robert Kelly, an American professor of political science at Pusan National University. “It is more blunt and open than ever before.”
A key reason to proceed would be to directly deter North Korea, which has defied all efforts by all parties to halt its nuclear arms programs.
“So that begs the question: ‘If North Korea does go ahead, what are we to do? More condemnation, more UNSC resolutions, more sanctions?” Lee continued. “That has not worked for two decades.”
America is strongly attached to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, or NPT, raising worries that Washington would crack down if Seoul decided to go nuclear. But other friendly power players would not be likely to sanction Seoul beyond lip service.
Moreover, Article 10 of the treaty would allow South Korea to exit the NPT in good faith.
“Acquiring nuclear weapons is not a violation of international law – only for those countries who are members of the NPT,” said Daryl Press, an associate professor at Dartmouth College. “South Korea could do it in a legal fashion by exercising its Article 10 legal rights to withdraw…there is no need to be a pariah.”
For a South Korean diplomat, explaining the necessity of the step would be “an easy day on the job,” Press suggested.
In fact, signaling an NPT withdrawal could be a legitimate step on Seoul’s response ladder, Lee proposed. “If [North Korea] conducts a seventh nuclear test, the least we can do is withdraw from the NPT,” he said. “That would put a lot of pressure on the international community to do more.”
Experts are divided regarding how much or little pressure Beijing has exerted over the years on Pyongyang to denuclearize – and how much leverage it realistically possesses. But any proposed Seoul withdrawal from the NPT – and the additional possibility that Tokyo would follow Seoul’s lead and tip over the nuclear threshold – would certainly trigger alarm bells in Beijing.
“China will strongly oppose this step,” Press said. “But the South Korean position is eminently reasonable: South Korea should hold open other options and say, ‘If there is some way the international community, perhaps led by China, [could] get North Korea to denuclearize, we would happily rejoin the NPT.’”
He added, “I would not phrase this as a threat to the Chinese, but a reach out of the hand.”
Others say that not even Beijing – a key source of fuel, food and medicine for North Korea – can reign in Pyongyang.
“North Korea has already demonstrated that they don’t give a damn about the US, the UN and China,” Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general told Asia Times. “The North Koreans will eat each other before they give up nuclear weapons.”
A key argument for Seoul’s nuking up is the possibility of the US backing down if faced with a truly locked-and-loaded North Korea.
“The core issue is that North can strike US with an ICBM and in doing so you introduce the classic dilemma: [French President Charles] De Gaulle asked [US President John] Kennedy if he would exchange New York for Paris,” Kelly said of the 1961 discussion between the two leaders. “Kennedy waffled. I think the answer is probably ‘no.’” I don’t believe the US would fight a nuke war solely for non-Americans.”
In this sense, South Korean nuclearization would not just aim a close-to-home deterrent at North Korea but could also lower risks for the US. And the nuclearization of US allies France and UK during the Cold War provides a European benchmark that could be applied to Asian allies South Korea and Japan, Kelly said – warning the US not to act in “hegemonic” fashion.
America’s public, he guessed, would be supportive. “My sense is that the issue of North Korea is so obvious it will move US public opinion, and the US foreign policy community will come around,” he said.
Policy cleavages between Seoul and Washington provide another rationale for independent nukes, according to Press. The rise of China and the “wedge” being driven “between South Korean and US priorities” is not yet “catastrophic” but is a “growing strain,” the American scholar said.
Rising fears are also hovering over not American strengths but rather its weaknesses.
In war, Washington is acutely casualty-sensitive and in recent conflicts has arguably lacked the political will to win. Moreover, US society and politics are deeply – some say dangerously – polarized. These chinks in America’s armor may be leveraged by a wily foe.
“[South] Korea needs a very stable US, but right now the US is trying to find itself or to be reborn,” Chun said. “As they do this, enemies will see an opportunity.”
Cheong Seong-chang, who directs the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute think tank, argued that the nuclearization of South Korea and/or Japan would rebalance Northeast Asia’s off-center strategic geography.
“There is tilted ground that will be more and more tilted…Russia, China and North Korea all have nuclear weapons,” he told the ALC. Conversely, among Japan, South Korea and the US, only the latter possesses a nuclear deterrent.
Chun agreed. “The US faces such a variety of challenges now,” he said. “It is only natural that Korea should have the ability to help the US in whatever situation.”
So could South Korea pull it off?President Yoon Suk-yeol gives a speech at the construction site of a nuclear power plant. Yoon is upping atomic power production, but has made any move on nuclear arms. Image: Twitter
Nuclear feasibility
There is no question about the “what” of the issue. South Korea, a highly-educated G10 economy that is home to a competitive nuclear power sector that exports reactors, could independently create atomic arms.
While Cheong did not specify kilotonnage, that would be a massive armory: World leader Russia is believed to field fewer than 6,000 nuclear warheads. The six-reactor Wolseong, in the country’s southeast, started operations in 1983.
It is not just plutonium South Korea could leverage. “Korea also has uranium enrichment technologies held by only a handful of countries in the world,” Cheong said.
In 2000, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute tested laser enrichment technology, according to a 2016 article in the Chosun Ilbo, that was reproduced by the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center. Using that, 1 kilogram of highly enriched U-235 could be produced in around four hours. The article also reported that the country already produces the kind of industrial alloys needed to encase fissile materials.
The question then is “when” – how long would the process take if the political will was mustered? Experts differ on the question.
The 2016 article estimated it would take six months to produce fissile materials and six-nine months to develop a detonation device – an overall timeline of approximately 18 months.
Others believe it could be done more quickly. In a widely quoted comment, Suh Kune-yull, a professor of nuclear engineering at the elite Seoul National University told the New York Times in 2017, “If we decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear weapons in six months…the question is whether the president has the political will.”
A more recent June 2022 commentary in the military website War on the Rocks by Lami Kim, who directs the Asian Studies Program at the US Army War College, found, “Although South Korea has advanced nuclear technologies…Seoul would still need three to five years to acquire a workable nuclear arsenal.”
It was unclear if Kim was discussing device production or a full nose-to-tail system. The latter would include the development of nuclear doctrine and leadership protocols; the creation of a dedicated command-and-control net; and the marriage of atomic devices with delivery systems.
Addressing a full-program scenario, Cheong was more optimistic. “If we pursued it at very high speed, we could have fully usable and deployable weapons within two years,” he said. “At slow speed, three years would be enough.”
In terms of delivery systems, South Korea looks to be good to go. Given that North Korea borders the country, tactical nuclear devices could be fired via tube or rocket artillery. But Seoul has ex-peninsular reach, too.
There is one hole in this otherwise impressive armory of capabilities. To be a credible deterrent, any nuclear device must be physically tested. So where could South Korea potentially conduct one?
North Korea has tested devices in underground tunnels in a remote, mountainous area. That is near-impossible for South Korea for reasons of population densities and politics.
The South has nearly double the population of its northern rival – 52 million versus the North’s 26 million – all compressed into a smaller land area – 100,210 square kilometers versus the North’s 120,540 square kilometers.
And authoritarian Pyongyang does not have to consider popular push back against its policies, while democratic Seoul must contend with street politics and NIMBYism related to defense, energy and other issues.
In recent years, there have been high-profile protests against a naval base on Jeju Island, nuclear reactors and the placement of a US anti-missile battery.
Still, Cheong hinted – tantalizingly – that the issue has been discussed.
“Where a nuclear test would be done is a very sensitive question – there are few candidate [locations] where tests are possible,” he said. “If this was tabled, the residents would protest, so I cannot disclose.”
One possibility could be a Bikini Atoll-style seafloor test off of one of the uninhabited islands that ring South Korea’s coast.
It has long been rumored – but never proven – that Imperial Japan test-detonated a nuclear device on an island off the coast of northeastern Korea in the waning days of World War II.South Korea’s Nuri space rocket blasts into the sky. The boosters sending this peaceful projectile into the heavens could feasibly be converted to an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Photo: South Korean Ministry of Science and ICT
The case against
Despite energetic discussion in specialist circles, the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is currently not on the national political agenda.
One reason – counter-intuitively – is that it has customarily been liberal Seoul governments that have pursued independent defense capabilities.
The process of moving wartime operational control (“OPCON Transfer”) of the South Korean military from Washington’s grip to Seoul’s was initiated by the leftist Roh Moo-hyun government that was in office from 2003-2008.
Subsequently, the Moon Jae-in administration (2017-2022) oversaw the lifting of US-set range caps on South Korean missiles and tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It also tabled the acquisition of an aircraft carrier, while pressing ahead with (still incomplete) OPCON transfer.
The latter program is costing the Korean taxpayer billions – and adding a nuclear capability would add to the burden.
“An indigenous nuclear program would consume and divert enormous funding from South Korea’s defense budget,” Bruce Klinger, senior fellow for Northeast Asia at US think tank The Heritage Foundation told Asia Times. “South Korea’s defense funding would be better spent augmenting conventional force requirements as stipulated in South Korea’s Defense Reform Plan 2.0 and the bilateral plan” for OPCON transfer.
Conservative administrations, such as Yoon’s, have historically been unadventurous on defense, preferring to place maximum trust in the US. Hence, Seoul is not courting Washington’s displeasure by initiating a nuclear deterrent.
“The Yoon administration, like its predecessors, has declared it will not pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons program,” Klinger said.
This ambiance is reflected in the caution some feel. “We would lose more than we gain,” a person familiar with the topic told Asia Times.
It is sensitive: The moderator of this month’s ALC discussion, Lee, noted that the topic was “…politically controversial and, perhaps, not politically correct.”
Doubly so given that movement on the issue could so alarm Washington that it could spark the risk that has stalked South Korean politics since the Donald Trump administration: A withdrawal of US troops.
“An attempt by Seoul to keep a major military capability separate from the combined and integrated command structure would be antithetical to the foundation of the bilateral alliance as well as long-standing US counter-proliferation policy,” Klinger warned.
“Such a step could lead to calls for reduction or withdrawal of US forces either due to concerns of possible independent South Korean actions or isolationist perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone.”
A further risk is likely sanctions damage – such as the heavy hit Korea Inc suffered from Chinese retaliation after Seoul established a US THAAD anti-missile system on South Korean soil in 2017.
And there is one other issue – one that lurks deep below the surface.
“Advocacy for developing an indigenous South Korean nuclear capability seems grounded more on national prestige rather than strategic considerations,” Klinger said.
Pollsters admit it. “Public attitudes on nuclear weapons do not strongly align with rationales for armament offered by some South Korean politicians and analysts,” the Chicago Council conceded.
The Council found that acquisition of home-grown nuclear muscle in the Korean public mind is not aimed exclusively at North Korea.
“Threats other than North Korea” are a “main driver of support” the Chicago Council found – with 55% of respondents saying China will be the biggest threat to South Korea in ten years.
Meanwhile, 26% of South Koreans considered national prestige as the key reason for their support for nuclear arms, higher than those who see the aim being to counter North Korea, who came in at just 23%.
These findings may reflect deep-seated public emotion.
A 1993 South Korean novel, “The Rose of Sharon is Blooming Again” – the reference is to the national flower – became a best-seller and was turned into a movie in 1995. It depicts North and South Korea joint-developing nuclear arms to take on national bete noire, Japan.
Be that as it may, Chun puts forward a final rationale for going nuclear.
“It’s a volatile world with multiple challenges and we need multiple capabilities and flexibilities,” he said. “There is so much we can prepare for.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Photo / Getty Images
China’s military plans could see nuclear-powered torpedoes capable of striking Australia within a week
23 Jul, 2022 03:44 PM
Australia’s greatest defence — distance — is under threat.
China wants to build a nuclear-powered torpedo “swarm” capable of striking targets anywhere in the Pacific within a week.
The idea’s just a proposal at this stage. But it builds upon Russia’s ‘Poseidon’ nuclear-powered torpedo designed to trigger a tsunami off any coastal city with a nuclear warhead.
The state-controlled South China Morning Post reports Beijing is thinking smaller. But in greater numbers.
Australia has defended its intention to buy or build nuclear-powered submarines against accusations of nuclear proliferating by separating its use as a power source from that of a warhead.
China is doing the same.
“Thanks to its high flexibility and low cost, this unmanned underwater vehicle equipped with the nuclear power system can be used as a conventional force like an attack nuclear submarine, rather than as a nuclear missile,” China’s Institute of Atomic Energy chief Guo Jian reportedly says.
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Like Australia, China finds the prospect of an almost unlimited reach appealing.
The institute wants to use tiny “disposable” nuclear reactors to power long-range submarine drones. This would drastically reduce the weapon’s size by eliminating the need for bulky fuel storage and making it harder to detect through a quiet, all-electric propulsion system.
Unlike Australia, China appears to be angling toward a large fleet of torpedo-sized, low-cost nuclear-powered “killer robots” that can be carried by any military vessel. Australia’s defence force aspires to a $170 billion force of 12 large, fully crewed submarines.
China’s researchers say they can deliver wolf-packs of the AI-controlled weapon within 10 years.
After 15 years of dithering over a replacement for the ageing Collins-class diesel-electric submarines, Australia’s earliest possible date for constructing nuclear replacements is in the 2040s.
Nuclear propulsion
Atomic power has been harnessed as a propulsion system since the 1960s. It drives enormous aircraft carriers. It allows submarines to stay underwater for as long as their air and food supplies hold out. It’s still powering the Voyager II space probe as it passes beyond the solar system’s edge after 45 years in space.
What’s changed is a fundamental redesign of the technology to make it more stable. And the ability for it to be miniaturised.
Guo says China will build the weapon with “mature and simple technology that is easy to use and maintain, inexpensive and suitable for mass production.”
“We need to think out of the box,” he added.
This involves removing most of the shielding around the reactor. As a result, only sensitive electronic components will be protected from radiation. The torpedo will operate on batteries for half an hour after launch. Only then will the reactor fire up to its 315C operating temperature.
The report also explains the reactor will not use expensive rare-earth minerals in its construction. Instead, it will be built with cheaper materials like graphite — which caught fire during the Chernobyl disaster and contributed to the radioactive fallout.
The result is a power pack needing just 4kg of low-grade uranium fuel. China says this will produce 1.4 megawatts of heat, of which only 6 per cent will be converted into electricity.
The allure of such a small power pack is that it can potentially drive a torpedo or underwater drone at speeds of 30 knots (56km/h). However, the Post gave conflicting reports about how long (200 or 400 hours).
It stated the torpedo would have a 10,000km range — “about the distance from Shanghai to San Francisco”. And Sydney.
Poseidon junior
Russia this month put a nuclear-powered submarine weapon into service.
Dubbed “Poseidon”, the giant torpedo was unveiled by President Vladimir Putin in 2019 as one of six “super weapons” destined to return Russia’s military to greatness.
The first crewed submarine capable of carrying the enormous device — the K-329 Belgorod — entered service earlier this month.
Unlike the Chinese proposal, Poseidon is huge. But it is reportedly capable of loitering at sea for long periods or travelling great distances before striking its target. A two-megaton nuclear warhead (some 100 times more potent than that dropped on Hiroshima) will then trigger a tsunami large enough to level a coastal city.
This puts the likes of Pearl Harbour in Hawaii and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia at risk of a surprise nuclear attack.
There’s no reason the standard-sized Chinese torpedo can’t also carry a small nuclear warhead.
But the Post reports China intends to use lurking swarms of the smart torpedo to “strike submarines as they leave a port in home waters that is difficult to reach by manned platforms.”
Its designers also reject any accusation of it being a “dirty bomb” or a nuclear weapon in disguise. Instead, the small reactor will be “ejected” to the seabed shortly before the torpedo strikes its target – with the final propulsion stage powered by the on-board battery.
This would leave the radioactive material outside any blast radius.
“Even if the hull is broken, the interior is filled with water, and the whole body falls into the wet sand on the seabed, the reactor will not have a critical accident. The safety is ensured,” argues Guo.
And the nuclear-powered submarine won’t only be a weapon, Guo says. Its high speed and endurance will enable it to inspect distant waters and track potential targets — such as nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and crewed submarines.
“When the manufacturing cost is low enough, even if the nuclear-powered device can only be used once, the overall cost will be low,” Guo says.
The war in Ukraine called into question many of the fundamental pillars of the international order. The European security system that has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has received a shattering blow. A war of aggression by a major power intent to destroy a neighboring state and annex significant territories has broken with major taboos, not to mention international law.
Apart from the obvious tragedy for the people of Ukraine, another potential casualty is the nuclear nonproliferation system which has existed since 1970. Putin’s blatant breach of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994 by Russia, the UK and US relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), has upended security guarantees in Europe.
The memorandum was an assurance of territorial integrity for Ukraine after it agreed to dismantle the large nuclear arsenal that remained on its territory after the break up of the Soviet Union. By signing the memorandum, Russia – along with the US and the UK – agreed not to threaten Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan with military force or economic coercion. This has proved to be worthless.
And there’s the danger. If we now live in a world where major powers are fully prepared to embark on a full-scale war to achieve their territorial ambitions, then the assumptions of the NPT, according to which non-nuclear states can rely on the security assurances from the major powers, may no longer be valid. Many countries may think it prudent to go nuclear to avoid Ukraine’s fate.
Anxiety in Asia
This doesn’t stop in Europe. Allies of the US in Asia are wondering the extent to which the principle of “extended deterrence” (the protection afforded by America’s nuclear umbrella) is still viable. China’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of its foreign policy aims in recent years has been a major concern for Taiwan, where many question Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” about how and to what extent the US would support the country.
China’s activities in the South China Sea, where it pursues its claims on maritime territories not accepted in international law, have also raised major concerns throughout the region. Japan and China have been at loggerheads for some years over a number of disputed territories including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Another concern is obviously North Korea’s nuclear program and its regular testing of ballistic missiles which could carry nuclear warheads and have a range which could easily threaten Japan and South Korea. If and when Pyongyang develops the capacity to hit targets in the continental US, this could well test America’s nuclear guarantee in Asia.
A nuclear South Korea?
There is increasing support within South Korea for the development of its own nuclear deterrent. A survey taken earlier this year found that 71% approved of South Korea going nuclear. This was in line with similar polls over recent years.
While the new South Korean government led by Yoon Suk-yeoul does not endorse such a policy and remains committed to the US-ROK alliance, there have been persistent voices in South Korea supporting a shift towards nuclear self-reliance.President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol gives a speech at the construction site of a nuclear power plant. Image: Twitter
There is also considerable pressure in Japan to abandon the post-war “Peace Constitution” which banned the country from maintaining anything stronger than a self-defense force – and the country recently doubled its military budget.
Japan has the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons quickly – but the experience of US atomic attacks during the second world war remains a powerful restraint.
In March 2022 the late prime minister, Shinzo Abe, called for US nuclear weapons to be based on Japanese territory, presumably to deter both China and North Korea. This – predictably enough – provoked an angry reaction from Beijing, which asked Japan to “reflect on its history.”
Fragile security
For now, the US nuclear guarantee remains credible in the eyes of its Asian partners and the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula remains stable – despite the wrangling already described. It’s a very different situation from what is happening in Ukraine. The US already has forces on the Korean peninsula and is committed to South Korea’s defense.
North Korea is much more vulnerable than the US under any nuclear war scenario. If Pyongyang ever launched a nuclear strike, it would risk rapid and complete obliteration.
An obvious way to address the extended deterrence problem would be to redeploy US nuclear forces in South Korea, similar to Abe’s suggestion for Japan.
That would considerably enhance the credibility of a US security guarantee and would complicate China’s calculations, even with respect to Taiwan – despite all the noises from Beijing about reunification.
But South Korea faces the European dilemma – which is that the more credible its own capabilities become, the less the US will feel the need to commit its resources. While South Korea’s conventional capabilities are more than a match for the North Korean army and its obsolete equipment, it has no answer to the North’s weapons of mass destruction.
So far South Korea seems to have struck a sensible balance – going nuclear could upend all of that as it may cause Washington to withdraw entirely.People at a railway station in Seoul on September 28 watch a television news broadcast showing file footage of a North Korean missile test. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
It seems that despite the flagrant violations of the security assurances by Russia and the increasing capabilities of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, the commitment to the NPT remains firm.
But this could change if the security environment in Europe and Asia continues to deteriorate and Russia and China become increasingly perceived as serious and realistic military threats.
If the reliability of the US as a security guarantor is weakened it could result in a fatal erosion of the assumptions of the NPT. This would make the pressure for indigenous nuclear arsenals – both in Asia and the Middle East – irresistible. This is something the “Great Powers” have taken pains to prevent since 1945.
BEIJING, July 21 (Xinhua) — A new research report released by Chinese academic entities says the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration has set a dangerous precedent for the illegal transfer of weapons-grade nuclear materials and thus constitutes a blatant act of nuclear proliferation.
The report, titled “A Dangerous Conspiracy: The Nuclear Proliferation Risk of the Nuclear-powered Submarines Collaboration in the Context of AUKUS”, was released Wednesday by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy. It is the first special report on AUKUS submarine collaboration published by Chinese academic entities.
The report says the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration runs counter to the spirit of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and also undermines ASEAN countries’ efforts to establish the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.
In addition, it ferments potential risks and hazards in multiple aspects, such as nuclear security and arms race in nuclear submarines, with a profound negative impact on global strategic balance and stability, says the report.
According to the report, though the AUKUS countries have been coy about the details of their nuclear-powered submarine collaboration, international arms-control experts have estimated that Australia’s eight planned nuclear submarines will need a total of 1.6 to 2 tonnes of weapons-grade HEU, which would be sufficient to build as many as 64 to 80 nuclear weapons.
“The United States and Britain are directly giving Australia tonnes of weapon-grade nuclear materials. This is without a doubt an act of nuclear proliferation,” said Zhang Yan, president of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Australia, a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openly accepted such a large quantity of weapons-grade nuclear materials. This is nothing short of “getting one foot across the nuclear threshold,” Zhang added.
After reviewing nearly 100 declassified nuclear files and related materials, the report finds that post-WWII Australian administrations were keen to develop nuclear weapons. In recent years, there have again been people in Australia arguing the case for nuclear possession, and the possibility of Australia seeking the development of nuclear weapons in the future may not be ruled out, it says.
The report urges the United States, Britain and Australia to immediately revoke their wrong decisions, stop their dangerous acts, and faithfully fulfill their international obligations in non-proliferation.
USS Connecticut File photo: VCGChina on Wednesday released a research report entitled The Nuclear Proliferation Risk of the Nuclear-powered Submarines Collaboration in the Context of AUKUS, the first report published by Chinese academic institutes to objectively analyze the serious risks of nuclear proliferation and multiple hazards caused by the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration through detailed data and case studies.
Under AUKUS, the US and the UK are anticipated to provide Australia with eight nuclear-powered submarines involving the transfer of tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials which are enough to manufacture nearly a hundred nuclear weapons, experts warned.
Jointly released by the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) and the China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy (CINIS), the report said that the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration has seriously violated the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), marking a blatant act of nuclear proliferation.
The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration obviously serves a military purpose, making it a direct violation of the Statue of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the report said.
The proposed AUKUS collaboration also has other baneful effects, including having higher nuclear security risks and fueling a potential arms race in nuclear submarines, plus weakening the existing international missile export control regime because of the transfer of Tomahawk cruise missiles, according to the report.
On the announcement of AUKUS, the three countries emphasized that the US and the UK would not only assist Australia in building nuclear-powered submarines, but also provide it with long-range precision-strike capabilities including Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Tomahawk is an offensive nuclear-capable weapon developed by the US and has been deeply marked by US militarism since its inception. The deal this time will involve the latest version of the Tomahawk, with a range of 1,700 kilometers, far exceeding the maximum limit of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), despite the US, the UK and Australia being members and major advocates of the MTCR.
The report called on the international community to take joint actions to safeguard the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.
AUKUS is a new political and military alliance jointly created by the US and a few countries following the Five Eyes Alliance and the QUAD serving the US’ “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” which aims to provoke regional confrontation and splitting-up. It is engaged in a geopolitical zero-sum game, bringing new destabilizing factors to the international and regional situation, said Zhang Yan, president of the CACDA, at a press conference for the release of the report on Wednesday.
AUKUS involves a major and highly sensitive issue, which is the transfer of weapons-grade nuclear materials, Zhang said.
Weapons-grade nuclear materials are the basis for nuclear weapons. Both the US and the British nuclear-powered submarines use weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, Li Chijiang, CACDA vice president and secretary-general, told the Global Times on Wednesday at the press conference.
According to experts’ analyses, the US and the UK will build eight nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, involving the transfer of tons of weapons-grade nuclear materials enough to manufacture nearly a hundred nuclear weapons, marking the first time since the NPT came into force that nuclear-weapon states will transfer a large amount of weapons-grade nuclear materials to a non-nuclear-weapon state, setting a bad example and creating a serious risk of nuclear proliferation, Li said.
The AUKUS collaboration will damage the global strategic balance and stability, encourage other countries to join the nuclear arms race, escalate geopolitical tensions and bring the Asia-Pacific region to a wrong path of confrontation and splitting-up, completely opposite to the common appeal for development and prosperity by countries in the region, Li said.
“It is our hope that this report will facilitate China and the international community to accurately and comprehensively understand the situation, and communicate from an academic perspective the concerns of Chinese think tanks and scholars over nuclear proliferation risks and their commitment to safeguarding world peace and stability,” said Pan Qilong, chairman of the CINIS, at the press conference.
The US, the UK and Australia should respond to the concerns of the international community, carry out international obligations of nuclear nonproliferation, and cancel the wrong decision for the collaboration on nuclear-powered submarines, said Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a routine press conference on Wednesday, commenting on the research report.
As New York City and the federal government strain to supply enough vaccines, patients face a private battle to find treatment and relief from serious symptoms.
July 18, 2022Updated 9:53 a.m. ET
Although he was covered with lesions, it took four hours of phone calls, and then five hours in a Harlem emergency room, for Gabriel Morales to be tested for the monkeypox virus earlier this month. And that was just the beginning of his wait.
He spent the next eight days alone in his apartment in what he described as excruciating pain, trying to find someone to prescribe him pain medication and a hard-to-access antiviral drug.
As time passed, the disorganization in the public health response disturbed him more and more: the city’s vaccine website glitches; a vaccine rollout that seemed designed to reach the privileged and that turned him away; an opaque process to access medicine that he believed could help, but that he couldn’t find.
When he received a $720 bill for his emergency room visit, it felt like more than incompetence. It felt like a lack of compassion.
“Iunderstand that this is new — but it is urgent,” said Mr. Morales, 27, who was eventually prescribed the antiviral drug to help with his symptoms. His test, he found out after 10 days, had never been picked up from the hospital. “It was just the worst pain I’ve experienced in my life.”
Beyond the very public shortcomings in the government’s vaccination efforts are the private struggles of the men infected with the disease who have found care hard to come by. Internal lesions in the anus, genitals and mouth can be particularly painful, and there is growing concern that they may cause debilitating scarring.
What’s also striking, she said, about this outbreak, is “how many of these patients have had difficulty getting the care they need to treat these symptoms.”
What to Know About the Monkeypox Virus
What is monkeypox? Monkeypox is a virus endemic in parts of Central and West Africa. It is similar to smallpox, but less severe. It was discovered in 1958, after outbreaks occurred in monkeys kept for research, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
What to Know About the Monkeypox Virus
What are the symptoms? Monkeypox creates a rash that starts with flat red marks that become raised and filled with pus. Infected people may also have a fever and body aches. Symptoms typically appear in six to 13 days but can take as long as three weeks after exposure to show, and can last for two to four weeks. Health officials say smallpox vaccines and other treatments can be used to control an outbreak.
Should I be worried? The likelihood of the virus being spread during sexual contact is high, but the risk of transmission in other ways is low. Most people have mild symptoms and recover within weeks, but the virus can be fatal in a small percentage of cases. Experts say that monkeypox is unlikely to create a pandemic scenario similar to that of the coronavirus.
What to Know About the Monkeypox Virus
What’s the situation in the United States?Experts say that the rapid spread of monkeypox across the country and the government’s sluggish response raise questions about the nation’s preparedness for pandemic threats. Tests will not be readily available until later this month and vaccines will be in short supply for months. Official case counts, now in the hundreds, are likely a gross underestimate.
Monkeypox, endemic in parts of Africa for decades, has been spreading globally since early May through networks of men who have sex with men, probably sparked by transmission at one or more raves in Europe, researchers believe. The disease, which mostly transmits though intimate, skin-to-skin contact, has resulted in fatalities in Africa, but no one has yet died of the disease in the United States.
In New York City, cases have nearly tripled over the past week to 461 total cases on July 15, up from 160 on July 8. While some of that increase stems from expanded testing capacity and awareness, the spread of the disease in the city is “exponential,” said Dr. Foote, and is likely to continue for a while.
The unexpected severity of symptoms is making patients’ encounters with an overburdened health care system that was not prepared for this outbreak even more difficult. Interviews with six recent and current monkeypox patients in New York City, and three in other cities across the country, suggest that the public health response has been slow and underresourced at every level, from testing to treatment to vaccination.
Another of those patients, Sebastian Kohn, 39, felt exhausted and feverish through much of the July 4 weekend and had painful, swollen lymph nodes. Then the rash started.
Mr. Kohn, who lives in the Flatbush neighborhood of Brooklyn, has private health insurance, so he went to a local urgent care to get tested while dizzy with a 103-degree fever. But he was not prescribed anything stronger than Tylenol for the pain. “The most painful thing are the anal rectal lesions,” he said. “They are just excruciating.”
Ultimately, he said, lidocaine helped, but for a week, no one prescribed it to him.
Both Mr. Morales and Mr. Kohn are sexually active gay men, as are most patients so far in the outbreak in New York and beyond. Within that group, privilege and know-how has helped some people find care faster than others.
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A lawyer who asked to be identified by his initial, M., to protect his medical privacy, said he went into full litigator mode after a sexual partner called him on June 15 to tell him he had monkeypox.
M. was able to get a first vaccine dose at Bellevue, the city’s main public hospital and a hub of its monkeypox response, by showing up and insisting. After he tested positive despite the dose, he was able to get the sought-after antiviral drug, TPOXX, which relieves symptoms but requires special approval for each patient, because one medical practice helped.
“It was still horrible but I was lucky,” he said. “I’m just worried about everybody else.”
Mr. Kohn also eventually received TPOXX, but only after an exhausting process.
The urgent care center where he had been tested told him to call the Department of Health. The Department of Health told him he had to be referred by his primary care doctor. His doctor’s office told him to speak to the health department.
Eventually, he received a call back from a sexual health clinic affiliated with NewYork-Presbyterian Hospital, which said someone at the health department had referred him. “It’s just no coordination at all,” he said. “It’s just not fair to have patients who are severely ill run in circles to organize their own care.”
Providers and local health officials are pushing the federal government to open up access to the drug.
“This is not a mild disease, for a percentage of people it is much more worse than I would have anticipated,” said Dr. Jason Zucker, an infectious disease specialist at the NewYork-Presbyterian clinic.
His clinic has given the antiviral to 26 patients so far,he said. Citywide, 70 prescriptions have been written, Dr. Foote said.
“As a city and a system, we are still really struggling to meet the demand,” she said.
Sergio Rodriguez, 39, is a queer trans man who lives on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Because he was already a patient at Callen-Lorde, a well-known sexual health clinic, he was able to quickly get an appointment to be swabbed there for lesions on July 5. But his results never came back, either.
A week after his test, he did receive a call from the Health Department — but it was a contact tracer telling him he had been exposed to someone else with the virus. Mr. Rodriguez told the tracer he was living with his immunocompromised, 76-year-old father, and that he desperately needed him vaccinated.
Finally, on July 15, the department called his father to arrange for his vaccination.
Mr. Rodriguez was frustrated with the response. “In my experience, especially as a trans Latino person in New York City, my health and my concerns are not going to be emphasized,” he said. “Things are going to go to people that have more access and that have more strings to pull and also who are of a different socioeconomic class.”
Dr. Foote said the Health Department is well aware of the difficulties people are having in accessing care. City health officials are trying to push the federal government for more vaccines and access to TPOXX and are concerned about equity in distributing it. Mayor Eric Adams recently wrote a letter to President Biden asking for more vaccines.
In recent weeks, aspects of the response have improved. Testing capacity has grown after LabCorp, a commercial lab, began offering tests. Vaccines have begun to flow into the city in greater numbers, though demand still far outstrips supply. On Friday, 9,200 vaccine appointments were booked in seven minutes, the city said.
The city has also been working to improve its vaccine rollout system, reserving some doses for distribution through community providers and developing a mass vaccination plan. And education among health care providers, though still uneven, has been growing: L.G.B.T.Q. health organizations have held webinars, and the city has issued treatment guidance to providers.
Eli,28, a Chelsea resident who works in nightlife and asked to be identified by his nickname to protect his medical privacy, was among the first in New York to test positive for monkeypox. He came down with a fever on June 22 and began noticing anal pain the next day, as did three friends he had been sexually active with on Fire Island.
The next day, he went to the Chelsea Sexual Health Clinic, where he was told by two providers that he most likely had a different sexually transmitted disease, not monkeypox.
By Sunday night, the pain had increased so much that he and his friends went to an urgent care clinic in Union Square. The doctor at first refused to test him for monkeypox, he said, but eventually agreed to submit photos of his lesions to the Department of Health.
He said the Health Department called five days later with his results, and that, after he pushed, the contact tracer gave him the cellphone number for the Department of Health’s head of bioterrorism. That connection helped him obtain shots for 26 close contacts — friends and people he works with in nightlife who he knew were at high risk.
Though his own case was relatively mild, Eli said he has found it very upsetting to watch the government flub its virus response. He has known from the beginning, he said, that it probably wasn’t going to go well.
“‘Y’all are being dumb about this,’” he recalled yelling at the Health Department tracer. “‘This is going to be bad.’”
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