The prophecy is more than seeing into the future. For the prophecy sees without the element of time. For the prophecy sees things as they were, as they are, and as they always shall be.
The tangible prospect of defeat in Ukraine has increased the likelihood of Russia using nuclear weapons in the conflict, a former British general said.
Moscow would probably use a 10-kilotonne warhead set on an Iskander missile, he said, creating a massive fireball incinerating people and buildings within 150 metres of ground zero, while causing third-degree burns within a 1.6-kilometre radius.
Kyiv’s forces recent gains, especially around the Russian-held city of Kherson, have raised the possibility of Russia facing “catastrophic success for Ukraine”, Sir Richard wrote in The Times, but if “Putin senses strategic defeat, he is likely to employ tactical nuclear weapons”.
A nuclear attack would “break an enormous taboo”, being the first use of the weapons since the US dropped two atom bombs on Japan in 1945, but it was not “inconceivable to Russians if the ends justify it in their eyes”. The Hiroshima blast stemmed from a 15-kilotonne bomb that killed 146,000 people.
The potential for a “catastrophic miscalculation” by Moscow could come as early as spring next year if its forces were being pushed out of Ukraine, said the former head of Britain’s Joint Forces Command.
The retired officer’s warning comes after concerns raised by western officials, who told The National late last month that “Russia had definitively lost the initiative” and faced with defeat had “other tools available which it could choose to employ which would escalate the situation”.
“It comes down to how threatened the Russian state feels,” Sir Richard said. “The more threatened or cornered it becomes, the more likely it will be to reach for essentially the types of tools [nuclear weapons] that you’re talking about.”
President Vladimir Putin oversees the test of a new Russian hypersonic missile system called Avangard, which can carry nuclear and conventional warheads, in Moscow. Reuters
Sir Richard wrote that Russian doctrine was to use small nuclear weapons “to impose unacceptable damage on an opponent as a means of coercion”, particularly when “the existence of the state is in question”.
To avoid the nuclear radiation from a ground detonation, it would likely be an air blast from 700 metres that fired over a town such as Kramatorsk would create a fatal radiation dose to anyone within 1km.
A warhead could also be dropped on a Ukrainian brigade of up to 5,000 personnel, causing mass casualties.
While a nuclear strike would “create great sense of peril around the world”, a smaller device would “not physically touch areas beyond the borders of Ukraine”, Sir Richard said.
“These weapons exist for just the sort of circumstances the war in Ukraine may lead to, so nobody should claim total surprise if they are used.”
Were such a devastating assault to materialise, defence alliance Nato might escalate efforts to remove Mr Putin from power.
While it was unlikely to lead to all-out nuclear Armageddon between the great powers, Sir Richard warned it could lead to countries such as India and Pakistan becoming more willing to use nuclear weapons on each other.
12:58, Thu, Aug 4, 2022 | UPDATED: 13:03, Thu, Aug 4, 2022
We use your sign-up to provide content in ways you’ve consented to and to improve our understanding of you. This may include adverts from us and 3rd parties based on our understanding. You can unsubscribe at any time.
The Kremlin warned that it could use the lethal weapons “if western countries try to test our resolve”. Russian diplomat Alexander Trofimov listed two “hypothetical scenarios” which could trigger a nuclear response. Speaking at the nuclear non-proliferation conference on Tuesday, Mr Trofimov denied that Russia has threatened to use its nuclear arsenal against Ukraine.
He said this is “utterly unfounded, detached from reality and unacceptable”.
However, he said Russia could use nuclear weapons “in response to weapons of mass destruction or a conventional weapons attack that threatened the existence of the Russian state”.
He added: “None of these two hypothetical scenarios is relevant to the situation in Ukraine”.
August 4, 2022: Sixty-four percent (64%) of voters believe that China has the capability to launch nuclear weapons that could reach the United States. A Scott Rasmussen national survey found that just 9% think they do not, and 26% are not sure.
However, the survey also found that 59% think it is likely that, if China launched such an attack, U.S. defense systems could stop those weapons. Twenty-three percent (23%) say that is not likely, and 19% are not sure.
Methodology The survey of 1,200 registered voters was conducted online by Scott Rasmussen on July 19-21, 2022. Fieldwork for the survey was conducted by RMG Research, Inc. Certain quotas were applied, and the sample was lightly weighted by geography, gender, age, race, education, internet usage, and political party to reasonably reflect the nation’s population of registered voters. Other variables were reviewed to ensure that the final sample is representative of that population.
The margin of sampling error for the full sample is +/- 2.8 percentage points.
Note: Neither Scott Rasmussen, ScottRasmussen.com, nor RMG Research, Inc. have any affiliation with Rasmussen Reports. While Scott Rasmussen founded that firm, he left nearly a decade ago and has had no involvement since that time.
Scott Rasmussen is founder and president of the Rasmussen Media Group. He is a political analyst, author, public speaker, independent public opinion pollster and columnist for Creators Syndicate. Read Scott Rasmussen’s Reports
12:58, Thu, Aug 4, 2022 | UPDATED: 13:03, Thu, Aug 4, 2022
We use your sign-up to provide content in ways you’ve consented to and to improve our understanding of you. This may include adverts from us and 3rd parties based on our understanding. You can unsubscribe at any time.
The Kremlin warned that it could use the lethal weapons “if western countries try to test our resolve”. Russian diplomat Alexander Trofimov listed two “hypothetical scenarios” which could trigger a nuclear response. Speaking at the nuclear non-proliferation conference on Tuesday, Mr Trofimov denied that Russia has threatened to use its nuclear arsenal against Ukraine.
He said this is “utterly unfounded, detached from reality and unacceptable”.
However, he said Russia could use nuclear weapons “in response to weapons of mass destruction or a conventional weapons attack that threatened the existence of the Russian state”.
He added: “None of these two hypothetical scenarios is relevant to the situation in Ukraine”.
A Russian sailor prepares for Navy Day in Kronstadt Navy base, outside St.Petersburg, Russia, … [+] COPYRIGHT 2020 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
With No U.S. Pushback, China Follows Russia, Eying New Nihilistic Weaponry
I evaluate national security threats and propose solutions.Follow
Aug 3, 2022,08:54am EDT
As the Biden Administration prepares to roll out an abruptly revised and more Russia-focused national security strategy within the next few weeks, it is no secret that the process of formulating America’s national security strategy is broken. America’s strategic challenges are multi-faceted, the formative process is bureaucratically painful, and, by the time America’s grand new national defense strategy is finally ready to be implemented, it is either overtaken by events or a whole new team is settling into the White House.
It is a corrosive exercise. As one administration after another produces National Security Strategies full of little more than watered-down, overly-broad proclamations about protecting the “American people, the homeland and the American way of life,” talented national security operators are opting out of the entire process, leaving it to folks who enjoy nothing more than long DC meetings and slapping backs during mid-meeting coffee klatches. But the failure to produce a durable, long-term national security strategy is trickling down to other components within the national security space. Rather than build to a defined strategy, the U.S. Navy and others take refuge in a “warfighter” ethos, focusing on building a grab-bag of tactics with no defined goal or end-state.
At the top, America’s leisurely path towards an underwhelming and watered-down strategic “document” does America no good. This failure to quickly generate bold, responsive and longer-term strategies leads to strategic paralysis and has real national security consequences.
The world moves quickly. Rivals quickly identify and focus in on America’s policy gaps, knowing that America’s ponderous national security processes won’t respond.
Few push back on Vladimir Putin’s strategic nihilism AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un delivers his speech during a ceremony to mark the 69th anniversary of the signing of the ceasefire armistice that ends the fighting in the Korean War, in Pyongyang, North Korea Wednesday, July 27, 2022. Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
“If the south Korean regime and military ruffians think about confronting us militarily and that they can neutralize or destroy some parts of our military forces preemptively by resorting to some special military means and methods, they are grossly mistaken!” the North’s state-controlled media Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) quoted Kim as saying in his speech at the 69th anniversary of the armistice for the 1950-53 Korean War.
Since he took office in May, Yoon has reiterated the importance of strengthening military ties with the United States and its allies to cope with North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats. During his presidential campaign, Yoon brought up the possibility of striking North Korea preemptively when there is an explicit sign of Pyongyang launching missiles toward the South’s soil. Also, he once said that he would ask the U.S. to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea or sign a nuclear-sharing agreement. However, Washington killed this initiative right away and Yoon has not spoken about tactical nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing again.
Such remarks were interpreted as political rhetoric to garner support from South Korean conservatives as the U.S. has not supported such moves on the basis of its extended deterrence policy. Also, it is impossible for South Korea to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons or develop its own indigenous nuclear programs as it is a member state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
However, Yoon’s military has been working to readopt the “three-axis” defense system, which includes preemptive strike scenarios against North Korea. Kim directly called this a “very dangerous self-destructive action.”
“Such a dangerous attempt will be punished at once by a powerful force and Yoon Suk Yeol regime and its army will be annihilated,” Kim said.
Hours after KCNA published the transcript of Kim’s speech, the South Korean Presidential Office of National Security expressed “deep regret” over Kim’s direct criticism of Yoon, saying that the government is holding a strong and effective readiness posture against any provocation from North Korea. While reiterating its stance to strengthen its self-defense under the ironclad military alliance with the United States, Seoul urged Pyongyang to return to dialogue for denuclearization and peace construction.
Washington and Seoul have not ruled out diplomatic overtures on North Korea issues. However, since then-U.S. President Donald Trump walked out of his 2019 summit with Kim in Hanoi, North Korea has been crystal clear that it will only consider returning to the negotiating table once Washington makes concessions first.
However, Kim likely views denuclearization as a suicidal move, as there is no reason to fear a Pyongyang with no nuclear weapons. Kim has never expressed interest in Yoon’s “audacious plan” but ignored it by continuing the power game.
American and South Korean negotiators urged Pyongyang to return to the table without any conditions, but the leaders of the two countries have implied that the dovish overtures could be made when North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons – which is the old school policy that has long failed to entice North Korean leaders to denuclearize the country.
Kim pointed to the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises as proof of the so-called “double standard” of the United States. He also accused the U.S. of demonizing his country to justify its “hostile” policies toward his country.
The South Korea-U.S. joint military drills, one of the “hostile” policies that North Korea has demanded Washington withdraw, are expected to be held in late August. Compared with the previous military drills for the past few years, the upcoming military drills are going to be conducted on a larger scale. Both Seoul and Washington have raised the necessity of reinvigorating the drills in a bid to respond to the unprecedented spate of the North’s missile tests this year.
Months ago, U.S. F-35 stealth fighter jets were deployed in the region and conducted drills with the South Korean military. As more and more powerful U.S. weapons are expected to be deployed for the joint military drills, even while North Korea is preparing to conduct its seventh nuclear test, the arms race on the Korean Peninsula will intensify in the coming months.Authors
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is Chief Koreas Correspondent for The Diplomat and a non-resident Research Fellow of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm Korea Center.
Off-peninsula developments are equally sobering. Russia has successfully ring-fenced its February invasion of Ukraine by threatening nuclear use against any nation that dares to cross its red lines. As a result, while Kiev receives moral, financial and arms support from Western partners, it stands alone on the battlefield.
South Korea, unlike Ukraine, has a national insurance policy: The US is treaty-bound to defend it. However, there is the question of US resolution: The credibility of that insurance is untested in the face of real-world nuclear aggression.
Some fret that – if push came to shove – Washington would be unwilling to risk losing one or more of its cities to a North Korean reprisal, leaving South Korea exposed to potential perdition.
One of the highest-profile proponents of that possibility put a stark question to Asia Times on the sidelines of a recent conference. “How can we sleep at night?” asked political heavyweight and Hyundai Heavy Chairman Chung Mong-joon.
Currently, institutes are churning out research showing that the public overwhelmingly supports the national acquisition of nuclear arms. It is increasingly a hot topic at conferences and in media.
But with the Yoon Suk-yeol administration cleaving tightly to a US that is still strongly attached to non-proliferation, there is no tangible momentum. And any South Korean leader who decided to go critical would need to first answer the multiple questions that hang over the issue.
Technically: Is South Korea capable of creating both nuclear arms and their delivery systems? And if it built a nuclear weapon, where would it test it?Intercontinental ballistic missiles at a military parade celebrating the 70th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army in Pyongyang. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is a key – but not the only – issue prodding South Korea to follow suit. Photo: KCNA via Reuters
The case for going nuclear
That the Korean public is in favor of a domestic nuclear deterrent is clear.
The matter was in the open at this month’s Asian Leadership Conference 2022 in Seoul, with a dedicated discussion panel.
“People are talking about this now,” said panelist Robert Kelly, an American professor of political science at Pusan National University. “It is more blunt and open than ever before.”
A key reason to proceed would be to directly deter North Korea, which has defied all efforts by all parties to halt its nuclear arms programs.
“So that begs the question: ‘If North Korea does go ahead, what are we to do? More condemnation, more UNSC resolutions, more sanctions?” Lee continued. “That has not worked for two decades.”
America is strongly attached to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, or NPT, raising worries that Washington would crack down if Seoul decided to go nuclear. But other friendly power players would not be likely to sanction Seoul beyond lip service.
Moreover, Article 10 of the treaty would allow South Korea to exit the NPT in good faith.
“Acquiring nuclear weapons is not a violation of international law – only for those countries who are members of the NPT,” said Daryl Press, an associate professor at Dartmouth College. “South Korea could do it in a legal fashion by exercising its Article 10 legal rights to withdraw…there is no need to be a pariah.”
For a South Korean diplomat, explaining the necessity of the step would be “an easy day on the job,” Press suggested.
In fact, signaling an NPT withdrawal could be a legitimate step on Seoul’s response ladder, Lee proposed. “If [North Korea] conducts a seventh nuclear test, the least we can do is withdraw from the NPT,” he said. “That would put a lot of pressure on the international community to do more.”
Experts are divided regarding how much or little pressure Beijing has exerted over the years on Pyongyang to denuclearize – and how much leverage it realistically possesses. But any proposed Seoul withdrawal from the NPT – and the additional possibility that Tokyo would follow Seoul’s lead and tip over the nuclear threshold – would certainly trigger alarm bells in Beijing.
“China will strongly oppose this step,” Press said. “But the South Korean position is eminently reasonable: South Korea should hold open other options and say, ‘If there is some way the international community, perhaps led by China, [could] get North Korea to denuclearize, we would happily rejoin the NPT.’”
He added, “I would not phrase this as a threat to the Chinese, but a reach out of the hand.”
Others say that not even Beijing – a key source of fuel, food and medicine for North Korea – can reign in Pyongyang.
“North Korea has already demonstrated that they don’t give a damn about the US, the UN and China,” Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean general told Asia Times. “The North Koreans will eat each other before they give up nuclear weapons.”
A key argument for Seoul’s nuking up is the possibility of the US backing down if faced with a truly locked-and-loaded North Korea.
“The core issue is that North can strike US with an ICBM and in doing so you introduce the classic dilemma: [French President Charles] De Gaulle asked [US President John] Kennedy if he would exchange New York for Paris,” Kelly said of the 1961 discussion between the two leaders. “Kennedy waffled. I think the answer is probably ‘no.’” I don’t believe the US would fight a nuke war solely for non-Americans.”
In this sense, South Korean nuclearization would not just aim a close-to-home deterrent at North Korea but could also lower risks for the US. And the nuclearization of US allies France and UK during the Cold War provides a European benchmark that could be applied to Asian allies South Korea and Japan, Kelly said – warning the US not to act in “hegemonic” fashion.
America’s public, he guessed, would be supportive. “My sense is that the issue of North Korea is so obvious it will move US public opinion, and the US foreign policy community will come around,” he said.
Policy cleavages between Seoul and Washington provide another rationale for independent nukes, according to Press. The rise of China and the “wedge” being driven “between South Korean and US priorities” is not yet “catastrophic” but is a “growing strain,” the American scholar said.
Rising fears are also hovering over not American strengths but rather its weaknesses.
In war, Washington is acutely casualty-sensitive and in recent conflicts has arguably lacked the political will to win. Moreover, US society and politics are deeply – some say dangerously – polarized. These chinks in America’s armor may be leveraged by a wily foe.
“[South] Korea needs a very stable US, but right now the US is trying to find itself or to be reborn,” Chun said. “As they do this, enemies will see an opportunity.”
Cheong Seong-chang, who directs the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute think tank, argued that the nuclearization of South Korea and/or Japan would rebalance Northeast Asia’s off-center strategic geography.
“There is tilted ground that will be more and more tilted…Russia, China and North Korea all have nuclear weapons,” he told the ALC. Conversely, among Japan, South Korea and the US, only the latter possesses a nuclear deterrent.
Chun agreed. “The US faces such a variety of challenges now,” he said. “It is only natural that Korea should have the ability to help the US in whatever situation.”
So could South Korea pull it off?President Yoon Suk-yeol gives a speech at the construction site of a nuclear power plant. Yoon is upping atomic power production, but has made any move on nuclear arms. Image: Twitter
Nuclear feasibility
There is no question about the “what” of the issue. South Korea, a highly-educated G10 economy that is home to a competitive nuclear power sector that exports reactors, could independently create atomic arms.
While Cheong did not specify kilotonnage, that would be a massive armory: World leader Russia is believed to field fewer than 6,000 nuclear warheads. The six-reactor Wolseong, in the country’s southeast, started operations in 1983.
It is not just plutonium South Korea could leverage. “Korea also has uranium enrichment technologies held by only a handful of countries in the world,” Cheong said.
In 2000, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute tested laser enrichment technology, according to a 2016 article in the Chosun Ilbo, that was reproduced by the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center. Using that, 1 kilogram of highly enriched U-235 could be produced in around four hours. The article also reported that the country already produces the kind of industrial alloys needed to encase fissile materials.
The question then is “when” – how long would the process take if the political will was mustered? Experts differ on the question.
The 2016 article estimated it would take six months to produce fissile materials and six-nine months to develop a detonation device – an overall timeline of approximately 18 months.
Others believe it could be done more quickly. In a widely quoted comment, Suh Kune-yull, a professor of nuclear engineering at the elite Seoul National University told the New York Times in 2017, “If we decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear weapons in six months…the question is whether the president has the political will.”
A more recent June 2022 commentary in the military website War on the Rocks by Lami Kim, who directs the Asian Studies Program at the US Army War College, found, “Although South Korea has advanced nuclear technologies…Seoul would still need three to five years to acquire a workable nuclear arsenal.”
It was unclear if Kim was discussing device production or a full nose-to-tail system. The latter would include the development of nuclear doctrine and leadership protocols; the creation of a dedicated command-and-control net; and the marriage of atomic devices with delivery systems.
Addressing a full-program scenario, Cheong was more optimistic. “If we pursued it at very high speed, we could have fully usable and deployable weapons within two years,” he said. “At slow speed, three years would be enough.”
In terms of delivery systems, South Korea looks to be good to go. Given that North Korea borders the country, tactical nuclear devices could be fired via tube or rocket artillery. But Seoul has ex-peninsular reach, too.
There is one hole in this otherwise impressive armory of capabilities. To be a credible deterrent, any nuclear device must be physically tested. So where could South Korea potentially conduct one?
North Korea has tested devices in underground tunnels in a remote, mountainous area. That is near-impossible for South Korea for reasons of population densities and politics.
The South has nearly double the population of its northern rival – 52 million versus the North’s 26 million – all compressed into a smaller land area – 100,210 square kilometers versus the North’s 120,540 square kilometers.
And authoritarian Pyongyang does not have to consider popular push back against its policies, while democratic Seoul must contend with street politics and NIMBYism related to defense, energy and other issues.
In recent years, there have been high-profile protests against a naval base on Jeju Island, nuclear reactors and the placement of a US anti-missile battery.
Still, Cheong hinted – tantalizingly – that the issue has been discussed.
“Where a nuclear test would be done is a very sensitive question – there are few candidate [locations] where tests are possible,” he said. “If this was tabled, the residents would protest, so I cannot disclose.”
One possibility could be a Bikini Atoll-style seafloor test off of one of the uninhabited islands that ring South Korea’s coast.
It has long been rumored – but never proven – that Imperial Japan test-detonated a nuclear device on an island off the coast of northeastern Korea in the waning days of World War II.South Korea’s Nuri space rocket blasts into the sky. The boosters sending this peaceful projectile into the heavens could feasibly be converted to an intermediate-range ballistic missile. Photo: South Korean Ministry of Science and ICT
The case against
Despite energetic discussion in specialist circles, the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent is currently not on the national political agenda.
One reason – counter-intuitively – is that it has customarily been liberal Seoul governments that have pursued independent defense capabilities.
The process of moving wartime operational control (“OPCON Transfer”) of the South Korean military from Washington’s grip to Seoul’s was initiated by the leftist Roh Moo-hyun government that was in office from 2003-2008.
Subsequently, the Moon Jae-in administration (2017-2022) oversaw the lifting of US-set range caps on South Korean missiles and tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It also tabled the acquisition of an aircraft carrier, while pressing ahead with (still incomplete) OPCON transfer.
The latter program is costing the Korean taxpayer billions – and adding a nuclear capability would add to the burden.
“An indigenous nuclear program would consume and divert enormous funding from South Korea’s defense budget,” Bruce Klinger, senior fellow for Northeast Asia at US think tank The Heritage Foundation told Asia Times. “South Korea’s defense funding would be better spent augmenting conventional force requirements as stipulated in South Korea’s Defense Reform Plan 2.0 and the bilateral plan” for OPCON transfer.
Conservative administrations, such as Yoon’s, have historically been unadventurous on defense, preferring to place maximum trust in the US. Hence, Seoul is not courting Washington’s displeasure by initiating a nuclear deterrent.
“The Yoon administration, like its predecessors, has declared it will not pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons program,” Klinger said.
This ambiance is reflected in the caution some feel. “We would lose more than we gain,” a person familiar with the topic told Asia Times.
It is sensitive: The moderator of this month’s ALC discussion, Lee, noted that the topic was “…politically controversial and, perhaps, not politically correct.”
Doubly so given that movement on the issue could so alarm Washington that it could spark the risk that has stalked South Korean politics since the Donald Trump administration: A withdrawal of US troops.
“An attempt by Seoul to keep a major military capability separate from the combined and integrated command structure would be antithetical to the foundation of the bilateral alliance as well as long-standing US counter-proliferation policy,” Klinger warned.
“Such a step could lead to calls for reduction or withdrawal of US forces either due to concerns of possible independent South Korean actions or isolationist perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone.”
A further risk is likely sanctions damage – such as the heavy hit Korea Inc suffered from Chinese retaliation after Seoul established a US THAAD anti-missile system on South Korean soil in 2017.
And there is one other issue – one that lurks deep below the surface.
“Advocacy for developing an indigenous South Korean nuclear capability seems grounded more on national prestige rather than strategic considerations,” Klinger said.
Pollsters admit it. “Public attitudes on nuclear weapons do not strongly align with rationales for armament offered by some South Korean politicians and analysts,” the Chicago Council conceded.
The Council found that acquisition of home-grown nuclear muscle in the Korean public mind is not aimed exclusively at North Korea.
“Threats other than North Korea” are a “main driver of support” the Chicago Council found – with 55% of respondents saying China will be the biggest threat to South Korea in ten years.
Meanwhile, 26% of South Koreans considered national prestige as the key reason for their support for nuclear arms, higher than those who see the aim being to counter North Korea, who came in at just 23%.
These findings may reflect deep-seated public emotion.
A 1993 South Korean novel, “The Rose of Sharon is Blooming Again” – the reference is to the national flower – became a best-seller and was turned into a movie in 1995. It depicts North and South Korea joint-developing nuclear arms to take on national bete noire, Japan.
Be that as it may, Chun puts forward a final rationale for going nuclear.
“It’s a volatile world with multiple challenges and we need multiple capabilities and flexibilities,” he said. “There is so much we can prepare for.”
CHINA has unveiled plans for fearsome nuclear drone torpedoes that would be able to fire swarms of devastating torpedoes across the entire Pacific Ocean.
Beijing scientists claim the new torpedo could be mass-produced, allowing it to be fired from virtually any warship or submarine.
China has unveiled designs for its new nuclear drone torpedoesCredit: GettyIt is similar to the Russian Poseidon uncrewed nuclear droneCredit: Twitter
However, China claims that, unlike Russia’s model, their torpedo will be easier to produce, and can be placed into a standard torpedo tube, rather than needing a custom-designed tube.
Researchers in Beijing say they have completed the design for its small, low-cost nuclear reactor which would be able to unleash a swarm of torpedoes across the Pacific Ocean in around a week.
Each torpedo would use a throwaway nuclear reactor to keep it at its cruising speed of over 30 knots (35mph) for 200 hours before dumping it on the seafloor.
Lead scientist Guo Jian from China’s Institute of Atomic Energy claimed in a paper published this month by the peer-reviewed Journal of Unmanned Undersea Systems that there is a key difference between their design and the Russian “Poseidon”.
“Thanks to its high flexibility and low cost, this unmanned underwater vehicle equipped with the nuclear power system can be used as a conventional force like an attack nuclear submarine, rather than as a nuclear missile.”
Russia’s Poseidon was touted as being capable of flattening an entire city or larger area using its two-megaton nuclear weapon – around 100 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
But Chinese researchers claim such a weapon would spark a nuclear war that would destroy the world, making it unlikely to ever be developed.
This unmanned underwater vehicle equipped with the nuclear power system can be used as a conventional force like an attack nuclear submarineGuo JianLead scientist
Instead, Guo says China’s weapon would be able to be used “in reconnaissance, tracking, attack and strategic strike”.
The low-cost reactor would produce more than 1.4 megawatts of heat from less than 8.8lbs (4kg) of low-concentration uranium fuel.
This would be enough energy to power the torpedo across the Pacific Ocean.
“When the manufacturing cost is low enough, even if the nuclear-powered device can only be used once, the overall cost will be low,” the researchers said.
“This, in turn, stimulates us to make the system simpler and smaller.”
According to the team, the rector could run for up to 400 hours while travelling some 10,000km, roughly the distance between Shanghai and San Francisco.
Putin’s massive Poseidon drone will carry a two-megaton nuclear weapon
It could be in regular operation this year
Putin said the weapon was designed so Russia could destroy enemy naval bases
If deployed underwater, it could cause a tsunami as big as 300ft
It will travel at speeds of 60-70 knots underwater in a specially built submarine
The weapon was unveiled by Vladimir Putin during his State of the Nation address on March 1, 2018
Experts have warned the damage could match Japan’s 2011 tsunami when 20,000 people died
As it travels across the ocean, the reactor would separate from the torpedo and sink to the bottom of the ocean, triggering a safety mechanism to kill the remaining chain reaction.
This, the scientists claim, would prevent any form of nuclear accident from being triggered by the torpedos.
“Even if the hull is broken, the interior is filled with water, and the whole body falls into the wet sand on the seabed, the reactor will not have a critical accident,” they added. “Safety is ensured.”
Last year, US diplomat Robert Wood claimed that China is looking at exotic nuclear delivery systems such as Russia’s Poseidon drone and Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Associated Press reported.
However, Asia Times reported that the weapon may never get beyond a prototype.
Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said that China is known for following the lead of the US and Russia and then leaving its designs unbuilt.
While a study last year by the Nautilus Institute found that the Poseidon drone may only have marginal military value despite its devastating capabilities.
The war in Ukraine called into question many of the fundamental pillars of the international order. The European security system that has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has received a shattering blow. A war of aggression by a major power intent to destroy a neighboring state and annex significant territories has broken with major taboos, not to mention international law.
Apart from the obvious tragedy for the people of Ukraine, another potential casualty is the nuclear nonproliferation system which has existed since 1970. Putin’s blatant breach of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994 by Russia, the UK and US relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), has upended security guarantees in Europe.
The memorandum was an assurance of territorial integrity for Ukraine after it agreed to dismantle the large nuclear arsenal that remained on its territory after the break up of the Soviet Union. By signing the memorandum, Russia – along with the US and the UK – agreed not to threaten Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan with military force or economic coercion. This has proved to be worthless.
And there’s the danger. If we now live in a world where major powers are fully prepared to embark on a full-scale war to achieve their territorial ambitions, then the assumptions of the NPT, according to which non-nuclear states can rely on the security assurances from the major powers, may no longer be valid. Many countries may think it prudent to go nuclear to avoid Ukraine’s fate.
Anxiety in Asia
This doesn’t stop in Europe. Allies of the US in Asia are wondering the extent to which the principle of “extended deterrence” (the protection afforded by America’s nuclear umbrella) is still viable. China’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of its foreign policy aims in recent years has been a major concern for Taiwan, where many question Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” about how and to what extent the US would support the country.
China’s activities in the South China Sea, where it pursues its claims on maritime territories not accepted in international law, have also raised major concerns throughout the region. Japan and China have been at loggerheads for some years over a number of disputed territories including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Another concern is obviously North Korea’s nuclear program and its regular testing of ballistic missiles which could carry nuclear warheads and have a range which could easily threaten Japan and South Korea. If and when Pyongyang develops the capacity to hit targets in the continental US, this could well test America’s nuclear guarantee in Asia.
A nuclear South Korea?
There is increasing support within South Korea for the development of its own nuclear deterrent. A survey taken earlier this year found that 71% approved of South Korea going nuclear. This was in line with similar polls over recent years.
While the new South Korean government led by Yoon Suk-yeoul does not endorse such a policy and remains committed to the US-ROK alliance, there have been persistent voices in South Korea supporting a shift towards nuclear self-reliance.President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol gives a speech at the construction site of a nuclear power plant. Image: Twitter
There is also considerable pressure in Japan to abandon the post-war “Peace Constitution” which banned the country from maintaining anything stronger than a self-defense force – and the country recently doubled its military budget.
Japan has the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons quickly – but the experience of US atomic attacks during the second world war remains a powerful restraint.
In March 2022 the late prime minister, Shinzo Abe, called for US nuclear weapons to be based on Japanese territory, presumably to deter both China and North Korea. This – predictably enough – provoked an angry reaction from Beijing, which asked Japan to “reflect on its history.”
Fragile security
For now, the US nuclear guarantee remains credible in the eyes of its Asian partners and the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula remains stable – despite the wrangling already described. It’s a very different situation from what is happening in Ukraine. The US already has forces on the Korean peninsula and is committed to South Korea’s defense.
North Korea is much more vulnerable than the US under any nuclear war scenario. If Pyongyang ever launched a nuclear strike, it would risk rapid and complete obliteration.
An obvious way to address the extended deterrence problem would be to redeploy US nuclear forces in South Korea, similar to Abe’s suggestion for Japan.
That would considerably enhance the credibility of a US security guarantee and would complicate China’s calculations, even with respect to Taiwan – despite all the noises from Beijing about reunification.
But South Korea faces the European dilemma – which is that the more credible its own capabilities become, the less the US will feel the need to commit its resources. While South Korea’s conventional capabilities are more than a match for the North Korean army and its obsolete equipment, it has no answer to the North’s weapons of mass destruction.
So far South Korea seems to have struck a sensible balance – going nuclear could upend all of that as it may cause Washington to withdraw entirely.People at a railway station in Seoul on September 28 watch a television news broadcast showing file footage of a North Korean missile test. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
It seems that despite the flagrant violations of the security assurances by Russia and the increasing capabilities of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, the commitment to the NPT remains firm.
But this could change if the security environment in Europe and Asia continues to deteriorate and Russia and China become increasingly perceived as serious and realistic military threats.
If the reliability of the US as a security guarantor is weakened it could result in a fatal erosion of the assumptions of the NPT. This would make the pressure for indigenous nuclear arsenals – both in Asia and the Middle East – irresistible. This is something the “Great Powers” have taken pains to prevent since 1945.
By Danyal Hussain For Daily Mail Australia 11:23 EDT 23 Jul 2022 , updated 20:27 EDT 23 Jul 2022
Chinese scientists have claimed to have developed long-range ‘disposable’ nuclear-powered torpedoes that could hit Australia in just a week.
The Communist superpower wants to use tiny ‘disposable’ nuclear reactors to propel its long-range torpedos, which would make the weapons smaller and harder to detect.
Under the plans, is proposing to gather a large fleet of low-cost ‘killer robots’ that can be carried by any military ship or submarine and placed into a standard torpedo tube.
China wants to use tiny ‘disposable’ nuclear reactors to propel its long-range torpedos, which would make the weapons smaller and harder to detect Beijing could use the weapon to ‘strike submarines as they leave a port in home waters that is difficult to reach by manned platforms’. It has been compared to Russia’s Poseidon nuclear-powered drone (pictured)
could use the weapon to ‘strike submarines as they leave a port in home waters that is difficult to reach by manned platforms’, according to the .
It would be able to drive a swarm of torpedoes across the Pacific Ocean in about a week, researchers have claimed.
Scientist completed a conceptual design for the weapons system in a paper published this month.
Scientist Guo Jian from the China Institute of Atomic Energy says China will build the weapon with ‘mature and simple technology that is easy to use and maintain, inexpensive and suitable for mass production.’
‘We need to think out of the box,’ he explained. ‘Thanks to its high flexibility and low cost, this unmanned underwater vehicle equipped with the nuclear power system can be used as a conventional force like an attack nuclear submarine, rather than as a nuclear missile.’
The scientist likened the weapon system to Vladimir Putin’s notorious Poseidon system.
Under the plans, China is proposing to gather a large fleet of low-cost ‘killer robots’ that can be carried by any military ship or submarine and placed into a standard torpedo tube British nuclear-powered attack submarine HMS Astute at HMAS Stirling Royal Australian Navy base in Perth, Western Australia, Australia, 29 October 2021. Britain is to send a fleet of nuclear submarines to the Pacific in a decisive move to thwart Chinese aggression in the region
Poseidon is a Russian nuclear weapon that is a blend of torpedo and drone.
Moscow claims it is unstoppable by current nuclear defences, and could be used to destroy coastal cities or blow up aircraft carriers and their battle groups.
The weapon is designed to trigger a tsunami off any coastal city with a nuclear warhead.
Now, Chinese researchers claim they can deliver their version of the weapon within 10 years.
They have also insisted it is not a ‘dirty bomb’ or a nuclear weapon in disguise.
The small reactor would be ‘ejected’ to the seabed shortly before the torpedo strikes its target – with an on-board battery pushing it to its target.
This would leave the radioactive material outside any blast radius.
Guo says the submarine’s high speed and endurance will also allow it to inspect distant waters and track potential targets.
Two Australian Collins class submarines (front) and the UK nuclear-powered attack submarine, HMS Astute (rear) are seen at HMAS Stirling Royal Australian Navy base in Perth The AUKUS deal was signed by the Morrison government and has the backing of Anthony Albanese (pictured)
The revelation comes as Britain prepares to send a fleet of nuclear submarines to the Pacific in a decisive move to thwart Chinese aggression in the region.
The dramatic decision could see UK subs based in Australia until 2040, operating within striking distance of .
Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the head of the Armed Forces, will agree the arrangement at a naval conference in next week. Assigning submarines to patrol the South China Sea will be Britain’s most assertive move yet against .
According to reports in Australia, Royal Navy submarines would be based at on the country’s western coast and Australian submariners would be incorporated into British crews to improve their skills.
Basing the Royal Navy boats thousands of miles from UK shores is part of the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom and United States) security alliance.
AUKUS was set up last year primarily to confront Chinese military expansionism in the Indo-Pacific.
Then defence minister Peter Dutton signed a formal agreement in November last year alongside the US and UK to allow the countries to share information on nuclear-powered vessels
Australia has become embroiled in a trade war and diplomatic stand-off with China.
The deepening of defence ties with the UK is likely to cause further outrage with the Communist regime, which is vehemently opposed to AUKUS.
The Royal Navy declined to say how many of its submarines could be relocated to Australia, as all operational details surrounding Britain’s sub-surface fleet are classified.
The ‘Pacific tilt’ was signalled last year as part of the MoD’s Integrated Review.
The review set the target for the UK to become ‘the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence in the Indo-Pacific’.
Why is Australia building nuclear-powered submarines?
Why nuclear submarines?
Nuclear submarines are powered by nuclear reactors which produce heat that creates high-pressured steam to spin turbines and power the boat’s propeller.
They can run for about 20 years before needing to refuel, meaning food supplies are the only limit on time at sea.
The boats are also very quiet, making it harder for enemies to detect them and can travel at top speed – about 40kmh – for longer than diesel-powered subs.
The first nuclear submarines were put to sea by the United States in the 1950s. They are now also in use by Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, and India.
A senior US defence official told reporters in Washington DC: ‘This will give Australia the capability for their submarines to basically deploy for a longer period, they’re quieter, they’re much more capable.
‘They will allow us to sustain and to improve deterrence across the Indo-Pacific.’
Zack Cooper, a senior fellow with the American Enterprise Institute, said nuclear submarines would hugely boost Australia’s military capability.
‘They are going to be much, much more capable in the large, expansive ocean that is Australia has to deal with,’ he told the ABC.
Will Australia have nuclear weapons?
Scott Morrison made it clear that the nuclear-power submarines will not have nuclear missiles on board.
Australia has never produced nuclear weapons and signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1973 which prevents non-nuclear states which don’t already have them from developing nuclear weapons.
Mr Morrison also said the Australia has no plans to build nuclear power stations which are widely used around the world.
‘But let me be clear, Australia is not seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or establish a civil nuclear capability,’ he said.
‘And we will continue to meet all our nuclear non-proliferation obligations.’
Are they safe?
The nuclear reactors are shielded from the rest of the submarine in a separate section to protect the crew from dangerous radiation.
The US has an excellent safety record with its nuclear-powered fleet although early Russian subs suffered a few accidents which caused 20 servicemen to die from radiation exposure between 1960 and 1985.
At the end of their 20-year lifetimes, the contaminated parts of nuclear reactors need to be disposed deep underground in special waste storage cells.
Anti-nuclear campaigners say any leaks of radioactive waste could lead to an environmental disaster.
Greens leader Adam Bandt called the submarines ‘floating Chernobyls’ in reference to the 1986 nuclear power plant explosion in the Soviet Union.
Why now?
Australia needs to replace its six ageing Collins-class submarines.
In 2016 it signed a deal with French Company Naval Group to build 12 diesel-electric attack subs – but the parties were in dispute over the amount of building that would be done in Australia.
That deal has now been torn up in favour of nuclear powered subs aided by the US and UK who will provide the technology to Australia.
The West is becoming increasingly concerned about the growing assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific region where it has made huge territorial claims in the South and East China seas, clashed with Indian troops and repeatedly flown planes over Taiwan.
Mr Morrison wants Australia to have serious defence capability to deter China from encroaching in the Pacific and long-range nuclear submarines are just the ticket.
China has vastly built up its military in the past few years and now possesses six Shang-class nuclear powered attack submarines, equipped with torpedoes and cruise missiles.
:quality(70)/cloudfront-eu-central-1.images.arcpublishing.com/thenational/MI5KEO6BFSTVAS4PUFNOEDVEQI.jpg)
:quality(70)/cloudfront-eu-central-1.images.arcpublishing.com/thenational/6VUPBYD5M3RODSL23435LZFWTY.jpg)
