Nuclear Materials Remain Vulnerable to Theft, Despite U.S.-Led Effort
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROADMARCH 29, 2016
Trucks transported highly enriched uranium in Kiev, Ukraine, in March
2012, part of an American-sponsored effort to remove from the country a
stockpile of fuel large enough for eight or more nuclear bombs. Credit
Gleb Garanich/Reuters
WASHINGTON — As President Obama gathers world leaders in Washington this week for his last Nuclear Security Summit,
tons of materials that terrorists could use to make small nuclear devices or dirty bombs remain deeply vulnerable to theft.
Still, Mr. Obama’s six-year effort to rid the world of loose nuclear
material has succeeded in pulling bomb-grade fuel out of countries from
Ukraine to Chile, and has firmly put nuclear security on the global
agenda.
But despite the progress,
several countries are balking at safeguards promoted by the United States or are building new stockpiles.
President Vladimir V. Putin of
Russia, where some of the largest stockpiles of civilian nuclear
material remain, has decided to boycott the summit meeting, which
begins Thursday night. Mr. Putin has made it clear he will not engage in
nuclear cleanup efforts dominated by the United States.
In addition,
Pakistan’s embrace of a new generation of small, tactical nuclear weapons,
which the Obama administration considers highly vulnerable to theft or
misuse, has changed the way the administration talks about Pakistani
nuclear security. While Mr. Obama declared early in his presidency that
the United States believed Pakistan’s nuclear assets were secure,
administration officials will no longer repeat that line. Instead, when
the subject comes up, they note the modest progress Pakistan has made in
training its guards and investing in sensors to detect break-ins. They
refuse to discuss secret talks to persuade the Pakistanis not to deploy
their new weapons.
At least 2,965 kilograms of civilian HEU have been removed during the
Obama administration (the total of all reductions on this chart). That
is potentially enough for 100 or more bombs
Russia has never publicly declared its civilian HEU inventories.
In recent years, Russia has diluted 5,000 kilograms of civilian HEU
under Clinton-era programs. The United States and Russia have also
diluted tens of thousands of kilograms of military HEU since 2009. The
United States retains a reserve of 20,000 kilograms of HEU for civilian
use.
Pakistan, China, India and Japan are all planning new factories to
obtain plutonium that will add to the world’s stockpiles of bomb fuel.
And Belgium, where a nuclear facility was sabotaged in 2014 and where
nuclear plant workers with inside access went off to fight for the
Islamic State militant group, has emerged as a central worry. The
country is so divided and disorganized that many fear it is vulnerable
to an attack far more sophisticated than the bombings in the Brussels
airport and subway system last week.
For the first time, the Nuclear
Security Summit will include a special session on responding to urban
terrorist attacks — and a simulation of how to handle the threat of
imminent nuclear terrorism.
“The key question for this summit,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear
expert at Harvard and a former White House science adviser, “is whether
they’ll agree on approaches to keep the improvements coming.”
The nuclear initiative has been a signature issue for Mr. Obama: It
is among the goals he campaigned on in 2008 and part of the reason he
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize barely a year into his presidency.
Benjamin J. Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser, told reporters
on Tuesday that the administration’s overall efforts had made it “harder
than ever before for terrorists and bad actors to acquire nuclear
material.”
But the administration’s budget for aiding global nuclear cleanups
has been cut by half; some officials argue that less funding is needed
with fewer nations willing to give up nuclear materials. A report Mr.
Bunn helped write noted, “The administration is now projecting lower
spending year after year for years to come, postponing or canceling a
wide range of nuclear security activities that had been included in
previous plans.”
In a recent report, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private advocacy
group in Washington that tracks nuclear weapons and materials, warned
that
many radioactive sources were “poorly secured and vulnerable to theft.”
The report called the probability of a terrorist’s detonating a dirty
bomb “much higher than that of an improvised nuclear device.”
Ingredients for so-called dirty
bombs, which use conventional explosives to spew radioactive material,
are still scattered around the globe at thousands of hospitals and other
sites that use the highly radioactive substances for industrial imaging
and medical treatments. Less than half of the countries that
attended the last nuclear summit in 2014 pledged to secure such
materials, and they in turn represent less than 15 percent of the 168
nations belonging to the International Atomic Energy Agency.And while
the administration succeeded in getting more than a dozen countries to
give up their civilian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, a main
fuel of atomic bombs, the Nuclear Threat Initiative said in another
report that some 25 nations still had such materials — enough for
thousands of nuclear weapons.
The report called highly
enriched uranium “one of the most dangerous materials on the planet,”
warning that an amount small enough to fit in a five-pound sugar bag
could be used to build a nuclear device “with the potential to kill
hundreds of thousands of people.”
Still, that does not mean Mr. Obama’s efforts have failed altogether.
He is expected to announce a major achievement soon: the removal of
roughly 40 bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium and separated
plutonium from Japan. Some of the uranium was fabricated in pieces the
size of squares of chocolate that could be easily slipped into a pocket,
a terrorist’s dream.
And Ukraine was the site of a success that, in retrospect, looks even bigger than it did four years ago.
On a bitterly cold day in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, in March 2012,
two years before Ukraine descended into crisis, a team of Americans and
Ukrainians packed the last shipment of highly enriched uranium into
railway cars, ridding the country of more than 500 pounds of nuclear
fuel. It would have been enough to build eight or more nuclear bombs,
depending on the skill and destructive ambitions of the bomb maker.
“We had vodka,” recalled Andrew J. Bieniawski, then a United States
Energy Department official central to the elimination. “It was amazing.”
Yet there are signs that what
began as a global effort to prevent terrorists from obtaining the
world’s deadliest weapons is fracturing.
In fact, there is a case to be made that even as vulnerable stockpiles have shrunk, the risk of nuclear terrorism has not.
There is evidence that groups like the Islamic State are more
interested than ever in nuclear plants, materials and personnel —
especially in Belgium, where the attacks last week killed more than 30
people.
The Belgian police discovered last year that Islamic State operatives
had taken hours of surveillance video at the home of a senior official
at a large nuclear site in Mol, Belgium. The plant in Mol, a northern
resort area, holds large stocks of highly enriched uranium.
Laura Holgate, Mr. Obama’s top adviser on nuclear terrorism, noted on
Tuesday that the United States had worked with Belgium to “reduce the
amount of nuclear material” at one key site. Asked about the Islamic
State’s interest in obtaining nuclear fuel from Belgium, she said, “We
don’t have any information that a broader plot exists.”
Ms. Holgate told reporters that this week’s meeting would address the
question: “How do you sustain the momentum to the summit after the
summit ends?”
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The results of previous summit meetings have ranged from treaty
ratifications to the establishment of more than a dozen training centers
around the globe where guards, scientists, managers and regulators
sharpen their skills at preventing atomic terrorism.
Near Beijing, one of the largest training centers opened this month.
“It’s in our national interest” to help foreigners secure their atomic
materials, said Nick Winowich, an engineer at Sandia National
Laboratories, one of the American nuclear labs that helped in the
center’s development.
The biggest wins have been the removal of all highly enriched uranium
from 12 countries, including Austria, Chile, Hungary, Libya, Mexico,
Turkey and Vietnam. The material was mostly reactor fuel. But officials
said terrorists could have turned it into least 130 nuclear weapons.
Critics of the summit process point to vague communiqués that seem to
have done little to drive hard decisions. A sense of summit fatigue now
seems to prevail, the critics add, noting that Russia’s withdrawal
evades some of the biggest security problems.
The Obama administration has also presided over a steady drop in
American spending on international nuclear security. Budgets fell from
over $800 million in 2012 to just over $500 million in 2016. For 2017,
the White House has proposed less than $400 million — half the spending
of the high point.
The administration has defended the cuts, saying they reflect the
completion of some programs and upgrades and the suspension of
cooperative work with Russia after its invasion of the Crimean
Peninsula.
“The summit process has achieved some very important objectives,”
said Kenneth N. Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global
Security, a private group that advocates new nuclear safeguards. “But it
needed to aim higher. The world is not becoming any easier to deal
with. There’s still a responsibility to think big.”