Iran Deal Is Shaping the Iraq War
12 AUG 19, 2015 11:54 AM EDT
By Noah Feldman
Iraq’s prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, is taking severe steps to rid
himself of his troublesome predecessor, Nuri al-Maliki. On the heels of
a government shakeup,
the latest
move is a parliamentary report blaming Maliki and many of his political
and military leaders for the fall of Mosul to Islamic State last
summer. The report is going to be referred to a public prosecutor —
which means Abadi may be plotting a criminal prosecution. Maliki is
fighting back, issuing a public statement repudiating the report.
Given that Maliki had more domestic support than Abadi when the U.S.,
with grudging Iranian acquiescence, forced Maliki out of office, it’s
no surprise that Abadi would like to consolidate his authority by
purging Maliki completely.
But beyond an interest in the Byzantine manipulations of Iraqi
politics, why should the rest of the world care about Abadi’s move or
Maliki’s displacement?
The answer lies in the effects of the U.S.-Iran deal, which is now
before Congress but is being treated by regional actors as a fait
accompli. Abadi’s move on Maliki reflects, through a glass darkly, the
realignment of regional politics in light of the Iran deal. Where once
Maliki was perceived as pro-Iran by Iraqi Sunnis and the U.S., today
Abadi
is pursuing a new approach in which, he is betting, U.S. and Iranian
interests will be closely aligned, and maintaining a multi-sectarian,
unified Iraq is no longer an inviolable goal. And the Iranians, having
abandoned Maliki to his fate, seem to be on board.
To see what’s going on, consider the challenge that Maliki faced, and
failed at, in dealing with Islamic State. The fall of Mosul is
emblematic. The Iraqi army, a mixed Shiite-Sunni force, collapsed
disastrously, as the parliamentary report emphasizes.
The reason for that failure was more than technical. Shiites in the
army might have been loyal to Maliki, but they didn’t relish the idea of
dying in defense of the mostly Sunni city. As for Sunnis in the army,
they’d become so disillusioned by the impression that Maliki was running
Iraq on Iran’s behalf that they were unwilling to stand and fight
against Sunni attackers from Islamic State. In the end, the failure to
defend Mosul was a failure of Maliki’s leadership, and of his plan to
keep Iraq unified under Shiite control.
To be sure, Abadi hasn’t yet done any better than Maliki in resisting
the jihadists. In May, under Abadi’s prime ministership, Ramadi fell,
just as ignominiously and easily as Mosul the previous year. But Abadi
seems to be contemplating a different way of addressing the problem than
that adopted by Maliki. His strategy appears to have two prongs, both
of them premised on growing U.S.-Iran cooperation.
First, Abadi embraces the
deployment of Iranian-trained and -led Shiite militias supported by U.S.
air strikes against Islamic State. It’s been a slow process getting
the Americans and the Iranians on the same page, given the mutual
distrust. But Abadi seems to think, with some reason, that the U.S.-Iran
nuclear deal makes cooperation more likely. In June, Abadi went to Iran
to urge Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to continue supporting the fight
against Islamic State — and he also went to the G-7 meetings in Austria
to lobby Barack Obama for more support. He’s urged the U.S. to do more
to train Iraqi army units, and welcomed the deployment of U.S. advisers,
who might even coordinate with Iranian-led forces.
It’s optimistic to think that combined U.S. and Iranian efforts would
actually defeat Islamic State in Iraq. That can’t be done without Sunni
Arab ground troops, and Abadi has no clear way to create such a force.
But Abadi, unlike Maliki, plans to avoid taking the blame if the
fight against the jihadists falters — because he is striving to show
both sides, the U.S. and Iran, that he’s trying to get them all to help
him in the war. In other words, Abadi, hedging against continuing
failure to beat Islamic State, is relying on a deepening alignment of
U.S.-Iranian interests.
Abadi has another thing Maliki lacked: a fallback strategy for what
to do if Islamic State is here to stay in the medium-term in Iraq. Abadi
is signaling to Iraqi Shiites, as well as to Iran and the U.S., that he
can govern a rump state of Iraq, one that effectively excludes the
jihadist-controlled Sunni areas and recognizes the de facto autonomy of
Iraqi Kurdistan.
Abadi’s reform efforts of the last few weeks, in which senior Sunni
politicians lost their positions, signaled as much. The position of
vice-president of which there were three — including Maliki himself —
was eliminated. The parliamentary report assigning blame for the fall of
Mosul named two more prominent Sunni politicians, Saadoun al-Dulaimi,
the acting defense minister under Maliki, and Atheel al-Nujaifi, the
former governor of the Nineveh province and brother of Osama al-Nujaifi,
one of the fired vice-presidents.
The message is that Abadi is done with Maliki’s strategy, adopted
under intense U.S. pressure, of incorporating Sunni leaders into the
central Iraqi government. This change may anger the U.S., since it’s
hard to see how else to placate Sunnis and keep them committed to
holding the country together. But it makes sense if Iraq is acknowledged
as divided already by the presence of Islamic State in the
Sunni-majority areas of the country.
In the past, an Iraqi prime minister might have worried about how the
U.S. would feel about a Shiite-dominated rump Iraq, which would be
something close to an adjunct of Iran. Abadi must be calculating that,
having made its own deal with Iran, the U.S. can live with this result
as the least-bad outcome — because it’s less threatened by Iran after
the nuclear deal.
The U.S. would like to defeat Islamic State, and we assume Iran
would, too. The big change, however, is that the U.S. may no longer be
as committed to a multi-denominational, unified Iraq as a buffer against
Iran. That’s the result of a regional change – brought about by the
nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran.