Antichrist Influencing Iraqi Politics (Revelation 13)

Fighting Over Who Heads Important Political Alliance Threatens to Split Shiite MPs

Ibrahim Saleh

At a time when the country badly needs stability, infighting about who will lead the country’s biggest political alliance is a sign of local MPs’ badly timed power games.

6.08.2015  |  Baghdad

In September 2014, senior Shiite Muslim politician Ibrahim al-Jaafari was named the leader of the Iraqi Parliament’s largest bloc of Shiite Muslim parties. The bloc is known as the National Iraqi Alliance and members include all the major political parties made up of mostly Shiite Muslim interests, such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Sadrist movement and the State of Law alliance. The country’s current Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, is a member of the Dawa party, which in turn is the cornerstone of the State of Law bloc, and therefore also of the National Iraqi Alliance, or NIA; so was the country’s last Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki.

The problem is that al-Jaafari is also Iraq’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and he must be replaced as leader of the National Iraqi Alliance.

But this has become a problem: Just because most of the Shiite Muslim-majority parties are in the NIA doesn’t mean they always agree. During the last elections, at the end of 2014, as MPS wrangled to form a government there were major divisions within the NIA. Alliance members had to try and decide on a new Prime Minister for the country and al-Maliki, of the State of Law bloc, insisted he should retain the job despite what many saw as his poor performance over the past few years. Other Alliance members insisted that he didn’t stay in the job and threatened to withdraw their support from the bloc if he did. In the end, another member of the State of Law coalition, the far more conciliatory Haider al-Abadi, was nominated Prime Minister and things settled down again.

But now the same parties within the NIA are fighting once again – only this time their argument is not about the Prime Minister-ship, but about who leads the NIA. Some analysts have suggested that leadership of the NIA is a purely symbolic position but the infighting seems to indicate that it is actually considered more important than that.

Once again it is the State of Law bloc that is in conflict with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI.

The State of Law bloc apparently considers that the removal of al-Maliki from the country’s top job has diminished its influence within the NIA. That is despite the fact that Prime Minister al-Abadi is also a member of the bloc. Currently the State of Law bloc are wanting to give the job to another of their senior members, Ali al-Adib.

Meanwhile the ISCI believes that their party’s leader, Ammar al-Hakim, should be heading the NIA. They say that the job is rightly his because the Alliance was actually created by al-Hakim’s father, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. Additionally it would only be a fair way of splitting Iraq’s top political jobs, they say – the State of Law bloc already has the prime minister’s chair, why shouldn’t the ISCI then get the leadership of the NIA?, they argue.

Al-Hakim hasn’t officially nominated himself for the job but he has said a few things that indicate that if the issue isn’t resolved to his satisfaction, certain steps would be taken. Reading between the lines of al-Hakim’s various comments, observers say that this might mean that the ISCI could withdraw from the National Iraqi Alliance, or that the Alliance could be reformed to leave the State of Law bloc out of it.

An MP affiliated with the ISCI, Salim al-Muslimawi, told NIQASH that in fact, the ISCI prefers to keep the National Iraqi Alliance united, and that stability is especially important in the face of the challenges that Iraq currently faces.

“Any suggestions the ISCI makes aim to maintain the Alliance’s unity and strengthen it,” al-Muslimawi stated. “But if a certain bloc wants to nominate a member for leadership of the Alliance but they are not necessarily qualified to lead, then the ISCI must take appropriate steps by itself.”

Al-Muslimawi also hinted that, as they did when the issue of the new Prime Minister was being debated, that the Sadrist movement would support the ISCI.

“On more than one occasion, Muqtada al-Sadr [leader of the Sadrist movement] has expressed support for [ISCI leader] al-Hakim to head the Alliance,” al-Muslimawi noted.

The State of Law coalition believes that another way of resolving the issue might be to organise an election process to choose the head of the Alliance. Several other parties within the Alliance have agreed that this may be the best way forward.

The other option might be to try and find some sort of consensus internally, within the Alliance,” suggests Abbas al-Bayati, a senior member of the State of Law bloc; al-Bayati also added that he didn’t think this issue should be a problem for the Alliance

Iraq’s New PM Will Need To Appease The Antichrist

Iraq’s new PM’s work won’t be easy

MOHAMAD BAZZI

The newly installed Iraqi prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, has inherited a country wracked by a complex civil war. Al-Abadi, a Shiite Islamist, must convince Sunnis to abandon their revolt while simultaneously responding to the threat posed by extremists of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). To keep his government in power, al-Abadi needs to assure Iraq’s Sunnis that he will be able to reverse the legacy of his divisive and sectarian predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki.

Sunni political factions have several interconnected demands: amnesty for tens of thousands of
Sunnis imprisoned— in many cases without judicial review — by al-Maliki’s regime in the name of fighting terrorism; greater power in the new government, especially by securing one of the “sovereign ministries” (defense, interior, foreign affairs, oil, and finance); and a more significant role in the Iraqi security forces, which Maliki cleansed of many senior Sunni officers. While some Shiite factions are willing to give Sunnis these demands, others are adamantly opposed.

Even if al-Abadi is eventually able to meet all Sunni demands, he will consistently face sectarian violence and rifts beyond his control. Iraq is at the center of several regional proxy battles: Iran is heavily involved in shaping Iraqi policy, while ISIL represents spillover from the Syrian civil war next door. The militant group is also a byproduct of the Gulf Arab states that support Sunni jihadists in both Syria and Iraq.

In 2010, al-Maliki ultimately secured a second term after Iran strong-armed two fellow Shiite leaders, the clerics Ammar al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr, into supporting him. The two clerics control about 63 seats in the new Parliament. To remain in power, al-Abadi will also need to appease these two clerics and several other Shiite parties largely beholden to Iran, including the League of the Righteous, a militia led by Qais al-Khazali.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has emerged as a kingmaker in the political process. Al-Sistani represents the dominant theological school in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf, which rejects the Iranian model of rule by clergy. The Najafi clerics believe their role is to be spiritual leaders and not to participate directly in politics. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, al-Sistani seized a more direct political role on several occasions, especially in 2004 when he insisted on early elections and a constitutional referendum.

But al-Sistani had never stepped into the political process as forcefully as he has since the fall of Mosul to ISIL militants in early June. Al-Sistani issued a call to arms urging all able-bodied Iraqi men to join the security forces against ISIL, and he also played a leading role in persuading Iraq’s political elite to replace al-Maliki as prime minister. Al-Sistani’s actions could shift the historic debate regarding the role of Shiite clerics. Ironically, in order to preserve the “quietist” position of the Najafi clerics, al-Sistani has become more deeply involved in politics.

Since 2003, al-Sistani has competed with more radical clerics, especially al-Sadr, for leadership over the Shiite community in Iraq. This struggle reflects a parallel battle between Iranian and Iraqi clerics for dominance over the larger Shiite realm. The rise of ISIL, which views Shiites as apostates, threatens the interests of all Iraqi Shiite factions and of the Iranian regime.

Iran is the regional player that has benefited the most from America’s gamble in Iraq. The United States ousted Tehran’s sworn enemy, Saddam Hussein, from power. Then Washington helped install a Shiite government for the first time in Iraq’s modern history. As U.S. troops became mired in fighting an insurgency and containing a civil war, Iran extended its influence over all of Iraq’s major Shiite factions.

Tehran wants to ensure that Iraq never again poses an existential threat to Iranian interests, as Saddam did when he invaded Iran in 1980, instigating the eight-year Iran-Iraq war that devastated both countries. Saddam was supported by most Arab states and Western powers. Iran will do whatever is necessary to keep a friendly, Shiite-led government in power in Baghdad.

Through a combination of funding, training for militias and political support, Iran will continue to back all the major Shiite groups in Iraq. Al-Maliki did not start out as beholden to Iran, but as he struggled to remain in power, he became more dependent on Tehran.

Even if al-Abadi personally feels closer to the West, he needs Iranian support to keep his new government in power. Iran has many levers to maintain its influence over the political process in Iraq — and it will not hesitate to use them.

Mohamad Bazzi is a journalism professor at New York University and a former Middle East bureau chief at Newsday

October/13/2014

Antichrist Will Be The Next Prime Minister of Iraq

How will Iraqis choose their next PM?

There are three “most likely” scenarios as politicians are jockeying for position, partnership while analysts try to predict outcome.

Middle East Online

By Mustafa Habib – BAGHDAD

Iraq’s next round of elections, scheduled for April 2014, will be a tough test of democracy in the country. They’ll be the first elections held in Iraq without major US presence while the country is also facing numerous challenges in political, security-related and economic areas. Looking ahead, there are around 39 major coalitions planning to run and around 244 different political entities taking part in the elections; around three dozen parties, mostly from the provinces of Anbar and Ninawa, have decided not to take part in elections because of security issues. And as one might expect, the wrangling over coalitions, partnerships and power balancing has already started behind the scenes. The ultimate goal for almost all parties competing in the elections, due to be held at the end of April, is clear though: the Prime Minister’s chair. After eight years of leadership from current prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki it is clear to most ordinary Iraqis, and therefore also to their politicians, that this is the most powerful position in the country. Over the past decade the executive branch of Iraq’s government has shown that it seems to have more power over what goes on in the country than Iraq’s parliament. And how will the next Iraqi Prime Minister be chosen? Doubtless the person will be chosen by the members of political alliances that form after the upcoming federal elections. Right now the shape of those alliances are far from clear cut. Additionally the fact that Iraq’s current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is so deeply unpopular and that his mostly Shiite Muslim political alliance has been crumbling, alongside the differences in opinion among Iraq’s Sunni Muslim politicians, means that voters will definitely see some new alliances formed. Analysts inside and outside the country are already coming up with a number of scenarios they believe may occur. Scenario One: The first involves what has become the “traditional” political scenario in Iraq with three main forces holding sway: Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and the Iraqi Kurdish. This scenario is based on the idea that the country will never be able to rid itself of sectarian and ethnic polarization that was encouraged under the regime of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and used by the US-led administration of the country after the 2003 invasion that toppled Hussein. This system – which is basically an unofficial quota system – was used to put together an interim government after 2003. The religious and ethnic background of would-be politicians in the interim leadership was based on demographics and the quota system was used to keep the peace and to maintain a balance between all the different, and often competing and conflicted, ethnic and religious factions. Although the quota system was never based in law, it has continued to be used in Iraqi politics today. What often happens is that this quota principle leads to supposedly independent institutions being hamstrung, or dead locked. The latter scenario – where the three major groups continue to run the country based on the ethnic and sectarian quota system – presupposes the Shiite Muslim alliance sticking together. That is the State of Law coalition, headed by al-Maliki, which currently runs the country, which also includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or ISCI, led by Ammar al-Hakim and the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. “Realities on the ground mean that no prime minister can be chosen without the approval of the Shiite Muslim parties,” says one senior Shiite Muslim politician Jamal Al-Wakil. “So it’s highly likely the future Prime Minister will be Shiite,” he concludes. However there are deep splits in the Shiite Muslim alliance so coming to some kind of agreement will be tough. Even more divided at the moment are the country’s Sunni Muslim politicians. In previous elections they gathered together under former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. Scenario One imagines that, when it comes to the formation of the next government, these parties will unite to back their candidate for Prime Minister. The same is expected of the Iraqi Kurdish parties in Parliament – this group is fairly stable in Baghdad despite any disagreements the constituent parties might have back home up north, in the semi-autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan. Scenario Two: In this scenario analysts envisage al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition winning a simple majority. Given al-Maliki’s unpopularity, the coalition would find it difficult to win a majority all by itself. In this case it would need to seek allies from among the smaller Shiite Muslim and Sunni Muslim parties. Al-Maliki is expected to try and cosy up to the National Reform Trend headed by former Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and the Islamic Virtue Party, or Fadhila, headed by controversial Najaf-based cleric, Mohammed Musa al-Yaqoubi. He will most likely also approach the Shiite Muslim militia, League of the Righteous. The League of the Righteous is an armed group, led by another Shiite cleric Qais al-Ghazali, a high ranking, former aide to Muqtada al-Sadr until 2004, that split from the Sadrists when they disarmed in 2007; the League did not want to disarm and over recent years the two groups have become more and more estranged. In these elections, the League of Righteous is running for political office for the first time. It also seems likely that al-Maliki will approach smaller Sunni Muslim groups like the White Iraqiya and Free Iraqiya parties, which have broken away from the main Iraqiya opposition bloc over the past few years. There have been recent occasions when these Sunni Muslim politicians have supported moves by the Shiite Muslim Prime Minister. “The coalition governments that formed over the past eight years have proved ineffective and incapable,” says Abdul-Hadi al-Hassani, a former member of the State of Law bloc. “Any new government should be formed according to a political majority.” If al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc succeeds in cobbling together a ruling coalition like this, then it is also likely that other big parties will need to be more open to negotiating with the Prime Minister. If other Shiite Muslim, Sunni Muslim or Iraqi Kurdish parties want to see members in high ministerial positions or if they want to make any political gains, then they won’t have a choice but to do this. Otherwise they will simply need to form an opposition front. Scenario Three: The third scenario focuses on the past few years’ of disintegration and disagreement inside the various political blocs and alliances and suggests that new alliances will be formed on the basis of common political objectives, rather than on ethnic or sectarian grounds. If this happens it will do away with the unofficial ethnic and sectarian quota system that Iraqi politics often labour under. And this step towards democracy is not as unlikely as it sounds. The Shiite Muslim alliance has been disintegrating and two major components of it are competing in national elections separately from their former running mate, al-Maliki. The Sunni Muslim parties are riven by antipathies and argument and have been for some time. It is only Iraq’s Kurds that will continue to stick together. Although Iraqi Kurdish parties saw the balance of power change in their own region, it is more than likely they will continue to present a united front in Baghdad, probably mainly because of Arab versus Kurdish issues such as oil revenues, the federal budget and the disputed territories. Last year’s provincial elections saw several non-sectarian political alliances formed around Iraq. One need only look at Baghdad’s local authority to see how this scenario could work out. In this area al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc won 20 seats, which made them the overall winners in the capital province. However two other major Shiite Muslim groups – the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Council – formed alliances with two Sunni Muslim blocs – the United party and Iraqiya – to form a majority under the title “Alliance For Baghdad”. As a result this non-sectarian alliance also holds the top two jobs in Baghdad’s local government. No matter which scenario does eventually play out in Iraq, there is one thing that most analysts would agree upon and that most Iraqi voters probably expect: that no matter who leads the next government, it will take some time before it can be formed. Negotiations will probably take months, as they did after the last federal elections. Another thing that is clear: whoever ends up sitting in the Prime Minister’s seat will not necessarily be the politician who got the most votes, It will be the politician who is best able to negotiate, who can persuade Shiite Muslim parties that he is competent to hold the job, convince Iraq’s Kurds that they will be given their due and that their outstanding issues will be resolved and assure Iraq’s Sunni Muslims that they will not be marginalized.