Saudis’ Parade Nuclear Bomb
While the purpose of
multilateral negotiations with Iran is to reduce proliferation concerns,
successful talks may in fact accelerate nuclear plans in the Gulf
states and Jordan.
In April 2009, King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia famously told U.S. special envoy Dennis Ross
that “if [the Iranians] get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear
weapons.” Such comments suggest that leaders in Riyadh and other
Gulf capitals will closely study any deal reached with Iran, whether on
or after the expiration of current nuclear talks next Monday. The
message out of the kingdom, delivered repeatedly and recently in
Washington by former intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal, is that
whatever Tehran gets, Gulf Arabs will want. U.S.
wishes aside, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates,
and perhaps even Jordan could make as plausible a case as Iran for
building nuclear power plants. And from their perspective, if Iran is
going to be allowed to enrich uranium and retain its nuclear-capable
missiles — as they believe likely given Washington’s reported approach
to the negotiations thus far — why shouldn’t they be permitted to
acquire similar capabilities?
THE UAE’S NUCLEAR CALCULUS
The first challenge to even limited diplomatic success with Iran
would likely come from Abu Dhabi, the lead sheikhdom of the United Arab
Emirates.
Despite having
around 10 percent of the world’s oil, the UAE also has the region’s most
advanced plans for domestic nuclear power. Its first two nuclear
facilities are under construction and due to start up in 2017 and 2018,
respectively. Abu Dhabi obtained the reactors from South Korea, but in
order to secure access to U.S. technology, material, and equipment, it
also
agreed to forgo uranium enrichment by signing a so-called “123 Agreement” at Washington’s behest.
Yet the UAE’s continued commitment to eschew enrichment is hardly
guaranteed. For one thing, the 123 Agreement itself may give Abu Dhabi
an out. The “123″ refers to the section of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act
that regulates U.S. nuclear cooperation with foreign countries.
Depending on how one reads the “Agreed Minute” attached to that section,
if Washington and its P5+1 partners (Russia, China, France, Britain,
and Germany) reach a deal with Iran, the UAE may have cause to
renegotiate its enrichment rights. Of particular note is this passage
from the Minute: “The fields of cooperation, terms and conditions
accorded…shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which
may be accorded from time to time to any other non-nuclear weapons
state in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.”
More important, if the UAE decides that pursuing enrichment — whether
alone or with its Gulf partners — is in its interest, it would not need
to ask Washington to renegotiate the 123 Agreement. Instead,
it could simply abandon U.S. nuclear cooperation altogether and obtain the technological help it needs elsewhere.
Whether it takes either route will depend on Crown Prince Muhammad bin
Zayed, the effective ruler of Abu Dhabi, whose admiration for America is
matched only by his disappointment with the Obama administration’s
policies. Already infuriated when Washington allowed the initial
euphoria of the “Arab Spring” to distract it from Iran, he is now said
to be livid at the prospect that Tehran’s quasi-nuclear status will be
confirmed by an agreement not worth, in his mind, the paper it is
written on.
UAE officials have never stated publicly that they would
pursue enrichment if Iran is permitted to do so. Yet it is uncertain
whether they are silent because they do not plan to do so or because
they do not wish to tip their hand.
SAUDI MINDSET
Saudi Arabia’s plans for
nuclear power lag behind the UAE’s but are even more ambitious — sixteen
plants are to be built over the next twenty years. Although the
kingdom has nearly a quarter of the world’s oil reserves, its rapidly
growing energy demand could drain much of its oil exports unless it
finds ways to reduce consumption. Switching to an alternative fuel
source for electricity generation and increasing energy efficiency are
the two most promising routes.
The kingdom’s ambition will stretch its capabilities, however. So far
it has only one nuclear institution up and running, the King Abdullah
City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE). Despite the
organization’s civilian-sounding name, a U.S. official noted last month
that the kingdom’s perceived nuclear intentions were not straightforward
or obvious, and that KA-CARE’s recent leadership transition could also
be cover for a policy change.
OTHER GULF PLANS
Kuwait’s tentative nuclear moves have slowed of late, but they have
not stopped. In 2009, the government formed the Kuwait National Nuclear
Energy Committee (KNNEC). In addition, economic feasibility studies and
site surveys have been conducted, and students have been sent abroad for
specialist education. Although much of the nascent program was
cancelled after the 2011 nuclear accident in Japan,
KNNEC’s
activities were transferred to the Kuwait Institute for Scientific
Research, and there are plans to set up a nuclear research and training
facility.
Qatar has investigated the viability of domestic nuclear
power as well. In 2008, it announced that it was not proceeding with any
such plans, yet two years later it raised the prospect of a regional
nuclear project. Doha has also signed a cooperation agreement with
Russia’s state-owned Rosatom nuclear corporation.
For its part, Jordan persists in talking ambitiously of nuclear power
plans. In September, it signed an agreement with a Rosatom subsidiary
aimed at reaching a final construction contract within two years. The
projected power plant would cost $10 billion, with half being paid by
Russia. Jordan also has plans to mine domestic uranium deposits and is
working with South Korea on a project to build a small research and
training reactor.
MISSILES, CENTRIFUGES, AND PAKISTAN
One of the clearest signals
of how Gulf leaders view Iran diplomacy was Saudi Arabia’s decision to
show off two of its nuclear-capable missiles at a military parade in
April. The weapons were acquired from China in the 1980s but had
hitherto never been put on display, so the timing was conspicuous. Gulf
Arabs believe that Washington’s intended nuclear deal with Tehran is
unlikely to include limits on the regime’s arsenal of long-range
missiles capable of being modified to carry a nuclear warhead. UN
Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010) called for Iran to halt work on
nuclear-capable missiles, but there is no indication it has done so.
Pakistan’s potential proliferation role remains troubling as well. Among
the dignitaries at the Saudi parade last spring was Pakistan’s military
chief Gen. Raheel Sharif (who, it should be noted, paid an official
visit to Washington earlier this week). Even if the Obama administration
hopes that an Iran deal will squash the prospect of Riyadh borrowing or
buying nuclear warheads from Pakistan, it must also consider the
distinct possibility that the Saudis will ask Islamabad for enrichment
technology. Pakistan currently operates the P-2 centrifuge, equivalent
to Iran’s IR-2m, which is causing so much concern because of its higher
efficiency compared to Iran’s more numerous IR-1.
Saudi Arabia — along with the UAE — has been associated with
Pakistan’s enrichment program since as early as the 1980s. This included
hosting controversial nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, who was placed
under house arrest ten years ago when revelations emerged about his
nuclear trading with Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Well before his
detainment and subsequent release, Khan was a frequent visitor to the
kingdom — a 1998 brochure commemorating Pakistan’s first nuclear tests
contained photos of him meeting former Saudi defense minister Prince
Sultan, as well as the late Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi, Crown Prince
Muhammad’s father and founder of the UAE. And in 1989, Sheikh Abdullah
bin Zayed — then the UAE minister of information and now foreign
minister — visited Pakistan’s enrichment plant at Kahuta outside
Islamabad.
The Obama administration appears to believe it can stop the
proliferation of nuclear technology to Gulf allies by having suppliers
insist on extremely tough inspection regimes such as that used for Iran.
Yet long-time Gulf partners are unlikely to appreciate being told that
they will be treated in the same manner as Iran, with its long track
record of violating obligations to the International Atomic Energy
Agency. Moreover, it is by no means clear that all potential suppliers
of enrichment technology — such as Pakistan — would impose such tough
restrictions on Gulf states.
In
short, if an Iran deal is reached and Gulf leaders dislike it,
preventing the proliferation of nuclear technology in the region will be
a considerable challenge.
Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Gulf and
Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen is a
senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center and a former deputy
director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Previously, they coauthored Nuclear Iran: A Glossary of Terms,
a joint publication of the Institute and the Belfer Center.
Originally Posted on November 21, 2014
