Get Ready For Nuclear War (Revelation 15)

What You Need to Know About the Future of Nuclear Weapons Under Donald Trump

Emma Sarran WebsterMAR 22, 2017 1:09PM
In late January, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the “Doomsday Clock” 30 seconds closer to midnight. The clock is symbolic, with midnight representing the end of the world; the group moves the minute and second hands based on its analysis of various threats to humanity. Now, at two and a half minutes to midnight, the Doomsday Clock’s minute hand is closer to the catastrophic hour than it’s been since 1953. The decision to move it was in part because of Trump’s recent comments on nuclear arms, as well as nuclear tests by North Korea and new ballistics missiles being built by Russia.

Right now, nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons are estimated to exist in the world (that's down from the 70,000-plus that existed in the Cold War era), with the U.S. and Russia owning approximately 93% of those. The remaining 7% is owned by six other countries: France, China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, and Israel.

Here’s what you need to know about nuclear weapons.

What are nuclear weapons and proliferation?

Nuclear weapons are explosive devices that derive their destructive force from a combination of chemical explosives and nuclear reactions. They can be fired using airplanes, submarines, or missiles launched from silos. They can destroy entire cities, wipe out millions of people, and cause long-term, devastating effects to the environment and to human health.

The first nuclear weapons were developed during World War II, and they’ve only been used in warfare twice, when the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Since then, other countries have acquired nuclear weapons, and more than 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted.

Under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the term "nuclear proliferation" refers to the spread of nuclear weapons (including weapon material, information, and technology) to states that don't already have them, while nonproliferation refers to preventing such a spread.

What is the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and why is it important?

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an international agreement covering three pillars: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The core of the NPT states that "countries with nuclear weapons will move towards disarmament; countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and all countries can access peaceful nuclear technology."

The NPT was developed in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (when the U.S. and the Soviet Union teetered on the brink of nuclear war following the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba) and has been in effect since 1970. There are 190 countries that are signatories to the NPT, including five nuclear states: the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and China. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 but withdrew in 2003. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never signed the agreement.

“This treaty is just a piece of paper, but it has done a great deal in terms of limiting the creation of new nuclear capable states and fostering international cooperation,” Angelica Gheen, a radiation-health physicist at a large research university, tells Teen Vogue. Along with nonproliferation, "this has led to an environment of global cooperation on nuclear security...and it allowed for [South Africa] to successfully disarm with international resources," a process that took place from 1989 to 1991, culminating in South Africa joining the NPT in '91.

Some believe that nuclear proliferation can actually prevent war, with the dangerous weapons acting as deterrents to countries considering attacks. However, some studies state otherwise. Research has also shown that the closer a country is to acquiring nuclear weapons, the more likely it is to be attacked.

What are the main concerns with nuclear weapons?

Despite treaties and presumptions of deterrence, the fear that nuclear weapons could end up in the wrong hands or that existing nuclear states could choose to attack is real. “Terrorists are working every day to try to get their hands on weapons-grade materials that they could use in a bomb,” John Tierney, executive director at the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization "dedicated to enhancing peace and security" through policy analysis and research, tells Teen Vogue.

There are also concerns associated with nuclear states that aren't bound by the NPT, like North Korea, which has conducted several nuclear weapons tests over the years, as well as India and Pakistan, which have both conducted nuclear tests and are pursuing new nuclear delivery systems.

Though Syria and Iran don’t currently have nuclear weapons, both are believed to have taken steps toward proliferation, in violation of the treaty’s terms. (The 2015 Iran nuclear deal among Iran, the U.S., and five other countries was developed to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.) And then there are China and Russia. A Chinese state-run newspaper, Global Times, recently called for an increase in nuclear capabilities, and U.S. officials believe that China — North Korea’s only major ally — has supplied nuclear technology and materials to other countries. Russia has also caused concern recently: In 2014, U.S. officials said Russia violated the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by testing a ground-launched cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The treaty bans missiles capable of traveling between 310 miles and 3,400 miles, and experts believed the weapon Russia tested had that capability. And in December 2016, Russian president Vladimir Putin said the country needed to "strengthen the military potential of strategic nuclear forces."

And though in 2010 the U.S. and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to further limit nuclear arsenals (requiring each state to limit its number of deployed warheads to 1,550 by February 5, 2018), both countries (as well as China) are undergoing modernization of their nuclear arsenals. But if the goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons, what’s the point of updating them? From the looks of it, some people believe Russia’s modernization is a sign that they're working on a new bomb and that America’s modernization is in response to that. Then again, the Center for Arms Control states that the U.S. modernization plans are based on maintaining the amount of nuclear weapons (as deterrents) agreed upon under the New START Treaty — and those goals may be necessary, considering some systems still currently exist on floppy disks. “I don’t think anybody would have an objection [to modernization] as long as [the weapons are] serving the purpose of deterrent, and if we’re committed to eventually reducing the numbers and eliminating them, you want them to be safe and secure,” Tierney says. “But if people are using this modernization process as a guise to proliferate [and] to create more dangerous and risky weapons, then that just escalates the risk of a nuclear mistake or a nuclear incident.”

What is the risk of a nuclear mistake or incident?

Which brings us to another important point: Aside from acts of aggression, there’s the very real concern about simple mistakes that could have catastrophic effects. Between 1950 and 2013, there were 32 nuclear weapon accidents, or “broken arrows,” in which weapons were accidentally launched, fired, detonated, stolen, or lost; six lost weapons were never found. Fortunately, those accidents haven’t resulted in a nuclear explosion, but there have been close calls. In 1980, a missile technician dropped a socket from a socket wrench, which fell 70 feet and pierced the side of the underground Titan II missile, causing it to explode, killing one person. But had the incident caused the missile’s nuclear warhead to detonate, it would have wiped out all of Arkansas.

And then there are the close calls that come with making the decision to detonate a nuclear weapon. In 1983, the Soviet Union’s missile-detection systems mistakenly detected an incoming strike from the U.S. that was triggered by the sun’s reflection off of cloud tops. Instead of registering the supposed nuclear attack, the Soviet duty officer, Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, acted on a gut feeling and instead registered it as a false alarm, avoiding a nuclear disaster. There have been other close calls with similar outcomes: narrowly avoided catastrophes based on human decisions.

And making that decision is something that has to be done in an incredibly short time frame, given that if a nuclear weapon is on its way, it’s only a matter of minutes before it hits. Thus, the U.S. has weapons that are on “hair-trigger alert,” which enables them to be launched within minutes, but it also means an increased likelihood of accidental launches or launches in response to false alarms.

When an alert happens, the military chain of command has less than 30 minutes to go through the process of assessing the threat, communicating with the president, and launching a retaliation if the president gives the go-ahead. “One of the reasons why these weapons are so dangerous is that unlike sending people to war and having a little bit of process and hopefully a congressional debate, and then a vote about whether or not to go into war, this is a decision that one person is making and in such a short time frame,” Tierney says.

Why is there concern surrounding Donald Trump and nuclear weaponry?

The U.S. has a “first strike” nuclear weapon policy, meaning America can activate weapons against another country without being attacked first. And President Donald Trump has the final say. Though national security advisors can brief him, it’s ultimately up to the president whether or not to attack, a point that came up during the presidential campaign when Hillary Clinton called out Trump's impulsivity and how it could affect his decisions with the nuclear codes.

And though Trump said that receiving the nuclear codes was “sobering,” his various statements on the topic are cause for concern. Just one month before his inauguration, Trump tweeted that the U.S. should “greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability,” a statement in direct contrast with Obama’s stated policy of nonproliferation. When asked about the tweet, Trump told MSNBC in a statement, “Let it be an arms race.” He seemingly reinforced those views just a few weeks ago, telling Reuters that the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be at the “top of the pack.”

“When Donald Trump tweets casually about the U.S.’s need to ‘strengthen and expand its nuclear capability,’ it drastically undermines all of these efforts and years of work to denormalize the escalation of nuclear weapon proliferation,” Gheen says. She notes that the NPT was already weakened by the loss of North Korea, and if the U.S., one of the two remaining major nuclear powers in the agreement, were to ever withdraw, the NPT would likely be dissolved.

On the campaign trail, Trump vowed to do away with the Iran nuclear deal, though his more recent lack of comments on the deal give the impression that he may keep the agreement intact. Even if he does try to renegotiate or withdraw from the deal — which, Tierney says, has already been a success — he’ll likely face pushback from U.S. officials and other countries that support it. “The fact of the matter is … [the deal] has worked,” Tierney says. “It’s done what it was intended to do: It’s put us in a much less risky situation, and the other [nations] that were partners in negotiating this...they want it to stay.”

Not long after that tweet, Trump took to Twitter again, in response to North Korea’s recent missile test, dismissing the country’s claims that it is developing a weapon capable of hitting the U.S. Some experts, however, believe it’s only a matter of time before North Korea develops such a weapon. “With an unpredictable Kim Jong Un [North Korea’s leader]...it is time for a very delicate diplomacy,” Gheen says. “With Donald Trump tweeting without thought for consequence, you have a scenario with two prideful, impulsive, nuclear-armed leaders. Add China into the mix, which is pretty much DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]’s only ally and [a nation that] has nuclear capabilities, and [there’s] a growing anxiety over Donald Trump.”

Part of that also has to do with Trump’s hiring — and firing — decisions. The president nominated former Texas governor Rick Perry to lead the Department of Energy (DOE), which oversees the country’s nuclear programs. But unlike his predecessors, like MIT nuclear physicist Ernest Moniz, Perry — who once advocated for abolishing the DOE — has minimal education or experience in the field. During his confirmation hearings, Perry gave vague responses to questions about the U.S. nuclear warheads program, and it turns out he may not have been clear on what his role would be when he accepted the offer. Tierney noted that between Trump and Perry, “there’s concern that there’s a lack of technical knowledge [and] a lack of appreciation for the complexity and for the risk involved.”

And those concerns are heightened when you consider the fact that aside from his one-off tweets and eyebrow-raising statements, Trump hasn’t really shared a clear vision for the future of nuclear arms. “Effective nuclear and radiological emergency response, detection, and prevention requires a well-coordinated national effort,” Gheen says. “A unified national message is essential to maintain funding and efficacy of these programs.... The Trump transition team [showed] little interest in making the continuation of these programs a priority.”

What’s next?

Clearly, the issue of nuclear weaponry and proliferation is a sensitive and dangerous one. To maintain safety and avoid large-scale destruction, Tierney believes Trump needs to continue President Obama’s efforts in nonproliferation, and that he and Perry need to hire experts in the DOE and the administration who have significant knowledge and understanding of nuclear weapons necessary to advise the president and the secretary of energy.

As for the weapons themselves, Tierney and others believe the U.S. needs to take weapons off high alert and work with Russia to do the same. “No matter who’s the president, it’s almost too huge a task to expect anybody to encumber and have 100% accuracy all the time,” Tierney says. “If you’ve only got about 30 to 45 minutes to make a decision as monumental as that, that clearly isn’t enough time in most instances for somebody to have a full appreciation of all the facts that are going on and to make good judgment.” Multiple leaders as well as scientists have called for weapons to be taken off high alert.

And in January, Democratic senator Ed Markey and congressman Ted Lieu introduced legislation to restrict the “first use” policy and prohibit Trump from launching a nuclear first strike without a declaration of war from Congress.

Ultimately, Gheen says, Trump and the U.S. need to continue to partner with other countries, particularly nuclear states, to help avoid a disaster. “There is a great tradition of international nuclear cooperation, especially within organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, an international organization that promotes "safe, secure, and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology,” she says. “Together we can propose creative solutions for [nuclear] issues."

Tierney notes, though, that this is something that may also require a grassroots effort. “We need to get a public movement in gear again to understand that these risks are out there, and as frightful as they are, they can be dealt with,” he says. “We’ve had success in the past and we need to get people together, but it’s [going to] take a voice of people, a movement, to get people to speak up loudly enough that the people who make these decisions in the capitals of various countries react as they did in the ’80s and start taking action to stop the proliferation of these weapons and eventually keep on decreasing them, and put us in a safer environment.”

Pakistan Soon to be a Nuclear Triad (Daniel 8)

Pakistan’s Future as a Triad Power
By Hananah Zarrar on December 24, 2016

Pakistan is considered to be in possession of world’s fastest growing nuclear stockpile. Even if not fastest, Pakistan’s strategic location and nuclear posture has set other nuclear states in alarming situation. Even in much limited resources and limited stock of fissile material Pakistan has maintained its nuclear arsenal and keeps expanding it on a far better ratio than India does. It largely relies on highly enriched uranium (HEU) for making 10-15 nuclear warheads a year[1]. Besides that, weapons grade plutonium stock is also being used. Pakistan after advancing conventional capabilities and achieving land based BRBM, SRBM, MRBM, IRBM and various other ICBMs, has also gained advanced strategic bombers and setup for ensuring minimum credible deterrence against rivals. Pakistan has also developed cruise missiles both ground-based as well as air-based. Undoubtedly, Pakistan has achieved excellent nuclear weapon delivery of nuclear arsenal consisting strategic bombers as well as land based ballistic missiles for deterrence purposes. The only thing enduring in completing nuclear triad is Sub-marine launched ballistic missiles.

Pakistan Needs to Become a Triad Power

Insecurity is at the heart of every rivalry. India has always remained and will remain Pakistan’s principle rival and threat to its security. Element of insecurity is heightened day by day among the two, although both claim to follow no-first-use doctrine but at the same time both are aggressive enough to deny no-first-use policy with a cause of each other’s existence as rivals, with some external gamers playing their efficient role in escalating this rivalry in pursuit of their own regional interests and retaining their strategic influence.

India recently has completed its nuclear triad and paved way for credible second strike capability. India has developed 112m long INS Arihant nuclear missile submarine and it is now fully operational as Indian Navy states. Arihant is first of five SSBNs – the SS denotes submarine (or submersible ship), the B denotes ballistic missile, and the N denotes that the submarine is nuclear-powered – so India is really looking forward to excellent nuclear submarine stock and will stand among other triad powers. This has caused Pakistan to think over her nuclear arsenal and retaliatory potential in such uncertain terms with India, due to Pakistan’s India-centric nuclear doctrine. Pakistan has already built up Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) in recent past. It has also tested Hatf VII Babar cruise missile which can be launched from a ship; this is remarkable addition to deterrent power of the country. Yet Pakistan has not established her complete, reliable Sea based nuclear missile setup.

Pakistan’s urge of acquiring second strike capability has a number of reasons behind, of which prominent is India’s fast progress in Naval based second strike capability and retaining her influence, access and secured command on sea boundaries. One who rules the ocean rules the world. It is a precise statement as two-third of world comprises of waters. Since the Anglo-German naval arms race, many emerging powers started building up naval forces and acquiring their access towards oceans as well as securing their sea borders. This tradition has continued and in result gave established, successful navies like United Kingdom and Germany but British remained superior. Industrial revolution in 18th and 19th century has done a lot in Britain’s and West’s progress. Same could have been the case with Asia but Asia remained at a turtle’s speed in industrial innovation. In recent past, Asian naval arms race has also been escalated. For maintaining a robust position in South Asia, Pakistan must have her grip on sea boundaries and access.

How Pakistan can Achieve Nuclear Triad? Hindrances

‘Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are a bedrock of Pakistan’s security’, as stated by Gen. Khalid Kidwai, advisor of Pakistan’s National Command Authority on Second Strike Capability and Nuclear triad[2]. In order to fortify Pakistan’s defense posture, navy should be elevated from a junior player to a prominent authoritative nuclear arsenal keeper and for that Army, Navy and Air force commands should work in coordination under SPD as specified by Gen. Kidwai.

As admitted by Indian Defense experts, Pakistan is already working on counter plans to keep strategic balance in waters as well. It has kept and will keep ambiguity in its nuclear arsenal. Yet Pakistan has some factors of hindrance that are delaying a bona fide framework of SLBMs. Firstly, economic factor is a prior factor of dependence for developing or acquiring sea based quiet nuclear submarines for stated deterrence purpose. Defense budget of Pakistan was around 700 billion during year 2015-16. When compared to India, Pakistan has much lower defense and military budgets but has elevated it up to 8% when compared to year 2014-15. Pak-Navy gets roughly a 10% of this budget which should be increased[3]. This share of navy if expanded would be able to allow Pakistan to get sufficient technology on its own as well as assistance of strategic partners in contributing towards its sea-based 2nd strike capability.

Secondly, building secured naval shipyard in a port like Gawadar under country’s own naval command rather than allowing foreign partners to do so. This will help navy to buildup reliable command structures for submarine controls. China would play a vital role in transfer of technology to Pakistan to fulfill its navy aspirations. Qing class submarines of China, which are capable of carrying three nuclear war-heads CJ-10K LACMs each, are likely to be transferred to Pakistan[4].

Result: Better Deterrence and Unassailable Pakistan

Positively, in near future Pakistan could and will surely complete it’s triad that is not easy to achieve yet not impossible as well. This will enhance Pakistan’s minimum nuclear deterrence towards its rivals as well as would be able to avail 2nd strike capability and enhanced retaliatory potential. Her navy will also be enhanced and will share the same significance as Army and Air force does, also will have reasonable grip on Indian Ocean. Moreover, becoming a Triad Power would lead Pakistan towards achieving its global recognition as well as one more point towards NSG membership due to robust image and strategic existence. Nuclear triad of Pakistan will hopefully cause her enemies to think a hundred times more before any surprise attack.

[1] http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/

[2] http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/03/gen-kidawi-on-pakistans-2nd-strike.html

[3] http://nation.com.pk/columns/08-Jun-2015/defence-budget-analysis

[4] http://www.asian-defence.net/2014/02/pakistans-nuclear-submarine-development.html?m=1

Keeping The Bull Out Of The China Shop

Keep Donald Trump’s Finger Off The Nuclear Button

12/21/2016 12:34 pm ET | Updated 9 hours ago

Joe Cirincione President, Ploughshares Fund; Author, ‘Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late’

SHUTTERSTOCK

It’s too late to stop Donald Trump from becoming president. But it is not too late to stop him from impulsively blowing up the planet.

With the stroke of a pen, President Barack Obama could take our nuclear missiles off high alert, making sure that President Trump could not launch them rashly. If he doesn’t do this, we will all regret it.

It’s like wishing you had locked the door before you left the house. Or made sure the gun wasn’t loaded before you put it on the shelf. Or wishing you hadn’t stored gasoline quite so close to the furnace.

President Obama should take our nuclear missiles off hair-trigger alert before Donald Trump gets control of them. Ploughshares Fund has launched a new petition to do just that.

The Danger

On January 20, the military officer carrying the nuclear codes who follows the President everywhere, will follow Barack Obama to the inaugural platform. When he leaves, the officer will start following President Donald J. Trump. From that moment on, Trump will have the unfettered ability to launch one or one thousand nuclear warheads whenever he pleases. Four minutes after he gives the order, the missiles will fly. No one can stop him, short of a full-scale mutiny. Once launched, the missiles cannot be recalled.

Almost 1,000 nuclear warheads, each many times the size of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, are kept on missiles ready to launch in minutes. This is called high alert, or launch-on-warning, or, more commonly, hair-trigger alert.

It is a relic of the Cold War. Nuclear commanders wanted the ability to launch their land-based missiles before an enemy attack could destroy them. For years, experts have warned that this was a dangerous practice, subject to false alarms, mistakes, misunderstanding and human error. And it is not necessary. The weapons in our alert subs and bombers are not vulnerable to surprise attack. We have more than enough weapons to deter an attack or respond to one.

While running for the presidency in 2008, Obama said:

“Keeping nuclear weapons ready to launch on a moment’s notice is a dangerous relic of the Cold War. Such policies increase the risk of catastrophic accidents or miscalculation. I believe that we must address this dangerous situation — something that President Bush promised to do when he campaigned for president back in 2000, but did not do once in office.”

Obama didn’t do it, either. Many of the very people he appointed to implement his reforms sided with the nuclear bureaucracy to stop him. The State Department posted a condescending explanation about why we need to be able to destroy the world within 4 minutes, assuring us that this was safe and reasonable. Rereading the post now, one can see the how much of the argument rests on supreme confidence in the judgment of the president of the United States.

Few people have that confidence now. Obama has thirty days to fix his mistake. Thirty days to prevent the worst disaster imaginable.

The Solution

Yes, this will be hard. Yes, much of the defense bureaucracy will argue against him. Yes, Obama has said he doesn’t want to “box in” his successor.

Yet, the press reports that in the last few days:

“Obama has used his final weeks in office to press for new rules on coal mining pollution, offshore drilling and the venting of planet-warming methane — all of which are likely to be challenged or repealed by the Trump administration and Republicans in Congress.”

If the president can do this for parts of the environment, he can take this one simple step to safeguard the entire planet.

Scores of leading nuclear scientists wrote to the President asking him to take nuclear missiles off hair-trigger alert. You can now add your voice.

Ploughshares Fund has started a public petition to President Obama. Join us.

Tell the president to end this obsolete policy. President Trump could still launch nuclear weapons in an emergency, but it would take hours or days. This gives time for consultations, consideration, time to check mistakes and blunt the impulses of the moment. More time doesn’t weaken our national security; it strengthens it.

Please sign the petition now. It says:

“Now more than ever, we call on you to ensure calmer heads prevail. Taking this critical step would bring profound security benefits for all Americans by reducing the risk of nuclear disaster.”

Urge the President to lock the nuclear door before he leaves.

More Black Market Uranium Seized (Revelation 8)

Thane crime branch detains 2, claims seizure of 8kg ‘depleted uranium’

MUMBAI Updated: Dec 22, 2016 00:32 IST

Padmja Sinha
Hindustan Times

The police show the plates that they claim are depleted uranium. (Praful Gangurde/HT)

The Thane crime branch on Wednesday detained two people and claimed to have seized 8 kg of depleted uranium plates worth Rs 24 crore from them. The officials are investigating the case for further information.Joint commissioner of police Ashutosh Dumbre said, “The detention has been result of the efforts put by the officials under the guidance of Deputy Commissioner of Police Parag Manere and senior police inspector Ravindra Doiphode.”Bharat Shelke, an official who was also part of the investigation team, said, “We got a tip off regarding the uranium from our informers and accordingly we took steps to nab them. The culprits were nabbed near Byke Hotel at Ghodbunder Road and are being grilled for more information.”

The two persons, who have been detained, were allegedly looking for customers and planning to sell it at throw away prices. “The sample of the uranium has been sent to the Bhabha Atomis Research Center (BARC) Lab for testing to establish content and worth of the depleted uranium. As the samples have already been sent it will take at least two days’ time to get the reports. Depending on the BARC report, we will take further action,” added Shelke.

When HT asked the official if there are chances that others too are involved in a similar illegal trade, Shelke said, “Though we are not sure but it is possible. That’s why we are continuously talking to them and grilling them. A detailed FIR would be filed once reports are obtained and we suppose that the investigation will go on for long also we have activated our informers for more clues.”

Economic Consequences of the Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

Scenario Earthquakes for Urban Areas Along the Atlantic Seaboard of the United States

NYCEM.org

New York City Area Consortium for Earthquake Loss Mitigation

If today a magnitude 6 earthquake were to occur centered on New York City, what would its effects be? Will the loss be 10 or 100 billion dollars? Will there be 10 or 10,000 fatalities? Will there be 1,000 or 100,000 homeless needing shelter? Can government function, provide assistance, and maintain order?

At this time, no satisfactory answers to these questions are available. A few years ago, rudimentary scenario studies were made for Boston and New York with limited scope and uncertain results. For most eastern cities, including Washington D.C., we know even less about the economic, societal and political impacts from significant earthquakes, whatever their rate of occurrence.

Why do we know so little about such vital public issues? Because the public has been lulled into believing that seriously damaging quakes are so unlikely in the east that in essence we do not need to consider them. We shall examine the validity of this widely held opinion.

Is the public’s earthquake awareness (or lack thereof) controlled by perceived low Seismicity, Seismic Hazard, or Seismic Risk? How do these three seismic features differ from, and relate to each other? In many portions of California, earthquake awareness is refreshed in a major way about once every decade (and in some places even more often) by virtually every person experiencing a damaging event. The occurrence of earthquakes of given magnitudes in time and space, not withstanding their effects, are the manifestations of seismicity. Ground shaking, faulting, landslides or soil liquefaction are the manifestations of seismic hazard. Damage to structures, and loss of life, limb, material assets, business and services are the manifestations of seismic risk. By sheer experience, California’s public understands fairly well these three interconnected manifestations of the earthquake phenomenon. This awareness is reflected in public policy, enforcement of seismic regulations, and preparedness in both the public and private sector. In the eastern U.S., the public and its decision makers generally do not understand them because of inexperience. Judging seismic risk by rates of seismicity alone (which are low in the east but high in the west) has undoubtedly contributed to the public’s tendency to belittle the seismic loss potential for eastern urban regions.

Let us compare two hypothetical locations, one in California and one in New York City. Assume the location in California does experience, on average, one M = 6 every 10 years, compared to New York once every 1,000 years. This implies a ratio of rates of seismicity of 100:1. Does that mean the ratio of expected losses (when annualized per year) is also 100:1? Most likely not. That ratio may be closer to 10:1, which seems to imply that taking our clues from seismicity alone may lead to an underestimation of the potential seismic risks in the east. Why should this be so?

To check the assertion, let us make a back-of-the-envelope estimate. The expected seismic risk for a given area is defined as the area-integrated product of: seismic hazard (expected shaking level), assets ($ and people), and the assets’ vulnerabilities (that is, their expected fractional loss given a certain hazard – say, shaking level). Thus, if we have a 100 times lower seismicity rate in New York compared to California, which at any given point from a given quake may yield a 2 times higher shaking level in New York compared to California because ground motions in the east are known to differ from those in the west; and if we have a 2 times higher asset density (a modest assumption for Manhattan!), and a 2 times higher vulnerability (again a modest assumption when considering the large stock of unreinforced masonry buildings and aged infrastructure in New York), then our California/New York ratio for annualized loss potential may be on the order of (100/(2x2x2)):1. That implies about a 12:1 risk ratio between the California and New York location, compared to a 100:1 ratio in seismicity rates.

From this example it appears that seismic awareness in the east may be more controlled by the rate of seismicity than by the less well understood risk potential. This misunderstanding is one of the reasons why earthquake awareness and preparedness in the densely populated east is so disproportionally low relative to its seismic loss potential. Rare but potentially catastrophic losses in the east compete in attention with more frequent moderate losses in the west. New York City is the paramount example of a low-probability, high-impact seismic risk, the sort of risk that is hard to insure against, or mobilize public action to reduce the risks.

There are basically two ways to respond. One is to do little and wait until one or more disastrous events occur. Then react to these – albeit disastrous – “windows of opportunity.” That is, pay after the unmitigated facts, rather than attempt to control their outcome. This is a high-stakes approach, considering the evolved state of the economy. The other approach is to invest in mitigation ahead of time, and use scientific knowledge and inference, education, technology transfer, and combine it with a mixture of regulatory and/or economic incentives to implement earthquake preparedness. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) has attempted the latter while much of the public tends to cling to the former of the two options. Realistic and reliable quantitative loss estimation techniques are essential to evaluate the relative merits of the two approaches.

This paper tries to bring into focus some of the seismological factors which are but one set of variables one needs for quantifying the earthquake loss potential in eastern U.S. urban regions. We use local and global analogs for illustrating possible scenario events in terms of risk. We also highlight some of the few local steps that have been undertaken towards mitigating against the eastern earthquake threat; and discuss priorities for future actions.

The Truth Of The Iranian Deal

Tehran’s Nuclear Program

Iran nuclear chief threatens new uranium enrichment

BY: Charles Hoskinson April 10, 2015 | 10:15 am

Iran can resume enriching uranium to higher levels at “any time” if the international community doesn’t live up to its commitments under a proposed nuclear deal, the head of Iran’s nuclear program said.

Ali Akbar Salehi also said in a nationally televised speech Thursday night that foreign companies, including those from the United States, would be required to supply Iran what it needs for the Arak heavy water reactor under any deal.

Salehi’s speech is the latest in a string of public remarks by top Iranian officials that have systematically unraveled what President Obama has called a “historic understanding” that was supposed to lead to a permanent deal limiting Iran’s nuclear program and preventing it from developing a nuclear weapon.

“Regarding the 20-percent [enriched] uranium, any time that the opposite side does not live up to its commitments, we can join two cascades of centrifuges to produce more than five kilos of 20-percent uranium,” Salehi was quoted by state-controlled Press TV as saying.

The U.S. fact sheet about the framework announced April 2 in Lausanne, Switzerland, between Iran and the P5+1 countries — the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China — says Iran has agreed not to enrich uranium beyond 3.67 percent for 15 years or build any new facilities to enrich uranium during that period.

But the fact sheet also notes that Iran would not be required to destroy any of its existing infrastructure beyond the 6,104 centrifuges allowed to operate under a proposed deal. The rest would be placed in storage under monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Keeping Iran from enriching uranium to 20 percent is crucial, because it exponentially increases the time needed to create a bomb-grade stock of the radioactive element. In a November 2013 interim deal, Iran agreed to stop enriching uranium to that level.

The only thing Iran has agreed to destroy under the framework, according to the U.S. side, is the core of the reactor at Arak, which was the focus of concerns that it might be used to develop weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor is to be converted to a facility limited to peaceful research.

Salehi’s threat to resume higher-level enrichment comes in the context of sharp disagreements between Iran and the United States on what, if anything, was agreed to at Lausanne.

On Thursday, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader, discounted the idea that any agreement was reached at all, and accused the United States of lying about the status of the talks.

Why Is Iran Enriching Uranium? (Rev 15:2)

 Why Is Iran Enriching Uranium?

by FRED FLEITZ
April 10, 2015 4:00 AM

That Iranian demand should have been a deal breaker for the United States and its European allies.
It is now clear from the framework nuclear deal with Iran announced last week that the final nuclear agreement will permit Tehran to continue to enrich uranium. Although U.S. and Iranian officials disagree on specifics, Iran also will be allowed to develop advanced uranium-enrichment centrifuges while a for the duration of a final agreement.

According to a French fact sheet on the framework, Iran will be permitted to install advanced centrifuges between the tenth and 13th years of a final agreement, a detail left out of the Obama administration’s account of the framework deal. President Obama inadvertently confirmed the consequences of this concession when he told NPR on April 7 that Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear bomb will shrink “almost down to zero” in 13 to 15 years because of a final deal based on the framework.

According to the Times of Israel, Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and its atomic-energy chief, Ali Akbar Salehi, take a different view. They reportedly told the Iranian parliament that their country will be begin using its most advanced uranium-enrichment centrifuge design, which is 20 times faster than the primitive model Iran is currently using, as soon as a final nuclear deal takes effect. Uranium enrichment is the process of separating out the uranium isotope uranium-235 for nuclear fuel.

Although Iran claims it wants to enrich for peaceful purposes, it is very easy to use this process to produce nuclear-weapons fuel, which is why, until 2012, the United States called on Tehran to halt all uranium enrichment. However, because Iran refused to cease uranium enrichment, the Obama administration made a major policy change in 2012 by proposing to allow it to continue to enrich with some restrictions as part of a future agreement to reduce the threat from its nuclear program.

For example, in 2009 Washington signed a peaceful-nuclear-cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates that specifically barred uranium enrichment. Given the significant nuclear-proliferation risk posed by uranium enrichment, one has to ask how the Obama administration could agree to let Iran enrich uranium in a deal that was intended to reduce or at least significantly delay the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The Iranian government claims it needs to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel rods for its Bushehr power reactor and for other power reactors it hopes to construct.

This explanation doesn’t add up, for two reasons. First, Iran would need many more centrifuges — about 200,000 (it currently has 19,000, of which 9,000 are operational) — to produce enough fuel for this reactor. Second, it does not make economic sense for Iran to construct fuel rods domestically when it can buy them at much lower cost from several countries.

Obama’s Iran ‘Agreement’ Is a Charade Iranian officials also have claimed their uranium-enrichment program is to produce medical isotopes, and fuel plates for a small research reactor in Tehran. These explanations are dubious, since Iran’s existing centrifuge program produces far more enriched uranium than the country needs for these purposes. Iran can also purchase medical isotopes and nuclear fuel plates from other countries for far less than it would cost to produce them domestically.

Foreign Minister Zarif recently said that a final nuclear agreement will allow Iran to sell enriched uranium in the international marketplace and will be “hopefully making some money” from it. Let’s hope he was joking. The proliferation concerns that would be raised if a state that had developed a secret uranium-enrichment program in violation of U.N. resolutions started selling enriched uranium to other states are hard to contemplate.

None of the explanations Iran has given account for why it is enriching uranium. However, the size of its centrifuge program strongly points to a weapons program. Former CIA deputy director Michael Morell expressed this view when he told Charlie Rose in February, “If you are going to have a nuclear weapons program, 5,000 [centrifuges] is pretty much the number you need.” Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a similar statement last September when he told MSNBC’s Andrea Mitchell that Iran’s centrifuges “are only good for one thing: to make bomb-grade material.”

Iran’s pursuit of uranium enrichment in secret and with the assistance of Dr. A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program, raise more questions about the peaceful intent of this program.  Obama officials contend they had no choice but to agree to let Iran enrich uranium because Iranian leaders refused to give up enrichment in a nuclear deal. This begs the question of what good is an agreement that permits Tehran to continue to pursue nuclear weapons. Iran’s demand to enrich uranium should have been a deal breaker for the United States and its European allies. By allowing Iran to enrich with thousands of centrifuges and to develop advanced centrifuges, this deal will significantly shorten Iran’s timeline for producing weapons-grade fuel.

The Obama administration probably decided to concede uranium enrichment because of President Obama’s desperation to get a legacy nuclear agreement with Iran. Although there are many reasons for Congress to reject this deeply flawed agreement, the most important is the administration’s irresponsible concession of uranium enrichment: a program that is central to Iran’s nuclear-weapons program.

Fred Fleitz, a former CIA analyst, is senior vice president for policy and programs for the Center for Security Policy.

Iran Already Producing 20% Uranium (Rev 15:2)

Ayatollah Tells Air Force: We Enriched Uranium 20%; Commanders: ‘Death to America, ‘Death to England,’ ‘Death to Israel’

March 5, 2015 – 12:26 AM

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei addressing Iranian Air Force personnel on Feb. 8, 2015. (AP Photo/Office of Iranian Supreme Leader)

(CNSNews.com) – In a speech delivered last month to commanders and other personnel in the Iranian Air Force, whom he described as “officials who have very sensitive occupations,” Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—Iran’s Supreme Leader and commander in chief—boasted that Iran had enriched uranium to the 20-percent level.

At the same time, the Supreme Leader noted that his government had agreed to shut down its production of 20-percent enriched uranium “for a while” in its effort to reach a deal with United States and other foreign powers that would include lifting the sanctions now imposed on his country.
“It was a very great achievement to produce 20-percent uranium,” the ayatollah told a Feb. 8 Iranian Air Force gathering, according to a transcript posted on his website.

“Those who are experts on this matter know that producing 20 percent from 5 percent is much more significant than producing uranium which is higher than 20 percent,” he said. “However, our youth and our committed scientists did so.”

A report published last month by the Congressional Research Service explains why Iran’s efforts to produce uranium enriched to the 20 percent level is a problem.

“LEU used in nuclear power reactors typically contains less than 5% uranium-235,” said CRS, “research reactor fuel can be made using 20% uranium-235; HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% uranium-235.”

“Iran’s production of LEU enriched to the 20% level has caused concern because such production requires approximately 90% of the effort necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU, which, as noted, contains approximately 90% uranium-235,” said CRS.

“Tehran argues that it is enriching uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors and nuclear research reactors,” said CRS.

In his speech to the Air Force commanders, the ayatollah followed his assertion that Iran had been able to enrich uranium to the 20 percent level by accusing the U.S. and its allies of being “greedy” in negotiations for a nuclear deal and asserting that the “Iranian nation will not submit to greed and tyranny.”

The audience of Air Force commanders and other personnel responded to this with a chant, according to an English-language transcript produced by BBC Worldwide Monitoring and available through Nexis.

“Allah Akbar [God is great],” they chanted, according to the BBC transcript. “Khamenei is the leader. Death to the enemies of the leadership. Death to America. Death to England. Death to hypocrites. Death to Israel.”

Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has testified in Congress that Iran has the technical capability to build a nuclear weapon and that whether it does so will be personally decided by Ayatollah Khamenei.

“Clearly, Tehran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce them, so the central issue is its political will to do so,” Clapper told the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 18, 2013. “Such a decision, we believe, will be made by the Supreme Leader, and at this point we don’t know if he’ll eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”

Then-Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin asked Clapper: “Have they made a decision, in your assessment, to produce nuclear weapons?”

“They have not,” said Clapper. “We continue to hold that they have not yet made that decision. And that decision would be made singly by the Supreme Leader.”

Clapper echoed this assessment in another Senate Armed Services Committee hearing held last week.
“Iran will face many of the same decision points in 2015 as it did in 2014,” he said. “Foremost is whether the Supreme Leader will agree to a nuclear deal. He wants sanctions relief but, at the same time, to preserve his options on nuclear capabilities.”

“We believe the supreme leader would be the ultimate decision maker here,” Clapper said. “As far as we know, he’s not made a decision to go for a nuclear weapon.

“I do think they certainly want to preserve options across the capabilities it would take to build one,” Clapper said. “But right now they don’t have one, and have not made that decision.”

At a background briefing sponsored by the White House on Sept. 25, 2009, “senior administration officials” explained that Iran had twice been caught secretly constructing a facility for enriching uranium—first at Natanz and then at Qom. One of the officials at this briefing explained why the administration believed the second facility appeared particularly designed to produce enriched uranium not for peaceful use but for a weapon.

“[T]he Iranian nuclear issue first became public back in 2002, when it was revealed that Iran was building a secret underground enrichment facility, which we now know as the Natanz facility,” a senior administration official said at that briefing. “Once the Iranians were caught building the secret underground enrichment facility with centrifuge machines in it, they were forced to declare the facility, to allow the IAEA inspectors to inspect the facility and to place it under safeguards.”

“So the obvious option for Iran would be to build another secret underground enrichment facility, and our intelligence services, working in very close cooperation with our allies, for the past several years have been looking for such a facility,” said the senior administration official. “And not surprisingly, we found one. So we have known for some time now that Iran was building a second underground enrichment facility. And as the president mentioned this morning, it’s located [at Fordo] near the city of Qom, a very heavily protected, very heavily disguised facility.”

“Our information is that the facility is designed to hold about 3,000 centrifuge machines,” said this senior administration official. “Now, that’s not a large enough number to make any sense from a commercial standpoint. It cannot produce a significant quantity of low-enriched uranium. But if you want to use the facility in order to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it’s the right size. And our information is that the Iranians began this facility with the intent that it be secret, and therefore giving them an option of producing weapons-grade uranium without the international community knowing about it.”

Another problematic Iranian nuclear project is a heavy-water reactor it is building at Arak.
“Iran is constructing a heavy water-moderated reactor at Arak, which, according to Tehran, is intended to produce radioisotopes for medical use,” said the CRS report published last month.
“The Arak reactor is a proliferation concern because heavy water reactors produce spent fuel containing plutonium better suited for nuclear weapons than plutonium produced by light water moderated reactors,” said the CRS report.

In his speech last month to his Air Force commanders, Ayatollah Khamenei first stressed that he supported a nuclear deal that is “workable.” He then went on to praise Iran’s achievement in enriching uranium to the 20 percent level and hailed the construction of the Arak reactor and the Fordo uranium enrichment facilty.

“I want to say that first of all, I consent to an agreement that is workable,” said the ayatollah, according to the translation of his speech posted on his official website. “Of course, I do not mean a bad agreement. The Americans constantly repeat, ‘We believe that making no agreement is better than making a bad one.’ We too have the same opinion. We too believe that making no agreement is better than making an agreement that is to the disadvantage of national interests, one that leads to the humiliation of the great and magnificent people of Iran.”

In mentioning that the Arak and Fordo facilities had been closed—which was done as part of the temporary agreement (or “Joint Plan of Action”) that Iran made with the United States, France, the United Kingdom, German, Russia and China, the ayatollah stressed that these facilities were closed “for now”—according to the translation posted on his own website.

“The Iranian side has done whatever it could to reach an agreement,” the ayatollah said. “It has done many things: it has stopped developing enrichment machines. Well, it deemed it necessary to stop these machines for a while. It has stopped producing 20-percent uranium which is a very great feat. It was a very great achievement to produce 20-percent uranium.”

“Those who are experts on this matter know that producing 20 percent from 5 percent is much more significant than producing uranium which is higher than 20 percent,” said the ayatollah. “However, our youth and our committed scientists did so.

“In any case,” he said, “the Iranian side stopped this because negotiations required it. The Iranians have closed the Arak Factory–which was a very great achievement and a very important innovation in the area of technology–for now. They have closed–for now–Fordo which is one of the best innovations made by our domestic forces for the sake of ensuring the security of our centrifuges. They have achieved so many great tasks. Therefore, the Iranian side has acted in a reasonable way. It has acted according to the requirements of negotiation.”

Toward the end of his speech, the ayatollah indicated that his over-arching goal is to have sanctions lifted from Iran.

“Everything that is done is for the sake of taking the weapon and option of sanctions away from the enemy’s hands,” he said.

“However, if they fail to make such an agreement, the people of Iran, officials, the honorable administration and others have many different options,” the ayatollah said.

“By Allah’s favor,” he said, “the people of Iran will show on the 22nd of Bahman, that those who want to humiliate the people of Iran will face their counterblow.”

According to the BBC, 22nd of Bahman—or February 11—is the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.

At this point in the BBC transcript of the speech, the audience of Iranian Air Force commanders and other personnel repeated the chant they had made earlier in the speech: “Allah Akbar. Khamenei is the Leader. Death to the enemies of the leadership. Death to America. Death to England. Death to hypocrites. Death to Israel.”