Australia’s Uranium Trade: The Pusher in the Pacific
Australia has the world’s largest known uranium deposits – about 28
percent – and is the world’s third largest exporter of uranium with
nearly 7,000 tonnes a year.
Global Research
Since the First World
War, conflict and mining activities have gone hand in hand in Australia.
Without a reliable, steady supply of sufficient volumes of coal, iron
ore and associated metals required for the rapid and production of
weapons and machinery, the war effort would be short-lived.
Essington Lewis, appointed managing director of BHP in 1926, while
visiting Japan in 1935 described the nation as a ‘big gun-powder
magazine and the people as fanatics and any day the two might connect
and there will be an explosion’. Although Lewis responded by urging
large stockpiles of raw materials for steel production and the
manufacture of munitions (guns, ships, tanks, planes, mines, ammunition,
tools, optical aids etc.), he and Attorney General Robert Menzies
rationalized that iron ore exports to Japan should continue so as to
fund the manufacturing industry to prepare for a likely engagement with
that country. A ban was finally placed on ore exports to Japan in May
1938. But in November of that year, Menzies demanded that a remaining
277,000 tonnes of pig iron of a Japanese order be loaded on the
Dalfram
at Port Kembla. Dockside workers, already outraged by the news of the
Japanese invasion of China in 1937, refused to work. Only after the
workers’ remarkable interstate solidarity in the face of the application
of the draconian Transport Workers Act, did Menzies cave in and ban the
Dalfram shipment.
[1]
In May 1940, Prime Minister Menzies appointed Lewis Director of
Munitions. As an ‘industrial dictator’ Lewis had carte blanche to
acquire materials, appoint favoured private industrial leaders to
executive boards, and contract private firms he deemed necessary.
The importance of this example was not the loading of pig iron onto the
Dalfram,
but the reactionary treatment of domestic workers by the Lyons/Menzies
government for economic gain from the supply of an expansionist foreign
militarist state. This is not to make a direct parallel between
contemporary conditions and Japan’s invasion of China in the 1930s so
much as to indicate how, in the circuitous logic of capital
accumulation, one nation can supply another with the materials which
then return in destructive ways – as with the bombing of Darwin by
Japanese planes on 19 February 1942.
Since 2011
After the disastrous nuclear meltdowns at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant ongoing since 11 March 2011, the world was
re-awakened to the dangers of nuclear power. The price of uranium in the
global markets halved as advanced economies, led by Germany,
downscaled, shutdown and turned away from their nuclear energy plans. In
response, the nuclear industry turned to the ambitions of economies
tipped for rapid economic expansion. As global electricity supply from
nuclear power generation fell to the lowest level since 1980 and the
number of operating units were reduced to 388 (fifty less than the peak
in 2002),
[2]
the Australian uranium mining industry and their transnational
corporate investors scrambled to reprioritise so as to recoup the huge
investments they had committed. From early 2013, however, uranium mining
confidence returned to the industry in Australia, with new mining
leases were approved (in West Australia, Queensland and NSW). What
justified such confidence while all the other uranium miners sought
escape from the industry?
On 7–11 July 2014 Prime Minister Abe of Japan made a five-day visit
to Australia, which included a special trip with Prime Minister Abbott
to the Pilbara mines. The day Abe arrived, the CEO of the Mitsubishi
Corporation (heavily involved in nuclear technologies) announced that
Australia was a ‘veritable lifeline’ for Japan’s resource-dependent
economy, and promised billions in investment in Australia’s resources
sector, agribusiness and retail.
[3]
The Fukushima Daiichi disaster did not deter the Japanese government
from actively courting more than 20 countries for the purchase of
Japan’s nuclear technologies. Indeed, with agreements already reached
with Jordan, Vietnam, South Korea and Russia under the previous Kan and
Noda DPJ governments, the export of nuclear technology is also central
to the Abe government’s economic plan. Two more agreements have been
reached with Turkey and the United Arab Emirates,
[4] and six more are under consideration with India, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Bangladesh.
The unveiling of a surge in
military spending in December 2013, and the push to reinterpret its
constitution to permit collective security operations is intended to
boost its military capacity due to an aggravated antagonism with China.
Abe’s frenzied inter-state activity has led to fresh security and trade
agreements with the US, UK, EU representatives, Australia, India and
the ASEAN nations with special attention to the Philippines, Vietnam and
Burma.
For Australia’s part,
this included a free trade agreement and the purchase of Japanese
Sōryu-class submarines, which are designed to counter China’s
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capacities and to support US Navy
carrier strike groups.[5]
A similar pattern took shape on 5 September 2014, when Abbott and
Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata
Party of India committed to the Australia-India Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement in New Delhi. This Agreement was the culmination of
preparations initiated by the Howard government in 2007 and supported by
the Gillard government in 2012. These included the lifting of bans on
uranium mining in West Australia and Queensland in 2008 and in NSW in
2012.
Australia has the world’s
largest known uranium deposits – about 28 percent – and is the world’s
third largest exporter of uranium with nearly 7,000 tonnes a year. The
Australian government (and many other countries) placed a ban on
exporting uranium to India after its ‘Smiling Buddha’ Pokhran I nuclear
tests produced from a clandestine nuclear weapons program. India
justified its indigenous development of civil and military nuclear
capacity and refusal to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) as contingent upon the significant reduction of nuclear weapons
held by existing nuclear weapons states. India was also excluded from
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), comprising 48 nations, and suffered
economic sanctions after its Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998.
This stalemate shifted when the Singh administration, which had
actively canvassed for national and international backing, finally
procured the US–India energy agreement of July 2005 and the US–India
Civil ‘1-2-3’ Nuclear Agreement of October 2008. The 1-2-3 Agreement
stipulated that India would open its civilian nuclear facilities to
inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
delineate its civil and military facilities. In return the US would
provide nuclear technologies (six reactors) and others would provide
nuclear fuels. This led the NSG (including Canada and Australia) to lift
the ban on uranium export even though India remained a non-NPT
signatory and a nuclear weapons state.
In 2008, India’s Reliance Industries began paying Uranium Exploration
Australia Ltd (UXA) for licenses to participate in exploration in
Australia.
[6] China already had requested to conduct uranium exploration activities in Australia in 2005,
[7]
and India seeks to become an alternative market to China. It plans to
double national energy consumption (presently 949 kwh) and triple
electricity generation (presently 135 kwh) over the next 20 years. This
will include a projected increase from nearly 4 percent of electricity
from nuclear power to 25 percent, or a 13-fold increase to 62,000
megawatts by 2032, so as to achieve half of China’s current power
consumption level, which is roughly 4000 kwh.
[8]
Australian uranium mining companies, as well as other nuclear-related
corporate combines such as GE/Toshiba, Westinghouse/Hitachi,
AREVA/Mitsubishi, have welcomed this as a key opportunity to revive the
nuclear industry and become less reliant on the Chinese market.
The new demand from India will draw uranium from Ben Lomond near Mt
Isa shipped from Townsville Port, and coal mined from the gargantuan
Galilee Basin shipped from Abbott Point, passing through the dredged
Great Barrier Reef, or freighted by road to Darwin or Adelaide (which
hold uranium licenses).
[9] The Australia-India uranium agreement supports this concerted and accelerated push.
Effects
In cementing a nuclear deal
with India, the Abbott government has committed to selling uranium to a
nation-state that barely conceals its intentions to expand its nuclear
weapons arsenal and rejects the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). As a pro-business politician and hardliner on Pakistan and
Muslim populations in India, PM Modi favours a security policy based on
nuclear deterrence. The BJP holds a commanding majority in the lower
house of Parliament, and can pass legislation with little opposition.
The deal with Australia is only one of several such agreements Modi
seeks to conclude as part of an ambitious five-year plan.
First, the Australia-India uranium trade agreement is unsafe.
If Japan’s nuclear industry and government have proven unable to
properly contain the potential for serious nuclear accidents at its
domestic nuclear power plants, then India’s nuclear industry, which is
much less reliable and possibly even more corrupt, would pose even
higher risks of mismanagement.
[10]
Internally, India is also
unstable, as the government fights an embedded insurgency and continues
to sustain tensions along its northern borders, with Pakistan and China.
It maintains a violently repressive approach to imposing nuclear
installations and uranium operations (such as Gorakhpur, Koodankulam,
Jaitapur, Jadugoga) upon vulnerable communities, and significant numbers
of civil protesters, five of whom have been killed since 2010.
[11]
While guaranteed only intermittent electricity supply, these
communities are experiencing higher rates of disease, congenital
malformations and early deaths. In Jagudoga, Jharkhand (19,500 people),
those living near the central uranium mine operated by Uranium Corp. of
India Ltd. (UCIL), have suffered disproportionate health problems.
While the Jharkhand High Court found in 2007, based on an
epidemiological study of 4,022 households by Indian Doctors for Peace
and Development, that proximity to the mining operations increased rates
of illness, Chairman Diwakar Acharya denied any correlation, and blamed
ordinary socio-economic factors (malnutrition).
[12]
Another study in 2008 by the Centre for Science and Environment found
that the dust and water contaminated with heavy metals from the mine and
the tailing ponds accumulates in crops and water, fish and animals
which are then ingested. This is consistent with many other findings
around mines in other countries which tend to be located in areas where
the communities are politically disempowered.
Second, while Tony Abbott reiterated that ‘suitable safeguards’ were
in place to ensure that Australian uranium would be used for ‘peaceful
purposes’ and for ‘civilian use only’, such ambiguous terms create false
impressions.
Nuclear
technologies are inherently dual-use (both for civil energy production
and military use), and it is disingenuous to claim that a water-tight
separation can be ensured. In fact, ten of India’s twenty nuclear
facilities do not fall under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
supervisional authority, and India only selectively recognises IAEA
safeguards for specific foreign supplied reactors and facilities. With
no mechanism to inspect this nuclear technology to ensure that the fuel
is not diverted into nuclear weapons production, safety cannot be
guaranteed.
Even if the diverted fuel was discovered, neither Australia nor the
IAEA could force compliance. An influx of imported foreign uranium will
simply make it easier for India to reserve some of its indigenous
uranium for enrichment and/or reprocessing weapons-grade plutonium,
[13] or some of Australia’s uranium to be ‘misallocated’ toward military facilities.
In effect, Tony Abbott’s policy follow the United States and to treat
India as the exception undermines the IAEA standards within the
disarmament regime, and breaches Australia’s obligations to the
Rarotonga Treaty for the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
Third, and perhaps most
significant, is that the ‘balance’ between India-Pakistan and in the
South Asian region will be upset so as to aggravate rivalries and
intensify tensions between the two nations, as well as others such as
China and Bangladesh. A new uranium enrichment facility at the
Indian Rare Metals Plant recently identified near Mysore may serve to
expand India’s ballistic missile nuclear submarine fleet, and to support
the development of thermonuclear weapons. It is unthinkable that the
‘international community’ would allow Iran or North Korea to conduct
such operations without sanction.
[14]
So why does Australia continue to actively seek to accelerate the
exploration, extraction and export of uranium into volatile conditions
such as those in India?
Motives
Following a visit in January 2014 by PM Abe to India received by then
PM Singh, PM Modi visited Kyoto and Tokyo from 31 August for five days
to conclude the Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Although Modi
left without signing the Agreement, the Japan-India relationship was upgraded to a ‘special strategic and global partnership’.
[15]
This means that in return for Japanese investment ($35 billion over
five years), Modi promised to set up a ‘Japan-plus special management
team’ under the Prime Minister’s Office to fast-track approvals of
investment proposals from Japan. Although it is as yet unknown whether
India will procure Japan’s turbines for 1000 Mw capacity reactors, it
may turn to Canada or South Korea for the 19 reactors it plans to build
with a total of 17,400 MW capacity over the next five years.
[16]
Nonetheless, an increased power and industrial base will feed into an
upgraded and stronger military-strategic ‘partnership’ with Tokyo.
India will purchase Japanese armaments to build its blue-water navy and
enhance its forces for likely integration with existing US and Japan
technologies. Despite economic incentives and an invitation from China
to India to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, India’s ‘Look
East’ policy puts it on track to a trilateral military security
cooperation between the US, India and Japan. This is already
demonstrated in Japan’s participation in the annual US-Indian Malabar
naval exercise since 2010, as a gesture toward securing Japan’s access
to supply lines in the Indian Ocean. These rehearsals slot neatly into
an overarching US anti-China ‘pivot to Asia’.
It is unlikely that the Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
probably went unsigned because of any putative scruple Japan may have
about selling nuclear technologies to a nuclear weapons state. The
sticking point over India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND
2010), which places liability upon vendors and component manufacturers,
[17]
was surmounted by US and Indian negotiators in the 1-2-3 agreement of
2007–8. Japan could adopt this model and appear to stay within IAEA
guidelines. Rather, it is likely that a full nuclear agreement was not
signed for two reasons: so as not to fall into the trap of challenging
China, at least overtly; and, so as to not be forced to be held
completely liable as the nuclear vendor in the case of an accident with
its technology.
In this light, can this alliance building be all that different from
the ‘assertive expansionism’ China is accused of in the South and East
China Seas?
Conclusion
The pattern discussed suggests the perennial links between mining and militarisation.
As seen in Essington Lewis’ involvement in the Menzies war cabinet,
when nation-states seek to radically increase their energy generation
capacity for mass production of munitions, they are usually preparing to
contest their position in the world order. Uranium and nuclear weapons
have been intrinsic factors in the post-war US-led alliance system
beginning from the Reverse Course policy of 1948 in which Japan and West
Germany were inculcated as strategic allies and the Soviet Union was
threatened with ‘massive retaliation’ on its homeland. During the Korean
War (1950–53) when the US repeatedly threatened China and North Korea
with nuclear weapons and which continued ever since, during the
atmospheric nuclear testing between 1946 and 1963 (underground tests
continued), and in the proliferation of nuclear weapons as nations
sought ‘parity’, the reliable supply of metals, minerals and fossil
fuels have been essential.
The Australia-India uranium trade agreement will supply enough yellow cake for India to diversify its nuclear program.
If and when the Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is concluded,
it will supply nuclear technology India requires to enhance its nuclear
arsenal. Both of these Agreements, negotiated almost simultaneously,
tacitly legitimise India’s nuclear status and assist in its ambitions
for greater geopolitical influence. This will make Australia and Japan,
both NPT members, complicit in India’s nuclear weapons program. A
nuclear arms race in East and South East Asia, and an increased risk of
accidents in India similar to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster,
may result.
While leaders such as Abe, Abbott and Modi downplay the negative
reality confronting people and ecologies in areas affected by
radioactive exposure from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, we
should remember that this contamination came, in part, from Australian
uranium.
[18]
The refusal of executive leaders to acknowledge the dangers of the
uranium trade reflects the centrality of nuclear power to the US-led
security regime, and a network under the US Pacific Command in
particular, that seeks to dominate non-compliant nations such as China
or Russia. This was highlighted when Tony Abbott, prior to departing to
India to conclude the uranium deal, placed a ban on uranium export to
Russia over the conflict in Ukraine. Uranium trade, it seems, is now a
political instrument beyond institutional regulatory control. Political
leaders understand the value of a constant, reliable and prompt supply
of fresh uranium to fuel reactors that can produce Uranium 235 or
Plutonium 239 for nuclear-tipped tactical or strategic missiles.
When the actual benefits
from uranium trade are weighed against the potential and actual damage
being wrought by malfunctioning nuclear reactors, the use of nuclear
weapons (broadly defined), and the steady production of nuclear waste,
however, the policies of these political leaders and their corporate
collaborators cannot be justified. This becomes ever more obvious
when we compare the costs and risks of nuclear power and the recent
rapid advances in solar, wind and tidal energy generation.
Dr Adam Broinowski is an ARC postdoctoral research fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.