Trump is Beating the War Drums

With eyes on Iran, Trump builds ‘war council’
By Ihsan al-Faqih
ISTANBUL
John Bolton, the newly-appointed U.S. national security advisor, portends a more hawkish approach by Washington to America’s perceived enemies.
The 69-year-old has a long history of adopting hardline positions and showing a readiness to use military force overseas as evidenced by the “preemptive war” doctrine embraced by President George W. Bush (2001-2009), who launched wars on both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).
Under Bush, Bolton served as both undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs (2001-2005) and as U.S. ambassador to the UN (2005-2006).
Bolton was close to U.S. decision-making circles throughout the terms of republican presidents Ronald Reagan (1983-1989) and George H. W. Bush (1989-1993).
He was a vocal supporter of regime change during the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990/91 and maintained this orientation under the George W. Bush administration, which would end up invading -- and occupying -- both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003).
The younger Bush took the decision to invade Iraq when Bolton was serving as undersecretary of state. In the run-up to the invasion, Bolton exerted pressure on decision-making circles -- including the CIA and the U.S. National Security Council -- to endorse Bush’s decision.
Trump era
With his appointment last week as national security adviser, the Trump administration appeared to follow the policies of the Bush era, which was dominated by the pro-war "neo-conservative" movement.
The national security adviser's most significant function is to provide the president with options, alternatives and information relevant to political and/or military decision-making.
Bolton does not hide his preference for the use of force against Iran and North Korea in response to perceived threats to U.S. national security on the pretext that both these countries boast a nuclear capacity and are generally antagonistic to the U.S.
Bolton's appointment was made in the run-up to historic peace talks with North Korea (expected in May) and shortly after Trump's remarks on March 20, in which he -- in the presence of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman -- voiced his refusal to allow Iran to threaten global stability.
Just before signing the six-nation nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015, Bolton had argued that Tehran would never abandon its nuclear program and that U.S. sanctions would not be enough to deter it from developing a nuclear-weapons capacity.
Only military action would stop Iran from acquiring nuclear arms, Bolton asserted, citing Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor and its 2007 strike on a nuclear reactor in Syria.
Bolton’s latest appointment, experts say, along with that of Mike Pompeo -- a former CIA director -- as secretary of state, suggests the nuclear deal with Iran will be revoked by Washington.
Declaration of war
Others, including Trita Parsi, head of the National Iranian American Council, have gone further, saying the appointment of Bolton and Pompeo was tantamount to a “declaration of war” on Iran.
Before his appointment, Bolton told members of Iran’s opposition People's Mujahideen in Paris that Trump should “review” his policies on Iran and that the U.S. should openly call for regime change.
In Iran, there has been a general sense of pessimism regarding the nuclear deal, especially since the appointment of Pompeo, who, like Trump, has described it as "terrible".
Trump believes there are only two options regarding the deal with Iran -- to withdraw from it or to “do something else”. But given that the agreement is not a bilateral one between Iran and the U.S., Washington’s choices in this regard are limited.
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghji, for his part, believes Washington “is determined” to withdraw from the deal and that Pompeo was appointed expressly for this purpose.
While some voices in Tehran say Iran should abandon its obligations as laid out in the agreement if the U.S. withdraws, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has reiterated his country's commitment to the deal -- even if the U.S. abandons it -- “as long as it benefits Iran”.
N. Korea
Before his appointment, Bolton did not appear to put much stock in diplomacy as a means of resolving the dispute with North Korea.
His appointment, however, comes only weeks ahead of a meeting, slated for May, which will bring together -- for the first time ever -- the U.S. and North Korean leaders.
Bolton's appointment came following a series of resignations by senior administration officials -- resignations that have left Trump surrounded by officials who largely agree with his views on major foreign policy issues, including North Korea and Iran.
Bolton’s appointment appears to suggest that Trump is building a “war council” stacked with hardliners who favor a muscular foreign policy.
That council, which now includes both Bolton and Pompeo, is now awaiting a successor to Defense Secretary James Matiss, who many observers believe is on the verge of being replaced by Trump.
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US Considers Complete Separation From Pakistan (Daniel)

US considering permanent freeze on Pakistan military aid: American magazine

By News Desk

 

Unprec­edente­d new measur­es agains­t Islama­bad includ­e visa ban on govt offici­als, revoki­ng status as non-NATO ally.

The Trump administration has been looking into a range of new options to incrementally pressure Pakistan into acting against militants, Foreign Policy reported.
According to the American publication, White House functionaries are weighing unprecedented penalties including revoking the country’s major non-NATO ally status, permanently cutting off military aid and imposing a visa bars on Pakistani government officials.
However, the magazine claimed the suggestions stimulated internal debate in Washington circles on the “tempo and scale” of the under-consideration measures. The publication noted some officials and military men favoured pursuing an aggressive policy while others counselled caution.
These reports come amidst an ongoing shuffle in the Trump cabinet. Foreign policy hawk John Bolton was recently appointed National Security Advisor and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director Mike Pompeo replaced Rex Tillerson at the US State Department.
These changes could “tilt” the discussion on Pakistan in the Trump inner circle in favour of new measures against Islamabad, according to the American publication.
Foreign Policy cited current and former deputies in the White House as saying that drastic measures against Pakistan included punitive actions like a visa ban on government and security officials from Islamabad allegedly involved in subversive activities.
“We are prepared to do whatever is necessary to protect US personnel and interests in the region,” a senior Trump administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told reporters last week.
These reports suggest a shift in American policy towards Pakistan with previous US presidents being hesitant to push Pakistan too hard.
There have also been murmurings that cutting off aid to the country permanently would make it harder for Islamabad to access high-tech military hardware, hampering the fight against terrorism in the tribal regions bordering Afghanistan, emboldening militants and destabilising the nuclear-armed nation.
Pakistan is also important to the peace process in Kabul, as US forces seek a dignified exit from the war-torn country after over a decade of little progress.
Two lethal attacks in Kabul in January claimed by the Taliban, occurring only days after the suspension of US aid was announced and after a tweet by Trump castigating Pakistan, have added urgency to the debate.

The Growing Russian Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

A New Cold War With Russia? No, It’s Worse Than That

The New York Times By ANDREW HIGGINS 4 hrs ago

 

© Yuri Kadobnov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, center, at a ceremony for Defender of the Fatherland Day in Moscow last month.

MOSCOW — The expulsion of scores of Russian diplomats from the United States, countries across Europe and beyond has raised, yet again, the question of whether the world is veering back where it was during the Cold War. The alarming answer from some in Russia is: No, but the situation is in some ways even more unpredictable.
For all the tension, proxy conflicts and risk of nuclear war that punctuated relations between Moscow and the West for decades, each side knew, particularly toward the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, roughly what to expect. Each had a modicum of trust that the other would act in a reasonably predictable way.
The volatile state of Russia’s relations with the outside world today, exacerbated by a nerve agent attack on a former spy living in Britain, however, makes the diplomatic climate of the Cold War look reassuring, said Ivan I. Kurilla, an expert on Russian-American relations, and recalls a period of paralyzing mistrust that followed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.
“If you look for similarities with what is happening, it is not the Cold War that can explain events but Russia’s first revolutionary regime,” which regularly assassinated opponents abroad, said Mr. Kurilla, a historian at the European University at St. Petersburg.
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He said that Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, had no interest in spreading a new ideology and fomenting world revolution, unlike the early Bolsheviks, but that Russia under Mr. Putin had “become a revolutionary regime in terms of international relations.”
From the Kremlin’s perspective, it is the United States that first upended previous norms, when President George W. Bush scrapped the Antiballistic Missile accord, an important Cold War-era treaty, in 2002.
Russia, Mr. Kurilla said, does not like the rules of the American-dominated order that have prevailed since then, “and wants to change them.”
One rule that Russia has consistently embraced, however, is the principle of reciprocity, and the Kremlin made clear on Monday that it would, after assessing the scale of the damage to its diplomat corps overseas, respond with expulsions of Western diplomats from Russia.
The Russian Parliament also weighed in, with the deputy head of its foreign affairs committee, Aleksei Chepa, telling the Interfax news agency that Russia would not bow to the West’s diplomatic “war.” Russia, he said, “will not allow itself to be beaten up, the harder they try to intimidate us, the tougher our response will be.”
When Britain expelled 23 Russian diplomats this month in response to the nerve agent attack in Salisbury, England, Moscow not only evicted an equal number of British diplomats, but ordered the closing of the British Council, an organization that promotes British culture and language.
While denying any part in the March 4 poisoning of Sergei V. Skripal, a former spy, and his daughter, Yulia, both still critically ill in the hospital, Russia in recent years has built up a long record of flouting international norms, notably with its 2014 annexation of Crimea, the first time since 1945 that European borders have been redrawn by force.
© Peter Foley/EPA, via Shutterstock Employees at the Russian Consulate in an adjacent driveway in New York on Monday. The attack on the Skripals was another first, at least according to Prime Minister Theresa May of Britain, who denounced the action as the “first offensive use of a nerve agent in Europe since the Second World War.”
Kadri Liik, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said she was mystified by the nerve agent attack. Ms. Liik said she had expected Mr. Putin, who won a fourth term by a lopsided margin on March 18, to back away from disruption during what, under the Constitution, should be his last six years in power.
Mr. Putin, she said, might not be predictable but usually follows what he considers fairly clear logic. “Putin does not do disruption just for fun, but because he is Putin and he can,” she said.
Each time Russia has been accused of having a hand in acts like the seizure of Ukrainian government buildings in Crimea or the 2014 shooting down of a Malaysian passenger plane over eastern Ukraine, in which nearly 300 people were killed, Moscow has responded with a mix of self-pity, fierce denials and florid conspiracy theories that put the blame elsewhere.
In the case of the poisoning in Salisbury, Russia’s denials became so baroque that even the state-run news media had a hard time keeping up.
After officials denied any Russian role and insisted that neither Russia nor the Soviet Union had ever developed Novichok, the nerve agent identified by Britain as the substance used against the Skripals, a state-controlled news agency published an interview with a Russian scientist who said he had helped develop a system of chemical weapons called Novichok-5. The agency later amended the article, replacing the scientist’s mention of Novichok with an assertion that the “chemical weapons development program of the U.S.S.R. was not called ‘Novichok.’”
The attempted murder of Mr. Skripal on British soil, however, “was the straw that broke the camel’s back,” said Vladimir Inozemtsev, a Russian scholar at the Polish Institute of Advanced Studies in Warsaw. “Western leaders finally decided that enough is enough” because Moscow has played the denial game so many times and showed no real interest in establishing the truth, he said.
Unlike Soviet leaders during the Cold War, he added, Mr. Putin follows no fixed ideology or rules but is ready to pursue any “predatory policies,” no matter how taboo, that might help “undermine the existing order in Europe,” while insisting that Russia is the victim, not the aggressor.
When the United Nations in 2015 proposed an international tribunal to investigate the MH-17 air disaster a year earlier over territory held by Russian-armed rebels in eastern Ukraine, Moscow used its veto in the United Nations Security Council to block the move, the only member of the Council to oppose the investigation.
Ian Bond, a former British diplomat in Moscow who is now director of foreign policy at the Center for European Reform in London, said Russia’s often implausible denials had made it “like the boy who cried wolf.”
“If you keep putting forward crazy conspiracy theories, eventually people are going to ask whether what you are saying is just another crazy Russian denial,” he said.
Mr. Bond said diplomacy during the Cold War, even when it involved hostile actions, tended to follow a relatively a calm and orderly routine. No longer is that the case, he added, noting that the Russian Embassy in London and the Foreign Ministry in Moscow have issued statements and tweets mocking Britain as an impotent has-been power and scoffing at the Salisbury poisoning as the “so-called Sergei Skripal case.”
President Putin, Mr. Bond added, “is not trying to foment international revolution, but he is the great disrupter” and revels in wrong-footing foreign governments by flouting established norms.
While Russia may have been surprised by the magnitude of the coordinated expulsions by Britain’s allies on Monday, it was clearly anticipating something. Hours before they were announced, it went on the offensive.
Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, posted a message on Facebook sneering at the European Union for showing solidarity with Britain at a time when London is negotiating its exit from the bloc. Britain, she wrote, is “exploiting the solidarity factor to impose on those that are remaining a deterioration in relations with Russia.”
While President Trump has expressed a curious affinity with Mr. Putin and raised expectations of improved relations, the Russian leader has always been more measured. The underlying mistrust seemed to be reinforced on Monday by Russia’s ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Antonov, who told the Interfax news agency that “what the United States of America is doing today is destroying whatever little is left in Russian-U.S. relations.”
Despite the unpredictability under Mr. Putin, the possibility of nuclear conflict between the Russians and the West, the most frightening aspect of the Cold War, does not appear to have increased. Arms control agreements reached since the 1970s are still honored — with the exception of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile accord, known as the ABM Treaty, which Mr. Bush abandoned 30 years later.
Mr. Bush’s decision, questioned by even some American allies, opened the way, in Moscow’s view, to a free-for-all in international relations that has left the United States and Russia struggling to recover the trust developed by President Ronald Reagan and the last Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, in the 1980s.
In a state of the nation address in February, President Putin unveiled what he described as a new generation of “invincible” long-range nuclear missiles but, speaking later in an interview with NBC, he blamed Washington for pushing Moscow into a new arms race by disregarding a Cold War status quo.
“If you speak about the arms race, it started when the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty,” he said.
Confronted with Moscow’s disruptive actions in the 1920s, Britain and other European countries “did not know how to respond and took 10 years or more to figure out how to deal with Moscow,” said Mr. Kurilla, the St. Petersburg historian.
In the case of Britain, the leading power of the day and the first Western country to recognize the Soviet Union, the process had echoes of the present. It recognized the new Bolshevik government in 1924 but then expelled Soviet diplomats and shuttered their embassy three years later after the police uncovered what they said was a Soviet espionage ring bent on spreading mayhem.

2018: The Year of the Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

Sloshing of Earth’s core may spike major earthquakes
By Paul VoosenOct. 30, 2017 , 1:45 PM
The number of major earthquakes, like the magnitude-7 one that devastated Haiti in 2010, seems to be correlated with minute fluctuations in day length.
SEATTLE—The world doesn’t stop spinning. But every so often, it slows down. For decades, scientists have charted tiny fluctuations in the length of Earth’s day: Gain a millisecond here, lose a millisecond there. Last week at the annual meeting of the Geological Society of America here, two geophysicists argued that these minute changes could be enough to influence the timing of major earthquakes—and potentially help forecast them.
During the past 100 years, Earth’s slowdowns have correlated surprisingly well with periods with a global increase in magnitude-7 and larger earthquakes, according to Roger Bilham of the University of Colorado (CU) in Boulder and Rebecca Bendick at the University of Montana in Missoula. Usefully, the spike, which adds two to five more quakes than typical, happens well after the slow-down begins. “The Earth offers us a 5-years heads up on future earthquakes, which is remarkable,” says Bilham, who presented the work.
Most seismologists agree that earthquake prediction is a minefield. And so far, Bilham and Bendick have only fuzzy, hard-to-test ideas about what might cause the pattern they found. But the finding is too provocative to ignore, other researchers say. “The correlation they’ve found is remarkable, and deserves investigation,” says Peter Molnar, a geologist also at CU.
The research started as a search for synchrony in earthquake timing. Individual oscillators, be they fireflies, heart muscles, or metronomes, can end up vibrating in synchrony as a result of some kind of cross-talk—or some common influence. To Bendick, it didn’t seem a far jump to consider the faults that cause earthquakes, with their cyclical buildup of strain and violent discharge, as “really noisy, really crummy oscillators,” she says. She and Bilham dove into the data, using the only complete earthquake catalog for the past 100 years: magnitude-7 and larger earthquakes.
In work published in August in Geophysical Research Letters they reported two patterns: First, major quakes appeared to cluster in time
—although not in space. And second, the number of large earthquakes seemed to peak at 32-year intervals. The earthquakes could be somehow talking to each other, or an external force could be nudging the earth into rupture.
Exploring such global forces, the researchers eventually discovered the match with the length of day. Although weather patterns such as El Nino can drive day length to vary back and forth by a millisecond over a year or more, a periodic, decades-long fluctuation of several milliseconds—in particular, its point of peak slow down about every three decades or so—lined up with the quake trend perfectly. "Of course that seems sort of crazy," Bendick says. But maybe it isn’t. When day length changes over decades, Earth’s magnetic field also develops a temporary ripple. Researchers think slight changes in the flow of the molten iron of the outer core may be responsible for both effects. Just what happens is uncertain—perhaps a bit of the molten outer core sticks to the mantle above. That might change the flow of the liquid metal, altering the magnetic field, and transfer enough momentum between the mantle and the core to affect day length.
Seismologists aren’t used to thinking about the planet’s core, buried 2900 kilometers beneath the crust where quakes happen. But they should, Bilham said during his talk here. The core is “quite close to us. It’s closer than New York from here,” he said.
At the equator, Earth spins 460 meters per second. Given this high velocity, it’s not absurd to think that a slight mismatch in speed between the solid crust and mantle and the liquid core could translate into a force somehow nudging quakes into synchrony, Molnar says. Of course, he adds, “It might be nonsense.” But the evidence for some kind of link is compelling, says geophysicist Michael Manga of the University of California, Berkeley. “I’ve worked on earthquakes triggered by seasonal variation, melting snow. His correlation is much better than what I’m used to seeing.”
One way or another, says James Dolan, a geologist at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, “we’re going to know in 5 years.” That’s because Earth’s rotation began a periodic slow-down 4-plus years ago. Beginning next year, Earth should expect five more major earthquakes a year than average—between 17 to 20 quakes, compared with the anomalously low four so far this year. If the pattern holds, it will put a new spin on earthquake forecasting.
doi:10.1126/science.aar3598

China Fuels the Pakistani Nuclear Horn

India Pakistan conflict: China sell nuclear weapons to Pakistan as world war 3 fears rise | UK | News

Dan Falvey

GETTYPakistan have been buying nuclear weapons from China it has been revealed

The revelations come as tensions between India and Pakistan are rising, risking a full blown conflict between the two neighbours.Pakistan’s decision to invest in its nuclear capabilities during such a volatile moment in its diplomatic relations with India has caused concern.
China declassified the information regarding the sales this week, but it is uncertain when the transfer took place.
However, it is already known Pakistan has been testing its nuclear capabilities for over a year.

Last March, the head of the Defence Intelligence Agency stated Islamabad had “conducted the first test launch of its nuclear-capable ‘Ababeel' ballistic missile, demonstrating South Asia's first multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload.”According to the Arms Control Association Pakistan is pro-actively looking to increase its nuclear stock.
They said the nation is “pursuing new ballistic missile, cruise missile and sea-based nuclear delivery systems”.
The group estimated the Asian country has a nuclear warhead stockpile of approximately 130 to 140.

GETTYIndia's Prime Minister Modi has accused Pakistan for the conflict, but their neighbour disagrees

They also admitted the increase in nuclear stock was a direct consequence of rising tensions with New Delhi.The Arms Control Association said: “Pakistan has lowered the threshold for nuclear weapon use by developing tactical nuclear weapon capabilities to counter perceived Indian conventional military threats.”
Heavy exchanges of shelling on the contested border, known as the Line of Control (LoC), have increased over the past 12 months.
The Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947 and 1965 both revolved around competing claims for the area.

Pakistan Day parade shows off country's military power

Both countries have accused the other of being responsible.There are fears the tensions could cause a rift across the whole region with countries in Asia picking sides in the conflict.
The United Nations have encouraged the pair to engage in talks as part of a desperate plea for the violence on the border to be de-escalated.

The Growing Russian Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

The Origin and Implications of Russia’s 'New' Nuclear Weapons

Austin Long

 

“Crazy.” “Dr. Strangelove weapons.” These were just two of the more colorful reactions to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revelation of new exotic nuclear delivery systems in a March 1 speech. The system receiving the most attention is a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile with intercontinental range, though the Status-6, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed long-range underwater vehicle, has also drawn comment. Why would Russia, which has over 1,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads that can already be delivered from existing ballistic and cruise missiles, invest in these new, exotic — and, according to some, crazy — systems?
The answer is deeply rooted in two of the defining events of modern Russian and Soviet history: the Great Patriotic War (or World War II) and the Cold War. Far from being crazy, these “new” Russian nuclear weapons have their origin in an abiding fear and respect for U.S. nuclear and missile defense capabilities. This history has implications for the future of U.S.-Russian arms control, which will remain bleak absent a return to limitations on missile defense to address Russia’s longstanding concerns.
Stalin and Defending Against the Bomb
The roots of Russian insecurity go back to the German surprise attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. While the traditional barriers to invading Russia — vast spaces, harsh weather, and Russian fighting spirit — held against German ground forces, the same cannot be said of aerial attack. Soviet air defenses were inadequate to counter Luftwaffe air raids, vaulting over the barriers and striking the Soviet interior.
While the Soviets were eventually able to adjust the organization and equipment of their air defenses, the Red Army was well aware of the damage done to Germany by their allies’ massive strategic bombing campaign. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki underscored that in the next war, traditional Russian defensive advantages would count for nothing. The horrifying Nazi devastation of the Soviet Union took years — next time, it might only take days or even hours.
Stalin launched crash programs to build atomic bombs and the means to deliver them. Notably, he also undertook a series of efforts to ensure defense of the Soviet Union against the atomic bomb. First, he launched air defense organizational reforms, culminating in the 1949 creation of a separate branch of the Soviet armed forces focused on strategic air defense. This created an enduring bureaucratic advocate for air and, later, missile defense. Then, in 1950, Stalin created a research and development organization focused on surface-to-air missiles that was essentially co-equal with the atomic bomb and offensive missile projects. Surface-to-air missiles were key to defending against high-flying nuclear bombers and, in the future, ballistic missiles. The Soviets, living with the searing memory of the Great Patriotic War linked to the possibility of nuclear war, took strategic defenses extremely seriously.
Stalin’s efforts bore fruit a decade later when, in 1960, a Soviet surface-to-air missile downed an American U-2 spy plane. Less well-known is that the Soviets performed their first successful test intercept of an intermediate-range ballistic missile less than a year later. By the mid-1960s the Soviets had greatly expanded the areas of the country protected against air attack and begun deployment of a missile defense system around Moscow.
Fear of Checkmate: Soviet Views of the Missile Defense Competition
Even so, the Soviets were well aware of the limits of both their offensive and defensive forces relative to the Americans. The United States in the mid-1960s had a vastly more capable offensive nuclear force — if it invested as extensively in missile defense as the Soviets had, it would likely have had an equally huge advantage in that area as well. A CIA estimate from 1966 assessed likely Soviet responses to various proposed U.S. missile defense deployments, concluding:
While we worry about their strengths and our vulnerabilities, they worry about our strengths and their vulnerabilities … From their point of view either the [missile defense] Posture A or the Posture B program would threaten eventually to degrade the deterrent power of their strategic attack forces.
The Soviets took missile defense so seriously that they did not want to lose a competition in the field. Better that neither side have missile defenses than the United States be superior in offense and defense. Thus, despite intense interest in missile defense for both strategic and bureaucratic reasons, Soviet leaders were eager for an arms control agreement to end the competition. A Special National Intelligence Estimate in 1970 assessed that the Soviets would be interested in arms control limits on missile defense based in large part “on a fear that U.S. technology could put it ahead in this field.” Such limits were codified in 1972 as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Freezing missile defense also allowed the Soviets to agree to limits on the number of strategic nuclear weapons, as embodied in the agreements of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. Yet as Brendan Green and I have described, limits on the number of arms did not limit competition over the quality of those arms. The United States began improving the accuracy of its nuclear weapons and the intelligence to find elusive targets like submarines and mobile missiles. By the early 1980s, Soviet leadership was increasingly fearful that the United States was developing the capability to neutralize the Soviet strategic deterrent with offensive strikes. The head of the KGB (and soon-to-be leader of the Soviet Union) Yuri Andropov concluded in 1981, “The US is preparing for war but it is not willing to start a war … They strive for military superiority in order to ‘check’ us and then declare ‘checkmate’ against us without starting a war.”
It was in this context that President Ronald Reagan announced in 1983 the Strategic Defense Initiative, a comprehensive missile defense program sometimes derisively called “Star Wars.” To the Soviets, already concerned about U.S. technical advantages in missile defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative was an obvious complement to existing U.S. capabilities to attack Soviet nuclear forces. Some Soviet calculations suggested that by the mid-1990s, when U.S. nuclear modernization was complete, a Soviet retaliatory strike following a U.S. nuclear first strike might only be able to hit 100 American targets. An even modestly effective missile defense could cut that number in half, while a highly effective missile defense might reduce the number of targets struck to fewer than ten. U.S. “checkmate” looked increasingly possible — perhaps even likely.
The Soviets began considering ways to neutralize the advantage of U.S. missile defenses. These included attacking space-based components of the system with anti-satellite weapons and building decoys for their existing missiles. More exotic asymmetric responses were apparently contemplated as well: A declassified article from the CIA’s professional journal notes, “General Secretary Yuri Andropov had considered such options as … developing and deploying underwater missiles that would not be affected by the space-based missile shield.” A 1983 U.S. intelligence assessment also noted the possibility that to counter U.S. missile defenses, the Soviets might eventually pursue “[n]uclear powered intercontinental cruise missiles” which “would have a greater payload capability, range, and ability to deploy advanced defensive electronics than present small cruise missiles.”
In summary, nearly 35 years ago the Soviet leadership, fearful of renewed missile defense competition and U.S. nuclear modernization, began to mull exactly the sort of systems Putin revealed this month. They did so not because they were crazy, but because they were deeply fearful that the United States would resume missile defense competition in parallel with a competition over the quality of strategic nuclear forces. The Soviets doubted they could keep up in either competition — much less both — so asymmetric responses were their only hope. Within a few years the Cold War wound down peacefully, but historical experiences continued to underlie Soviet — now Russian — fears of missile defense.
The Meaning of the Nuclear Precision Color Revolution: Russian Views Today
Through the 1990s Russian leadership had no substantial fears of U.S. missile defense, as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was still in place and the country was dealing with a variety of domestic concerns. However, in the early 2000s, the United States began to pursue national missile defense, eventually withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. Russian leaders were deeply concerned. In June 2000, Putin, near the beginning of his first term as president, remarked:

… in the event of an official U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty Russia will be forced to consider the scenario whereby it may abandon its commitments not only under the START Treaty but also under the treaty of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles.

The following year, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev “threatened the resumption of ‘three mighty programs [begun during the SDI era] to counteract asymmetrically the national missile defense of the United States,’” according to the declassified CIA article. Though it is unclear which programs exactly he was referring to, it is plausible that he meant the Status-6 and the nuclear-powered cruise missile.
Regardless, Russian leaders made clear they might “abandon” the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and deploy asymmetric means to counter U.S. missile defense. In this way, Moscow telegraphed the deployment of the treaty-violating SSC-8 missile, the Status-6, and the nuclear-powered cruise missile more than 15 years ago. No wonder Putin claimed in his recent speech, “no one has listened to us … You listen to us now.” The rationale for these deployments is essentially the same as the one that drove their origins during the Cold War: fear that Russian strategic nuclear deterrent would be undermined if it could not compete with the United States in weapons technology. Thus, just as in the 1960s, it is not U.S. capabilities today (which are very, very modest) or tomorrow that worry the Russians — it is U.S. capabilities over the course of a long competition.
However, there are two differences between Soviet fears of missile defense in the Cold War and Russian fears today. The first is the “precision revolution” in conventional munitions, which Russia has observed closely since the Gulf War in 1991. Based on these observations, the Russians now believe a massive first strike volley of conventional precision munitions could be effective in neutralizing much of their strategic deterrent. The second difference is the emergence of so-called “color revolutions” on the Russian periphery — successful uprisings against Moscow-friendly regimes that the Russians believe the West helped engineer.
Together, these two new fears have led Russian leadership to fear it might face Western-sponsored unrest, which the West will support with precision munitions. The Russians think they have seen this movie before in Serbia, Libya, Iraq, and, if not for timely Russian intervention, Syria. Unlike these other states, Russia has a nuclear deterrent — which is why missile defense competition looks, if anything, more ominous to the Russians today than to the Soviets in the 1980s. For the Russian leadership, the “new” nuclear systems are not crazy or Strangelovian — they are intimately connected to regime survival. 
Implications for U.S.-Russia Arms Control
None of the foregoing is intended to justify Russian behavior, particularly treaty-violating behavior. But it is important that U.S. policymakers understand the Russian perspective. Russian proclamations about missile defense are not mere propaganda, though they may overstate some of their views publicly to influence various audiences. So what does this mean for the nuclear relationship? First, U.S. leaders should recognize that no amount of explaining of the technical limitations of present or even potential U.S. missile defense capability is likely to change long and deeply held Russian views about missile defense competition.
Second, and more importantly, there is probably no future for formal, treaty-based U.S.-Russian arms control if the negotiations do not cover missile defense. The Russians sought unsuccessfully to include missile defense in the last round of strategic arms control negotiations (2009-2010). Today, with their “new” systems, they have a stronger bargaining position. This presents a dilemma for American policymakers, who clearly want to continue the ongoing U.S. deployment of limited missile defense capabilities against North Korea and Iran, even if they do not seek to neutralize Russia’s strategic deterrent, as the Kremlin fears. The instinct may be to simply proceed with missile defense despite the consequences for arms control.
Yet there are real benefits to arms control with Russia, and so the United States seeks to preserve existing agreements, especially the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Given that the Russians have made clear they think that treaty was linked to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the only solution may be to start from scratch, with a broader set of negotiations that seeks new mutually acceptable limits on intermediate-range systems, “new” Russian systems, and missile defenses. The recently postponed U.S.-Russia strategic stability talks may be a venue to explore these possibilities.
But if such an agreement is impossible, it likely spells the end of formal arms control for the foreseeable future. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty will become a dead letter (if it is not already). Further strategic arms control after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expires is unlikely. Would the United States — and especially the Senate — agree to a new treaty that does not cover Status-6 and the nuclear-powered cruise missile? Would the Russians agree to limit these systems without missile defense limitations? While tacit or non-treaty based agreements may be possible, the Russians have not shown much interest in these possibilities.
Putin’s revelation of these “new” systems no doubt had many motives, but one was surely to underscore that Russia has long taken U.S. offensive forces and missile defenses very seriously. Rather than dismissing these systems as mere destabilizing aberrations or an element of Putin’s election posturing, policymakers should grapple with the implications. Unfettered U.S. missile defense might be worth the slow unraveling of the current arms control regime, but policymakers should not fool themselves into believing there are no costs to the unconstrained pursuit of missile defense.

Austin Long is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and the author of multiple studies on nuclear strategy.

US Goes After Pakistani Nuclear Horn

Trump Slams Pakistan Companies With Sanctions

Newsweek Cristina Maza

 

The U.S. has decided to sanction seven Pakistani companies suspected of having links to the nuclear trade, another indication that the Trump administration views Pakistan as a rogue actor that cannot be trusted to protect international security.

 

A rule published by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security on March 22 determined that the seven entities from Pakistan are “acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” One entity from Singapore and 15 entities located in South Sudan were also added to the list. © Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images 936852998

The inclusion of the companies on the department’s “Entities List” means that U.S. and foreign companies doing business with the singled out businesses must obtain a special license. Some experts say this will allow the U.S. to more closely supervise the companies' behavior.“These sanctions are not a total embargo on economic activity by these companies, but require them to obtain a special license from the Department of Commerce in order to engage in this kind of economic trade, on a case-by-case basis. This would ensure more oversight of their activities related to nuclear energy by the U.S. government,” Harrison Akins, a researcher at the Howard Baker Center who focuses on Pakistan, told Newsweek.
“In the context of recent events in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, this is further evidence of the growing mistrust of Pakistan, not only in counterterrorism efforts but also in proliferation issues, a long time point of contention between the two nations,” Akins added.
The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan has been especially fraught since President Donald Trump brought in the New Year with a string of tweets attacking Pakistan. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. announced that it would cut nearly all security aid to Pakistan until Islamabad began doing more to crack down on the Taliban networks operating within its borders.
The inclusion of seven Pakistani entities on the Department of Commerce’s list could also negatively impact Pakistan’s ability to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international alliance of countries that aim to promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Diverse countries like Australia, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom are all part of the group, as is the United States. Pakistan has long aimed to join the group in order to gain further legitimacy on the international stage, but some experts say that goal is a long way off for Islamabad.
“Pakistan says it demonstrates responsible nuclear behavior, but these sanctions demonstrate that things have not changed enough. There is a lot of duplicity. And I think the Nuclear Suppliers Group was always out of reach for them. That was a far-fetched goal,” Bharath Gopalaswamy, director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, told Newsweek.
Pakistan’s reputation on the international stage will likely suffer from the inclusion of the companies—none of which are well-known—on the list, experts say. But that’s unlikely to force the country to change its behavior dramatically.
“Though these measures will have some problematic reputational consequences for Pakistan, we shouldn't overstate their impact,” Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia program at the Wilson Center, told Newsweek.
“Let's face it, these sanctions won't magically prompt Pakistan to change its behavior in ways that address US demands and expectations,” Kugelman added.