Recent reports
suggest that Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump insistently
asked an anonymous foreign-policy expert why the United States should
not use nuclear weapons more readily. This has led to a chorus of
voices decrying the way in which Trump is reported to have spoken about
the nuclear option, with many insisting the United States should only
ever employ nuclear weapons in retaliation after an opponent has used
them first.
It is certainly right that such terrible weapons should only be used
in extreme circumstances (a point of view Trump appears to have
expressed earlier this year), but the conventional wisdom is wrong in
suggesting the United States should under no circumstances be the first
to use nuclear arms.
This controversy is not merely another spark of the campaign season, for, according to newsreports,
President Barack Obama himself is considering implementing a “no-first-use” pledge regarding nuclear weapons — that is, a promise never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a pledge would be exceedingly unwise.
Nuclear weapons are horrible instruments of destruction, but they are
also associated with the longest period of major-power peace in human
history. And they only work because potentially ambitious states believe
their use is plausible enough that starting a war or escalating one
against a nuclear-armed state or its allies would just be too risky to
countenance. The point of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons
first (which, it must be emphasized, is different from a policy of
preemption or heavy reliance on them) is not to convey a madman’s itchy
trigger finger on the button. Rather, its purpose is to communicate
clearly to any potential aggressor that attacking one’s vital interests
too harshly or successfully — even without resorting to nuclear weapons —
risks prompting a devastating nuclear response, something that, at
scale, is far more costly than any realistic gains.
A no-first-use pledge would undermine this pacifying logic. If the
policy were believed, then it would make the world safe for conventional
war. Since potential aggressors would write the risk of nuclear use
down to zero, they would feel they could safely start and wage fierce
conventional wars.
Conventional wars can be small, quick, and decisive, which is why
they can also be appealing — just ask Napoleon, James Polk, Otto von
Bismarck, or Moshe Dayan. But they can also escalate dramatically and
unpredictably, especially when major powers are involved. Thus, the most
likely route to nuclear use is via a nasty conventional war, as
happened in World War II. In such circumstances, high-minded pledges
made in peacetime may well seem foolish or too burdensome.
A believable
no-first-use pledge would likely raise, rather than diminish, the
likelihood of nuclear weapons being used by lightening the shadow of
nuclear weapons over the decision-making of potential combatants. Better for everyone to think as carefully and clearly as possible about nuclear weapons before a war is underway.
Alternatively, if the no-first-use pledge were not believed, what
would the point of such a promise be other than diplomatic window
dressing?
It is for these reasons that the United States has never adopted a
no-first-use policy. During the Cold War, the United States relied on
its nuclear deterrent to compensate for perceived Soviet and Warsaw Pact
conventional advantages in Europe. But even in the post-Cold War period
of American military supremacy, when Washington sought to diminish its
strategic reliance on nuclear weapons, it judged the future was too
uncertain to dispense with the reserved right to go first. While other
countries such as China and India have declared no-first-use policies
(though there is a great deal of skepticism about how reliable Beijing’s
pledge is), Washington and the allies that depend on its nuclear
umbrella have always recognized that a no-first-use pledge by the United
States would be unwise because of the breadth of defense commitments it
has assumed. If the U.S. nuclear arsenal were solely designed to deter
conventional attacks on the continental United States, a no-first-use
pledge might have more merit, as launching such an assault would be
incredibly difficult. But Washington also seeks to deter attacks on its
allies in areas like Eastern Europe and East Asia, where U.S.
conventional superiority is far less assured.
The main reason why a no-first-use pledge does not make sense for
Washington, then, is the reality that the United States cannot always
expect to maintain the military upper hand everywhere, and a
no-first-use pledge is not the kind of commitment a nation can turn on
and off without damage to its credibility and reputation.
But can anyone plausibly challenge the United States in a conventional war in the near to medium term? The answer is yes;
China might well be able to. Russia and North Korea are also very
dangerous to the United States and its allies in their own ways, and
Moscow could plausibly hope to take on the United States conventionally
if it could localize a conflict in its “near abroad” and keep it short,
but neither can reasonably expect to challenge the United States in a
serious, prolonged conventional war and hope to prevail.
But China at some point in the not-too-distant future might. A range
of authoritative sources are showing that the conventional military
balance of power between the United States and China with respect to
points of contention in East Asia such as Taiwan and the South and East
China Seas is, at the very least, becoming increasingly competitive.
Beijing is fielding more and more highly capable forces in the Western
Pacific that present a growing challenge to America’s ability to
effectively project military power in the region.
The days are therefore passing when the United States could easily
swipe away any effort by the People’s Liberation Army at power
projection in the Western Pacific. Instead, any future fight in the
region between the United States and its allies on the one hand and
China on the other would be hard and nasty. And the trend lines are not
moving in a good direction. Indeed, within a decade, China might be in a
position where it could reasonably expect to confront a U.S. ally or
partner in the Western Pacific and hope to prevail if the conflict
remained relatively limited.
If the United
States adds to this a credible guarantee that it would not use nuclear
weapons first, it would strengthen China’s confidence that it could wage
a short, sharp conventional war and gain from it, just as such
confidence is rising and becoming more plausible to decision-makers in
Beijing already contemplating the use of force in the region. According
to a recent Reuters report, for instance, influential voices in the
Chinese military establishment are already pushing for firmer security
policies and even military action in the South China Sea — and this at a
time when the United States still enjoys the conventional upper hand.
These voices are likely to seem more credible and appealing in the
councils of power in Beijing as Chinese military advantages grow, and
they would only be emboldened by a U.S. statement that it will not use
nuclear weapons first. A no-first-use pledge would therefore increase
the chances of war in Asia.
Indeed, rather than excluding the possibility of American nuclear
first use, Washington should be emphasizing it. This does not mean the
United States should ever use its nuclear weapons lightly. Rather,
Beijing should simply understand that, even if it is able to gain
conventional military advantages in the Western Pacific, Washington is
prepared to seriously consider using nuclear weapons first to vindicate
its own vital interests and those of its allies — for instance with
respect to their territorial integrity. More than that, Beijing should
understand clearly that if it pushes forward with its military buildup,
it will spur the United States to rely even more on its nuclear forces
to compensate — and, if that is not enough, the real possibility that
U.S. allies will be impelled to pursue nuclear arsenals of their own.
Communicating all this to Beijing does not require any Strangelovian
contortions. But it does require the United States to firmly and
consistently say (or otherwise communicate) that it is prepared to use
nuclear weapons first if truly pressed; to build the forces, such as a
next-generation standoff cruise missile and intercontinental ballistic
missile, useful in making such a declaration credible; and to exercise
and deploy its forces in ways that show Beijing its earnestness about
such a declaration.
Such a policy is more likely to contribute to peace and stability
than a no-first-use pledge. China is very unlikely to turn away from its
effort to achieve military dominance in East Asia and the Western
Pacific based on appeals to goodwill or competitions in moral preening.
What might actually work is persuading Beijing that succeeding in this
effort is likely to backfire by resulting in little to no gain and a
more menacing and dangerous set of opposing militaries. Does China want a
U.S. defense posture for Asia that relies more on nuclear weapons? A
proliferated Asia-Pacific? Washington must make Beijing understand that
if it continues its military buildup, those are very real probabilities.
A no-first-use pledge would suggest to Beijing just the opposite —
that continuing to build up, and perhaps even using, its military power
may not be sufficiently dangerous or costly after all. That would be far
worse for Asia and America than a perhaps unfashionable reminder that
there will be a grim nuclear risk if Beijing ever seeks to capitalize on
its growing conventional military strength.
WORLD WAR 3: INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR WAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS POSSIBLE
