Showing posts with label second. Show all posts
Showing posts with label second. Show all posts

Friday, December 25, 2015

Christmas Is Preparing For Chist’s Second Coming (Isaiah 11)


Mac Slavo December 22, 2015

In their book Petrus Romanus, authors Tom Horn and Cris Putnam made two startling predictions. In 2012, while Pope Benedict was still in office, they predicted the occurrence of an event that had not happened for over 600 years – Benedict’s abdication of the Papacy. When Pope Benedict resigned early the following year it came as a total shock to the one billion Catholics worldwide. The two researchers, who jokingly say their inspiration was the Holy Spirit, have remained tight-lipped about how they were able to forecast an almost unprecedented event so accurately.

But as incredible of a prediction as it was, it is nothing compared to the second one Horn and Putnam put forth. The two cite a 600-year old prophecy by Saint Malachy who, through inspiration from God reportedly penned the names of the next 112 Popes in succession. As it turns out, Benedict’s resignation would lead to the eventual election of Pope Francis, the 112th person on the list. Where things get scary is that the Prophecy ends with Francis – after him Malachy listed no more successors. The prophecy itself refers to this final pope as “Petrus Romanus,” or Peter the Roman.
According to Malachy’s prophecy the world is headed into dark times:

“In extreme persecution the seat of the Holy Roman Church will be occupied by Peter the Roman.”
“Who will pasture his sheep in many tribulations and when these things are finished, the city of seven hills will be destroyed, and the terrible or fearsome judge will judge his people.
The End.”

Prophecy of the Popes – Attributed to St. Malachy circa 1139 A.D.

Whatever your thoughts on prophecy or prediction, Pope Francis holds incredible influence over some one billion Catholics worldwide. He is after all, the successor to Peter, the first Pope and direct disciple of Jesus Christ. So when the Pope speaks his words have serious ramifications for the Church. Within the last couple years he has already caused controversy both within the Church and the broader Christian public surrounding his thoughts on climate change, homosexual rights, and wealth distribution, with many saying that his changes to long-held doctrine could lead to the end of the Catholic Church as we know it today.

But his latest warnings could spell the literal End of Days

“It’s all a charade. The world has not understood the way of peace. The whole world is at war,” he said grimly.
We are close to Christmas. There will be lights, there will be parties, bright trees, even Nativity scenes – all decked out – while the world continues to wage war,” he said earlier in December.
The Pontiff, who turned 79 on Thursday, elaborated on his views this weekend, telling a crowd, “While the world starves, burns, and descends further into chaos, we should realise that this year’s Christmas celebrations for those who choose to celebrate it may be their last“.
Is Pope Francis simply assessing, like many have, the dire situation around the world as it relates to economic and geo-political strife? Or is he aware that he is, in fact, destined to be the Final Pope who oversees not just the destruction of the Church, but the entire planet?

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

India Extends Nuclear Arm Into Pakistani Waters (Dan 8)

thediplomat_2014-02-10_21-26-25-386x274 

Sea Trials of Indian Navy’s Deadliest Sub Going ‘Very Well’


Sea trials of India’s first indigenously developed ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) are going “very well”, Indian Navy chief of staff Admiral RK Dhowan observed last week on the sidelines of a naval aviation conference, according to local media reports.

The 6,000-ton nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant, began sea-trials  in the Bay of Bengal on December 16, 2014  (the day Pakistan formally surrendered to India in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 that lead to the creation of Bangladesh). The sea-trials are scheduled to last nine months, followed by extensive weapons testing on board of the vessel lasting at least an equal amount of time. The Arihant‘s reactor already went critical in August 2013.

“There are no problems in the INS Arihant project. The trials are underway and going on very well. We are satisfied with the way the project is progressing,” he noted. However, the admiral added that he is “not in a position to give timelines with regard to the completion of INS Arihant trials or what happens thereafter.”

The indigenously designed submarine, based on the Russian Project 971 Akula I-class nuclear powered attack boats, is the lead vessel of the Indian Navy’s future fleet of four (some media reports say five)  Arihant-class SSBNs. India already began construction of INS Aridhaman, the second vessel of the Arihant-class, this year.

Conversely, the Indian Navy still does not have a capable ballistic missile with which to arm the INS Arihant. As my colleague Ankit Panda noted the SSBN will be equipped with 12 K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a 700-750 km range – a significant limitation, since the submarine has to move close to enemy shores to launch its missiles, making it vulnerable to detection.

India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is also working on the K-4, an intermediate-range nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile, with a rage of up to 3,500 km and is currently undergoing testing.

Additionally, India’s nuclear warfare policy is predicated on a No First-Use (NFU) doctrine; consequently, New Delhi needs to field a credible second-strike capability. However, as a recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (see: “India and Pakistan Locked in Nuclear Naval Arms Race”) points out “India, like Pakistan, is known to keep its nuclear warheads de-mated from the delivery mechanisms. For the INS Arihant to fulfill its operational responsibility, SLBMs mounted with nuclear warheads will have to be deployed on the vessel.”

As I reported before (see: “India’s Submarine Fleet Faces Further Delays”), India’s submarine fleet is in a state of crisis. Readiness rates are below 40 percent and some vessels (especially the SSK U209 class) need urgent upgrades. On paper, the fleet currently consists of 16 boats: ten Russian SSK Kilo (Sindhugosh) Class, four locally built SSK U209 (Shishumar) Class, a leased nuclear-powered SSN from Russia (INS Chakra), and the INS Arihant. However, according to local media reports, the number of active duty subs is now down to 13 diesel-electric submarines and the nuclear-powered INS Chakra.

Tuesday, April 28, 2015

India Ups Nukes Against China And Pakistan (Dan 7:7)

India's Su-30MKI fourth-generation multirole fighter jet. (Internet photo)

India’s modified Su-30 can strike China with nuclear warhead: report

  • Staff Reporter
  • 2015-04-27
  • 15:39 (GMT+8)
India will now be able to strike “deep into the heart of China” with a nuclear missile after making modifications to its powerful Su-30MKI multirole fighter jet, according to a report from the Washington-based National Interest magazine.

India’s Strategic Forces Command is said to have modified 42 of its Su-30MKI aircraft so that they can carry air-launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles.

New Delhi already has around 200 Su-30MKI aircraft in its arsenal and plans to eventually acquire 282 of the fourth-generation combat fighter, which is intended to be the “backbone” of the Indian Air Force through 2020 and beyond.

The Brahmos, on the other hand, is the fastest cruise missile in the world, capable of traveling at speeds of Mach 3.0 — or 3,000 meters per second.

“In tests, the BrahMos has often cut warships in half and reduced ground targets to smithereens,” said the Russia and India Report, adding that pairing the two together will drastically expand the striking power of the air leg of India’s nuclear triad.

“The Sukhoi’s blistering speed will add extra momentum to the missile, plus the aircraft’s ability to penetrate hardened air defenses means there is a greater chance for the pilot to deliver the missile on to its designated target,” the report said.

Importantly, when the Su-39’s 1,800-km range is combined with the Brahmos’ ability to hit targets 300 km away, India will now be able to strike deep into the heart of China or Pakistan with a nuclear warhead.

In addition, India has also been testing the Agni-V, a three-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile. With a range of about 5,000 km, the missile will give India the ability to strike any part of China with nuclear weapons for the very first time, the National Interest said.

Friday, April 24, 2015

India Ups The Nuclear Ante (Daniel 7)


India’s New Mega Weapon: Nuclear-Armed Supersonic Missiles

According to media reports, India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) has begun receiving 42 Su-30MKI air dominance fighters modified to carry air-launched BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. This will significantly enhance the striking power of the air leg of India’s nuclear triad.
“Individually, the Su-30 and BrahMos are powerful weapons,” Russia and India Report noted. “But when the world’s most capable fourth generation fighter is armed with a uniquely destructive cruise missile, together they are a dramatic force multiplier.”
The Sukhoi Su-30 MKI is a twin-seater, highly maneuverable, fourth-generation multirole combat fighter aircraft built by Russia’s Sukhoi Design Bureau and licensed to India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The plane will serve as the backbone of India’s Air Force through 2020 and beyond. Delhi has already acquired around 200 jets, and eventually plans to acquire 282 of them.
The Brahmos is a joint development between joint effort between India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s NPO Mashinostroeyenia. Capable of traveling at speeds of Mach 3.0, the Brahmos is the fastest cruise missile in the world. As Russia and India Report explained, “The BrahMos’ 3000 km per second speed – literally faster than a bullet – means it hits the target with a huge amount of kinetic energy. In tests, the BrahMos has often cut warships in half and reduced ground targets to smithereens.”
The same report notes that the Su-30 will add to the Brahmos’ already deadly effect. “The Sukhoi’s blistering speed will add extra launch momentum to the missile, plus the aircraft’s ability to penetrate hardened air defences means there is a greater chance for the pilot to deliver the missile on to its designated targets.”
Pairing the Su-30 with the Brahmos missile will also drastically expand the striking power of the air leg of India’s nuclear triad. The Su-30 itself has a range of up to 1,800 kilometers while the Brahmos missile can strike targets nearly 300 kilometers away. Thus, the newly modified Su-30s will allow India’s nuclear aircraft to strike deep in the heart of China or Pakistan, Delhi’s two main adversaries.
The plan to modify the Su-30 to carry the Brahmos missiles was first hatched back in 2010 when the SFC submitted a proposal for two squadrons of Su-30s to be put under its command. Later, in 2012, India’s cabinet approved the project to modify 42 Su-30s to carry 216 Brahmos missiles. According to the Times of India, the integration project was mostly carried out by BrahMos Aerospace, with HAL also contributing crucial modifications.
The first of the new planes was handed over to the SFC in February and is believed to have undergone tests last month. Production on the second of the modified Su-30s has already begun. It is unclear when the SFC expects to receive the rest of the planes.
The Brahmos-armed Su-30s is only one of the ways that India is strengthening its strategic deterrent. It has also been busy testing the Agni-V, which is three-stage solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a range of about 5,000 km. When the Agni-V is inducted into service, India will have the ability to strike any part of China with nuclear weapons for the first time. Furthermore, India is currently testing ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), which will complete the nuclear triad.
Zachary Keck is the managing editor of The National Interest. You can find him on Twitter: @ZacharyKeck.

Friday, March 20, 2015

India’s Second Strike Ability Troubles Pakistan (Dan 8)

Going nuclear at sea

Written by Iskander Rehman | Posted: March 19, 2015 4:11 am |

 arianth
 
Almost six years ago, in Visakhapatnam, Gursharan Kaur, wife of then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, cracked a coconut on the hull of India’s first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Subsequently named the INS Arihant or “destroyer of enemies”, the vessel was the result of decades of efforts by India’s nuclear scientists. For many years, bureaucratic languor, technical challenges and chronic difficulties in nuclear reactor miniaturisation appeared to ensure that progress would be painstakingly slow. Indeed, at one stage, it became unclear whether the project would see the light of day.

In August 2013, when the Arihant’s nuclear reactor finally went critical, the event was thus widely hailed, both in India and abroad, as a major technological and symbolic milestone. Currently undergoing sea trials, the Arihant is destined to be the first vessel in a flotilla of up to five indigenously produced SSBNs, and it has been reported that a sister vessel, the INS Aridhaman, is nearing completion. Since the Pokhran-II series of nuclear tests in 1998, the Indian government has repeatedly iterated its desire to attain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, structured around what nuclear strategists refer to as a triad, that is, a mixture of aircraft, land-based mobile missiles and naval assets. India’s nuclear doctrine states that it is a no-first-use power, and it is in this light that one must view the importance attached to the sea-based leg of its nuclear deterrent.

Indeed, the survivability and overall resiliency of India’s nuclear arsenal has become a growing concern for military planners in New Delhi, particularly as Beijing continues to make rapid advances in missile, space and cyber technology. Nuclear submarines, provided they are sufficiently quiet, are still considered to be the most survivable of nuclear platforms, due to their mobility and discretion. Placing nuclear assets underwater puts them at a safer distance from a crippling first strike. The development of the Arihant and its successors therefore constitutes the next logical step in Delhi’s quest for an assured retaliatory capability.

It is important to note, however, that while the launch of India’s first indigenous SSBN constitutes a great accomplishment, it is also only the first step in what promises to be a long and onerous process. India’s naval nuclear journey has only just begun.

Going forward, the Indian navy will face three sets of nuclear challenges. The first set is in the technological domain, as the navy struggles to acquire the capability for continuous at-sea deterrence. The second set of difficulties will need to be addressed within the navy itself, as its officers begin to grapple with the importance of their service’s new nuclear role. Finally, Indian naval planners will also have to contend with their Pakistani counterparts’ development of what can best be described as a “naval nuclear force-in-being”.

When the Arihant is finally commissioned, it will be fitted with 12 Sagarika K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Sagarika, however, only has a strike radius of about 750 to 800 km, which many analysts rightly consider inadequate. Indeed, with such a short range, the Arihant could not reach Islamabad, let alone China’s strategic centres. The DRDO is currently working on two longer-range SLBMs: the 3,500-km range K-4, which recently underwent a successful test launch from an underwater pontoon, and the 5,000-km range K-5, which is still in the design phase. According to sources, the Arihant is fitted with four universal tube launchers, which can each carry either three K-15 missiles or one K-4 missile. Observers have raised questions, however, over the compatibility of the K-4’s height with the submarine’s 10.4-m hull. If the length of the K-4 cannot be shortened, the Arihant may need to be retrofitted with a hydrodynamic outer development, or “bump.” Even if the DRDO’s engineers do succeed in squeezing the K-4 aboard, the missile’s range remains somewhat unsatisfactory. It would require India’s nuclear submariners to operate on the northeastern fringes of the Bay of Bengal in order to effectively target China’s major metropolises, rather than within the more sanitised waters abutting India’s eastern seaboard. The K-5 is rumoured to stand at a height of about 12 m, which rules out its deployment aboard the Arihant. The second major technological limitation is that of the Arihant’s nuclear reactor. Reportedly based on first- or second-generation Soviet technology, the 83-megawatt pressurised water reactor has a short refuelling cycle, thus limiting the length of the Arihant’s deterrent patrols.

In short, in order to enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent with regard to China, India will need to deploy larger SSBNs with greater missile carriage capacity and more powerful nuclear reactors. The fourth planned submarine in the series is projected to possess such characteristics, but it may take more than a decade for it to be successfully developed and launched, and even longer for it to be commissioned. While India’s submarine fleet has been taking shape, Delhi has also conducted a series of test firings, starting in 2000, of Dhanush-class short-range ballistic missiles from surface ships. For the time being, however, it appears that the Dhanush programme is merely a stopgap measure until the SSBN fleet comes into full fruition.

Second, history has shown that all newly nuclear navies face some difficult tradeoffs. As India’s SSBN fleet gradually grows in size and importance, the challenge will be to ensure that the navy’s new nuclear role develops alongside, rather than to the detriment of, its conventional missions. As in all nuclear navies, a debate will no doubt unfold within the service as to how many resources and platforms should be devoted to the ballistic missile submarine fleet’s protection. Tough decisions may need to be made, particularly if India’s underwater environment becomes more contested. India’s nuclear command and control procedures will also almost certainly undergo a revision, as the SLBMs will be canisterised and ready for launch, rather than de-mated.

Finally, India’s naval and nuclear planners will also have to contend with the progressive materialisation of a nuclearised Pakistani navy — albeit one with much less orthodox characteristics and undergirded by a very different nuclear posture. Indeed, Islamabad aims to eventually disperse nuclear-tipped cruise missiles across a variety of naval platforms, ranging from surface ships in the short term to conventional diesel-electric submarines in the long term. Unlike India, Pakistan’s naval nuclear ambitions are fuelled primarily by the sense of a growing conventional imbalance in the maritime domain. By nuclearising — or by appearing to nuclearise — a large portion of their fleet architecture, Pakistani military planners hope to neuter India’s growing naval power, inject ambiguity and acquire escalation dominance in the event of a limited conflict at sea. Since Independence, Indian naval officers have been accustomed to operating within a purely conventional maritime setting. Dealing with such a prospective adversary will no doubt necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the navy’s operational concepts. Perhaps more importantly, it will also require an effort on the part of both countries to further institutionalise the maritime component of their relations so as to ensure that in future, isolated incidents don’t spiral out of control.

The writer, a nonresident fellow in the South Asia Programme at the Atlantic Council, is author of the report ‘Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean’.

- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/going-nuclear-at-sea/#sthash.Jq0cdF1d.dpuf

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Iraq The Second Horn (Daniel 8:3)

Iraqis look up to Iran as main ally in fighting ISIL
Iran and Iraq
Political Desk
25 February 2015

As Baghdad struggles to fight the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, many Iraqi now look up to Iran as their main ally.

Many Iraqis have grown to trust the powerful Iranian-backed fighters that have taken charge since the Iraqi army deserted en masse last summer. Dozens of paramilitary groups have united under a branch of the Iraqi government called the Popular Mobilization Committee, or Hashid Shaabi. Created by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s predecessor Nuri al-Maliki, the official body now takes the lead role in many of Iraq’s security operations. From its position at the nexus between Tehran, the Iraqi government, and the militias, it is increasingly influential in determining the country’s future.

Until now, little has been known about the body. But in a series of interviews with Reuters, key Iraqi figures inside Hashid Shaabi have detailed the ways the paramilitary groups, Baghdad and Iran collaborate, and the role Iranian advisers play both inside the group and on the frontlines.

Those who spoke to Reuters include two senior figures in the Badr Organization.

In all, Hashid Shaabi oversees and coordinates several dozen factions. The insiders say most of the groups followed a call to arms by Iraq’s leading Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. However, they also cite the religious guidance of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, as a key factor in their decision to fight and defend Iraq.

Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr Organization, told Reuters: “The majority of us believe that … Khamenei has all the qualifications as an Islamic leader. He is the leader not only for Iranians but the Islamic nation. I believe so and I take pride in it.”

“Khamenei would place the interests of the Iraqi people above all else,” Amiri said.

Iraqi and Kurdish officials put the number of Iranian advisers in Iraq between 100 and several hundred – fewer than the nearly 3,000 American officers training Iraqi forces. In many ways, though, the Iranians are a far more influential force, the Reuters said.

The Iranians, the Iraqi officials say, helped organize volunteers after Grand Ayatollah Sistani called on Iraqis to defend their country days after ISIL seized control of the northern city of Mosul last June.

Prime Minister Abadi has said Iran has provided Iraqi forces and militia volunteers with weapons and ammunition from the first days of the war with ISIL.

They have also provided troops. Several Kurdish officials said that when ISIL fighters pushed close to the Iraq-Iran border in late summer, Iran dispatched artillery units to Iraq to fight them. Farid Asarsad, a senior official from the semi-autonomous Iraqi region of Kurdistan, said Iranian troops often work with Iraqi forces. In northern Iraq, Kurdish peshmerga soldiers “dealt with the technical issues like identifying targets in battle, but the launching of rockets and artillery – the Iranians were the ones who did that.”

Kadhimi, a senior Badr official, said Iranian advisers in Iraq have helped with everything from tactics to providing paramilitary groups with drone and signals capabilities, including electronic surveillance and radio communications.

“The U.S. stayed all these years with the Iraqi army and never taught them to use drones or how to operate a very sophisticated communication network, or how to intercept the enemy’s communication,” he said. “The Hashid Shaabi, with the help of [Iranian] advisers, now knows how to operate and manufacture drones.”

Wednesday, January 21, 2015

The Third Nuclear Horn Of Pakistan Is The New Villain (Daniel 8:8)

The villains of the second nuclear age
Pakistan nuclear arsenal
Even as Pakistan accelerates its nuclear weapons programme, there seems to be all-round silence about its activities
 
Gayatri Chandrasekaran

Recent reports suggest Pakistan is accelerating its nuclear weapons programme. A US-based think-tank, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), released a report along with photographs that says external construction of the Khushab complex’s fourth reactor is complete and that it has “become operational.” Khushab is a nuclear complex in Pakistan’s Punjab province where its plutonium generation and processing activities are carried out. The first nuclear reactor there was activated in 1996. ISIS estimates in the report “the power of the original heavy water reactor to be about 50 MWth while reactors 2, 3, and 4 are believed to generate double or more the power of the first one, and are thus capable of producing more than double the amount of weapon-grade plutonium per year”. The report also states, “images show that some new construction activity is taking place in the south-west corner of the Khushab site, south of reactors 2, 3, and 4. It is not yet clear what this activity is. One possibility that cannot be ruled out is that this activity could be for the construction of another reactor”. The number of Pakistan’s nuclear transgressions is so large that by now, any report suggesting a new violation is consumed wearily. The result, however, is a strange silence. There has been no noise from the US administration; no angry news reports and certainly no reaction from the non-proliferation lobby in the US. It is as if Pakistan stepping up the pace of its nuclearization is a routine development and nothing to be worried about. Nuclear offenders This is in sharp contrast to how concerned western countries, especially the US, are about nuclear instability in Asia. Reports and research that focus on the nuclear arms race between India, Pakistan and China, tend to consistently imply that the race is being led or caused by India and not by Pakistan or China. Consider, for example, a November 2014 report by the Council on Foreign Relations (Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, Gregory D. Koblentz). Koblentz estimates that “by 2020, Pakistan could have a fissile material stockpile sufficient to produce more than two hundred nuclear weapons”. Yet, at various points in the report are arguments such as these: 1) While Pakistan is focused predominantly on the threat posed by India, it is reportedly also concerned by the potential for the United States to launch a military operation to seize or disarm Pakistani nuclear weapons. (page 18) (after the Abbottabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden) 2) China’s…modernization of its nuclear forces and development of antisatellite (ASAT) and missile defense capabilities, has triggered a reaction from India, which causes grave concern in Pakistan. (page 21) 3) The size and composition of Pakistan’s nuclear forces appear increasingly dictated by India’s growing conventional military capabilities. (page 27) 4) …changes in China’s nuclear force posture aimed at maintaining an assured retaliation capability against the United States could trigger a reaction by India and therefore Pakistan. (page 29) In all these arguments, Pakistan’s nuclear reaction is seen to be the result of concern for its safety and security. In three out of the four cases mentioned above, it is seen as the direct result of India strengthening its abilities that will necessarily trigger a reaction from Pakistan. Both Pakistan and China (see 1, 2 and 4), under perceived threats from the US, are free to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenal, but India’s response to a perceived Chinese or Pakistani threat is seen as increasing instability. According to 3, Pakistan’s decisions are based on India’s expansion of its conventional military capabilities. The truth is that India’s security challenges are now far more complex, spanning both unconventional (terrorist and non-state actors) and conventional threats. India’s nuclear programme is not opaque and after the signing of an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its military and civilian nuclear programmes are clearly demarcated. Reports such as the one issued by CFR describe what is going on—the continuing arms race in Asia, Pakistan’s aggressive acquisition of nuclear material and China’s modernization of its arsenal—but they don’t get to the root of the problem: what is driving this race? In Pakistan’s case, any outside observer can understand its security dilemmas—an inimical neighbour to the East and a porous and insecure border to the West. But what explains its breakneck generation of plutonium far beyond what is necessary for a credible nuclear deterrent, one that it already has? One answer could be that it does not understand the role of nuclear weapons. These weapons cannot be seen from the prism of more weapons implying greater security. Because they cannot be used in the way other military equipment is used, acquiring a greater number does not make sense. The other way to look at the Pakistani nuclear problem is the fear of these weapons being snatched by India and the US. Even this is hard to believe. By now, Pakistan has so many nukes that it is impossible to carry out a snatch operation to grab every single weapon. The new nuclear reactor at Khushab, the breakneck pace at which plutonium and other nuclear materials are being generated and the security of all these materials in a country with extreme insecurities—terrorists often strike at will anywhere, including military facilities—are all disturbing issues. The world should sit up and take notice. India should for sure. Global Roaming runs every Tuesday to take stock of international events and trends from a political and economic perspective.Read more at: http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/XaOv1ZhlkApXkxlEf2y32O/The-villains-of-the-second-nuclear-age.html?utm_source=copy

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

Pakistani Horn Having To Keep Up With India’s Nuclear Capabilities

Assessing India’s Nuclear Capabilities

Indian Nuclear Submarine
India’s offensive nuclear capabilities are coming of age with sea-trials for its first ballistic missile submarine. The INS Arihant is expected to be introduced into service by early 2015. New Delhi plans to field between four to six similar vessels by the end of 2025 to boost its second strike capability.
Pakistan is also likely to develop sea-based nuclear capabilities. Both foes are seeking to develop their own version of the nuclear triad, which incorporates air, land and sea-based systems. Some scholars have argued that second-strike capability will have a positive influence on strategic stability in the region while others have raised concerns about the dangers of a nuclear arms race. And considering the history between India and Pakistan, there is real concern that the next shooting war could spiral out of control.

For India, sea-based nuclear weapons have a credible second-strike nuclear deterrence. Nuclear submarines are capable of lurking undetected and are nearly invulnerable to even the most modern anti-submarine warfare measures. They offer a qualitative advantage to a country’s ability to retaliate after absorbing a nuclear first strike. This will dissuade an adversary, in India’s case, Pakistan, from attempting a dangerous preemptive nuclear attack.

India’s nuclear doctrine draft in 1999 envisioned the necessity for an assured survivable deterrent capability by developing and maintaining credible minimum deterrence based upon a strategic triad of nuclear forces. Threats from both China and Pakistan prompted India to work towards this goal.
India’s rise as a naval power has been in part a reaction to Pakistan, but also China’s “blue water” aspirations where by it feels threatened by the regional superpower. Beijing strategists, on the other hand, see the Indian nuclear ballistic missile submarine capability as threatening to its access to the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait, where eighty percent of China’s oil trade takes place. India could use its submarine to block Chinese oil imports through the strait, thereby causing major disruption in the Chinese economy.

For Pakistan, the rationale for developing a naval nuclear capability is to acquire second-strike capability against India and this would also provide the country with greater strategic depth. In 2012 Pakistan inaugurated its Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC). The navy is being integrated into the country’s command and control structure, which is dominated by the army.

Pakistan’s financial constraints prevent it from acquiring a sea based nuclear deterrent. Pakistan has no plans to deploy nuclear propelled submarines over the next few decades. Instead, naval planners have focused on acquiring more sophisticated conventional submarines, like the recently announced purchase of six Chinese built submarines, and equip them with Babur cruise missiles.

Regarding the submarine purchase from China, a senior Pakistani official told Jane’s, “the contract is in an advanced stage and discussions will not linger on for too long. Realistically, we should have a deal by the end of 2014.” In this way Pakistan can offset India’s increasingly conventional advantage in the Indian Ocean, much in the same way it managed to balance India’s conventional advantage on land.
Both countries, however, need highly secure command and control system for sea-based systems. There is a strong possibility that submarines can lose contact with their bases, leaving the submarine officials to decide about the use of nuclear weapons during a crisis. To prevent the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan have been keeping the warheads separate from their delivery systems.

Nuclear arsenals at sea also increase the risk of terrorist elements getting hold of these weapons. The international community is particularly concerned about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons due to its culture of political instability and extremism. There are several examples in which Pakistan’s naval forces were attacked by terrorist groups.

The lack of political will has prevented India and Pakistan from averting an arms race, both conventional and now nuclear. It is important for both countries to enhance strategic stability by reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and taking measures to reduce their nuclear arsenals. India-Pakistan relations have long been cleaved by deep antagonism, repeated military crises, and a costly arms race. Both countries have rarely interacted in a non-hostile political sphere and the presence of non-state actors has further exacerbated the situation. In order to avoid catastrophic misinterpretation it is essential to negotiate arms control agreements and increase transparency through exchanging information and signaling intent to improve strategic and crisis stability.