Showing posts with label london. Show all posts
Showing posts with label london. Show all posts

Friday, December 9, 2016

The Unthinkable Is Thinkable (Revelation 15)

Nuclear War Not Unthinkable for Russia

Nikolas K. Gvosdev
The newly-released "Foreign Policy Concept" of the Russian Federation contains some interesting changes and updates. Given that this document reflects the Kremlin's strategic mindset and how it views international relations, it is important to take what is says seriously.
The fact that the strategy was being prepared in parallel with the U.S. presidential election is perhaps not accidental given two of its most noticeable features. The first is a slight but significant shift in assessing the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons from "unthinkable" to "unlikely." While the concept does not anticipate a high probability of a nuclear exchange occurring, it does warn that the risk of crises escalating between nuclear-armed states is increasing. The second is a very loud and clear restatement of classic Westphalian principles of how states should interact with each other in the international order: on the basis of absolute "non-interference in one another's internal affairs." Should a country not wish to operate from that principle in its relations with Russia, Moscow reserves the right to utilize harsh retaliatory measures to any perceived unfriendly actions.
Perhaps the expectation in the Russian Foreign Ministry was that Hillary Clinton was on track to win the White House. Those two elements, in particular, seemed designed to send a clear warning to Washington that Moscow would brook no interference in its domestic affairs on the basis of any U.S. adjudication of failures in democratic practices or human rights observances. Russia learned from its momentary lapse in 2011, when appeals to the humanitarian principle of the "responsibility to protect" caused Russia to abstain from a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the creation of safe areas for rebellious Libyans. Moscow is determined that this not be repeated in the future, especially if such authority is used not to send forces to patrol refugee camps but to engage in active military operations against the offending government. It also reflects a growing Russian unwillingness to accept Western claims that internal repression by a government seeking to retain its power automatically constitutes a threat to regional peace and stability and justifies international action. Russia thus signals to itself and to other regimes that it stands by the principle that a government has the right to take action to defend itself against threats to its rule — both internal and external — and that it wants to raise the cost of Western-sponsored regime change whenever possible.
The change to the assessment about nuclear war reflects a growing consensus among experts that indeed that risk is growing. But it also fits with a pattern displayed by Russian president Vladimir Putin to warn the United States to back off. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin used the metaphor of the spring to suggest that ongoing, consistent Western pressure on Russia's frontiers had finally produced a reaction. Even if a nuclear exchange is "unlikely," the Russians are noting that if relations between Russia and the West continue to spiral downward, it is no longer out of the realm of possibility.
But this document is now released in the context of a Donald Trump transition to the White House. During the campaign, the candidate and many of his surrogates suggested that Hillary Clinton would end up provoking World War III with Russia by miscalculating and pushing the Kremlin too far— perhaps by trying to enforce a no-fly zone over Syria that resulted in the destruction of Russian aircraft, or ending up in a clash over the Baltic States. He also, at times, suggested that U.S. foreign policy ought to move back in the direction of less interventionism and involvement in the affairs of others. Humanitarian intervention does not appear to be high on the foreign policy priorities of the new administration, while finding ways to decrease tensions with other major powers, or at least with Russia, has been proposed.
So it will be interesting to see whether the new U.S. administration picks up on these signals as part of its own review of the U.S.-Russia relationship. Compromising on or scaling back on a number of past bipartisan policy approaches—notably the continued enlargement of NATO—in order to decrease pressure on the “spring” might resonate with the new chief executive. Focusing a relationship on "hard" security matters (starting with preventing nuclear conflict) rather than on Russia's progress with democratization would revert U.S. policy back to a  pre-1991 standard and reverse the insistence that has guided U.S. policy since that time that how Russia is governed internally is of vital national security interest to the United States.
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a contributing editor at the National Interest.

Friday, November 25, 2016

Russia Expands The Nuclear Triad

 
Russia has successfully tested Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) for its revamped Soviet era ‘nuclear trains’ program.
The missile advancement comes as Kremlin deploys nuclear-capable missiles along the Polish border.
Tests on missiles for the Barguzin "railway-based combat rocket system" were carried out at the Plesetsk cosmodrome two weeks ago, the Interfax news agency reports.
"They were fully successful," the agency reported quoting an unnamed military source, "paving the way for further flight tests."
The mobile weapons platform, made up of several train carriages designed to conceal the launchers of six Yars or Yars-M thermonuclear ICBMs and their command units, are expected to enter service between 2018 and 2020.
Lieutenant-General Sergai Karakayev, who commands Russia's strategic missile forces, said the Barguzin would be superior to the Soviet-era Molodets nuclear trains in accuracy and range.
He expects them to be in service until 2040.
The Soviet Union had 12 Molodets trains in total, each of which were equipped with three nuclear missiles. Known by the Nato designation Scalpel, they were disposed of between 2003 and 2005.
Russia's latest advancement in its nuclear weapons technology comes as a senior MP announced the deployment of nuclear-capable missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave.
Moscow will deploy S-400 surface-to-air missiles and nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to the exclave, which borders Poland and Lithuania.

Tuesday, November 22, 2016

Russia Continues to Modernize Its Nukes

Russia Defense Report - Dec. 28, 2015
This analysis originally appeared in December 2015
Recent days and weeks have seen several news items pertaining to the future state of the Russian nuclear triad. The scope of modernization plans suggests the role Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are to play as of Russia’s security foreign policy.
The scale of Russian strategic nuclear modernization is impressive. President Putin recently attended the laying down of Aleksandr III, the seventh Borey-class ballistic missile submarine out of eight planned which carry 16 multi-warhead Bulava SLBMs each. Three of these ships are already in service, the whole series is to become operational by 2020. It was also announced that the first PAK-DA heavy bomber flight is to take place in 2020, with the aircraft becoming operational by 2025. In the interim, Russia’s Long-Range Aviation will receive several squadrons of Tu-160M2 bombers, whose production is expected to resume in the upcoming years. The Sarmat heavy ICBM research and development has been recently declared complete, and the missile will begin launch testing in 2016 or 2017. The missile’s unique capabilities include the ability to strike any target on the planet using multiple possible trajectories, for example, it could be used to strike North America not only by flying over the North Pole, but also using an alternative trajectory over the South Pole which would render US ABM systems irrelevant. The construction of Voronezh-DM over-the-horizon ballistic missile attack early warning radars is continuing. Finally, the Russian General Staff announced the development of a system allowing strategic ballistic missiles to be retargeted following launch, which thus far was impossible to do because once the target selection was completed prior to launch there was no way to alter it once the missile was in flight.
This brief outline of current developments shows that Russia is pursuing a sophisticated strategy of deterrence. The comparatively small and uniform French, Russian, and Chinese nuclear arsenals are capable of deterring only one threat, namely a nuclear attack on their national territory. The variety of capabilities inherent in Russia’s triad means that its national leadership has a range of responses at its disposal and can use its capabilities to deter not only nuclear attacks against its territory but also conventional attacks against its military targets, including outside of Russia’s borders.
Syria is an example of what these capabilities mean for Russia. It is no accident that Putin’s request to raise the strategic nuclear force readiness level to 95% came when he instructed the General Staff to destroy any potential threat to Russian aircraft or ground facilities in Syria. The Russian military presence in Syria is not large enough to guarantee survival against a concerted NATO attack. Fifty aircraft located at a single airbase, even one protected by the S-400, are still vulnerable due to their exposed location and lack of strategic depth. Russian conventional forces could not easily come to Hmeimim’s aid in the event of it being attacked by NATO forces. What makes Hmeimim secure from attack is the credible and flexible deterrence posture.
What makes that deterrence both credible and flexible is the variety and modernity of Russia’s delivery vehicle force which is not limited to having to launch a multi-warhead ICBM or SLBM, and which can penetrate all current or planned defenses. The credibility of Russia’s nuclear deterrent is strengthened by the existence of a powerful conventional deterrent in the form of Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The use of these missiles against ISIS targets was likely motivated to dissuade any countries hostile to Russia’s presence in Syria because it demonstrated Russia could use these weapons to retaliate against any attack on Hmeimim. The target state would then have to choose between backing down or escalating, thus risking a nuclear exchange with Russia. If Russia simply had an ICBM and SLBM force, Hmeimim would be a much more tempting target because an ICBM launch would be disproportionate response to the attack. Russia’s strategic force modernization plans indicate that its leadership anticipates Syria-like scenarios in the years to come.

Tuesday, November 8, 2016

Russia Prepares For War With US

By Tom O'Connor @Shaolintom On 11/07/16 AT 3:40 PM
A senior Polish military official has announced that the nation's military may seek more naval strike missiles to establish a third coastal squadron along the Baltic Sea, Defense News reported Friday. Poland, a NATO member that shares an approximately 120-mile northern border with Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, has expressed serious concern over increased Russian military activity in its vicinity.
Russia has recently expanded the ballistic capability of its Baltic fleet after NATO announced its biggest military buildup near the international military alliance's Russian borders since the Cold War. Now Poland has considered its own need for reinforcements by adding a third naval missile strike squadron, utilizing military weaponry from Norwegian defense company Kongsberg, according to Secretary of State Bartosz Kownacki of Poland's Ministry of Defense. He also noted the shortcomings that would need to be addressed prior to expanding the country's missile defense system.
"We are considering this, but please note that our current reconnaissance capability is insufficient. This is a significant issue. Such a squadron has a strike range of about 200 [kilometers], but our radars have a range that is considerably shorter," Kownacki told local daily Dziennik Gazeta Prawna.
"There are several solutions that could be used. We could consider to ensure reconnaissance capabilities with the use of drones, and in the future, also through merging [the naval strike missiles] with the Wisla [medium-range air-and-missile defense] system," he added.
Kownacki also expressed interest in adding to the country's submarine fleet. He stated that the ministry of defense was prepared to purchase three submarines for Poland's navy in 2017 and that the deal would likely be a joint venture with another ally, possibly Norway, Sweden or Germany.
Kaliningrad, Russia's only Baltic territory, has been a focal point for recent tensions between the country and the West. European countries such as Finland and Estonia have accused Russia of violating their airspace and Russia has defended its heavy military activity in the area by claiming that NATO uses sabre-rattling techniques that threaten Russian defenses. Last month, Russia moved nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad. Since then, the U.S. has urged its NATO allies to name Poland as the destination for one of the alliance's strategical battle groups.

Monday, November 7, 2016

UK At Risk for Nuclear Attack From Russia (Daniel 7)

Express.co.uk spoke to a nuclear expert to determine how and why a Putin nuke strike would happen.
The Doomsday Clock, which calculates how far the world is from total destruction, is currently set at its most dangerous level since 1959 – the height of the Cold War.
A leading academic in the field of nuclear weapons, Matthew Rendall, revealed what he believes will spark the potentially apocalyptic conflict and how he thinks it will play out.
The other likely cause of nuclear war, according to the University of Nottingham academic, would be terror groups getting their hands on the deadly weapons – which they are now more likely because Mr Putin pulled out a 16-year-old agreement with America designed to safely destroy stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium in both nations.
The snub from the Russian leader now means enough plutonium to make 17,000 nuclear weapons still has the chance to fall into the hands of terror groups such as Islamic State.
Mr Rendall told Express.co.uk what he regards as the most likely possible causes for a nuclear holocaust: “Two scenarios come to mind. The first would be if Moscow believed that it was already under nuclear attack, and struck NATO in the hope of limiting damage.
“In 1995, Russia mistook a Norwegian research rocket for an incoming Western missile.
“Fortunately, President Boris Yeltsin did not launch Russia's missiles in response. In a similar situation, President Putin would almost surely also sit tight, wait and see, but do we want to take that chance?
"Unfortunately, the recent downturn in relations between the two countries makes it unlikely that they will agree to reduce alert levels any time soon."
He added: “All too many seem to believe that arms control is a favour one does the other side, rather than a process undertaken in both sides' self-interest."
“At the end of the Cold War, Russia and the United States co-operated in securing dangerously vulnerable Russian nuclear sites.
“Unfortunately, this co-operation too has now fallen victim to the downturn in relations.”
NATO is likely to back down if Russia launched a nuclear attack in a foreign part of the world, such as Syria, “for fear that it would escalate to an all-out nuclear war, says the Canadian-born author.
And Britain would be largely powerless if a nuclear attack from terrorists was shown to have been facilitated by Russia, because even though “Moscow might be blamed for allowing them to do it, unlike Afghanistan in 2001, it could not be punished with impunity”.
Express.co.uk discovered that, with the use of sophisticated software from Nukemap.com, if Satan 2 was dropped in the middle of London, it would kill 2,278,500 people and injure a further 2,603,390 in the first 24 hours alone.
The fireball alone would have a radius of 31 sq km, more than 1,000 schools would be incinerated instantly and the fallout would be felt as far away as Denmark.
But Mr Rendall believes the thing that could save Britain from a Russian-launched nuclear apocalypse – Vladimir Putin’s sanity.
He said: “The threat is significant, but not from a pre-meditated attack.
"Since Britain and its close allies France and the United States all have nuclear weapons, Russia would risk its major cities and much of its population.
“Whatever Putin and his associates may be, they are neither fools nor suicide bombers.”
A NUCLEAR weapons expert has told Express.co.uk that Britain faces a “significant threat” of radioactive attacks either from Russia or terrorists who come into possession of stolen warheads.
By EXCLUSIVE BY PATRICK CHRISTYS

Monday, September 12, 2016

Terrorism Is On The Rise

The terrorist threat is worse now than it was before 9/11
Pamela Engel
9/11 September 11th AttacksNew York police stand near a wanted poster printed by on a full page of a New York newspaper for Saudi-born militant Osama bin Laden in the financial district of New York.REUTERS/Russell Boyce-Files
It's been 15 years since the 9/11 terror attacks, but in some ways, we're no safer from terrorism today than we were before 2001.
Al Qaeda still has a formidable presence across the world, and a new terror threat - ISIS - rose up during the chaos that followed the US invasion of Iraq.
The world is also now contending with spates of attacks carried out by radicalized individuals who have managed to fly under the radar of Western intelligence officials.
The Soufan Group, a strategic security firm, contended in a note this week that the terror threat against the US is actually more pronounced today than it was before 9/11.
Since September 11, 2001, "the global terror threat has compounded and cascaded," said the note. We're now facing "unprecedented terror concerns" that will likely persist for years to come, according to the firm.
The firm noted that after the attacks, the US outlined several goals with regards to fighting terrorism: Preventing another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11; denying terrorists sanctuaries in countries like Afghanistan; destroying Al Qaeda, and countering extremist ideology.
"As the 15th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approaches, only one of these goals - the prevention of an attack nearing the scale of 9/11 - has been met," the firm stated. "While the prevention of another such attack is a significant achievement, many of the other post-9/11 concerns are considerably worse now than in 2001."
The US successfully toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan, but the group still controls territory there.
And the death of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden hasn't weakened the group to the point where it's no longer a threat. Bin Laden's ideology has actually continued to inspire and radicalize people across the globe, especially with the rise of ISIS, a group that borrowed from the ideological doctrine bin Laden espoused, and the use of social media by extremist recruiters.
Al Qaeda is in fact stronger today than it was before 9/11, The Soufan Group argued in its note. The intelligence apparatus in the US has grown to counter this threat, and new counterterrorism and security measures have succeeded at preventing many attacks, but some terrorists have still been able to slip through the cracks.
"The spread of violent extremism since 9/11 has surpassed anything bin Laden likely thought achievable in a fifteen-year period," The Soufan Group note said. And the threat of attacks by lone actors as well as terrorist cells in the West "will remain for years to come."
Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in a column this week how widespread terrorism has become since 9/11.
"September 11, 2001, was unique in the sense of its scale; otherwise it was anything but," Haass wrote. "Terrorism has become commonplace."
But Haass also puts things into perspective - while terrorism certainly is a serious threat, it is not yet a threat to the very existence of the US.
"Over the last decade, there have been, on average, more than 10,000 terrorist attacks per year, causing an average of more than 15,000 deaths per year," Haass noted.
He continued: "Relatively little of this terrorism has involved Americans. Over this same decade, there have been fewer than 15 terrorist attacks a year in the United States. An average of five Americans per year have died on US soil and approximately 20 per year have lost their lives worldwide."
Where terrorism could become an existential threat, however, is with the use of nuclear weapons or a "dirty bomb" with nuclear material.
"Such 'grand terrorism' has for decades been the nightmare of many strategic thinkers," Haass wrote.
While such "grand terrorism" hasn't become a reality yet, it could be in the future. Pakistan, for example, is country that has nuclear weapons, a significant terrorist presence, and a weak government. This could create conditions where nuclear material could fall into the hands of terrorists.
Even the US has nuclear material that could fall into the hands of terrorists, some of which is relatively accessible in places like hospitals.
Steven Brill noted recently in The Atlantic that "despite significant work done by the Obama administration, large quantities of radioactive material already sit unguarded in the US."
"It doesn't require a wild leap to imagine someone with terrorist sympathies planting shielded radioactive material in a car or a cargo container that then makes its way through one of our ports," Brill wrote. "But it's even easier to imagine a dirty bomb being constructed from material that doesn't have to be snuck through the ports."
As the threats have grown, Americans have also been forced to grapple with another reality: Terrorism doesn't just threaten American lives - it threatens our way of life. Terrorists seek to sow fear and provoke overreactions that could fundamentally change not only US policies but how Americans live their lives day-to-day.
In his editorial, Haass wrestled with the balance between freedom and security.
"Terrorism will happen sometimes despite our best efforts," he wrote, concluding, "This argues for resilience in addition to all else. This may require some compromise on privacy for individuals in order to promote collective security, but this is a price worth paying, since the threat to democracy would quickly become far greater if existential terrorism were to become a reality." 

Wednesday, August 31, 2016

The Reality Of The Dirty Bomb (Daniel 8:4)


Dirty bombs: update on US safeguardsdirty-bomb-ISIS
What is a dirty bomb?

Yahoo News

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) defines a dirty bomb as a device that “combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive material.” Its detonation would result in a “regular” explosion, with the added effect of dispersing radioactive material.

But the consequences might not be as dire as some fear. “This wouldn’t be like a nuclear bomb,” says David Albright, the first nongovernmental inspector of Iraq’s nuclear program in 1996, and a frequent testifier on nuclear issues before Congress. “It’s important for people to understand that it can be dangerous, but the risk isn’t what the public often imagines – making a city uninhabitable, causing hundreds or thousands of deaths.”

What are the safeguards surrounding radioactive materials in the United States?

The NRC is responsible for ensuring the safe use of radioactive sources for civilian uses. The group works with other agencies, both domestic and international, to track and control all nuclear material designated for peaceful purposes. “We as a country have spent billions making sure these materials can’t be smuggled in,” but those efforts would be for naught if a “bad actor” could simply acquire them from within, says David Trimble, who heads the department in the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that conducted the recent investigation.

A set of regulations, based upon International Atomic Energy Agency designations, governs the distribution of radioactive sources in the US. Category 1 materials are the most dangerous, and Category 5 the least.

Why did the GAO conduct its investigation?

In 2007, the agency carried out an operation almost identical to the recent effort – with sobering results. It set up fictitious companies and was able to obtain an NRC license for Category 3 materials. And by altering that license, it entered into agreements with multiple suppliers, giving it access to dangerous quantities.

Now, almost a decade later, the GAO aimed to assess what had changed. After the last investigation, for example, mandatory site visits were introduced; previously, the whole process had taken place over the phone.

This time, the GAO team created fake websites to serve as refer-ences, giving their fake businesses glowing reviews. It set up spaces for the nonexistent companies but left them vacant, doing nothing to make them appear legitimate.

Twice, inspectors refused to grant licenses – one uncovering the fake references, the other demanding that the site be more developed. The third, however, was content with assurances that the site would be further developed, and granted the license. Again, the operatives altered the license and were able to place orders with two suppliers.

What can be done?

“NRC staff are already considering the GAO recommendations,” says Maureen Conley, an NRC spokeswoman. “All of that will then be rolled into a paper and presented to the commission. They will decide how to proceed.”

The commission is led by five politically appointed commissioners.

In 2009, after the GAO’s first covert operation, the commission rejected a proposal to include Category 3 materials in the nascent National Source Tracking System. The argument was that the NSTS was experiencing too many teething troubles to be expanded beyond Categories 1 and 2. As soon as the GAO’s new report was published in July, Jeff Baran, one of the NRC commissioners, stated in a memorandum that it was “time to revisit the question of whether and how to track Category 3 sources.”

“The NRC appears to be taking our work seriously and is already implementing corrective actions,” says Mr. Trimble of the GAO. “Of course we can’t be sure they’ll get them all done, but they’re on the right track.”

Is it a good idea to publicize this kind of information?

Some may question the wisdom of sharing publicly how an undercover investigation obtained materials for a dirty bomb. But Trimble says the only way the shortcomings will be addressed is if they “see the light of day.”

“The point is that these things can be fixed,” he says. “If we had uncovered things that couldn’t be fixed, we would have considered that very sensitively.” There certainly are occasions, he says, when issues are handled “through other channels.”

Mr. Albright, who is also founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, agrees. First, he says, it acts as an alert for people to show “due diligence” in controlling the hazardous materials. Second, it provides an opportunity to put things in perspective, to remind people that while a dirty bomb is dangerous, the imagined horrors tend to exceed reality.

Monday, August 22, 2016

ISIS planning ‘dirty bomb’ terror attack on London



ISIS planning ‘dirty bomb’ terror attack on European city claims nuclear expert

17:45, 9 JUN 2016 UPDATED 18:03, 9 JUN 2016 BY CHRIS HUGHES

A ‘dirty bomb’ terror attack on a European city is more likely than at any time since the end of the Cold War, nuclear experts claim.

Islamic State terrorists want to seize nuclear materials to strike terror in the West and have already launched many chemical attacks in Iraq and Syria.

The group attacked rebels and government forces in Iraq and Syria and militants linked to both the Paris and Brussels attacks are thought to have studied a Belgian nuclear power plant.

Moshe Kantor, head of the Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, warned: “ISIS has already carried out numerous chemical weapons attacks in Syria . We know it wants to go further by carrying out a nuclear attack in the heart of Europe.

“This, combined with poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centres in the former Soviet Union mean the threat of a possible ‘dirty-bomb’ attack on a Western capital is high.”

Khalid El Bakraoui planned attack on nuclear site in Belgium

He warned the US and Russia to co-operate on using their technological resources to monitor the illegal transportation of radioactive materials.

Brussels suicide bomber brothers Khalid and Ibrahim El Bakraoui had originally planned an attack on a nuclear site in Belgium and had filmed the routine of the head of Belgium’s nuclear research and development programme.

On Tuesday the Kurdish military warned IS is planning on using chemical weapons in future suicide bombings.

Peshmerga General Akram Mohammed Abdulrahman said that while ISIS has previously used both chemical weapons and suicide bombings separately, they are now looking to combine them, training brainwashed teenage insurgents to carry out suicide bombings using munitions containing harmful chemicals.

Nuke cops face cuts

The warning comes after claims the police force guarding Britain’s nuclear arsenal is operating “at the limits of its resources”

Chairman of the Defence Police Federation Eamon Keating spoke out as the civilian Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) faces a potential further reduction of 15% in its workforce.

Read more: Paris attacks suspect had papers about nuclear research base hidden in flat
He said: “There is the potential for a substantial skills gap that would affect the security of our most important defensive asset. Not only this, but service personnel used for guarding duties could not then be deployed for any other duties – even in the event of a crisis.

“The loss of officers will put defence assets at greater risk, and that is not a decision that should be taken to cut costs.”

There are currently around 2,600 MDP officers and the workforce was reduced by a third due to Coalition budget cuts in 2010.

Monday, July 18, 2016

The Jihads Leading Up To London’s Dirty Bomb (Daniel 8)


nice-attack-1024x666 
Terrorism: The jihad-crime nexus

(CNN)There have been eight lethal terrorist attacks in Europe since 2014, five of them in France alone, carried out by ISIS or by “lone wolves” inspired by the terror group or by al Qaeda.
What do these attacks have in common? The terrorists are almost invariably criminals who have either served time in the French or Belgian prison systems, or they have been convicted for lesser offenses but have avoided jail time.

Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who killed at least 84 people Thursday in Nice, France, had a long record of petty crimes. Bouhlel assaulted a motorist last year for which he received a six-month suspended sentence. It is not yet clear how exactly Bouhlel came to commit his terror attack. But it is striking how many of the terrorism cases in Europe share a jihad-crime nexus. By contrast, of the more than 300 individuals charged of a jihadist terrorism crime in the United States since 9/11, only about 10% had a background of crimes other than terrorism.

Larossi Abballa, who stabbed a police commander and his partner to death in June in a town outside Paris, had been convicted of recruiting jihadists to fight in Pakistan. He was sentenced to 2½ years in prison in 2013 but was released shortly after his conviction because he had spent more than two years in jail awaiting trial, where he had preached about Islam to other prisoners.

The Kouachi brothers, the perpetrators of the January 2015 attack at the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo, had been imprisoned for a range of crimes, including involvement in a terrorist organization as well as trafficking in counterfeit sneakers.

Amedy Coulibaly, who killed four Jews at a kosher supermarket in Paris shortly after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, was a close friend of the Kouachi brothers. He met Chérif Kouachi in prison while he was serving a six-year sentence for armed bank robbery. It is there where they were both radicalized, in part by an incarcerated al Qaeda recruiter.

Prisons in France and Belgium have incubated many jihadist terrorists. This is because the proportion of the French prison population that is Muslim is estimated to be around 60%, which is extraordinarily high given that Muslims account for 8% of France’s population
In Belgian prisons, there is a similar disproportionality: Thirty-five percent of the prison population is Muslim, compared with 6% of the general population.

Conditions in these prisons and society in general exacerbate the spread of radicalism. Despite their high Muslim population, many of these prisons lack an adequate number of Muslim chaplains. This leaves the door open for Islamist militants among the prison population to spread their ideology during mealtimes and exercise hours through informal preaching sessions.

Muslims in France and Belgium have long been marginalized. They are often sequestered in poorer and more violent neighborhoods than their counterparts in the United States and are subject to pervasive racial discrimination.

French and Belgian prisons have proven to be universities of jihad. The members of the ISIS cell responsible for the attacks in Paris in November that killed 130 and the attacks in March in Brussels, Belgium, at the airport and on the subway system that killed 32, bonded through criminal activities or in prison.

Abdelhamid Abaaoud and Salah Abdeslam, the cell’s masterminds, were childhood friends who grew up in the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek. In 2010, the men were arrested and spent time in the same prison.

Ibrahim Abdeslam, Salah’s brother, also spent time in prison with Abaaoud. He would go on to be one of the terrorists in the November Paris attacks.

Khalid and Ibrahim El Bakraoui, both suicide bombers in the Brussels attacks, had served lengthy prison sentences for armed robbery and assault on police.

ISIS recruit Mehdi Nemmouche, who is accused of killing four at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014, had been in a French prison for robbery.

How to stop prison radicalization? France has begun to implement new measures, such as separating militants from the general prison population and placing them in solitary confinement so they cannot exert their ideological influence on other inmates.

But more needs to be done — not only to identify those who go into prison as radicals, but also, crucially, to identify those who come out of prison more militant, as seems to have been the case of so many terrorists who have launched attacks in France and Belgium in the last three years.

Friday, July 1, 2016

Worry About The Islamic State Dirty Bomb


Islamic State And The Threat Of WMDs

By David Patrikarakos
From Fallujah to Mosul, Paris to Brussels, the terrorist organization that calls itself Islamic State (IS) murders, maims, and enslaves with wanton abandon, if not exactly impunity. By now the world has woken up to the serious threat that the group poses, not just in the Middle East but also in Europe and the United States.

Islamic State’s crimes are horrific enough with its present capabilities, but a question increasingly asked among politicians and military officials is: What if IS were to acquire the unthinkable — a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)?

Earlier this month I attended the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe in Amsterdam, an NGO set up to tackle exactly this type of problem. And what emerged is that the danger of IS acquiring its most fearsome weapon yet is now a significant one.

According to an expert who participated in the forum, the danger is twofold. The gravest threat would come if IS were able to get its hands on nuclear materials. These would mean, for example, the type of enriched uranium Iran uses in its nuclear program — from which IS could theoretically make a small nuclear bomb with further enrichment — or existing weapons-grade plutonium, from which it could do the same.

But the probability of IS being able to do this is slim. The requisite materials are located in only 24 countries and are in highly guarded facilities. Set against this fact, however, have been several lapses in security. In 2012 an 82-year-old nun and peace activist, Megan Rice, broke into the Oakridge nuclear reservation in Tennessee. Rice never got near any nuclear material but a lot of systems had to fail for her to get as close as she did. Likewise, according to a British Ministry of Defense report, guards at one of the U.K.’s nuclear facilities were caught sleeping on the job. And then there is the problem of poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centers in the former Soviet Union.
The probability of IS taking advantage of these lapses in security is low, but not insignificant. The greatest danger comes from the most unstable countries with the largest amounts of documented radical activity: Pakistan, Russia, and India — with Pakistan at the top of the list.

Moreover, as retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, a chief researcher at the Center for International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations, told me: “there is a lot of illegal activity, trafficking in illegal natural material…so [IS] could either pull off a purchase for a significant amount of money or intercept illegal trafficking. Plus, they seem to have enough money to recruit scientists to build a rudimentary nuclear device. Not a nuclear warhead, but an explosive nuclear device; it may, in fact, only weigh a few tons but it’s still something you could assemble close to an urban area, or on a vessel that could then be brought to U.S. or European shores.”

Many Ways To Dirty Bomb

Another problem would be a conventional weapons attack on a nuclear facility, which could conceivably cause a Chernobyl-like disaster or worse. It remains nearly impossible to attack a nuclear power plant, as they have substantial protection, but attacking nuclear-research facilities that have reactors filled with nuclear materials is far easier, and a lot of cities have these. According to Dvorkin even bombing a nuclear-storage facility with a relatively small bomb would mean the destruction of buildings within a 3-4-kilometer radius and fallout covering a much larger area and creating a lasting effect.

The second and far more immediate threat is that of attack with a radiological device. The materials for this are located in over a 100 countries and, critically found not just in specialized facilitates but in hospitals and research centers used, for example, in treating cancer — places that, unlike major nuclear facilities, don’t have gates, guards, and guns. The expert who attended the forum warned me that IS has many such facilities within the land it already controls and that is where the “dirty bomb” (a radiological as opposed to nuclear bomb) threat is now unequivocally real.

One can easily use conventional resources to make a dirty bomb, use agents to plant it in a major urban center, then simply watch it ignite and cause billions of dollars of damage. The loss of life would likely be modest — only those in its immediate vicinity would die. But the psychological element would be huge; as a nuclear specialist told me, the public hears “radiological” and immediately panics. Then there would be the cost of demolishing and rebuilding the buildings that had been contaminated in a far wider area.

While nothing is certain when dealing with what is clearly a fanatical organization, it is clear that IS is organized and thinks strategically. As Dvorkin points out, the chances of IS using even a rudimentary nuclear device are accordingly slim. First, it would risk alienating even Sunni Muslim communities across the Middle East that might presently have some sympathy with its aims. Second, what is now a fractious coalition fighting against IS would almost certainly unite and bring its combined weight to utterly annihilate the organization.

Nonetheless, as The New York Times reported in February, a man linked to the November 13 Paris attackers was found in possession of surveillance footage of a high-ranking Belgian nuclear official. With IS any horror is possible, even if it is not probable.

The question more realistically facing us is not whether IS can employ a dirty bomb — most likely in Europe or the United States — but will it? And experts fear the worst. According to Dr. Moshe Kantor, president of the Luxembourg Forum, “the threat of a terrorist group, such as Islamic State, staging a nuclear bomb attack on a major European city, such as London, is ‘high.'”

Given that IS has already carried out numerous chemical-weapons attacks in Syria, its willingness to use a WMD of some kind is clearly present. As Kantor continued “the threat of a so-called ‘dirty bomb’ attack is at its highest level since the end of the Cold War.”

The world should be worried.

Tuesday, June 28, 2016

US And Russia’s Contribution To The London Dirty Bomb



Poor U.S.-Russia relations increase risk of dirty bomb in Europe – experts

(Corrects this June 7 story to remove reference in paragraph 6 to Swedish diplomat Hans Blix and IAEA chief Yukiya Amano, who did not attend the conference.)

By Toby Sterling

(Reuters) – Tension between Russia and the West may be distracting them from cooperating to prevent an accidental nuclear confrontation or a dirty bomb attack by militants, nuclear policy experts said on Tuesday.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry said he regretted the current lack of communication between the United States and Russia, which went into a deep freeze after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

“We are about to recreate the conditions that nearly brought us to the brink of nuclear war” during the Cold War, Perry said.

Anatoly Adamishin, a former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, argued that the U.S. has focused on a policy of “strangling Russia” and hoping for the departure of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which has the effect of putting Russia at the forefront of a list of U.S. enemies.

“The U.S. simply has to rethink its own policy: what should be in focus is nuclear reductions,” he said. “Russia and the U.S. are not inherent enemies.”

They made their comments at a conference organised by the the Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe.

The forum’s head, Moshe Kantor, said the threat of a ‘dirty bomb’ attack on a European city was at its highest level since the end of the Cold War.

Security experts have raised concerns since the attacks in Paris and Brussels by Islamist militants that poorly guarded European nuclear facilities pose a risk.

Kantor cited chemical weapons attacks carried out by Islamic State in Iraq, their stated desire to carry out more attacks in Europe, and evidence militants linked to the attacks in Paris had also been studying a Belgian nuclear power plant.

“This, combined with poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centres in the former Soviet Union mean the threat of a possible ‘dirty-bomb’ attack on a Western capital is high,” Kantor said.

He urged the United States and Russia, both nuclear powers, to cooperate on using their technological resources to monitor the illegal transportation of radioactive materials.

Gorbachev, appearing by satellite link, said he was alarmed by the increasing readiness of many nations to use military force to resolve conflict rather than negotiation.

“I note that these have not solved the problems, but they have served to undermine international law and weaken international relations,” he said.

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Huge Threat For ISIS Dirty Bomb This Summer


The threat of a NUCLEAR terror attack is at its highest since the Cold War, as ISIS continues to try and obtain materials for a dirty bomb, warns international think-tank


ISIS’s efforts to obtain nuclear materials, and continued threats to attack Western capitals contribute to experts’ analysis that the threat of a bomb is higher than ever.

ISIS has used chemical weapons in Iraq and Syria and militants linked to both the Paris and Brussels attacks had been studying a Belgian nuclear power plant.

‘ISIS has already carried out numerous chemical weapons attacks in Syria,’ Moshe Kantor, head of Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, said at a conference on Tuesday.

‘We know it wants to go further by carrying out a nuclear attack in the heart of Europe.

He urged the United States and Russia, both nuclear powers, to cooperate on using their technological resources to monitor the illegal transportation of radioactive materials.

In March, it emerged that Brussels suicide bomber brothers Khalid and Ibrahim El Bakraoui had originally been considering an attack on a nuclear site in Belgium.

In what may have been preparation for an attack, the El Bakraoui brothers had filmed the daily routine of the head of Belgium’s nuclear research and development programme.

It is thought the brothers’ spying operation was possible preparation for a kidnap plot to force him to let them into one of Belgium’s two atomic facilities.

However, it is likely they switched targets to the less well-guarded Zaventem airport and Maelbeek Metro station after authorities became suspicious.

Also on Tuesday, the Kurdish military warned that ISIS are planning on using using chemical weapons in future suicide bombings.

Peshmerga General Akram Mohammed Abdulrahman said that while ISIS has previously used both chemical weapons and suicide bombings separately, they are now looking to combine them.

ISIS’s tactic involves training brainwashed teenage insurgents to carry out suicide bombings using munitions containing harmful chemicals, he told Russian media.

There have been previous reports of ISIS militants using mustard gas in their attacks on civilians in Iraq.

‘Recently, the militants have been using chemical weapons and suicide bombers, and before it was adults, now – teenagers,’ General Akram Mohammed Abdulrahman told Russian news agency RIA Novosti.

‘From our intelligence, there is evidence that they are prepared, so to speak, to combine these two tactics and develop a method to supply chemical weapons to suicide bombers to use on the front.

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

US Fails To Stop ISIS Dirty Bomb



U.S. Program Deterring Nuclear Smuggling Can’t Measure Progress

Watchdog cites shortcomings of program to stop proliferation of WMDs

An instrument for detecting radiation during a 2011 exercise to intercept radioactive "dirty bombs" in waterways near New York / AP


The federal program responsible for detecting and deterring the international smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials cannot measure its progress, a government watchdog says.
The Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence program, or NSDD, is a key prong of the federal government’s effort to ensure that terrorists do not get ahold of nuclear or radiological materials to create weapons of mass destruction. The program has spent $1 billion over five years to provide equipment and training to other countries to counter nuclear smuggling. It plans to spend $809 million over the next five years.

But the Government Accountability Office concluded in a report released Friday that the program “cannot measure its progress toward completing key activities” because its current goals are not measurable and do not address all tasks relevant to the program, in addition to other shortcomings.
“NSDD cannot measure its progress toward completing key activities and achieving these goals,” the report explains.

“NSDD’s goals are not all measurable, some describe actions rather than outcomes, and they do not fully address all of the program’s key activities,” the report continues. “In addition, its performance measures are not aligned with these goals, and its program plan does not detail how it will complete key program activities or achieve its goals.”
Without being able to measure progress, the program’s officials may not be able to recognize when their mission is accomplished. They also risk “continuing to deploy equipment past the point of diminishing returns,” the auditors said.
The counter-smuggling effort is housed within the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency operating within the Department of Energy that promotes national security through the military application of nuclear science. The administration, established nearly two decades ago, protects the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons and also works to prevent terrorists, rogue nations, and other adversaries from obtaining nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.
The NSDD partners with 59 countries to provide tools and training in order to detect and counter nuclear smuggling. Program officials install radiation detection systems at locations of interest worldwide, including airports, seaports, and border checkpoints.
Established as the Office of the Second Line of Defense in 1998, the NSDD at first only provided equipment and technical support to sites in Russia. The program’s work was expanded to nations formerly part of the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe following the domestic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
While NSDD has selected four five-year goals to guide its efforts, the goals are not all easily measurable and do not cover all program tasks, the GAO report concludes.
For instance, the NSDD seeks to “prepare partner countries to take full responsibility” of the radiation detection equipment and other tools they receive. GAO auditors concluded this specified goal is not measurable because it describes an action, not an outcome. The NSDD’s program plan does not specify the number of countries expected to take over full operation of equipment and does not provide a deadline for when this should occur.
The program plan also does not address what goals need to be met after countries assume full operation of the equipment they are provided.
GAO auditors noted that NSDD faces “unusual” challenges carrying out its work because of fluctuating conditions in partner countries. For example, more than two-dozen detection systems installed by program contractors in Ukraine have been destroyed as a result of the ongoing conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists, which began in 2014
“NSDD officials do not know whether the program will be able to fix or replace them and, if so, when,” the report says. “To mitigate this challenge, NSDD plans to deploy additional radiation detection equipment at key locations outside the conflict area.”
The status of equipment sites in Russia—representing roughly 45 percent of program sites—is also unknown given Russia’s decision in 2014 to stop cooperating with the U.S. government on most matters related to nuclear nonproliferation.
The international smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials poses a significant national security threat, with terror groups like ISIS pursuing weapons capabilities. The Wall Street Journal reported in April that ISIS had hijacked a university chemistry lab in Mosul, Iraq, to create new explosive devices, including chemical weapons. Experts worry that ISIS has sought nuclear material to make a dirty bomb.
An Associated Press investigation published last October revealed that arms smugglers with Russian ties attempted to sell radioactive material to ISIS and other extremist groups, though the attempts were thwarted by the FBI.
Small quantities of highly enriched uranium can be used to fashion an improvised nuclear device, and radiological materials can also be combined with conventional explosives to create a dirty bomb.
There have been roughly 2,900 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials as of 2015, according to an International Atomic Energy Agency database. Those cases come only from countries that volunteer the information.
Despite NSDD’s shortcomings, the program has provided equipment to other countries that helped detect and deter illicit nuclear smuggling. Officials in one unnamed partner country told GAO auditors that NSDD equipment and training had helped detect and interdict radiological material 15 times since 2009. Tools provided by NSDD to another country were used to seize weapons-grade highly enriched uranium, according to officials.
Jack Caravelli, a former National Nuclear Security Administration senior official, told the Washington Free Beacon that the GAO report points to chronic problems with the NSDD that have been ignored by leaders in the Department of Energy.
“For nearly 20 years DOE’s program management problems have been routinely singled out as a major flaw in the department’s ability to implement critical national security programs. Moreover, the problems cited by the GAO go to the fundamental quality of the program and raise questions about its integrity,” Caravelli said.
“Unfortunately, senior DOE management seems incapable of learning or addressing the lessons of the past that keep recurring—and continue to be pointed out. That these same issues surface repeatedly by an independent investigatory body and are routinely ignored attest to either the department’s willful refusal to fix chronic problems or inability to do so,” Caravelli said.
“In either case, the program is important and deserves to be better managed, perhaps outside DOE control.”

Saturday, June 18, 2016

The Coming Dirty Bomb In London (Daniel 8:4)



ISIS is plotting a DIRTY BOMB strike on a major EUROPEAN city, top nuclear experts warn

THE Islamic State could launch a “dirty bomb” attack on a central European city at any moment, leading nuclear experts have warned.

Nuclear
GETTY


Experts claim the jihadis are looking to develop nukes to blast europe
 
ISIS terror fanatics – who have been working to bolster their ranks with a team of jihadi scientists capable of creating a dirty bomb – have already launched chemical attacks in Syria and Iraq.And now experts have said the jihadi death cult are looking to develop nuclear weapons that mark the biggest threat to Europe since the cold war.Moshe Kantor, head of the Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, warned: “ISIS has already carried out numerous chemical weapons attacks in Syria.
ISIS 
NC
ISIS terror fanatics have been working to bolster their ranks with a team of jihadi scientists
“We know it wants to go further by carrying out a nuclear attack in the heart of Europe.“This, combined with poor levels of security at a host of nuclear research centres in the former Soviet Union mean the threat of a possible ‘dirty bomb’ attack on a Western capital is high.”The threat of ISIS developing a nuclear arsenal of its own was brought to a terrifying reality when it was discovered two of the Brussels suicide bombers had filmed the routine of the head of the country’s nuclear research and development programme.
 
Brothers Khalid and Ibrahim El Bakraoui had originally planned to strike a nuclear site in Belgium before committing the horrific attack, murdering 32 innocent civilians.And 25 years on from the end of the Cold War, the nuclear expert called on Russia and the US to merge their technological prowess to monitor the trafficking of illegal nuclear materials.Earlier this year, David Cameron raised fears that the Jihadis are ready to launch a horrific nuclear attack on the West.
 Cameron called on world leaders to address: “The issue of nuclear security and the security of nuclear materials, particularly when it comes to the problems of international terrorism, the concept of terrorists and nuclear materials coming together – which is obviously a very chilling prospect and something in the light of the Belgian attacks, we know is a threat that is only too real.
Bombers 
GETTY
Two of the Brussels bombers filmed the routine of the head of the country’s nuclear programme
It comes as it was revealed that the security of Britain’s nuclear arsenal is at risk as the Government threatens to slash the already overstretched workforce charged with protecting the Trident missile system.The Government is considering a further 15 per cent cut to staff within the Ministry of Defence Police force.But Chairman of the Defence Police Federation Eamon Keating claimed the strained security unit is already “at the limits of its resources”.