Showing posts with label incompetence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label incompetence. Show all posts

Monday, February 6, 2017

The Incompetency of Babylon the Great

 
The CIA Comedy of Saddam Hussein
By Adam Fleming Petty
FEBRUARY 4, 2017
WHAT IS THE GENRE of the Iraq War? What do the hundreds of books written on the subject over the last 15 years have in common? You might begin by reading terse accounts by and about soldiers, stories of men, and a few women, struggling to maintain their lives and dignity both on the field and back at home. Or perhaps you would choose the geopolitical intrigues of journalists and historians, labyrinths of ideology, power, and money.
Among this growing genre, John Nixon’s Debriefing the President is nearly unique, resembling nothing so much as a workplace comedy. Forget American Sniper or Zero Dark Thirty — the nearest analogue to Nixon’s story of meetings going nowhere and supervisors talking past each other may very well be The Office.
The bureaucratic absurdism appears right at the start, and only increases. In 2003, CIA analyst Nixon was stationed in Iraq, sorting through intelligence briefings. A five-year veteran of the Agency at this point, he had previously spent his time at Langley monitoring Iraq in general, and Saddam in particular. When US forces captured Saddam on December 13, 2003, following a lead from one of the leader’s former bodyguards, Nixon made an ideal candidate for debriefing him. He couldn’t help but be excited at the prospect of speaking to a world historical figure at length. He hoped to ask Saddam the questions he had been pondering for years, to gain invaluable insights into his background and motivations. However, Nixon was alone in his enthusiasm. Everyone else seemed to regard the debriefing of High Value Target Number One as, at best, an inconvenience. Nixon writes:
[It never] occurred to me that our government had never prepared for capturing Saddam alive. U.S. officials took it as a foregone conclusion that Saddam would kill himself rather than be captured, or be killed as he tried to escape. When he was captured alive, no one knew what to do.
This is a microcosm of the ineptitude that went into launching the war, the first example of many in the book.
After a week of dithering, during which crucial opportunities for extracting intelligence from the rattled subject were squandered, Nixon begins his debriefing. But his hands are still tied: he receives orders to not question Saddam about terrorism. The FBI will handle that when they arrive and start to build their criminal case against him.
Nothing about terrorism? Isn’t that why they’re here in the first place? Nixon is frustrated, but realizes this could allow him to focus on Saddam’s character and history without worrying about gleaning the right piece of intelligence under deadline. This open-ended approach suits Nixon, who has a scholar’s interest in Saddam. But it’s an interest that few of his colleagues share.
The portrait Nixon sketches here is fascinating, offering details that have been misrepresented or completely missed elsewhere. For example, it was widely known that Saddam grew up poor in Tikrit, a backwater village north of Baghdad. After the death of his father when Saddam was very young, one of his uncles became his stepfather and raised him. The going theory in the intelligence community was that Saddam’s stepfather was cruel, beating him from a young age, and that withstanding such abuse made Saddam into a cruel dictator.
Saddam was certainly vicious, but not for this reason. Nixon learns that Saddam loved his stepfather, “the kindest man he knew.” A minor discrepancy, perhaps, but one that speaks to a larger laziness on the part of US leaders to understand Saddam on his own terms, within the context that shaped him, rather than the pop psychology of a supervillain. Indeed, this Dr. Doom view of Saddam informed US policy in Iraq since the administration of Bush the Elder, and almost certainly did more harm than good.
Take the military. The popular view held that the Iraqi army was effectively an extension of Saddam himself, the fearsome Republican Guard ready to defend their leader at all costs. But as Nixon writes, Saddam had little idea what the military was actually doing:
In his final years, Saddam appeared to be as clueless about what was happening inside Iraq as his British and American enemies were […] Saddam had deep respect for the military but only a primitive understanding of military affairs. He seemed to have learned little from Iraq’s eight-year war with Iran.
This is not how US forces saw the matter. As part of their “de-Ba’athification” effort to rid the country of every last trace of Saddam, the Coalition Provisional Authority, led by L. Paul Bremer, eliminated the upper ranks of the Iraqi military. Thousands of generals, colonels, and lieutenants were fired en masse, forcing them to look for work. Though the military was not without blemish, it was relatively stable, and its stability likely owed something to the fact that Saddam didn’t manage it too closely. Had the command infrastructure remained, it could have provided the CPA with a foundation for establishing a more stable Iraqi society. Instead, the streets were flooded with disgruntled military officers looking to put their skills to use. And they did: many of them were absorbed into the insurgency forces that coalesced into ISIS. Second-guessing is perhaps too easy when it comes to history, but it is likely that this decision — made by Bremer, who carried out orders from Donald Rumsfeld — did much to fortify the Islamic State that terrorizes Iraqi citizens to this day.
If Saddam wasn’t overseeing the military, what was he doing? Writing novels, of all things. He considered himself a man of letters, naming The Old Man and the Sea as his favorite book. He tells Nixon, “A man, a boat and a fishing line. These are the only ingredients to the book, but they tell us so much about man’s condition. A marvelous story.” In the weeks leading up to the invasion, Saddam spent his time not preparing for war, but going over the manuscript for his latest historical epic, sending it out to one of his ministers for a critique. The Romans fiddled as their city burned. When Baghdad went to war, Saddam workshopped his fiction.
Saddam, so everyone said, was a cancer on the Iraqi body politic. This gets Saddam right, but mischaracterizes the patient. There is an episode of The Simpsons where Mr. Burns visits a doctor and learns that he is “the sickest man in the United States,” afflicted with every disease known to science along with a few ones unique to him. However, the diseases are so numerous that they keep one another in check, preventing any one from overtaking Mr. Burns’s health. A harmony of sickness, you could say. This is not unlike the political situation in Iraq, a complex state that US warmongers failed to appreciate, spectacularly so.
Saddam didn’t see himself as a cancer, of course. He was the great leader that Iraq needed, the heir of Mesopotamian glories. But he discerned the other diseases afflicting the country with far greater acuity than anyone in the Bush administration. More than Iran, more than the majority Shi’a population, Saddam feared the Wahhabist-influenced extremists who were making a name for themselves throughout the Arab world. What Saddam found so worrisome about such fundamentalists was that their ideology was religious more than nationalistic, allowing them to appeal to marginalized communities in many different countries with failed despotic leaders. Likely because he was such an ardent nationalist, with delusions of Iraqi grandeur, he saw the threat that transnational extremist groups posed to his own country far more accurately than leaders ensconced in the Beltway. Get rid of Iraq’s leader, dismantle its military, and fundamentalists would swarm the country like locusts. In this regard, time has proven Saddam exactly right.
So the United States had sketchy intelligence regarding the political situation before the war. But once Saddam was captured and thoroughly debriefed, weren’t leaders better equipped to handle the growing insurgency? Answering that question is where Nixon’s book becomes not just compelling, but enraging.
After completing the debriefing process, Nixon returns to the United States, working a desk at Langley again. The final chapters detail several encounters with the Bush White House itself, briefing the president on several issues unfolding in Iraq. No matter the topic at hand, whether it’s rising Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr or Iraqi sovereignty, Bush proves himself again and again to have little interest in the nuances and subtleties that constitute foreign policy. If it’s not cut and dry, he’s not interested. This worldview has been well documented, but Nixon has the unique perspective of one who has sat in rooms with George W. Bush and his avowed enemy. The way he writes it, they seemed to be made for each other:
One of the great ironies of the Iraq War was that brutal dictator Saddam Hussein and freedom fighter George W. Bush were alike in many ways. Both had haughty, imperious demeanors. Both were fairly ignorant of the outside world and had rarely traveled abroad. Both tended to see things as black and white, good and bad, or for and against, and became uncomfortable when presented with multiple alternatives. Both surrounded themselves with compliant advisers and had little tolerance for dissent.
Nixon is frustrated by Bush’s insistence on easy answers, but what really draws his ire is the CIA’s willingness to dole them out. From its inception, the CIA’s stated goal has been to inform the president, enabling him to perform his duties. But the way Nixon tells it, the CIA used to approach the president like a doctor would a patient, delivering unpleasant truths for the benefit of his own health. Now the “service” approach is enshrined as best practice, and the president is treated as less of a patient and more of a customer. According to Nixon, “The service approach can have disastrous results when a president has strong preconceptions, a short attention span, and little time until the next election.” This co-dependent dynamic led to the perfect storm of hubris, mismanagement, and disinformation that became the legacy of the war. Nixon writes:
Discarded reporting was suddenly presented as solid intelligence. The era of analytic mediocrity had begun, and Iraq was its first casualty. It made the CIA complicit in the tragedy of Iraq.
Where does this leave the CIA today? Say the Agency rethinks the service approach and takes a more hard-nosed approach to briefing the president. Will the president even hear it, or will he simply dismiss intelligence, substantiated or otherwise, as fake news?
Adam Fleming Petty’s writing has appeared in The Millions, the Christian Courier, and Cultural Society.

Trump Finally Speaks Some Truth About Babylon the Great

"Fox News" Bill O'Reilly interviews President Donald Trump in a segment slated to air right before the Super Bowl on Sunday, January 5, 2017. (Image source: Fox News)
Sarah Lee
President Donald Trump told Fox News host Bill O’Reilly that he doesn’t think America is “so innocent” when confronted with the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a killer of those who criticize him.
In a preview of the interview, which is slated to air at 4 p.m. Sunday right before the Super Bowl, O’Reilly asks Trump if he respects Putin, and Trump gives a surprising answer:
O’Reilly: “Do you respect Putin?”
Trump: “I do respect him.
O’Reilly: “Do you? Why?”
Trump: “I respect a lot of people, but that doesn’t mean I’m going to get along with them. He’s a leader of his country. I say it’s better to get along with Russian than not. And if Russia helps us in the fight against ISIS…and Islamic terrorism all over the world…major fight. That’s a good thing. Will I get along with him? I have no idea.
O’Reilly: “He’s a killer, though…Putin’s a killer.”
Putin is known for placing a value on brutality as a leader, as this Foreign Policy piece from 2016 details in attempting to explain Russia’s sustained and unmerciful bombing of Aleppo to fight the Islamic State. The article compares Putin’s strategic approach in Aleppo with his moves in the Second Chechen War’s battle for Grozny, one of his first wars as leader of Russia. That battle left thousands dead, tens of thousands homeless, and “the city described by the United Nations as the most ruined one on the planet,” writes Foreign Policy.
He has been implicated in the 2004 dioxin poisoning during the campaign of eventual President of Ukraine Victor Yushenko, leaving him disfigured. He was most recently implicated in another poisoning, this time of Vladimir Kara-Murza, an outspoken activist for Democracy in Russia, who was recently placed on life support in Moscow.
Additionally, in a story Putin denies but one that has particular and humorous relevance to the Super Bowl Sunday interview between Trump and O’Reilly, Putin was accused in 2013 of stealing New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft’s 2004 Super Bowl ring during his visit to Russia in 2005.

Saturday, October 3, 2015

Dam Incompetence Before The Sixth Seal (Rev 6:12)


After quake, Buzon wants Gilboa Dam checked


9/30/2015
By David Avitabile

A minor earthquake just west of the upper reservoir of the Schoharie Reservoir last Saturday apparently caused little damage, but still left local leaders nervous.

The quake, about eight miles below the surface, struck at between 11 and 11:15pm and was measured at 3.0 on the Richter Scale, according to Middleburgh town Supervisor Jim Buzon, who is also the chairman of the county’s flood committee.

Mr. Buzon felt the tremor, and, thinking a tree hit the back of his house in Huntersland, went outside to check. He then called county dispatch.

He noted that the New York Power Authority never contacted county safety officer Michael Hartzel, according to Mr. Buzon.

Mr. Hartzel was contacted at about 4am by the Schoharie County Sheriff’s Office and by the NYPA at 11:40am on Sunday.

Mr. Buzon is upset that the NYPA did not reach out to the county about the earthquake.

The NYPA, he added, did its own check of the area and found no apparent damage.

Mr. Buzon would like a federal dam safety inspector to check the Gilboa Dam for any possible damage.

He noted that Governor Cuomo and DEP officials toured the dam after a 2.9 magnitude earthquake a few days before Hurricane Irene struck in 2011.

That earthquake was centered near Altamont.

“Those dams should be checked out by a federal inspector and not in an in-house inspection,” he stressed.

Middleburgh Fire Department Chief Mike Devlin and several other firefighters were not contacted by the NYPA but felt the earthquake and checked the area “as good as they could,” Mr. Buzon said, and saw no movement in any area.

The information about the quake is on the USGS website.

Friday, June 19, 2015

Babylon In A No Win Situation (Rev 15:2)

iran-goes-nuclear
No, the Iran Nuclear Deal Will Not Be Good for the U.S.

Aaron David Miller
June 18, 2015

Once Iran learned how to make a nuke, there wasn’t much chance for a really good and reassuring deal on the nuclear issue. The agreement being negotiated now may well be the least bad of the terrible options available to slow Iran’s nuclear program. But we should be clear-eyed about what else we may be getting from this deal: a richer and stronger Iran, one pushing for a Middle East more hostile to the U.S.–and one that will still retain the capacity to build nuclear weapons.

It’s the cruelest of ironies that this issue is now the pathway offering Iran a way in from the cold. It would be fine if the agreement could truly end Iran’s ability and motivation to have a nuclear-weapons option. But it hardly lays to rest those concerns.

Iran will agree to what will likely be a smaller, more easily monitored nuclear program. But there can be no real assurance, let alone guarantee, that this will be the “forever” deal Secretary of State John Kerry referred to. What is guaranteed–what will be the new normal in the Middle East–is that Iran will emerge as a state with the right to enrich uranium and continue R&D while maintaining some nuclear infrastructure. Iran has played us and its card well, profiting from sanctions relief without abandoning its nuclear-weapons aspirations, let alone its repressive policies at home or its expansionist aims abroad.

The Obama Administration argues that regardless of Iran’s behavior in the region, constraining Tehran’s nuclear program is important in its own right. But Iran is not Japan, a nuclear threshold state that respects international principles. It’s impossible to separate the nuclear issue from Iran’s regional aspirations. Keeping the world on edge about Iran’s nuclear-weapons capacity and ensuring that the U.S. remains an adversary are still vital for the regime’s survival–and this agreement isn’t going to make Iran a moderate anytime soon.

The nuclear deal will bring Iran money and legitimacy in a turbulent region. Iran has influence on just about every issue the U.S. confronts in the Middle East: Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, ISIS, Yemen. And while Tehran is prepared to cooperate when that serves its interests, its view of the region is not Washington’s. Far from constraining Iran’s power, the deal may well enhance it as it directs more resources to its Iraqi Shi’ite, Yemeni Houthi, Syrian Alawite and Hizballah allies and surrogates. And the opening to Iran has alienated Saudi Arabia and Israel, U.S. allies who fear Iran’s rise.

Were there alternatives to the deal? Tougher sanctions and negotiating? A more compelling threat to use force or more aggressively confront Iran’s allies? We’ll never know. The deal may succeed in slowing Iran’s nuclear program. But sooner or later, some future U.S. President is bound to confront a richer, stronger, more influential Iran, one with nuclear weapons still within its reach.

Miller is a former Middle East negotiator and adviser in Democratic and Republican administrations

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Russian Horn About To Enable Iranian Horn

 

 US, Israel express concern as Russia lifts ban on missile deliveries to Iran 

Published April 13, 2015
FoxNews.com

Russia’s move Monday to lift its ban on delivery of sophisticated air defense missiles to Iran drew criticism from Israel and raised U.S. concerns, as world powers continue to negotiate with Iran about its nuclear program.

In a clear sign that he wants to strengthen economic ties with Iran, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree Monday lifting his country’s ban on the delivery of S-300 anti-missile rocket systems to the Islamic Republic.

Russia signed an $800 million contract to sell Iran the S-300 missile system in 2007, but later suspended their delivery in 2010, after strong objections from the U.S. and Israel.

Monday’s developments follow the interim deal between Iran and several world powers — including the U.S. and Russia — to lift sanctions on Iran if it limits its nuclear program. Western nations suspect Iran’s nuclear aspirations were aimed at developing an atomic weapons capability. Iran insists the program is for purely peaceful purposes.

At a briefing in Washington Monday, acting State Department spokesperson Marie Harf said the U.S. has reservations about Iran receiving new missile systems.

“We think given Iran’s destabilizing actions in the region in places like Yemen and Syria or Lebanon, this isn’t the time to be selling these kinds of systems to them,” Harf told reporters.

When asked whether talk of a missile deal between Tehran and Moscow would jeopardize nuclear negotiations with the group of six world powers, Harf said Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated U.S. concerns in a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Monday.

“We don’t believe it’s constructive at this time for Russia to move forward with this but we’ve worked very closely with the Russians on the P5+1 negotiations. We don’t think this will have an impact on unity in terms of inside the negotiating room,” Harf said.

Israel reacted swiftly to Russia lifting the ban on selling missiles to Iran, saying it is a “direct result” of the international community’s framework nuclear deal with the Islamic Republic.

Israeli cabinet minister Yuval Steinitz said Monday that the framework agreement helped legitimize Iran and cleared the way for a Russian deal.

“This is a direct result of the legitimacy that Iran obtained from the emerging nuclear deal,” he said. Steinitz added that the arms deal shows that Iran plans to use the relief from economic sanctions to buy weapons, not improve the living conditions of its people.

Israel has harshly criticized the U.S.-led nuclear deal, saying it would give Iran relief from sanctions while leaving its nuclear program largely intact. Israel believes Iran still intends to develop a nuclear weapon.

Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan said Monday that Russia lifting the ban on missile sales to his country could lead to an expansion of cooperation and help stability in the region,
Reuters reported, citing Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

“This order shows the political will of the leaders of the two countries for developing and promoting the levels of cooperation in all fields,” Dehghan said.

“The expansion of the two-way cooperation and the development of cooperation with other neighboring countries in various fields can be effective in establishing stability and security in the region,” Dehghan said.

Meanwhile, a senior Russian government official said Monday that Russia has entered a barter deal — starting to supply equipment, construction materials, and grain to Tehran, in exchange for crude oil.

Iran is the third largest buyer of Russian wheat, and Moscow and Tehran have been negotiating the barter deal for more than a year.

A deal worth up to $20 billion was on the table with Tehran, which had Russia buying up to 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day, in exchange for Russian equipment and goods, sources told Reuters more than a year ago.

The status of that deal has been unclear as officials from the two countries issued contradictory statements on whether a barter deal had been signed. But Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov suggested one was already being implemented.

“I wanted to draw your attention to the rolling out of the oil-for-goods deal, which is on a very significant scale,”

Ryabkov told a briefing with members of the upper house of parliament on the Iran talks.

“In exchange for Iranian crude oil supplies, we are delivering certain products. This is not banned or limited under the current sanctions regime,” Ryabkov said.

Ryabkov did not elaborate and Russia’s Agriculture Ministry declined comment.

Iran has made no comment on news of a possible deal.

The next deadline to work out a detailed technical agreement under which Iran would limit its nuclear program and permit international control in exchange for a lifting of economic sanctions is in June.

“It takes two to tango. We are ready to provide our services and I am sure they will be pretty advantageous compared to other countries,” Ryabkov said. “We never gave up on Iran in a difficult situation… Both for oil and gas, I think the prospects for our cooperation should not be underestimated.”

He also reiterated Moscow’s line that an arms embargo on Iran should be lifted once a final nuclear deal is sealed.

Sunday, April 12, 2015

Selling Our Soul To Satan (Daniel 8)

 

 5 key demands US dropped in Iran talks 

April 11, 2015 – 09:49 AM EDT
BY KRISTINA WONG

The framework deal on Iran’s nuclear program has come under heavy scrutiny as the Obama administration seeks to sell the agreement to skeptical lawmakers.

Many of the terms mark a shift from President Obama’s stated goals at the start of negotiations 18 months ago.

Democrats and the White House say those changes are the result of tough negotiations and are calling for time to allow diplomats to finalize the accord.

But Republican critics say the administration made concessions that go too far and secured little in return.

Here are five areas where the administration shifted course during negotiations:

1. Banning uranium enrichment . Before talks began, the Obama administration and the United Nations Security Council called for Iran to stop all uranium enrichment.

The framework agreement, though, allows Iran to continue enriching uranium and producing plutonium for domestic civilian use.

“Zero enrichment” was a key demand since 2009, said Michael Singh, a senior fellow and managing director at The Washington Institute. “We basically went from zero to a number that kept going up.”

The deal’s critics worry any enrichment could quickly be diverted to military use.

Omri Ceren, senior advisor for strategy at the Israel Project, said the administration started “sliding” on zero enrichment after talks began.

But U.S. officials have suggested that halting all enrichment was never a realistic goal, and instead a key bargaining chip to secure other concessions from Iran.

“As soon as we got into the real negotiations with them, we understood that any final deal was going to involve some domestic enrichment capability,” a senior U.S. official told the Wall Street Journal last week. “But I can honestly tell you, we always anticipated that.”

Reza Marashi, research director at the National Iranian American Council and a former State Department official, said the U.S. had to budge on this demand for the talks to advance.

“It was the icebreaker. It was what allowed these negotiations to take root,” he said.

He said it led to key concessions from Iran, including unprecedented inspections of nuclear facilities.
“It’s the single most important point in my opinion, in terms of getting negotiations off the ground,” he said. “Once that position softened, it allowed the Iranian position to soften.”

 2. Capping centrifuges at 1,500. The Obama administration initially called for limiting the number of Iranian centrifuges used to enrich uranium to 500 to 1,500, experts say.

But U.S. negotiators walked back those limits, allowing Iran 6,104 centrifuges. Only 5,060 of those centrifuges, at the nuclear facility at Natanz, will be allowed to enrich low-grade uranium.

“The number [went] from hundreds, to thousands, to eventually, 6,104, which is where they ended,” said Singh.

Critics balked at the framework figure, noting Iran would have four times as many centrifuges as Obama hoped to allow.

But proponents of the deal say it is still a huge two-thirds reduction from Iran’s current 19,000-some centrifuges, and that any enriched uranium would be unusable for a bomb.

They also argue the more important criteria is not the number of centrifuges but the time it takes Iran to have enough material for a bomb — the ”break-out” period — which the framework leaves at one year.

Marashi said expanding the number also led Iran to agree to only use older so-called first-generation centrifuges.

“This is critical, because now we know the exact infrastructure, we know the exact output, we know the exact number of centrifuges so there’s no mystery,” he said.

 3. Shuttering secret nuclear facilities. The U.S. initially called for Iran to completely close down its secret underground nuclear enrichment facility at Fordow and the heavy water reactor at Arak.

President Obama said in December 2013 that Iran had no need for either.

“They don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear program,” he said. “They certainly don’t need a heavy-water reactor at Arak in order to have a peaceful nuclear program.”

However, under the framework announced last week, both Fordow and Arak remain in operation. Fordow will have 1,000 centrifuges but be converted into a research facility, wile Arak will continue producing plutonium, albeit at a low-grade unusable for a bomb.

“We had always, always, always said that Fordow must be closed,” said Ceren. “That was always the plan. We collapsed on that.”

Officials, though, say the facilities will no longer contribute to a weapons program.

Fordow will not enrich uranium or keep any fissile material there for at least 15 years, and almost two-thirds of its centrifuges and infrastructure would be removed and placed under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring.

Also, Iran has agreed to implement the “Additional Protocol of the IAEA” which would provide inspectors expanded and regular access to Iran’s facilities and nuclear supply chain.

Marashi said it was painful for the U.S. to allow Fordow and Arak to remain open, but stressed that the facilities would be reconfigured for peaceful purposes.

Skeptics, though, say Iran could continue covert work on a bomb, noting that Fordow is underground and heavily fortified.

“There was certainly a sense that we were seeking to sort of shut-down or dismantle Iran’s nuclear program in a significant ways,” said Singh. “Under this deal, there’s certainly no dismantling of any kind.”

 4. Ending Iran’s ballistic missile program. U.S. negotiators also dropped demands that Iran restrict development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver warheads, experts say.

The current framework only says a new UN resolution would incorporate “important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles.”

“They have completely given up ballistic missiles,” Ceren said.

The Obama administration says the issue of missiles and other conventional weapons should be treated separately from the nuclear deal.

“As we’ve said, we have concerns about Iran’s conventional weapons, including ballistic missiles, separate from the nuclear program, obviously,” State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said Wednesday.

“Those concerns don’t go away with the nuclear agreement,” she added.

Marashi said the ballistic missile issue was something opponents of diplomacy tried to force into the negotiations.

Singh, though, called the issue critical.

“It’s treated like a side issue, but it really shouldn’t be treated as a side issue because obviously, long-range ballistic missiles are essential to a nuclear weapons program,” he said.

5. Finalizing a 20-year deal. Initially the U.S. pushed for a deal that would last over 20 years. However, the framework would see the deal’s key terms sunset in 10 to 15 years.

Specifically, Iran would have to restrict the number of centrifuges enriching uranium for 10 years. In addition, the level of uranium enrichment would be capped at a lower-quality grade and the amount Iran stockpiles limited for 15 years.

“For many months, we’ve said we’ve wanted a 25-year sunset clause, then a 20-year sunset clause, now we’re down to a 10-year sunset clause,” Ceren said.

Administration officials push back against the idea that the deal sunsets at all.

Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz characterized it as a “forever agreement,” with terms forcing Iran to be transparent about its program and ensuring the international community can always keep a close eye.

Marashi predicted the final deal will include “permanent transparency measures that go beyond” the IAEA’s requirements.

“So yes, some of the limitations that Iran will agree to will come off after 10 to 15 years. But even when those things come off, Iran will still have the most heavily inspected nuclear program in the history of the world,” he said.

Some supporters also say the next decade could herald a thaw in U.S.-Iran relations. But deal skeptics are unsold.

“If nothing changes in Iran in 10 years… then you’re looking at after 10 years, a much shorter break-out time,” Singh warned.

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Iran Nuclear Deal Not Enforceable (Dan 8)


Economics make Iran nuclear deal unenforceable

Peter Morici

The United States was successful in assembling an international coalition to impose tough economic sanctions. Restrictions on access to technology, international banks and their electronic payments systems imposed double digit unemployment and inflation and brought Iran to the negotiating table. 
Simply, finding buyers for oil shipped via 3 million barrel supertankers was one thing, but the inability to transfer funds through western banks made securing $150 million payments quite another. 
The Obama administration sought to dismantle Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure, including its underground centrifuge machines, which enrich uranium into fissionable material. However, Tehran balked and other events in the region made Obama desperate for a deal-the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, its spinoff in Libya, and deteriorating relations with Israel and Saudi Arabia on issues transcending the Iranian nuclear challenge. 
The agreement significantly reduces the number of Iranian centrifuges and other nuclear infrastructure, but only limits Tehran’s ability to quickly “break out” from these restrictions and accumulate enough fissionable material to create a nuclear weapon in less than one year. Theoretically, we are told that is enough time for the West to detect Iranian violations and respond — but it is not. 
The lifting of economic sanctions has the potential to create an economic superpower with malevolent, anti-western aspirations. 
In 2010, Iran produced 1.6 million automobiles — across virtually all vehicle classes — through indigenous manufacturers and joint ventures with western firms. Although sanctions pushed that number down to 1 million in 2014, it bears noting autos are among the most difficult and complex mass production items to make, and Iran’s technological potential could quickly put it in the same category as South Korea or even France. 
Iran provides Western Europe and China with an alternative to Russian natural gas. 
The surge of European, Chinese and American investment into Iran will be a reminder of the Gold Rush that gave rise to modern California. And once those euros, yuan and dollars are in, political pressures will make it very tough to reimpose western economic sanctions. 
Were Iran to start making weapons-grade material, any western actions would be preceded by talks. But as with Russia in the Ukraine, Europe’s largest economy, Germany, would be cautious about losing access to Iranian natural gas and its other commercial interests, and similar distractions would impede other European and Asian cooperation. 
The U.S. trump card has been its unique grip on the global banking and payments system, but China’s success in recruiting European allies to join its Asian Infrastructure Bank demonstrates that Asian alternatives to U.S. dominated western financial institutions will soon emerge. 
Even as sanctions handicapped Iran, it has projected power directly and through surrogates in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere. Once the Iranian industrial juggernaut gets rolling, a society with an anti-western theocratic bent, sophisticated technology and manufacturing industries, and the resource wealth of Saudi Arabia, Russia and Australia combined will emerge as an economic and military power on a par with our European allies. 
A decade from now, when UN inspectors discover Iran is building a nuclear weapon, western leaders will ask how they could have let this happen. 
Barack Obama will still be around and perhaps will offer some answers.

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

IAEA Displays Their Incompetence Beforehand (Rev 15:2)

IAEA inspectors barred from nuclear site_634655870263373836_main

U.N. Agency Unsure About Iran’s Past Nuclear Activity

Iran hasn’t sufficiently answered questions about its nuclear program’s history, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency says.

By

As a deadline approaches next week for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the head of the U.N. agency in charge of nuclear inspections said his organization is unable to ensure that all of Iran’s nuclear material is intended for peaceful purposes.

“We are still not in a position to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is [for a] peaceful purpose,” Yukiya Amano, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington on Monday. “Progress has been very limited in clarifying issues with possible military dimensions.”

The IAEA is the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog, and is responsible for monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities. It isn’t party to the current nuclear negotiations between Iran and six major world powers, including the U.S., but is charged with ensuring the implementation of an interim agreement governing the talks until a final deal is reached. IAEA inspectors are on the ground in Iran and have access to the country’s nuclear facilities to ensure it is no longer enriching uranium.

“We will remain the eyes and ears of the international community on nuclear matters in Iran,” Amano said. “We expect Iran to be as transparent as possible.”

Amano stressed that his agency is responsible for clarifying the technical elements of Iran’s nuclear program, but that it is up to U.N. member states to determine the appropriate response to any violations.

A confidential IAEA report detailed by Reuters last week said that Iran continues to meet its obligations under the interim Joint Plan of Action and is not enriching uranium above a 5 percent concentration. But Amano said Monday that although Iran has been compliant, the country has not sufficiently addressed other issues his agency raised in a 2011 report, which focused on 12 areas of concern about the possible military dimensions of its past nuclear activities.

A bipartisan group of U.S. representatives also expressed concern that Iran has not revealed the full extent of its previous nuclear actions in a letter to President Barack Obama on Friday.

“Unless we have a full understanding of Iran’s past program it will be impossible for the international community to judge Iran’s future breakout time with certainty,” the 367 House members wrote.