The prophecy is more than seeing into the future. For the prophecy sees without the element of time. For the prophecy sees things as they were, as they are, and as they always shall be.
Showing posts with label revelation 17:4. Show all posts
Showing posts with label revelation 17:4. Show all posts
Do you wait till the prospect of obliteration is upon you? Or
initiate, blithely, a nuclear holocaust upon your enemy as a matter of
what is termed “first use” by the nuclear weapon high priests? Neither
prospect is particularly attractive, for each assumes the unthinkable
made possible, madness made real.
In one way, even articulating a policy on first use or otherwise is a
shoddy way of earning plaudits in the game of annihilation. The logic
of obliteration remains. In any case, this was a debate that has
transfixed the inner circles of Washington.
Keeping the first use option available became a critical feature of
deterrent plans against a potential Soviet invasion of Western Europe,
where its calamitous promise would hopefully chill the prospect of any
such move. Such weapons would also come into play in potential actions
in the Asian theatre, notably focused on North Korea and China.
While scant on precise details, The Washington Post did suggest that
Japan, South Korea, France and Britain had send urgent notes of concern
to the administration feeling that such a move would be unwise and
unnecessarily disruptive.[1]
The message of concern from Japan came straight from Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, conveyed directly to Adm. Harry Harris Jr., head of US
Pacific Command, while Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares
Fund, reiterated his understanding that the diplomatic wires had been
particularly hot on the subject. “The allies lobbying against [adopting
no-first use] are nervous nellies.”
Such nervous nellies can also be found closer to home. Secretary of
State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Secretary of
Energy Ernest Moniz can be counted amongst them. Their concerns became
clear at a National Security Council meeting in July.[2] Carter’s gripe
was that having a no first use posture would risk fostering insecurity
within US allied circles and dirtying the sacred notion of deterrence.
The central fallacy to such opposition lies in the self-deluding
notion that nuclear deterrence has any genuine credibility. To keep that
delusion alive entails staying firm on the issue of obliterating your
enemy even as a matter of first course. The finger must be ever hovering above the button.
Such a stance does not convince the secretary-general of an A-bomb
survivors group, Kazuo Okoshi, who has been particularly aggravated at
Japanese opposition to the new slant in Washington. “North Korea
repeatedly conducts nuclear tests. Deterrence is not working.”[3]
Clearly.
The United States, with its alliances, diplomatic and economic might,
“our conventional and cyber weaponry our technological advantages,
constitute a global military juggernaut unmatched in history.” If
Washington’s adversaries refrain from using nuclear weapons, the US has
no need to even consider the prospect.
While the authors do slip into the imperial-speak typical of such
pronouncements (we have power far superior to others and all that), they
make obvious points. Using such weapons against Russia and China would
entail global death; employing such weapons against non-state actors
would be “gratuitous”.
The more telling point here is that ditching first use would provide
reassurances across the globe while saving oodles of money (less need
for a strategic nuclear missile strike force, housed in expensive silos;
a leaner force).
This giant, in short, will not act unless provoked, and if so, the
results will be catastrophic to all concerned. This assumption is as
much grounded in false assessment as it is in optimism, the ultimate
point being that if you have such entities at hand, you will use them.
The normalisation such weapons of mass murder has exerted a numbing
effect on the strategic establishment. Even Cartwright and Blair, both
having been connected with the nuclear establishment in some way, never
countenance a world free of nuclear weapons. They are in the business of
risk reduction and norm creation, hoping that Obama’s embrace of a
no-first use policy would cause other states to follow.
States in possession of them may well make superficial gestures: the
odd promise to cull a certain type of delivery weapon; a scant reduction
of warheads. Others will wheeze their way in response. None of this
ultimately helps with the prospect of abolition – the mere existence of
one such weapon is one too many.
In his May 28 letter, B. J. Roberts accused M. Reza Behnam (letters, May
25) of conducting a “tirade” against Hillary Clinton’s hawkishness in
foreign affairs, labeling as “innuendo” his claim that her efforts
against Saddam Hussein aligned perfectly with the neocons in demonizing
the Iraqi leader.
In spite of being informed beforehand by prominent arms control
analysts that none of the Bush administration’s claims and charges
regarding Hussein’s possession of chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons was true, Clinton persisted that they weren’t in doubt, and said
“if left unchecked, Saddam … will continue to increase his capacity” to
wage such war, disregarding his total lack of delivery systems.
She further sought to discredit those questioning the
administration’s alarmist rhetoric by insisting that Iraq’s possession
of such weapons and weapons programs were true, and said “if left
unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage
biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop
nuclear weapons.”
She even went so far as to insist that Hussein would “employ those
weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States,”
justifying “action by the United States to defend itself” via invasion
and occupation of that country, now disintegrating into ruin.
Roberts’ charge of “innuendo” — defined as “an allusive or oblique remark or hint” — is easily dismissed.
As the general election heats up, Clinton supporters have been eager
to tout the virtues of her foreign-policy experience relative to Donald
Trump. And as a former Secretary of State and First Lady, no one
questions Mrs Clinton’s bona fides in that regard.
First, there was the Iraq War. Without
question, it was the single greatest foreign policy catastrophe of the
past 40 years. Undertaken without UN endorsement, with a justification
that was totally wrong, Iraq fast became a strategic quagmire.
De-Baathification destroyed the Iraqi state, gave rise to a Sunni
insurgency, and cost thousands of American lives and trillions of
dollars. Hillary Clinton voted for the war.
Meanwhile, in 2003 Iran offered the United States a grand bargain.
Everything was on the table. Iran would dismantle its nascent nuclear
program, assist the U.S. stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, cease its
support of proxy militants and even accept the existence of Israel. The
Bush administration rejected it. Back then Iran had tested a single
ten-centrifuge cascade, which increased to over nineteen thousand
centrifuges by 2014. Under the 2015 nuclear deal that limit is now over
five thousand centrifuges, which continue to enrich uranium and will be
upgraded in less than eight years’ time.
This includes Libya.
Gaddafi had previously given up his WMD program and sought to
reconstitute himself into the international system. The price he paid
for this cooperation was severe. Relying on Clinton’s assurances, Russia
abstained from UN Resolution 1973, enabling military intervention to
protect civilians under the explicit understanding that this would not
mean regime change.
Clinton immediately reneged on the deal (which I warned against at the time).
NATO bombing led to Gaddafi’s overthrow in favor of ISIS-style
militants. Later, four Americans including Ambassador Stevens were
murdered at an American diplomatic compound in Benghazi on Clinton’s
watch. Today Libya is a failed state. Obama has since labelled this his
single greatest failure as president, a failure for which Clinton is
largely responsible.
So much for the reset. In the wake of the Libya betrayal Russia
became hostile and resurgent in Europe (albeit not merely because of
it). After the Georgia conflict Russia reorganized its military, and
began fielding new medium-range missiles in violation of the INF Treaty.
In 2014, Putin annexed Crimea and fueled the Ukrainian civil war in
open defiance of NATO and the United States. Obama’s response has been
risible.
And then there’s Syria. In 2011 Secretary Clinton then repeatedly stated “Assad must go”
(FYI six years on he’s still in power). Obama destroyed America’s
credibility around the world by imposing a ‘redline’ on chemical weapons
being used in Syria that he was never willing to enforce. In the end
Obama had to be bailed out by Russia, who brokered a deal with Assad to
have those weapons removed.
While the United States was lurching from one failure to the next in
the Middle East, massive challenges arose in Asia. North Korea has now
completed four nuclear tests of increasing sophistication, and has made
strides in long range ballistic missiles and SLBM technology. As a
consequence, Obama bequeaths his successor a North Korea that will have
the capability to conduct a nuclear strike on the United States within
an eight-year term of office.
To underscore just how feeble the United States has become over the
past decade and a half, consider this mind-boggling statistic: when
George W. Bush went into Iraq, the U.S. economy was eight times larger
than China’s. Today, China’s economy is about three-quarters that of the
U.S. and will certainly eclipse it within a decade.
China is America’s greatest long-term challenge, and is fast
reemerging as a global superpower that seeks to expel the United States
from Asia. It commits cyber theft on an industrial scale, employs
mercantilist trade practices and currency manipulation, and of course,
is asserting its expansive territorial claims by force. China has
dredged three thousand acres of new land in the South China Sea, and
Obama has done nothing to stop them. The U.S. Navy is increasingly
unable to operate safely in the region, while China’s military budget
continues to grow at double digits almost every year.
No matter where you look, whether it’s Iran’s expansion in the Middle
East, Russia’s aggression in Europe, nuclear proliferation in rogue
states, or China’s bid for regional hegemony, the verdict is in—those
running American foreign policy have been an ignominious disgrace on
every possible front and in every conceivable respect, and Hillary
Clinton has been central to that failure.
Others have accurately foreshadowed American foreign policy under a
new Clinton presidency. In clear contrast, Trump is centered in realism.
As Senator Jeff Sessions recently confirmed, Trump’s foreign policy
resembles that of Henry Kissinger. And as I’ve previously explained,
this approach is best able to meet America’s key challenges and restore
its pre-eminence in the world (See ‘Trump, a Nixon-Kissinger realist’).
Along this path Trump has taken positive steps. He’s now met
personally with Kissinger, and delivered a major foreign policy speech
where he laid out a realist platform: be unafraid of bold reform where a
changing global environment demands it; ensure scarce resources support
a cohesive strategy; and exercise sober reflection with respect to past
failures in order to avoid their repetition—Not what America has been
doing in recent times!
It’s time to shake the rust off America’s foreign policy… I have to
look for talented experts with new approaches and practical ideas,
rather than surrounding myself with those who have perfect resumes but
very little to brag about except responsibility for a long history of
failed policies and continued losses at war.
Hillary Clinton represents precisely that continuity—something that America can no longer afford.
Crispin Rovere is a member of the Australian Labor Party and previous
convenor of the ACT ALP International Affairs Policy Committee.
Formerly he was a PhD candidate at the ANU’s Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre (SDSC) and previously worked in Secretariat of the
Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament, and published on nuclear policy.
U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, right, and Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov press a red button symbolizing the intention to
“reset” U.S.-Russian relations during their meeting in Geneva,
Switzerland, Friday, March 6, 2009. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton raised the hope of U.S-Russian cooperation on missile
defense Friday on her way to discussions with her Russian counterpart,
with a goal of repairing the two nations’ relations. (AP Photo)
Rachel Whitlark
Rachel Whitlark is a post-doctoral research
fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and the International
Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, at..
From Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from arms races to arms
control, from the Cold War and its proxy wars to the 2003 invasion of
Iraq and the 2015 deal with Iran, few subjects have so consistently, and
so controversially, concerned the American presidency as nuclear
weapons have. A dozen men have been responsible for the decision to use
the US nuclear arsenal since 1945, and whoever wins the election in
November will inherit the
responsibility for approximately 4,670 warheads at a time when relations
with Russia (holder of 4,500 warheads) have reached a perilous low, a
time when support for arms control is perhaps faltering, and a time when
nuclear threats abound from the Middle East to the Korean Peninsula. Attempting
to predict precisely how a candidate will govern after Election Day is
always challenging. Presidential hopefuls often rely on rhetoric to get
elected, and once in office confront numerous complex factors that crowd
the decision-making environment and impact eventual policy choices.
Still, issues like nuclear war and nuclear proliferation are too
important to ignore until a new commander in chief assumes office next
January. And although the topic has hardly gotten the attention it
deserves in the election so far, most of the leading candidates have
said enough about nuclear weapons that we can examine their positions in
some detail. In fact, as ongoing academic research suggests, a
candidate’s prior views on nuclear weapons may be more likely to
influence his or her eventual policy choices as president.
The dealmaker. The most surprising thing about the
candidates’ positions on nuclear policy might be that Donald Trump, the
one contender who has never held public office, boasts a plentiful
record on the topic, extending back at least as far as a 1987 interview
with journalist Ron Rosenbaum. The author of a 2011 book about nuclear
war, Rosenbaum recently recounted the episode for Slate, who
also republished his original article, all of which makes for
interesting reading. Rosenbaum recalls that Trump “seemed genuinely
aware of just how much danger nukes put the world in” and how little had
been done about it. The real-estate mogul, then in his early 40s,
questioned the wisdom of popular nuclear-deterrence policies and said
his uncle, a scientist at MIT, had gotten him interested in nuclear
proliferation and terrorism. As he still does today, Trump identified
proliferation as the number one problem confronting the United States—a
position that’s difficult to reconcile with his recent comments
supporting selective proliferation to key American allies. Still, it’s
clear that Trump has engaged the issue of nuclear weapons since the days
of the Reagan administration, and, if Rosenbaum’s original assessment
still applies, has done so sincerely.
In 1987, with the Cold War still at the forefront of nuclear
discussions, Trump pushed for Washington to do more with Moscow on the
nuclear portfolio. Yet he seemed just as worried about potential
failures of deterrence outside the US-Soviet relationship—between India
and Pakistan, for example (Pakistan would ultimately acquire nuclear
weapons in 1998), or as a bulwark against a terrorism-sponsoring
dictator like Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, with whom he had a particular
fascination. He also worried about “countries like France … blatantly
selling nuclear technology.” His solution, not surprisingly given his
profession, was a deal—a deal with the Soviet Union to prevent other
states from going nuclear at all costs. It involved the Americans and
the Soviets using economic pressure in their respective spheres of
influence to forestall proliferation. When pressed, Trump reluctantly
advocated using military force if economic punishments failed. “It’s not
that [I] think he’s got the solution,” Rosenbaum wrote at the time,
“but I like the visionary urgency he brings to the problem.”
Thirteen years later, Trump would advocate a similar position, with
less reluctance, while discussing North Korea in his 2000 campaign book The America We Deserve:
“Am I ready to bomb this reactor? You’re damned right. When the
Israelis bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor they were condemned … But they
did what they had to do to survive.” In that same book he praised
Richard Nixon (he of the “madman” school of foreign relations) for his
work in bringing the Russians to the table for the first serious
arms-control negotiations between the two superpowers and lauded Ronald
Reagan for being “crazy like a fox,” a quality the Nobel laureate Thomas
Schelling touted in his 1966 book Arms and Influence: “Another
paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be
believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself
or one’s country.” Whether in the nuclear context or in describing US
intervention policy, one can’t help but get the sense that Trump
believes American leaders talk too much, telling our adversaries just
what we’ll do and when.
In his 2011 book Time to Get Tough, Trump expanded his views
on counter-proliferation and extended deterrence. He pointed to Israel,
for whom keeping all options on the table—including military force—has
proven effective against previous proliferation challenges.
Foreshadowing his most recent comments about allied free-riding, he also
described how South Korea “likes our military defending them against
North Korea.” Recently, this last point brought Trump significant
criticism for his seeming renunciation of decades of American
policy—advocating that South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia might
benefit from going nuclear instead of using the American nuclear
umbrella for protection.
Trump was similarly criticized by opponent Ted Cruz for not knowing
what the nuclear triad was, and for not having an answer about which
leg(s) should be prioritized under proposed modernization plans. (Cruz
stated his support for the modernization plans and said the submarine
leg of the triad was its most significant priority.) Trump’s most recent
comments, in a speech in Washington last week dedicated to his foreign
policy, are critical of the Obama administration for allowing the
nuclear arsenal to “atrophy,” but are ambiguous about his potential
support for the current modernization proposal. Trump and Cruz do agree,
however, on the use of tactical nuclear weapons against ISIS—a
remarkably explicit position for candidates or leaders to utter. (As
Cruz said, “I don’t know if sand can glow in the dark, but we’re going
to find out.”) Trump seems also to regard nuclear weapons as an option
of last resort in a wider range of contingencies (in line with current
US policy), calling them “an absolute last step.” Elsewhere he has said,
“Nobody is going to mess with us. But I would be very, very slow on the
draw.”
Despite his longstanding interest in the issue of nuclear weapons,
some of Trump’s recent remarks could use some clarification. He has
suggested that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may not subscribe to
rational deterrence, yet he also proposes that Japanese and South Korean
nuclear weapons could deter and balance the threat from Pyongyang’s
arsenal. He also ignores the potential risk of a costly and dangerous
arms race in East Asia, which could include China and other neighboring
states, should Japan and South Korea head in this direction.
The liberal hawk.Like
Trump, Hillary Clinton has listed nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism as the most threatening issues (or among the most threatening)
confronting the United States—as far back as 2003—and has worked
personally on these issues throughout her career.
As a senator from 2001 to 2009, Clinton criticized what she saw as
the Bush administration’s significant failures on nuclear policy.
Specifically, she focused on the dangers of weakening US support for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Clinton was also a
vocal advocate for the Nunn-Lugar initiative to increase security for
nuclear material and a critic of President Bush for not doing enough on
these significant issues. Running for president in 2007, she made
overcoming these failures central to her message and pledged to
strengthen the necessary institutions and alliances key to combatting
proliferation and the threat from WMD terrorism, positions she has
recommitted to in her current campaign.
Clinton also addressed the threats emanating from Iran and North
Korea, and their links to terrorism and the nuclear black market. As a
senator, she consistently voted for sanctions to pressure Iran to give
up its weapons ambitions. She introduced the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act,
designed to decrease the availability of and access to radiological
materials, and cosponsored the Nuclear Facility and Material Security
Act, intended to improve safety and security measures at national
nuclear facilities. She has been explicit in keeping “all options on the
table” to ensure that Iran does not go nuclear—a significant position
for a candidate whose 2002 vote for the Iraq War showed she was ready to
use military force as a counter-proliferation tool.
As secretary of state from 2009 to 2013, Clinton continued to elevate
nuclear proliferation as among her highest priorities. Alongside
President Obama, she led the global efforts to pressure Iran to the
negotiating table by designing one of the toughest international
sanctions campaigns in recent history, and by authorizing the secret
US-Iranian diplomatic channel in Oman that preceded the ultimately
successful negotiations. This effort culminated in 2015 with Iran
shipping out its stocks of enriched uranium, dramatically decreasing the
number of operating centrifuges, foreclosing the plutonium pathway, and
reducing the likelihood of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in
Iran for at least 10 to 15 years. Clinton has also underscored how this
diplomatic solution—backed by a combination of pressure and
engagement—has not only blocked Iran’s path to the Bomb but has also
prevented what might have turned into a dangerous regional arms race.
Likewise, she has focused on the threat emanating from North Korea.
This was one aspect of Obama’s pivot to Asia—working to prevent the
spread of WMD regionally and beyond. The challenge is familiar to
Clinton—it was Bill Clinton whose efforts to prevent North Korea’s
nuclearization in the early 1990s led to the Agreed Framework, which
blocked the Kim regime’s plutonium pathway for more than a decade,
avoiding what might have been a costly war. In her 2003 book Living History,
Clinton articulated the dangers North Korea posed both as a
proliferation risk itself, but also as a black-market actor, poised to
sell “the world’s most lethal substance to the highest bidder.” As
secretary of state, Clinton urged sanctions following repeated
provocations and nuclear advancements, as well as regional pressure
through an augmented US military presence.
Finally, Clinton provided critical support for the rest of Obama’s
nuclear security initiative, the so-called “Prague Agenda.” She also
worked to secure the 2010 New START agreement, bringing Russian and
American arsenals down to their lowest size in decades, and reinstating
vital verification measures that had previously lapsed. In particular,
as she wrote in Hard Choices, she used her congressional
connections to secure key Republican votes needed to ensure treaty
ratification. Prior to the 2008 election, she argued that “taking
dramatic steps to reduce our nuclear arsenal would build support for the
coalitions we need to address the threat of nuclear proliferation.” A
President Clinton would likely continue efforts on nuclear security,
seek opportunities to reengage on arms control with Russia, and take a
tough or tougher line with Iran and North Korea. Her most recent
comments—“any nation or group that supports or enables terrorist efforts
to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction will be held
accountable”—suggest she would pay more attention to state-based
sponsorship than Obama has recently. There may also be a more limited
focus on the effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide.
The rest of the pack. Fewer positions are
attributable to Cruz, Sanders, and John Kasich since they have said and
written much less about nuclear matters—both during and prior to their
presidential campaigns. Cruz’s short political tenure (three years as a
US senator) and lack of foreign policy focus means that much of what
exists reflects current debates over Iran and nuclear modernization.
Kasich, the governor of Ohio since 2010, is described as a
budget-conscious defense hawk, but he too has focused little on nuclear
affairs. And Bernie Sanders, despite a lengthy political career,
including a quarter-century in the House and the Senate, has largely
prioritized domestic topics, leaving him vulnerable to criticisms of
foreign policy ignorance and inexperience. (Exceptions to this would
include significant work on veterans’ affairs and, more relevant here,
engagement on the domestic energy, climate, and industrial aspects of
nuclear power, as overseen by the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and
Nuclear Safety, of which he is a member.) Nevertheless, it’s worth
recording what we do know about each of these other three candidates.
On his website, Cruz lists six pillars for securing America and
defending the nation. The sixth is ripping up the Iran deal. Cruz has
said his position is motivated by a lack of “anytime—anywhere”
inspections and by the potential for a monetary windfall emboldening the
Iranian regime. Cruz’s hostility, though, precedes the deal’s
implementation: In March 2015, he joined 46 fellow senators in signing a
letter to Iran describing the deal as simply an executive order—subject
to review, modification, or termination under the next administration.
Cruz also introduced the Sanction Iran, Safeguard America Act to further
pressure Iran and complicate efforts to ensure the deal’s
implementation. He introduced a resolution in 2015 designating the
powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization.
(Clinton co-sponsored a similar resolution in 2007.) Cruz recently
endorsed a 10-year extension of the Iran Sanctions Act, and has
supported other measures designed to undermine the negotiated solution.
Regarding the potential challenge from North Korean nuclear weapons,
Cruz has described how the regime in Pyongyang is not suicidal and
subscribes to some notion of rational deterrence. Subsequently, this
February, he left the campaign trail for Washington to cast a vote in
favor of a new round of missile-related sanctions. Despite voicing
similar concerns, Sanders did not return to vote. Elsewhere on the
Republican side, Kasich called for a harder line on North Korea. Beyond
Iran and North Korea, Cruz has indicated his support for ballistic
missile defense and nuclear modernization, as noted above.
According to Sanders, a nuclear-armed Iran threatens to further
destabilize the Middle East and spur a dangerous arms race. Generally
preferring negotiated, multilateral solutions, Sanders, in contrast to
many Republicans, views the 2015 deal as the best option for
forestalling a nuclear-armed Iran. Sanders is also the only candidate on
either side of the aisle who has not vocally advocated for the use of
force as a possible counter-proliferation strategy. Even Kasich, who has
criticized those who would end the deal on day one, saying they were
“inexperienced” and “playing to a crowd,” said that “if we think they’re
getting close to … developing a nuclear weapon… you better believe that
I would do everything in my power as the commander-in-chief to stop
them from have a nuclear weapon.” Sanders also voted against the Iraq
War, despite its intended goal of preventing Iraqi nuclear acquisition.
Like Clinton, Sanders endorses the notion of a world without nuclear
weapons. He has voiced skepticism with the current $1 trillion
modernization plan, and may be likely to oppose such efforts going
forward. Conversely, Kasich supports the modernization effort—despite
being a known defense hawk and favoring balanced budgets in Ohio and
Washington.
It’s also worth noting that in 2009 Sanders voted in favor of New
START. In 2002, when still in the House, he voted to prohibit the use of
defense funds for new nuclear weapons as well as to remove funding for
space-based missile defense from a Pentagon appropriations bill. Around
the same time, Clinton voted to shift funds allocated for missile
defense to nonproliferation efforts instead. Room for improvement. What are we to make of all of
this? It is clear that Trump has been thinking about nuclear issues far
longer than his current presidential bid. It is perhaps curious, then,
given the accusations of foreign policy inexperience and ignorance that
his competitors have levied, that he has not raised his well-documented
positions. This seems especially perplexing in light of the fact that
his main rival’s expertise amounts to three short years as a senator.
One potential explanation for Trump’s relative silence is that his and
Cruz’s positions on nuclear matters seem more similar than distinct: To
varying degrees, both have criticized the deal with Iran; both see
potential in using nuclear weapons against ISIS and perhaps elsewhere;
and both focus on state-based nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea.
There are differences, though. Cruz sees North Korea as rationally
deterred, while Trump disagrees. Cruz (along with Kasich) has supported
missile defense, which Trump has opposed—though not because it couldn’t
work, but rather, in an echo of his fears from the 1980s, because “in
this age of miniaturization, our real threat is not going to be flying
in on a missile. It’s going to be delivered in a van, or a suitcase, or a
fire-hydrant sized canister.” If there is more to the similarities than
the differences, highlighting nuclear issues may be unhelpful for
Trump. Given that neither Cruz nor Trump has demonstrated much penchant
for nuance on the campaign trail, this may be unsurprising—particularly
in light of the extremely small constituencies familiar with the details
of nuclear policy. One further possibility is that even Trump, for whom
very little seems sacred, sees nuclear rhetoric as very high stakes.
Despite an overcrowded domestic and international landscape, nuclear
policy should still occupy a central place on every candidate’s agenda,
as Clinton herself has said. The few remaining candidates hold different
views on critical issues, including proliferation, security, and the
role of nuclear weapons in the US military apparatus. While Trump may
have been thinking about nuclear matters the longest (at least according
to available records), he has not yet come out in support of a world
without nuclear weapons. While Clinton advocated repeatedly for the use
of force as a counter-proliferation strategy, she has most recently
backed the use of force as a signal of credibility and strength
undergirding the Iran deal’s diplomatic solution. Regardless of how one
feels about the deal, it is likely that only a Clinton or Sanders
presidency would keep it firmly in place; the Republicans have all
voiced some opposition, though it’s unclear how quickly the deal itself
could be annulled or modified. While Sanders is the most likely
candidate to veto US nuclear modernization plans, only Cruz and Trump
have explained how they could envision using nuclear weapons in a future
conflict.
Clearly the candidates from both major parties leave much to be
desired in their positions on nuclear issues. Individually and
collectively, these positions are far too superficial for people hoping
to occupy the Oval Office. Given the stakes, the nuclear portfolio
demands much more than the cursory treatment it presently receives.
During the Cold War, U.S. policy was to avert a nuclear war with the
former Soviet Union. Even when Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest,
Hungary, in 1956 to smash a rebellion by Hungarian freedom fighters, the
U.S. did not intervene. Recently however, Hillary Clinton stated that
as president of the United States she would not hesitate to shoot down
Russian war planes if they violated a “no fly zone in Syria.”
Sanders, who was trailing by just 1500 votes in the Missouri primary
elections on Tuesday, said he would not request for recounting of votes
and has conceded defeat to Clinton.
“I prefer to save the taxpayers of Missouri some money,” Sanders said through spokesman Michael Briggs yesterday.
Results of the Republican presidential primary in Missouri is yet to
be officially declared as it is too close to call. Front-runner Donald
Trump is leading his rival Senator Ted Cruz by 1700 votes. So far, Cruz
has not conceded defeat.
Since the margin of victory in each case is less than one percentage
point, CNN and other US networks said they will not project a winner in
either contest.
Missouri saw more than 1.5 million ballots, or 39 per cent of
registered voters, cast on Tuesday. That was the highest amount recorded
for a Presidential primary in Missouri history. The previous record of
1.4 million, or 36 per cent, was set during the 2008 primary.
Missouri went to polls along with the key states of Florida, Illinois, North Carolina and Ohio
She took a swipe at Mr. Sanders, saying he should be more specific
about his plans, but she lodged a wholesale indictment of Republican
front-runner Donald Trump. “When we hear a candidate for president call
for rounding up 12 million immigrants, banning all Muslims from entering
the United States, when he embraces torture—that doesn’t make him
strong. It makes him wrong,” she said.
With 214 pledged delegates at stake, Florida was the night’s biggest
prize, while Illinois had 156 pledged delegates and Ohio 143 up for
grabs. They will be awarded proportionally.
Heading into Tuesday, Mr. Sanders was ramping up his attacks on Mrs.
Clinton, and has vowed to fight all the way to the summer convention.
But he may now face increasing pressure to back off and revert to his
earlier role as a candidate primarily driving a progressive, populist
message rather than pursuing a viable path to the nomination.
At his election night rally in Arizona Tuesday night, though, Mr.
Sanders showed no signs of backing off. He pointed to Wall Street
contributions to the super PAC supporting Mrs. Clinton and repeated his
call that she release transcripts of her high-priced speeches to Wall
Street firms.
“To my mind, if you’re going to give a speech for $225,000 it must be
a really great speech,” he said. “And if it’s such a great speech, all
of America should be able to read it.”
In a statement issued late into the night, Mr. Sanders said the race was still winnable.
In Illinois, her margin was much closer, some 50.3% to 48.9% with 98% of precincts reporting.
Mrs. Clinton had been expected to easily win Florida, with the
state’s demographics and rules barring independents from participating
helping her. But Ohio was closely fought, and Mr. Sanders had hoped to
parlay a victory last week in Michigan to the neighboring state. Both
have seen a drain in manufacturing jobs, and Mr. Sanders put the blame
squarely on free-trade agreements that Mrs. Clinton has long supported.
Mrs. Clinton completed a sweep of the South, where strong support
from African-Americans pumped up her totals. But her Ohio win was more
important, showing she could win in the industrial Midwest.
After Tuesday’s vote, Mrs. Clinton was assured of adding at least 253
delegates to her column, bringing her total pledged delegates, who are
chosen by the voters, to more than 1,000. Mr. Sanders was sure to add at
least 124 delegates, but he was on track to end the night more than 300
delegates behind. Including superdelegates, who can vote for any
candidate they like, her total topped 1,400, more than double his.
At roughly the halfway point of the race, Sanders advisers say they
now have the advantage, with friendlier states set later in the
calendar. His campaign now looks ahead to contests next week in Arizona,
Utah and Idaho, three states where aides have hoped to do well. But the
next big delegate hauls aren’t awarded until April: first in Wisconsin,
and then the giant prize of New York, where Mrs. Clinton lives and
which she represented in the Senate for eight years.
ENLARGE
In Florida, Mrs. Clinton’s advantage was on display Tuesday in Miami,
home to large populations of Hispanic and African-American voters who
have gravitated to her campaign.
“I like that she’s a smart, charismatic woman,” said Bridgette
Thornton, a 37-year-old African-American attorney, who cast her ballot
at a Miami church. “It was a difficult choice for me, but I’m a
practical person. Hillary has a better shot at winning the presidential
election.”
The race was closer in Ohio, where Mr. Sanders hammered his
anti-free-trade views in recent days. Mrs. Clinton tried to recast her
trade message, but the attempt fell flat with at least some voters.
“The Clinton history with trade policies, that really just killed our
area,” said Fred Woke, a 57-year-old radio announcer who voted for Mr.
Sanders in Niles, in northeastern Ohio.
The question now is what tone Mr. Sanders will adopt in coming days.
In the leadup to Tuesday’s contests, the Vermont senator targeted Mrs.
Clinton’s record of support for free-trade deals, and for the backing
she receives from an outside super PAC.
Earlier in the race, Mr. Sanders vowed to avoid negative attacks, but
he has amped up his critique in the weeks since voting began. On the
stump leading into Tuesday’s voting, he suggested Mrs. Clinton is in the
pocket of Wall Street and connected her support for free-trade
agreements to an exodus of manufacturing jobs across the Midwest.
The challenge for both Democrats is that Mr. Trump, should he win the
Republican nomination, would be an unconventional opponent who could
pick up some of Mr. Sanders’s populist arguments.
That has some Clinton backers anxious for Mr. Sanders to ease up.
“The message of Sanders campaign has become personal attacks,” said
Robert Zimmerman, a superdelegate from New York who backs Mrs. Clinton.
“It’s not only wrong, it’s dangerous politically if he keeps up that
tone. It could hurt plans for party unity and empower Republicans.”
Steve Elmendorf, a political consultant who backs Mrs. Clinton,
agreed there will come a point when Mr. Sanders needs to let up, but he
said it isn’t for Clinton supporters to say when. “When it becomes clear
you cannot win, then you should unite behind the nominee of the party
and try to beat the Republicans,” Mr. Elmendorf said. “It’s for him to
decide when he can’t win.”
In 2008, Mrs. Clinton herself continued to compete in
presidential-primary contests against then-Sen. Barack Obama even though
he remained ahead in the delegate race the entire time.
“Even if he doesn’t think he will win the nomination, he’s trying to
amass as many delegates as he can,” said Joe Trippi, a Democratic
strategist. Delegates would give Mr. Sanders leverage at the party’s
convention and demonstrate the strength of his movement, Mr. Trippi
said, adding, “I don’t see him relenting.”
Sanders aides see a narrow path to the nomination to the nomination
and say the senator will continue to fight for it. His fervent
supporters, who continue to fill arenas, also hope he presses forward.
“I think that you need to fight the fight ’til the end,” said Cindy
Figh, 50, a massage therapist from Lithia, Fla., who shaved the name
“Bernie” into her hair and came to see the senator speak last week in
Tampa. “I just think that there’s a chance that he can pull it off.”
She rejected any suggestion that Mr. Sanders might damage Mrs.
Clinton, whom she plans to support if she wins the nomination. “I think
that this is part of politics,” Ms. Figh said. “We’re in the big-boy
playground now, and sometimes your ball gets taken away.”
Steve Schale, a Democratic consultant in Florida who voted for Mrs.
Clinton, said he doesn’t worry that the Sanders attacks will damage her,
partly because Democrats are sure to unify if Mr. Trump is the nominee.
“You want to get Democrats over the Sanders-Clinton thing, give them
five seconds to think about Trump being within five feet of the nuclear
codes,” Mr. Schale said.
He said he saw no mathematical way for Mr.
Sanders to overcome Mrs. Clinton’s delegate lead, and said a protracted
primary fight would occupy time that the Clinton campaign could be using
to prepare for the general election.