From Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, from arms races to arms
control, from the Cold War and its proxy wars to the 2003 invasion of
Iraq and the 2015 deal with Iran, few subjects have so consistently, and
so controversially, concerned the American presidency as nuclear
weapons have. A dozen men have been responsible for the decision to use
the US nuclear arsenal since 1945, and whoever wins the election in
November
will inherit the
responsibility for approximately 4,670 warheads at a time when relations
with Russia (holder of 4,500 warheads) have reached a perilous low, a
time when support for arms control is perhaps faltering, and a time when
nuclear threats abound from the Middle East to the Korean Peninsula. Attempting
to predict precisely how a candidate will govern after Election Day is
always challenging. Presidential hopefuls often rely on rhetoric to get
elected, and once in office confront numerous complex factors that crowd
the decision-making environment and impact eventual policy choices.
Still, issues like nuclear war and nuclear proliferation are too
important to ignore until a new commander in chief assumes office next
January. And although the topic has hardly gotten the attention it
deserves in the election so far, most of the leading candidates have
said enough about nuclear weapons that we can examine their positions in
some detail. In fact, as ongoing academic research suggests, a
candidate’s prior views on nuclear weapons may be more likely to
influence his or her eventual policy choices as president.
The dealmaker. The most surprising thing about the
candidates’ positions on nuclear policy might be that Donald Trump, the
one contender who has never held public office, boasts a plentiful
record on the topic, extending back at least as far as a 1987 interview
with journalist Ron Rosenbaum. The author of a 2011 book about nuclear
war, Rosenbaum recently recounted the episode for
Slate, who
also republished his original article, all of which makes for
interesting reading. Rosenbaum recalls that Trump “seemed genuinely
aware of just how much danger nukes put the world in” and how little had
been done about it. The real-estate mogul, then in his early 40s,
questioned the wisdom of popular nuclear-deterrence policies and said
his uncle, a scientist at MIT, had gotten him interested in nuclear
proliferation and terrorism. As he still does today, Trump identified
proliferation as the number one problem confronting the United States—a
position that’s difficult to reconcile with his recent comments
supporting selective proliferation to key American allies. Still, it’s
clear that Trump has engaged the issue of nuclear weapons since the days
of the Reagan administration, and, if Rosenbaum’s original assessment
still applies, has done so sincerely.
In 1987, with the Cold War still at the forefront of nuclear
discussions, Trump pushed for Washington to do more with Moscow on the
nuclear portfolio. Yet he seemed just as worried about potential
failures of deterrence outside the US-Soviet relationship—between India
and Pakistan, for example (Pakistan would ultimately acquire nuclear
weapons in 1998), or as a bulwark against a terrorism-sponsoring
dictator like Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi, with whom he had a particular
fascination. He also worried about “countries like France … blatantly
selling nuclear technology.” His solution, not surprisingly given his
profession, was a deal—a deal with the Soviet Union to prevent other
states from going nuclear at all costs. It involved the Americans and
the Soviets using economic pressure in their respective spheres of
influence to forestall proliferation. When pressed, Trump reluctantly
advocated using military force if economic punishments failed. “It’s not
that [I] think he’s got the solution,” Rosenbaum wrote at the time,
“but I like the visionary urgency he brings to the problem.”
Thirteen years later, Trump would advocate a similar position, with
less reluctance, while discussing North Korea in his 2000 campaign book
The America We Deserve:
“Am I ready to bomb this reactor? You’re damned right. When the
Israelis bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor they were condemned … But they
did what they had to do to survive.” In that same book he praised
Richard Nixon (he of the “madman” school of foreign relations) for his
work in bringing the Russians to the table for the first serious
arms-control negotiations between the two superpowers and lauded Ronald
Reagan for being “crazy like a fox,” a quality the Nobel laureate Thomas
Schelling touted in his 1966 book
Arms and Influence: “Another
paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be
believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself
or one’s country.” Whether in the nuclear context or in describing US
intervention policy, one can’t help but get the sense that Trump
believes American leaders talk too much, telling our adversaries just
what we’ll do and when.
In his 2011 book
Time to Get Tough, Trump expanded his views
on counter-proliferation and extended deterrence. He pointed to Israel,
for whom keeping all options on the table—including military force—has
proven effective against previous proliferation challenges.
Foreshadowing his most recent comments about allied free-riding, he also
described how South Korea “likes our military defending them against
North Korea.” Recently, this last point brought Trump significant
criticism for his seeming renunciation of decades of American
policy—advocating that South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia might
benefit from going nuclear instead of using the American nuclear
umbrella for protection.
Trump was similarly criticized by opponent Ted Cruz for not knowing
what the nuclear triad was, and for not having an answer about which
leg(s) should be prioritized under proposed modernization plans. (Cruz
stated his support for the modernization plans and said the submarine
leg of the triad was its most significant priority.) Trump’s most recent
comments, in a speech in Washington last week dedicated to his foreign
policy, are critical of the Obama administration for allowing the
nuclear arsenal to “atrophy,” but are ambiguous about his potential
support for the current modernization proposal. Trump and Cruz do agree,
however, on the use of tactical nuclear weapons against ISIS—a
remarkably explicit position for candidates or leaders to utter. (As
Cruz said, “I don’t know if sand can glow in the dark, but we’re going
to find out.”) Trump seems also to regard nuclear weapons as an option
of last resort in a wider range of contingencies (in line with current
US policy), calling them “an absolute last step.” Elsewhere he has said,
“Nobody is going to mess with us. But I would be very, very slow on the
draw.”
Despite his longstanding interest in the issue of nuclear weapons,
some of Trump’s recent remarks could use some clarification. He has
suggested that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may not subscribe to
rational deterrence, yet he also proposes that Japanese and South Korean
nuclear weapons could deter and balance the threat from Pyongyang’s
arsenal. He also ignores the potential risk of a costly and dangerous
arms race in East Asia, which could include China and other neighboring
states, should Japan and South Korea head in this direction.
The liberal hawk. Like
Trump, Hillary Clinton has listed nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism as the most threatening issues (or among the most threatening)
confronting the United States—as far back as 2003—and has worked
personally on these issues throughout her career.
As a senator from 2001 to 2009, Clinton criticized what she saw as
the Bush administration’s significant failures on nuclear policy.
Specifically, she focused on the dangers of weakening US support for the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Clinton was also a
vocal advocate for the Nunn-Lugar initiative to increase security for
nuclear material and a critic of President Bush for not doing enough on
these significant issues. Running for president in 2007, she made
overcoming these failures central to her message and pledged to
strengthen the necessary institutions and alliances key to combatting
proliferation and the threat from WMD terrorism, positions she has
recommitted to in her current campaign.
Clinton also addressed the threats emanating from Iran and North
Korea, and their links to terrorism and the nuclear black market. As a
senator, she consistently voted for sanctions to pressure Iran to give
up its weapons ambitions. She introduced the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act,
designed to decrease the availability of and access to radiological
materials, and cosponsored the Nuclear Facility and Material Security
Act, intended to improve safety and security measures at national
nuclear facilities. She has been explicit in keeping “all options on the
table” to ensure that Iran does not go nuclear—a significant position
for a candidate whose 2002 vote for the Iraq War showed she was ready to
use military force as a counter-proliferation tool.
As secretary of state from 2009 to 2013, Clinton continued to elevate
nuclear proliferation as among her highest priorities. Alongside
President Obama, she led the global efforts to pressure Iran to the
negotiating table by designing one of the toughest international
sanctions campaigns in recent history, and by authorizing the secret
US-Iranian diplomatic channel in Oman that preceded the ultimately
successful negotiations. This effort culminated in 2015 with Iran
shipping out its stocks of enriched uranium, dramatically decreasing the
number of operating centrifuges, foreclosing the plutonium pathway, and
reducing the likelihood of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in
Iran for at least 10 to 15 years. Clinton has also underscored how this
diplomatic solution—backed by a combination of pressure and
engagement—has not only blocked Iran’s path to the Bomb but has also
prevented what might have turned into a dangerous regional arms race.
Likewise, she has focused on the threat emanating from North Korea.
This was one aspect of Obama’s pivot to Asia—working to prevent the
spread of WMD regionally and beyond. The challenge is familiar to
Clinton—it was Bill Clinton whose efforts to prevent North Korea’s
nuclearization in the early 1990s led to the Agreed Framework, which
blocked the Kim regime’s plutonium pathway for more than a decade,
avoiding what might have been a costly war. In her 2003 book
Living History,
Clinton articulated the dangers North Korea posed both as a
proliferation risk itself, but also as a black-market actor, poised to
sell “the world’s most lethal substance to the highest bidder.” As
secretary of state, Clinton urged sanctions following repeated
provocations and nuclear advancements, as well as regional pressure
through an augmented US military presence.
Finally, Clinton provided critical support for the rest of Obama’s
nuclear security initiative, the so-called “Prague Agenda.” She also
worked to secure the 2010 New START agreement, bringing Russian and
American arsenals down to their lowest size in decades, and reinstating
vital verification measures that had previously lapsed. In particular,
as she wrote in
Hard Choices, she used her congressional
connections to secure key Republican votes needed to ensure treaty
ratification. Prior to the 2008 election, she argued that “taking
dramatic steps to reduce our nuclear arsenal would build support for the
coalitions we need to address the threat of nuclear proliferation.” A
President Clinton would likely continue efforts on nuclear security,
seek opportunities to reengage on arms control with Russia, and take a
tough or tougher line with Iran and North Korea. Her most recent
comments—“any nation or group that supports or enables terrorist efforts
to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction will be held
accountable”—suggest she would pay more attention to state-based
sponsorship than Obama has recently. There may also be a more limited
focus on the effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide.
The rest of the pack. Fewer positions are
attributable to Cruz, Sanders, and John Kasich since they have said and
written much less about nuclear matters—both during and prior to their
presidential campaigns. Cruz’s short political tenure (three years as a
US senator) and lack of foreign policy focus means that much of what
exists reflects current debates over Iran and nuclear modernization.
Kasich, the governor of Ohio since 2010, is described as a
budget-conscious defense hawk, but he too has focused little on nuclear
affairs. And Bernie Sanders, despite a lengthy political career,
including a quarter-century in the House and the Senate, has largely
prioritized domestic topics, leaving him vulnerable to criticisms of
foreign policy ignorance and inexperience. (Exceptions to this would
include significant work on veterans’ affairs and, more relevant here,
engagement on the domestic energy, climate, and industrial aspects of
nuclear power, as overseen by the Senate Subcommittee on Clean Air and
Nuclear Safety, of which he is a member.) Nevertheless, it’s worth
recording what we do know about each of these other three candidates.
On his website, Cruz lists six pillars for securing America and
defending the nation. The sixth is ripping up the Iran deal. Cruz has
said his position is motivated by a lack of “anytime—anywhere”
inspections and by the potential for a monetary windfall emboldening the
Iranian regime. Cruz’s hostility, though, precedes the deal’s
implementation: In March 2015, he joined 46 fellow senators in signing a
letter to Iran describing the deal as simply an executive order—subject
to review, modification, or termination under the next administration.
Cruz also introduced the Sanction Iran, Safeguard America Act to further
pressure Iran and complicate efforts to ensure the deal’s
implementation. He introduced a resolution in 2015 designating the
powerful Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization.
(Clinton co-sponsored a similar resolution in 2007.) Cruz recently
endorsed a 10-year extension of the Iran Sanctions Act, and has
supported other measures designed to undermine the negotiated solution.
Regarding the potential challenge from North Korean nuclear weapons,
Cruz has described how the regime in Pyongyang is not suicidal and
subscribes to some notion of rational deterrence. Subsequently, this
February, he left the campaign trail for Washington to cast a vote in
favor of a new round of missile-related sanctions. Despite voicing
similar concerns, Sanders did not return to vote. Elsewhere on the
Republican side, Kasich called for a harder line on North Korea. Beyond
Iran and North Korea, Cruz has indicated his support for ballistic
missile defense and nuclear modernization, as noted above.
According to Sanders, a nuclear-armed Iran threatens to further
destabilize the Middle East and spur a dangerous arms race. Generally
preferring negotiated, multilateral solutions, Sanders, in contrast to
many Republicans, views the 2015 deal as the best option for
forestalling a nuclear-armed Iran. Sanders is also the only candidate on
either side of the aisle who has not vocally advocated for the use of
force as a possible counter-proliferation strategy. Even Kasich, who has
criticized those who would end the deal on day one, saying they were
“inexperienced” and “playing to a crowd,” said that “if we think they’re
getting close to … developing a nuclear weapon… you better believe that
I would do everything in my power as the commander-in-chief to stop
them from have a nuclear weapon.” Sanders also voted against the Iraq
War, despite its intended goal of preventing Iraqi nuclear acquisition.
Like Clinton, Sanders endorses the notion of a world without nuclear
weapons. He has voiced skepticism with the current $1 trillion
modernization plan, and may be likely to oppose such efforts going
forward. Conversely, Kasich supports the modernization effort—despite
being a known defense hawk and favoring balanced budgets in Ohio and
Washington.
It’s also worth noting that in 2009 Sanders voted in favor of New
START. In 2002, when still in the House, he voted to prohibit the use of
defense funds for new nuclear weapons as well as to remove funding for
space-based missile defense from a Pentagon appropriations bill. Around
the same time, Clinton voted to shift funds allocated for missile
defense to nonproliferation efforts instead.
Room for improvement. What are we to make of all of
this? It is clear that Trump has been thinking about nuclear issues far
longer than his current presidential bid. It is perhaps curious, then,
given the accusations of foreign policy inexperience and ignorance that
his competitors have levied, that he has not raised his well-documented
positions. This seems especially perplexing in light of the fact that
his main rival’s expertise amounts to three short years as a senator.
One potential explanation for Trump’s relative silence is that his and
Cruz’s positions on nuclear matters seem more similar than distinct: To
varying degrees, both have criticized the deal with Iran; both see
potential in using nuclear weapons against ISIS and perhaps elsewhere;
and both focus on state-based nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea.
There are differences, though. Cruz sees North Korea as rationally
deterred, while Trump disagrees. Cruz (along with Kasich) has supported
missile defense, which Trump has opposed—though not because it couldn’t
work, but rather, in an echo of his fears from the 1980s, because “in
this age of miniaturization, our real threat is not going to be flying
in on a missile. It’s going to be delivered in a van, or a suitcase, or a
fire-hydrant sized canister.” If there is more to the similarities than
the differences, highlighting nuclear issues may be unhelpful for
Trump. Given that neither Cruz nor Trump has demonstrated much penchant
for nuance on the campaign trail, this may be unsurprising—particularly
in light of the extremely small constituencies familiar with the details
of nuclear policy. One further possibility is that even Trump, for whom
very little seems sacred, sees nuclear rhetoric as very high stakes.
Despite an overcrowded domestic and international landscape, nuclear
policy should still occupy a central place on every candidate’s agenda,
as Clinton herself has said. The few remaining candidates hold different
views on critical issues, including proliferation, security, and the
role of nuclear weapons in the US military apparatus. While Trump may
have been thinking about nuclear matters the longest (at least according
to available records), he has not yet come out in support of a world
without nuclear weapons. While Clinton advocated repeatedly for the use
of force as a counter-proliferation strategy, she has most recently
backed the use of force as a signal of credibility and strength
undergirding the Iran deal’s diplomatic solution. Regardless of how one
feels about the deal, it is likely that only a Clinton or Sanders
presidency would keep it firmly in place; the Republicans have all
voiced some opposition, though it’s unclear how quickly the deal itself
could be annulled or modified. While Sanders is the most likely
candidate to veto US nuclear modernization plans, only Cruz and Trump
have explained how they could envision using nuclear weapons in a future
conflict.
Clearly the candidates from both major parties leave much to be
desired in their positions on nuclear issues. Individually and
collectively, these positions are far too superficial for people hoping
to occupy the Oval Office. Given the stakes, the nuclear portfolio
demands much more than the cursory treatment it presently receives.
