Bad Blood Between The Antichrist and Babylon (Eze 17)

The Antichrist Moqtada al-Sadr

A history of bad blood between Iraq’s Shiite militias, US troops

By Robert H. Reid

Stars and Stripes

Published: March 27, 2015

WASHINGTON — A long, bloody history of conflict, double-crosses and American blood lies behind the U.S. military’s refusal to cooperate with Iraq’s Shiite militias — even if both sides now face a common enemy in the Islamic State.

Gen. Lloyd Austin, head of the U.S. Central Command, bluntly laid out the reasons why the military was loathe to launch airstrikes to help the stalled Iraqi government offensive against Islamic State fighters in Tikrit until Iranian-backed Shiite militias pulled back from the frontlines.

“Once those conditions were met, which included Shiite militias not being involved, then we were able to proceed,” Austin told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday. “[After] three tours in Iraq commanding [U.S.] troops who were brutalized by some of these Shiite militias, I will not, and I hope we never will, coordinate or cooperate with Shiite militias.”

Until the U.S. launched airstrikes late Wednesday, critics had accused the Obama administration of sitting on the sidelines, allowing the Iranians and their Shiite militia clients to exploit the campaign against Tikrit to expand their influence in Iraq, where nearly 4,500 American servicemembers died.
Others, including former Iraq commander Gen. David Petraeus, had warned that as long as militias made up the bulk of the pro-government forces besieging Tikrit, a Sunni city, the U.S. ran the risk of being seen by Sunnis as the “Shiite air force.”

Aside from the political risks, cooperation with the Shiite militias would be a bitter pill for Americans who fought many of those same militiamen only a few years ago. Some of those militia leaders rose in stature in the Shiite-dominated Iraq that the U.S. left behind when the last American troops left in December 2011.

[After] three tours in Iraq commanding [U.S.] troops who were brutalized by some of these Shiite militias, I will not, and I hope we never will, coordinate or cooperate with Shiite militias.
— Gen. Llyod Austin

For Americans who never served in Iraq, the image of the war promoted in such Hollywood productions as “American Sniper” has focused on the fight against Sunni insurgents from al-Qaida in Iraq, the forerunner of the Islamic State.

But much of the fighting, especially in the Baghdad area, was waged against Iranian-backed Shiite groups, some which are now part of the “popular mobilization units.” Since the Iraqi army collapsed last summer, the government has sent those militiamen to the front lines against the Islamic State, not only in Tikrit but in the old battlefields of Diyala, Salaheddin and Babil provinces where they once fought the Americans.

Those Shiite groups include the “Peace Brigades,” the rebranded Mahdi army of Muqtada al-Sadr, whose followers battled U.S. troops in Sadr City, Najaf, Basra and elsewhere, as well as two other groups — Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, or League of the Righteous, which were largely seen as proxies for Iran.

During the war, Kataib Hezbollah and the League were often described by the U.S. military as the “Special Groups” — shadowy militants responsible for rocket attacks on the Green Zone, kidnappings and ambushes in mostly Shiite areas of Baghdad and elsewhere.

The “Special Groups’” signature weapon was the notorious EFP, or explosively formed penetrator, a lethal IED that could fire an explosive charge through all but the most heavily armored vehicles. In the last years of the war, EFPs were believed to have accounted for as many as 80 percent of the U.S. casualties.

The EFPs were so well-made that U.S. intelligence was convinced they were manufactured in Iran and smuggled into Iraq by a network controlled by the League.

The League claimed more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. troops, including EFP and rocket attacks. After the U.S. routed al-Qaida in Iraq in 2008, the U.S. military identified the League as the biggest single threat to American forces in the final three years of the war.

Those Special Groups were also was believed responsible for the Jan. 20, 2007, raid on the Joint Security Station in Karbala, which left five American soldiers dead and three wounded. The raid was among the boldest and most sophisticated attacks against American troops during the war.

It was carried out by up to a dozen Shiite militants, dressed in American uniforms and carrying American weapons, who drove to the station in vehicles similar to those used by U.S. civilian convoys. They bluffed their way through Iraqi checkpoints and stormed a building used by the Americans, killing one U.S. soldier and capturing four others before fleeing with their prisoners.

Three of the Americans were found shot to death near the compound. A fourth was found alive but died soon afterward of his wounds.

Two months after the raid, American troops captured the leader of League, Qais al-Khazali. He was released in 2010 under an Iraqi-negotiated deal in exchange for a British computer contractor who had been kidnapped by Shiite militants.

Al-Khazali ended up rehabilitated and elevated to hero status by the government of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who needed political support from his fellow Shiites as the Americans were preparing to leave the country. Al-Khazali’s followers are among Shiite militias now fighting the Islamic State.

He wasn’t the only Special Groups leader to escape punishment thanks to Iraq’s murky sectarian politics.

Ali Mussa Daqduq, a Lebanese citizen who was sent by Hezbollah and the Iranians to train Shiite militias, was also captured by the U.S. in March 2007 and accused of a role in the Karbala raid.

With al-Khazali having escaped punishment, the U.S. was determined to see Daqduq held accountable for the five American deaths in Karbala. As with al-Khazali, however, the Iraqi government didn’t want to take the political risk of punishing a popular figure.

To add to the problem, Daqduq became the center of an internal political battle in Washington. The Obama administration wanted to extradite him to the U.S. to stand trial. Republicans in Congress demanded that he be sent to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. But the White House wanted to close the Guantanamo prison and refused.

Instead, the administration decided to hand him over to the Iraqis and formally ask them for his extradition. The Iraqis refused the request and put him on trial. But the courts threw out the charges.
After months of high-level wrangling and U.S. pressure, in July 2012 — five months after the last American troops left Iraq — the Iraqi central criminal court ordered his release, signaling that as far as Baghdad was concerned, the case was closed. Daqduq was free.

Robert H. Reid reported from Iraq as a journalist from 2003 until 2009.

reid.robert@stripes.com
Twitter: @rhreid

Nuke For Nuke Against Russia Is A Really Bad Idea (Rev 15:2)

The Wrong Move: Adding Nuclear Weapons to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

FEBRUARY 9, 2015 BY LT. GEN. ROBERT GARD GREG TERRYN

Despite the wishes of two key Congressmen, more nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe is a bad idea.
You may have missed it, but last month two key members of Congress asked the military to move additional U.S. nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft into Eastern Europe.

Reps. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, and Mike Turner, R-Ohio, chairman of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, sent a joint letter to Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry advocating the addition of new sites in Eastern Europe for the deployment of additional U.S. nuclear weapons and dual-capable aircraft.

In their letter, the two chairmen extend a Russian statement claiming its sovereign “right” to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea to an “intention” to do so. They also assert Russian “moves to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander short-range ballistic missiles as well as nuclear-capable Backfire bombers in the illegally occupied territory [Crimea].”

There is no evidence that Russia has taken or is preparing to take any of these actions; but the letter alleges that they pose a new military threat to U.S. allies and our forces in Europe, and that the U.S. must respond “to change President [Vladimir] Putin’s calculus.”

Declared U.S. policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security, not to employ them in hopes of intimidating a hostile head of state.

Fortunately, nuclear weapons have played no overt role in Russia’s annexation of Crimea or its ongoing aggression in eastern Ukraine. And while the U.S. and its European allies must react, introducing a nuclear confrontation into the already dangerous situation is more likely to cause Putin to respond in kind than to change his calculus. Declared U.S. policy is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security, not to employ them in hopes of intimidating a hostile head of state.

Russia’s possible deployment of nuclear weapons in Crimea would provide it little, if any, additional military capability. In fact, Russian dual-capable weapons in that area are not a new development; Russia’s naval fleet in the Black Sea has had a nuclear capability since well before the conclusion of the Cold War. Additionally, if Russia were to locate Backfire bombers in Crimea, which would require extensive upgrading of the Gvardiesky airbase, it would provide no additional reach to Western Europe or vicinity. Why overreact to a militarily ineffective provocation even if it should occur?

For whatever deterrent value they may provide, the U.S. already has some 200 B-61 nuclear bombs based in Europe, along with dual-capable aircraft to deliver them. Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons to Europe would escalate tensions between NATO and Russia while providing no additional security to our allies or to U.S. forces deployed there. As noted by then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright, our tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have no uniquely military function that cannot be provided by our other nuclear weapons.

Deploying additional U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to Europe would make them more vulnerable to a Russian preemptive attack, even with conventional weapons, in the event of an escalating crisis. Also, it is well-known that Russia possesses a far larger stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons than the U.S. has in its inventory. Russia could be tempted to employ its tactical nuclear weapons superiority to take out the U.S. weapons deployed in Europe in the mistaken belief that it could confine the conflict to Western Europe.

In addition, the role of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in allied NATO countries has been a topic of contention for years. Some East European allies welcome the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe for symbolic assurance of their security, while some Western European allies oppose their presence as unnecessarily provocative and dangerous. Following a determination that our nuclear sites in Europe were not secure, the United Kingdom actually insisted on the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from its territory. While Russian aggression has quieted calls for removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, the addition of more nuclear weapons to NATO countries would cause a serious split in the alliance.

Moreover, preparing additional sites in Europe to accommodate tactical nuclear weapons would require a significant financial commitment at a time of budget austerity with far higher priorities for scarce resources allocated to defense. Given the concern over budget caps and sequestration, syphoning defense dollars from conventional priorities to provide funds for this unnecessary and expensive proposal gives new meaning to the definition of “counterproductive.”

Deploying additional U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and more dual-capable aircraft in Europe provides no advantage: It would be an expensive initiative that would add nothing to our security, divert funds from higher priority defense expenditures, likely provoke Russia to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea, increase the possibility of nuclear war, and be divisive amongst our NATO allies.

AUTHORS

Lt. Gen. Robert G. Gard, Jr., (ret.) is chairman of the board of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Full Bio

Greg Terryn is a Scoville Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, where his work focuses on nuclear threat reduction and nonproliferation issues.

We WILL Make A Bad Deal With Iran

On Iran, no deal is a good deal

Iranian Nuclear Negotiations?

Updated November 27, 2014 8:09 PM
By TED R. BROMUND

It’s no secret that the Obama administration badly wants a nuclear deal with Iran. And it’s no secret that the Iranians are playing hard to get. The talks, which were supposed to yield a final agreement this week, have been extended to July. That’s a relief, because right now, the best deal is no deal.
Many of the finest minds in strategy and physics have spent years arguing over the parameters of a deal with Iran. But it’s easy to overthink this problem. We know what nations that give up on nuclear weapons programs look like. They look nothing like Iran.

The United States has done a lot of good work to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We discouraged Taiwan and South Korea from going nuclear. After the Soviet Union fell, we encouraged, and paid, the former Soviet states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to get rid of the Soviet nukes they had inherited.

We supported confidence-building efforts between Brazil and Argentina that ended their nuclear rivalry. In the 1990s, our pursuit of Iraq’s nuclear program persuaded South Africa to come clean about its nuclear stash. In 2004, during the Iraq War, we frightened Moammar Gadhafi into giving up Libya’s program.

But all of these places either went through a democratic transition, or — in Libya’s case — were scared into doing the right thing. Fundamentally, they came clean about their nuclear programs of their own accord. While we offered incentives, our incentives were never decisive.

We’ve offered loads of incentives to North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons, with no success. We’ve never been able to bribe or talk nations into giving up nuclear weapons: They usually give up nukes because they have newly free political systems and no longer want to have the bomb.

None of this is true of Iran. The anti-Western regime of 1979 is still in power. If you doubt that, watch the videos of the charming “Death to America” rallies held across Iran earlier this month. Rallies like that are organized by the regime.

This isn’t complicated. If Iran wanted only civilian nuclear power, it would make that clear. Instead, it has repeatedly been caught cheating, it is developing long-range missiles, and it demands the right to unlimited nuclear research, with no accountability for its past lies.

This is the behavior of a nation that wants a nuclear weapon and a means of delivering it, and is only interested in stalling until it gets both. My conclusion is, therefore, simple: There is currently no basis for meaningful negotiations about the Iranian nuclear program.

The Israelis fear an Iranian bomb would be used to destroy them; merely having the bomb would allow Iran to intimidate its neighbors. That’s why the time isn’t ripe for a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. Iran views its program as an opportunity, not a problem.

The United States and its allies can’t bribe Iran into giving up this program, and we have decided not to threaten Iran into giving it up. Iran is therefore going to continue to build its bomb. The only agreement we could make with Iran now is to accept that it is not going to quit.

If we want to change this unhappy state of affairs, we have two options: Use the threat of military force to bring the existing regime seriously to the table, or reimpose tough sanctions with the goal of bringing a better government to power.

Unfortunately, we are doing neither, because the administration wants a deal badly. But when you want a deal badly, all you get is a bad deal.

Ted R. Bromund is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Thatcher Center for Freedom.

A Bad Deal About To Be Made

Iran’s nukes: Too desperate for a deal

By John Bolton

November 13, 2014 | 7:32pm

President Obama answers questions on talks of international deal with Tehran over nuclear program. Photo: AP

The levels of diplomatic activity, fear and even desperation regarding Iran’s steadily advancing nuclear-weapons program are rising rapidly in the White House.

The same is true for Israel and America’s Arab allies in the region, but for very different reasons.
Israel and friendly Arab states worry that the religious fanatics and militarists ruling Tehran will achieve their long-sought goal of possessing deliverable nuclear weapons.

President Obama worries that his endless concessions to and compromises with these same fanatics and militarists will fail to produce a piece of paper he can call a diplomatic success.

With the Nov. 9-10 talks in Oman apparently producing no breakthroughs, it’s looking likely that the looming Nov. 24 negotiating “deadline” will simply be extended — though Iran may even force Obama to offer further sanctions relief before it will consent to another extension.

Tehran has Obama exactly where it wants him.

The past year’s intense “P5 + 1” negotiations (culminating a dozen years of such diplomacy) have seen the Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany make one concession after another.

This is not speculation: The White House has cheerfully leaked details of these concessions to friendly reporters to encourage news stories about how close a deal is.

Sadly, this practice is more evidence that it is the “deal” itself, rather than its substance, that constitutes Obama’s Holy Grail.

Reports that Obama has written to Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, linking cooperation against the terrorist Islamic State (or “ISIS”) with an agreement over Iran’s nuclear-weapons program, only further confirms this point.

Obama’s serial entreaties to Khamenei are both naïve and dangerous.

• Naïve because they reveal Obama’s blindness to the Tehran regime’s basic nature, his indifference to the extent and sophistication of its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs and his touching faith that the ayatollahs will abide by their commitments.
•  Dangerous because any deal similar to that now under discussion will legitimize both the authoritarian regime and its capacity to build unlimited nuclear weapons.

Obama’s weakness is also evident to other US enemies.

North Korea recently released its last three American prisoners, with no publicly known quid pro quo. Since Pyongyang never does anything for free, we can deduce the likelihood of secret diplomatic overtures there as well.

And from Pyongyang’s perspective, why not? If Iran can extract concessions and gain legitimacy from Obama without conceding much if anything, why should Kim Jong-un not demand the same?
US competitors like China and Russia can read the calendar. They see Obama’s tenure coming to a close in 2017, and surely doubt that his successor will be as weak or inattentive.

Nations out to enhance their interests at America’s expense will obviously try to exploit Obama’s last years in office. The just-announced agreement for Russia to build six or more nuclear reactors in Iran, over 10 years in the making, illustrates how this phenomenon will unfold.

As for Iran’s continuing proliferation threat, last week’s International Atomic Energy Agency report is deeply troubling. It shows Iran continuing to obstruct IAEA efforts to investigate its nuclear-weaponization activities and stonewalling many other long-pending questions.

The IAEA is a serious organization, professional and dedicated at its operational levels. Though politicized under Director-General Mohammed el-Baradei, who re-wrote staff-level reports on Iran’s activities and generally provided Tehran political cover, it has returned to balance under el-Baradei’s successor, Yukiya Amano of Japan.

Tehran’s persistent refusal to cooperate is important for two reasons.

First, the IAEA is not an intelligence agency. In many critical areas, it acts on information it receives from others (including the United States and Israel), trying to validate that information by other means.

By preventing IAEA from establishing an accurate “baseline” against which to measure future Iranian nuclear activity, Tehran undercuts the essential prerequisites for later verification.
(If inspectors don’t know what the starting point is, they can’t measure subsequent cheating.)
Second, we must worry whether any deal with Iran is truly verifiable. If Iran isn’t improving its conduct before a deal is signed, why expect its performance to improve once it succeeds in legitimizing its program and eliminating sanctions?

Only those unfamiliar with recent history could be confident that US, Israeli and other intelligence services actually know the full measure of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Hubris when it comes to atomic bombs is a dangerous mistake.

Iran’s continued duplicity underlines how little faith we can place in any commitments the regime makes. At this point, we can only hope that Tehran saves us from ourselves by overreaching, as it has so often before.

Sadly, with Obama so eager to declare victory, there may be no practical limit to what Iran can achieve.

John Bolton is a former US ambassador to the United Nations.