How the Antichrist's men are disrupting national unity

How Iraq's PMU law is disrupting national unity efforts

BAGHDAD — Iraq's parliament is divided over a proposal designed to unite the country.

Iraq's passage of a law establishing the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) as an official security force threw a wrench into efforts to adopt a national settlement proposal — basically a grand plan to abolish sectarian and ethnic quotas in parliament and "put an end to the monopoly of power by the Shiite parties, as opposed to the marginalization of the Sunni sect." The proposal says it will involve "all segments of Iraqi society and ethnic and religious communities, including women, youth and civil society organizations."

The parliament's Sunni blocs don't think empowering the PMU, an umbrella organization of dozens of predominately Shiite groups, is a good example for ending that monopoly. Since the PMU was formed in 2014, it has been seen by many as a band of outlaw militias accused of human rights violations against Sunni civilians in the areas where it has been fighting the Islamic State (IS).

When the PMU law passed Nov. 26, the Sunni blocs walked out of the parliamentary session as a show of opposition. Now the Sunni blocs have walked away from the national settlement proposal. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, called the PMU law the final destruction of the settlement.

Sheikh Khamis al-Khanjar, an influential Sunni leader, also rejected the national settlement proposal after meeting Dec. 6 with Jan Kubis, the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Kubis had tried to convince him to participate in the settlement.

The Sunni blocs now have three options. According to Ahmad al-Sulmani, a member of the Sunni Union of Nationalist Forces, the first option is to challenge the PMU law in federal court; the second option is to negotiate amendments. Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Shiite national Sadrist movement, has presented proposed amendments to the PMU law to Iraqi President Fuad Masum and parliament Speaker Salim al-Jabouri.

If both of those options fail, the Sunni blocs would have to resort to completely boycotting the national settlement project, which has been embraced by the largely Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, headed by Ammar al-Hakim.

Sulmani told Al-Monitor, “The Sunni blocs in the Iraqi parliament were hoping to find a solution to the PMU and integrate it within the army and police force. However, after the National Alliance insisted on turning the PMU into an institution, we agreed so long as it would be accepted by all parties and passed by consensus.”

The most important amendments that the Union of Nationalist Forces wants to make to the PMU law include preventing individuals accused of violating the rights of civilians from being integrated within the PMU institution, leaving the task of controlling areas liberated from IS to the army, not the PMU, and raising the percentage of Sunni fighters in PMU ranks to 40%. PMU spokesman Ahmed al-Asadi said in November that there were some 9,000 Sunni fighters — only 8% of the PMU total force of about 110,000.

“Sunni parties refused to receive the draft … from the National Alliance and agreed among themselves not to be part of this settlement as long as [the Shiite parties] do not show good intentions, particularly in amending the PMU law,” Sulmani added.

The National Alliance said it aims to involve all parties in the Iraqi national settlement project, to resolve outstanding issues and disagreements and eliminate all political issues for the post-IS phase.

However, not only did passing the PMU law by majority — without the consent of all political parties in parliament — make Sunni parties doubt the seriousness of the “settlement,” it also raised the ire of Sadrists, who object to the law in its current form.

On Nov. 28, Sadr addressed the three presidencies (the republic, government and parliament), calling for the introduction of reforms in the PMU law.

He noted in a statement that he has urged the three presidencies to “integrate the PMU within the official security forces.” He added, “To avoid all sectarian, political and security issues, I believe it would be best to take into consideration all proposals, especially after the parliament agreed on this integration.”

In addition, Sadr stressed in his recommendation “the need to keep all those who wish to stir sectarian strife at an arm’s length, along with those who sold out two-thirds of Iraq.” He was referring to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, under whose management two-thirds of the country was lost to IS.

This Sadrist-Sunni rapprochement will keep the debate over the PMU institution going for quite a while if changes aren't drafted by the president or the federal court. That would mean that Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades), the Sadrist movement’s military wing under the PMU umbrella, would not remain with the PMU. A Sunni division would emerge between parties that do wish to join the PMU and political parties objecting to the PMU’s current form. This tense situation also threatens the settlement project.

For his part, Salim Shawki, a member of the Al-Mouwaten bloc, headed by Hakim, told Al-Monitor, “The real problem facing the national settlement project does not lie in the PMU law at all; it is rather represented by the large number of parties wishing to be part of this project.”

He added, “Many parties claim to be representing Sunnis, which is turning into the biggest obstacle for the settlement. … Most parties agreed on the PMU law, and those that objected only want to amend a few of its provisions.”

Despite the long discussions conducted before the PMU law was passed, critics said its provisions were too general and lacked details. For instance, the law does not specify the number of fighters who would officially join the PMU, although Asadi had noted there will be 142,000 fighters, including 30,000-40,000 Sunnis.

It would be a first for an Iraqi security institution to be divided according to sects. This is why the law avoided mentioning ratios. However, all concerned parties noted that Sunnis and Shiites will control the liberated areas according to certain percentages, under the command of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

In this context, Abadi noted in a statement approving the PMU law: “Under the law, the PMU has come under the direct leadership of the general commander of the armed forces. This law will represent all Iraqi people and defend Iraqis wherever they are. This will not please those seeking chaos who tried to impede the law for a long time.”

For the first time ever, Shiite factions will officially be under government administration, and perhaps the state will be able to adjust their activities and follow up on their actions, allowing it to pursue and hold accountable the factions and armed groups that are not affiliated with the PMU.

However, one cannot tell how the prime minister will deal with Saraya al-Salam if they decide not to join the PMU under the law, as well as other Sunni factions such as the National Mobilization, headed by Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Ninevah province. It remains uncertain how the law would be able to integrate all PMU factions and isolate them from their previous leaderships.

Most importantly, many observers wonder what position the government would take if the PMU decides — either officially or unofficially — to participate in the battles in Syria, especially since Maliki had announced that the PMU would be heading to Syria after liberating Mosul.

Antichrist's Army Grows Larger (Revelation 13:18)

Iraq seeks to merge PMU militias under new image

Al Monitor 

BAGHDAD — Iraq's parliament plans to vote Nov. 26 on a proposal to integrate the militias that operate under the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). The proposal follows a July 27 order by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to make the PMU militias a united governmental force under his direct supervision.

The PMU, a state-sponsored umbrella organization for dozens of mostly Shiite militias, has been lobbying to improve its image in the eyes of the international community by meeting with Western leaders, politicians and diplomats. PMU leaders hope their efforts will help dispel its image as a group of outlawed militias and repair its reputation with the international human rights community. Since its inception in June 2014, the PMU has been accused of human rights violations against civilians in the areas where it has been involved in fighting the Islamic State (IS).

On Oct. 26, Sadrist movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr met with Patrick Samonet, the European Union ambassador to Iraq. Sadr's Peace Brigades force within the PMU earlier this year threatened to attack US troops in Iraq.

According to Sadr’s website, Sadr and Samonet discussed the humanitarian situation in Iraq and the battle to liberate Mosul, as well as the EU's role in supporting Iraq at the humanitarian level.

Hadi al-Amiri, the secretary-general of the Iraqi Badr Organization, which has a Shiite military wing, has been a busy ambassador recently for the PMU. He also met with Samonet on Oct. 10 to discuss the war against terrorism and the need to provide humanitarian support for the displaced. During the meeting, Samonet said, “The PMU capabilities and victories are no secret to anyone. Iraq does not need any more ground troops, and we believe that PMU participation in the battles is an internal Iraqi matter.”

On Oct. 4, Amiri met with British Ambassador to Baghdad Frank Baker, whom he told, "The PMU obeys the orders of the commander in chief of the armed forces and will participate in the battle to liberate Mosul alongside other security forces and armed factions to eliminate IS there.”

On Sept. 29, the official website of the French Embassy in Baghdad carried the news about a meeting between Amiri and French Ambassador Marc Barety. According to the website, the men discussed the fight against terrorism, preparations for the battle of Mosul and the city's future after liberation with regard to politics and the humanitarian and security situations. The meeting also touched on the time frame of the upcoming Iraqi elections and the security status quo.

In a video posted on YouTube, the Badr Organization quoted Barety as saying, “France supports the unity and sovereignty of Iraq and we are well-aware of the great [war] efforts" made by the PMU.

On Sept. 26, the secretary-general of the League of the Righteous movement, Qais al-Khazali, received Spanish Ambassador to Baghdad Jose Maria Ferre to discuss the PMU's image in the media. Just last year, Khazali was known by some in the West as "Iraq's most fearsome Shia militia leader." The movement’s website said Ferre has promised to address his government regarding the PMU's efforts.

Something that stands out about these meetings, however, is that they did not include the American ambassador or ambassadors of the Arab and Gulf countries that consider the PMU to be a militia affiliated with Iran and say the PMU cannot be part of the Iraqi security institution.

Yet pro-Iraqi government PMU leaders say the meetings demonstrate they have realized the importance of making overtures to the international community, instead of limiting themselves to the political environment of Baghdad and Tehran.

Iraqi Ambassador to Switzerland Majid Abdul Redha has been lobbying in international forums to rebut allegations against the PMU, considering them to be accusations against the security forces of the Iraqi state. On Sept. 21, a PMU delegation headed by Ahmed al-Asadi, a member of parliament and a PMU spokesman, visited the Human Rights Council in Geneva to deny reports about PMU involvement in abuses against civilians.

Asadi told Al-Monitor, “There are some who are seeking to distort the PMU image in the eyes of the international community. Our role now is to relay the true image of the PMU, especially to the West, because we will not allow inaccurate information and reports about our national forces to make the rounds in the media.”

He added, “We are here in Geneva to break this stereotyped image. We have met with Western diplomats and media outlets. We will not stop at this point."

In his Sept. 23 speech during a seminar in one of the Human Rights Council halls in Geneva, Rayan al-Kaldani, a Christian PMU leader, said, “We ask the international community not to comply with the [long-running] Saudi incitement against the PMU, not to harm any of its members and to release our heroes who are detained in Austria. If Europe has failed to pay tribute or honor those who are defending it against IS, the enemy of humanity, it can at least refrain from abusing or mistreating them.”

Antichrist's Army encircle ISIL-controlled town of Tal Afar

Iranian-backed militias encircle ISIL-controlled town of Tal Afar

Derek Gannon

The pro-Iranian, mostly Shia militia known as the People’s Mobilization Force—or, in Arabic, the Hashd al-Shaabi—have announced that they have captured key villages and the air base within and around the town of Tal Afar, Iraq, just west of Mosul and the Iraqi Army-led offensive taking place there. This Iranian-backed and -supplied paramilitary unit in essence closed the uncontested 20-mile-wide escape route left open by the U.S.-led coalition, giving ISIL a direct pipeline of retreat into Syria. The Hashd al-Shaabi, or HaS, has swiftly taken large swathes of desert and villages back from Islamic State fighters since defying the Iraqi government and opening up a western front, closing off ISIL’s escape just three short weeks ago. But they aren’t supposed to be there, and that has caused some members of the coalition, especially the Americans, to get nervous.

The United States, as well as the Iraqi government, have a good reason to be wary of the HaS militia. They have ties to Iran and its external Shiite military wing, the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or the IRGC. Weapons and training of HaS fell to both Quds Force and its proxy paramilitary unit known as Asaib al-Haq, or AAH. AAH is well known in the military and intelligence circles. They arrived on the scene in 2006, entering Iraq from Syria, and used Tal Afar—among other border cities—to conduct over 6,000 suicide attacks and other hit-and-run guerrilla attacks on American and Iraqi forces until the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011. Aligned with the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Madhi army during the height of the Iraq War, AAH received the designation of a “special group” by the U.S., which is a label given to Iranian-backed Shiite militias operating in Iraq.

At the outset of the Mosul offensive to take the city back from ISIL, the coalition left the western edge of the region open for the Islamic State to escape into Syria and their mini capital of Raqqa, which Syrian intelligence officials claimed was an attempt to “swamp Syria with hordes of ISIS fighters.” Many in the U.S. and around the world thought this a tactical blunder on the part of the American and Iraqi coalition. Michael Pregent, a Middle East analyst and former U.S. intelligence officer who served during the Iraq War, stated, however, that the intended strategy by Baghdad and Washington was that ISIL would use the western route to flee Mosul for a “final battle” later in its Syrian bastion of Raqqa. He also added that the Shia militias’ move to begin operations in the northwestern portion of Iraq was not sanctioned by Iraq’s government. The same scenario played out in Fallujah earlier this year when the Iraqi Army retook the city from ISIL, its fighters tucking tail and  fleeing directly into Syria to escape that buzzsaw.

Now, with Hashd al-Shaabi claiming to be “encircling” Tal Afar, along with retaking the main supply line ISIL was using at the airbase, the Shiite militia is confident they are within weeks, if not days, from destroying the Islamic State fighters still holed up within. A spokesman for the HaS, Ahmed al-Asadi, went on to confirm on the militia’s website that “Hashd al-Shaabi’s control over the airport will pave the way to liberate the Tal Afar district and will cut the last ISIS supply lines between Tal Afar and Mosul.” He claims that up to 10 villages have been ‘liberated,’ and that HaS has been busy clearing mines and improvised explosive devices placed throughout. Asadi continued, “This corridor is considered the main artery of the ISIL terrorist organisation between Mosul on one end and Raqqa in Syria on the other.”

All of this sounds like a positive in a sea of bad, until you take into account the tribal ramifications. Tal Afar is mostly Sunni, as is the majority of the Iraqi Army. It was hoped that the Shiite Hashd al-Shaabi militia would not play any part in the retaking of Mosul or any fighting in the north, as Sunni Muslims consider them just as deplorable and criminal as ISIL themselves. Many in the upper echelon of the U.S.-led coalition fear the militia is looking to exact revenge on the ISIL fighters who went door to door searching for Shiite families, either killing them or displacing them, sending 950 men, women, and children out into the desert to die, reportedly with help from the local Sunni population. Now, with unconfirmed reports of the militias attacking Sunni civilians, things could get worse for Tal Afar, as well as for the coalition’s efforts to route the Islamic State from Iraq altogether.

Iran And Their Shi’a Popular Mobilization Units (Dan 8:3)

Shiite Brothers

Is Iran creating its own state within Iraq?
Hamdi Malik and Maysam Behravesh for Tehran Bureau
Monday 18 May 2015 00.00 EDT

Iraq and its security occupy a central part in the debate about a possible nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers. The Gulf Arab states fear that Tehran, boosted by the relaxation of economic sanctions, will try to expand and consolidate its “hegemonic” grip over the Middle East.

According to this argument, Iranian hegemony will above all affect Iraq, where Tehran seeks to install a government in thrall to it, hindering the formation of a viable democratic system in its western neighbour. The domestic and foreign exponents of this view point to the growing power of Tehran-backed Shia groups fighting the so-called Islamic State (Isis) as proof of attempts to plant an Iranian “deep state” in Iraq, allegedly similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Such concerns are legitimate but exaggerated and even misplaced. Iranian influence is unlikely to produce a state within the Iraqi state, even if some elements in Iran desire it. And this holds regardless of whether the nuclear negotiations are successful or not.

Shia paramilitary forces are undoubtedly on the rise in Iraq, and this may intensify sectarian fault lines. David Petraeus, who commanded US troops in Iraq during 2007-2008, has voiced concerns over reports of sectarian atrocities committed by the Shia Popular Mobilization Units (al-Hashd al-Sha’bi or PMUs) as well as by Iraqi security forces.

Human Rights Watch has accused the PMUs of looting and destroying Sunni Arabs’ property. Although PMU commanders have invariably condemned these acts and promised to bring the perpetrators to justice, their recurrence is likely to exacerbate the chronic distrust between Sunni Arabs and the Shia groups that make up the security backbone of the central government in Baghdad.

More worrying for Petraeus and many Arab politicians in the region, however, is the increasing influence of Iranian Revolutionary Guards – especially its overseas arm, the Quds Force – on which the bulk of PMU forces rely for logistical support and advice.

“If Daesh [the Arabic acronym for Isis] is driven from Iraq and the consequence is that Iranian-backed militias emerge as the most powerful force in the country – eclipsing the Iraqi security forces, much as Hezbollah does in Lebanon – that would be a very harmful outcome for Iraqi stability and sovereignty, not to mention our own national interests in the region,” Petraeus warned in an interview with The Washington Post. John Brennan, director of the CIA, has made similar comments about Iran’s “very aggressive and active” role in Iraq.

But this is not the entire picture, and represents a skewed conception of the reality on the ground. There are significant factors in play that undermine prospects for the PMUs becoming a force operating on behalf of Tehran outside the jurisdiction of Baghdad. While most of Iraq’s Shia citizens might desire a prosperous and successful Iran next door, it would be an extraordinary stretch of imagination to claim they would favour turning their land into an Iranian satellite state.

The latest outburst of Iraqi nationalism vis-à-vis Iran came in response to controversial comments on Iranian-Iraqi relations from Ali Younesi, advisor to President Hassan Rouhani on ethnic minorities and a former intelligence minister. “Currently”, Younesi said, “Iraq is not only part of our civilisational influence, but it is our identity, culture, centre and capital…Because Iran and Iraq’s geography and culture are inseparable, either we fight one another or we become one.”

Younesi’s comments drew stringent criticism from Rouhani’s rivals in the Iranian parliament where 109 deputies signed a letter demanding his dismissal. Younesi was reportedly summoned to the Special Court for the Clergy, where he was questioned about “statements against national security” before being released on bail.

But by suggesting an imperial belief in bringing Iraq into the orbit of Iranian civilization, Younesi set off a massive backlash in Iraq not only from Sunni Arab groups and personalities, but also from Shias. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most revered Shia cleric in Iraq, was one who stepped forward in defence of Iraqi autonomy and sovereignty.

“We are proud of our country and our identity and our independence and sovereignty,” said Ahmad al-Saafi, Sistani’s representative, in apparent response to Younesi’s remarks. “While we welcome any help offered today from our brothers and friends in our fight against the terrorists and thank them for that, this doesn’t mean in any way that we would ignore our identity and independence.”

In their fight against Isis, Shia paramilitary forces derive their religious legitimacy primarily from Sistani as their chief “source of emulation” and from his fatwa, issued after the group’s takeover of Mosul in June 2014, calling on all able Iraqis to take up arms. Ever since, Sistani has consistently maintained that volunteers must operate under Iraqi state command.

By the same token, the PMUs are at the moment organised by a committee affiliated with the Iraqi National Security Advisory (NSA), which is accountable to the prime minister, Haidar al-Abadi. It is hard to believe that all PMU actions and moves are under the scrutiny of Baghdad, but the Iraqi government does maintain a degree of control, providing their salaries and fighting equipment according to the defence minister, Khaled al-Obaidi.

This goes some way to meet demands from Sunnis for the “institutionalisation” of PMUs as a means to bring them under state control. The former deputy prime minister and leading Sunni Arab Rafe al-Issawi, for example, said recently at the Brookings Institution in Washington that “some of the militias…[are] out of the total control of the central government…[and] without institutionalisation of paramilitary forces…there will be much more discontent”.

Given the strength of nationalist sentiment across all Iraqi sects and the broad-based recognition of Sistani as a force for national unity, it will be difficult for Shia PMU groups to form a quasi-state in parallel to the Iraqi government once Isis is dislodged. In the eventuality of such a political outgrowth, the PMUs are bound to lose Sistani’s backing, and with it their legitimacy in the eyes of millions of Iraqi Shias who currently support them.

Moreover, PMU leaders and military commanders have so far shown little interest in taking that path. Hadi al-Ameri, the head of Badr Organisation, a long-standing Shia group with close ties to Iranian Revolutionary Guards, envisions a future for PMUs where the Iraqi state has the final say. “After Sayyed Sistani’s fatwa, we were left with no choice but to take up arms and fight,” he told al-Sumaria TV. “These are, however, the state’s arms. The Badr Organization doesn’t possess any weapons.”

In a similar vein, Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq – another paramilitary Shia group with sympathies towards Iran – stressed during an interview with al-Ahd television that PMUs were “national factions for sure…part of the Iraqi state institutions, and committed to the decisions of the commander-in-chief [the Iraqi prime minister]”.

While seeing Iran as their major source of strategic depth, Iraqi Shias are reluctant to lose their majority position in the Iraqi state by creating a paramilitary force operating in parallel to the central government. Shia leaders understand these dynamics well, with a consensus emerging that a new National Guard will absorb the PMUs once Isis is done with and Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa expires.

The National Guard is supposed to recruit locally and fall partly under the command of the elected local governments, mainly to assure the Sunni Arabs they will be included in running security. Both Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq are generally driven by a strong sense of nationalism and look forward to the rise of Iraq – given its strategic position, cultural heritage and natural resources – as a regional power on a par with Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is a promising cause that can soften and mature factional politics.

Hamdi Malik is a PhD student of sociology at Keele university, UK, and a frequent contributor to BBC Persian TV programmes. Maysam Behravesh is a PhD candidate in the department of political science at Lund university, Sweden, and editorial assistant of the academic journal Cooperation and Conflict