US airstrikes weaken ISIL but keep it as a viable threat
ZAYD ALISA 4 April 2015
The US Air Force stood idly by as ISlL swept towards Baghdad,
but swiftly scrambled in August to launch airstrikes to halt an
unexpected advance towards Irbil – capital of the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG).
Iraq more than three years after the US withdrawal and more than one
year since ISIL or ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, which
initially called itself Al Qaida in Iraq AQI – seized Fallujah and parts
of Ramadi, is grappling with an increasingly menacing existential
threat by a heavily armed and increasingly barbarous ISIL, which on Jun
10, last year surged towards Baghdad, seizing large swathes of
territory, including Tikrit and Iraq’s second largest city Mosul.
Buoyed by the recent resounding victory in wresting control of the
highly strategic province of Diyala, the Iraqi government launched, on
Mar 1, a full-scale offensive to drive ISIL out of its vital stronghold
of Tikrit, which undoubtedly has not only an immensely symbolic
significance as the hometown of toppled dictator Saddam Hussein, but
also crucially controls the highway linking Baghdad to Mosul.
The
Pro-Government Force (PGF) consists of army units, Sunni tribesmen and
the increasingly powerful Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) – which
includes Shia Militias and volunteers – making up the bulk of the
anti-ISIL alliance.
The Pentagon’s highly unusual
statement, explicitly emphasizing that the US was not providing any air
power in support of the Tikrit operation left no doubt that the US has
not only been fiercely against it, but trying its utmost to publicly
distance itself from it. This came hard on the heels of another
highly damaging public rift: when, alarmingly, on Feb 19, a senior
Central Command (CentCom) official explicitly advertised that Iraqi
forces backed by US air support intended to stage an all-out assault on
Mosul in April or May. But, within a few hours CentCom declared that it
would not be able to train enough men in time. It has become
increasingly apparent that the US deliberately made the two
announcements, aiming to thwart the Tikrit offensive by sending out the
following unmistakable messages: First, the US adamantly refused to
provide air support to an Iraqi force that it has not directly trained,
let alone one spearheaded by PMF. Second, it was vehemently opposed to
any attempt to drive ISIL out of the Sunni heartland by a force that is,
not merely
overwhelmingly
dominated and spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shia militias, but far more
alarmingly, guided by Gen. Qassem Suleimanni, the commander of the elite
Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
And third,
it was far too early
to launch any major offensive in the Sunni-dominated provinces, such as
Anbar, Ninevah and Salahuddin – whose capital is Tikrit. These
unambiguous messages were principally designed to appease, not only the
increasingly outspoken critics – from the Republican party, such as John
McCain and Lindsey Graham – of Obama’s administration strategy on Iraq
and Syria, demanding a more robust US involvement to forestall the
mounting Iranian influence, but an even more vehement opposition to any
US air support which in Saudi Arabia’s eyes would pave the way to what
the Saudi Foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal, on Mar 5, forcefully
described as Iran’s takeover of Iraq. Saudi Arabia joined the US-led
coalition against ISIL, in September 2014, primarily
seeking
to cover its tracks in pumping a torrent of funding, arming, logistical
support and salaries – which was acknowledged in Oct 2014 by the US
Vice president Joe Biden – to extremist Wahhabi Salafi groups, such as
Jabhat Al Nusra and ISIL.
Gen Lloyd Austin, head of CentCom, explicitly confirmed, on Mar 26, that the
US
has indeed adamantly refused to provide any air support unless Iraq
meets its preconditions: First, pulling back the PMF from the
battlefield and even more essentially, routing it from leading the
Tikrit operation. Second, establishing an Iraqi command. And third,
implementing a new US plan. Clearly the US has been disingenuous in
its response, claiming that it held off launching airstrikes until March
26 because the Iraqi government did not request assistance.
Although previous attempts by the Iraqi government to recapture
Tikrit spectacularly failed, it is abundantly clear that this offensive
by the PGF has made seismic headway in dislodging ISIL, not merely from
its chief strongholds surrounding Tikrit, such as AL Dour village –
hometown of Izzat Al Douri, Saddam’s right hand man –, Abu Ajeel village
and Al Alam district, but more significantly advancing into Tikrit
city, effectively confining ISIL to the city centre. And with ISIL’s
back up against the wall, it is hardly surprising that it is tenaciously
holding its ground. Therefore, it was highly premature for Gen. Austin
to contend, on Mar 26, that the Tikrit operation has irrevocably
stalled. After all, it is undeniable that it took the US in 2004, two
strenuous attempts and far longer to oust AQI from Fallujah.
Ever since the end of the
US occupation of Iraq in 2011, it has been steadfastly determined to
shore up its waning influence by ensuring that Iraqi security forces
remain inadequately equipped and thereby heavily reliant on US support
and air cover. Even when ISIL seriously threatened Baghdad, in Jun
2014, the US showed absolutely no signs of urgency. Instead, Obama’s
first response, on Jun 19, was to insist that any US assistance was
contingent on forging a new broad-based inclusive government. Despite US
groundless claims that its airstrikes halted ISIL’s advance,
it
was, however, beyond doubt the Shia volunteers and militias, who
enthusiastically answered the Shia top religious cleric, Grand Aytollah
Ali Al Sistani’s, call to arms, that ultimately stopped ISIL in its
tracks.
While the US stood idly by as ISlL swept towards Baghdad, it swiftly
scrambled, on Aug 8, to launch airstrikes to halt its unexpected advance
towards Irbil – capital of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The
US Air Force has worked hand in glove with the Kurdish forces
(Peshmerga) to dislodge ISIL from Kurdish areas, such as Zumar, Sinjar
and Kobani, in both Iraq and Syria. In stark contrast, even with the
appointment of Haider Al Abadi as new Prime Minister and the formation
of a new inclusive government, the US airstrikes over areas outside the
Kurdish region – which began, on Sept 15 – have neither intensified nor
gathered momentum, remaining to all intents and purposes mere
window-dressing. All along, the US Air Force has deliberately stayed on
the sidelines as the PMF clawed back control of strategic areas, such as
Amerly, Jurf Al Sakar, and Diyala province.
But the Tikrit offensive
has laid bare the fact that the US has consistently been aiming to
weaken ISIL, while keeping it as a viable threat to accomplish the
following: First, utilising it as a perfect pretext to ramp up and
entrench its presence. Second, overhauling, if not utterly replacing the
current Iraqi army – which it perceives as heavily infiltrated by the
PMF. Third, fulfilling Saudi Arabia’s overarching goal in joining the
US-led coalition: that is, practically preventing the PMF from
clearing ISIL from Sunni-dominated provinces, especially Anbar, by
formulating a purely Sunni force called the National Guard. This force
would be ostensibly under the overall supervision of Abadi, who is
Iraq’s commander-in-chief, but in reality – as Ahmed Al Mesari the head
of the Sunni bloc in Parliament, the Union of Iraqi forces, forcefully
stressed – Abadi’s role would be restricted to financing and arming,
while the provincial councils would effectively oversee, not just the
selection of fighters, but far more crucially, direct control. Hence,
preparing the ground for a new purely Sunni Regional Government –
identical to the KRG, which is indisputably an independent region in all
but name – with not only its own army perilously threatening Baghdad,
but above all a highly hostile foreign policy toeing the Saudi line.
As part of US frantic efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia, it dispatched
Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Iraq on March
9.
He ominously warned that
Sunni Arab countries – led by Saudi Arabia – were profoundly outraged by
the Abadi government’s glacial pace in empowering Sunnis. Adding,
that unless Sunni alienation is swiftly addressed, the sustainability of
the US-led coalition would be critically undermined. Yet, more
strikingly, he asserted on March 7, that Abadi’s key task must be
balancing Iran’s role in empowering Shia militias with Iraq’s
partnership with the US –
thereby,
making no secret that Abadi had no option but to theatrically pretend
to be requesting US assistance while in reality the US had already
decided to intervene in the Tikrit offensive. US reasons for doing so are as follows.
First,
to wrest control of the leadership of the operation from Iran’s allies
in the PMF. Second, to bolster its influence on the ground by ensuring
that US-trained Iraqi units are leading the operation. Third, to snatch
credit for any victory from the PMF. Fourth, to soothe the frayed nerves
of its staunchest ally, Saudi Arabia. Fifth, to shore up the standing
of increasingly US-leaning Shia political leaders, such as Abadi, Amar
Al Hakim leader of the Islamic Supreme Council and even the once arch US
enemy, Muqtada Al Sadr, all of whom feel increasingly threatened by the
mounting popularity of their respective rivals: Nouri Al Maliki,
the previous prime minister, Hadi Al Amiri ,leader of the powerful Badr
organisation and Qais Al Khazaly, leader of the formidable Asaib Ahl Al
Haq. Sixth, to safeguard its newly-established, yet vulnerable influence
and military presence.
Surely, the PMF’s unequivocal decision on March 26, to flatly refuse
to take part in any US-led offensive while also firmly holding their
ground puts the US under considerable pressure to escalate its
airstrikes as it strives to outperform their substantial
accomplishments.
But, given
the intensifying internal uproar and a desperate need for highly
motivated fighters, Abadi, on March 29, was forced to discretely back
down, setting the stage for the final offensive, which has successfully
cleansed Tikrit.
It is high-time for the US to learn from its ill-conceived campaigns
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Utilising Al Qaida and relying on Saudi Arabia
to prop up its interests would spectacularly backfire, inevitably
leading to terror outrages in New York, London, Paris, Brussels, Sydney,
Baghdad and Damascus.
