What Antiballistic System?

As North Korea claims missile progress, Pentagon plans ICBM interceptor test
As North Korea makes headway in developing a nuclear-armed missile capable of reaching the US mainland, the Pentagon is preparing to test its missile interceptor – which has a very inconsistent record, APA reports quoting Sputnik.
First developed during the Cold War as part of former US President Ronald Reagan’s multi-billion dollar “Star Wars” effort to counter Soviet ballistic missiles, the US missile interceptor has only had nine successful tests among the 17 conducted since 1999.
After a recent successful missile test, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said the US mainland was in “sighting range for a strike,” and claimed that they have missiles capable of carrying a large nuclear warhead, though this has not been verified.
Earlier this week, US Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart warned a Senate hearing that if Pyongyang’s activities aren’t reined in, “the regime will ultimately succeed in fielding a nuclear-armed missile capable of threatening the United States homeland,” calling such an event “inevitable” if action isn’t taken.
Though the Pentagon has a number of missile defense systems, only one of them, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, is designed to counter a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This system is also the least reliable, according to critics.
The Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency has scheduled the test for Tuesday, when a target will be launched from the Kwajalein Atoll test range in the Pacific. The intention is that the missile will be met by an interceptor launched from an underground chamber at California’s Vandenberg Air Force Base.
Missile Defense Agency spokesman Christopher Johnson explained that the target will be custom made to resemble an ICBM, meaning it will travel at a quicker pace than test missiles used in the past.
“We conduct increasingly complex test scenarios as the program matures and advances,” Johnson said on Friday. “Testing against an ICBM-type threat is the next step in that process.”
There has been much saber rattling between Washington and Pyongyang, with the two countries trading barbs and shows of force. North Korea refuses to halt its nuclear weapons and missile testing despite international calls for denuclearization and sanctions from the United Nations.
The US has riled Pyongyang by sending a Navy carrier strike group led by the USS Carl Vinson along with the USS Michigan, a Tomahawk missile-armed nuclear powered submarine, near its waters.

This Is Our Nuclear Defense? (Ezekiel 17)

Air Force withheld nuclear mishap from Pentagon review team

By ROBERT BURNS

Jan. 23, 2016 3:35 PM EST

FILE – This June 24, 2014, file photo, shows a patch is seen on the commander’s chair

WASHINGTON (AP) — In the spring of 2014, as a team of experts was examining what ailed the U.S. nuclear force, the Air Force withheld from them the fact that it was simultaneously investigating damage to a nuclear-armed missile in its launch silo caused by three airmen.

The Air Force on Friday gave The Associated Press the first substantive description of the accident after being questioned about it by the AP for more than a year.

The accident happened May 17, 2014, at an underground launch silo containing a Minuteman 3 intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. The silo, designated Juliet-07, is situated among wheat fields and wind turbines about 9 miles west of Peetz, Colorado. It is controlled by launch officers of the 320th Missile Squadron and administered by the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren Air Force Base at Cheyenne, Wyoming.

The Air Force said that while three airmen were troubleshooting the missile, a “mishap” occurred, causing $1.8 million in damage to the missile. The service declined to explain the nature of the mishap, such as whether it caused physical damage, saying the information is too sensitive to be made public.

The three airmen were immediately stripped of their certification to perform nuclear weapons duty. The missile was taken offline and removed from its silo. No one was injured and the Air Force said the accident posed no risk to public safety.

More than a year later the three airmen were recertified and returned to duty.

At the time of the accident, a group of nuclear weapons experts was nearing the end of a three-month independent review of the entire U.S. nuclear force, an examination prompted in part by a series of AP stories on troubles within the force. The experts were operating on orders from then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who asked them to begin their review in March. They reported their results to him June 2.

The AP asked Lt. Col. John Sheets, spokesman for the Air Force Global Strike Command, which is responsible for the ICBM force, whether the May 17 accident had been reported to the Hagel-appointed review group. The experts were looking at a range of issues, including shortcomings in training, equipment, morale and leadership.

“No. The accident was going through the investigative process when” the review teams made their visits to ICBM bases, Sheets said. Pressed further, he said he could say no more and referred questions about this to the Pentagon, which did not immediately comment.

The Accident Investigation Board did not begin its work until Aug. 25, more than three months after the mishap. A safety investigation was begun sometime earlier. The Air Force denied an AP request for the accident investigation report in 2015 under the Freedom of Information Act.

Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said Saturday the fact that the Hagel review group was not told about the accident “raises questions about what other accidents and incidents may have been overlooked by that investigation.”

On Friday evening, the AP was given a brief summary of the report. It said the Minuteman 3 missile “became nonoperational” during a diagnostic test on the evening of May 16, 2014. The next morning a “mishap crew” chief, who was not identified, “did not correctly adhere to technical guidance” during troubleshooting efforts, “subsequently damaging the missile.” No further details about the damage or errors were disclosed.

The investigation report summary said there were four contributing factors to the accident, and two were identified. One was the mishap chief’s failure to follow technical guidance. The other was that the mishap chief “lacked the necessary proficiency level” to anticipate the consequences of his actions during the troubleshooting.

In seeming contradiction of that second point, the Air Force said in its separate statement to the AP that the mishap team chief was properly trained for the task he was performing.

Sheets said it is possible that some or all of the three could still face disciplinary action.

The summary said the central cause of the mishap was established by “clear and convincing evidence,” but the Air Force would not disclose the cause or the evidence. It said the cause is cited in the investigation report. The Air Force refused to make that public, saying the report is classified, even though the service’s own policy requires the public release of accident board reports.

The amount of damage to the missile — $1.8 million,according to the Air Force — suggests that the airmen’s errors might have caused physical damage, Kristensen said. If so, he said, it could have been categorized by the Air Force as a “Bent Spear” event, which is an official reporting code word for a significant nuclear weapon incident. The Air Force refused to reveal how it categorized the Juliet-07 accident.

“By keeping the details of the accident secret and providing only vague responses, the Air Force behaves as if it has something to hide and undermines public confidence in the safety of the ICBM mission,” Kristensen said.

Sheets, the Global Strike Command spokesman, said Pentagon leaders were briefed on the results of the accident investigation in December. Members of Congress also were briefed, he said.

Babylon Is Ready To Attack (Dan 7:7)

 

U.S. Air Force Primed and Ready to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Sites

Mark Thompson @MarkThompson_DC

July 8, 2015 SHARE

U.S. and Iranian negotiators have been scrambling in Vienna to concoct an accord that will stay Tehran’s nuclear ambitions for at least a decade. Meanwhile, the Pentagon has spent the same amount of time plotting how to derail such an effort if it can’t be done at the negotiating table.

The U.S. has made it clear that it will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon to threaten Israel or its other neighbors in and around the Persian Gulf. If the atomic talks break down—and U.S. intelligence decides Iran is on the verge of becoming a nuclear-armed state—look for the Air Force’s Massive Ordnance Penetrator to get the assignment to try to destroy that capability.

Of course, the Obama Administration and its five negotiating allies—Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia—are engaged as much in psychological gamesmanship as potential pyrotechnics. The U.S. has leaked just enough information about the MOP to let the Iranians know that the Americans believe its use could set back Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear weapon for years.

But the nation’s military leaders have made clear that a single strike with one or (more likely) more Massive Ordnance Penetrators may not halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. “Obviously anything like that can be reconstituted,” Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said July 1. “And so a military strike of that kind is a setback, but it doesn’t prevent the reconstitution over time.” It’s a hammer that might have to be used repeatedly if Iran refuses to back down and continues to work on its nuclear program. “The military option isn’t use once and set aside,” Army General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added. “It remains in place.”

While no one will say so, Iran’s nuclear facility at Fordow–buried up to 80 meters beneath a mountain near the Shiite holy city of Qom, at a former missile base controlled by Iran’s unpredictable Revolutionary Guards–is at the top of that target list. Iran has been conducting much of its suspected nuclear-weapons work for years in underground labs and research facilities thought to be able to survive attacks by earlier generations of U.S. military bunker-busters.

“In October 2014, the Air Force successfully completed one weapon drop from the B-2 aircraft on a representative target,” the Pentagon’s top weapons-tester reported earlier this year. “The test, conducted at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, demonstrated weapon behavior after planned enhancements were incorporated.” Several additional tests have been carried out in recent months, Pentagon officials say.

Nearly a decade ago, the Pentagon concluded that dropping its one-ton bombs on buried targets was like using a peashooter against an elephant. “Our past test experience has shown that 2,000-pound penetrators carrying 500 pounds of high explosive are relatively ineffective against tunnels, even when skipped directly into the tunnel entrance,” a 2004 report said. “Instead, several thousand pounds of high explosives coupled to the tunnel are needed to blow down blast doors and propagate a lethal air blast throughout a typical tunnel complex.”

In late 2009, the Air Force quietly circulated a solicitation seeking a “Quick Reaction Capability” to “defeat a specific set of Hard and/or Deeply Buried Targets.” The weapon, the service said, would “maximize effects against Hard and/or Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs), while minimizing time over target.” The Air Force said it needed the weapon to meet “Urgent Operational Needs requirements”—generally a plea from a battlefield commander who doesn’t think he has the weapons he needs to accomplish a mission assigned to him.

“The system will hold at risk those highest priority assets essential to the enemy’s war-fighting ability, which are heavily defended and protected,” the Air Force elaborated in February 2011 budget documents, “providing a critical global strike capability not currently met by inventory conventional weapons.”

The $15 million MOP has six times the heft of existing GBU-28 bunker busters. Glided into its destination by GPS-guided lattice-type fins, its alloy steel hull – some 80% of its weight – is designed to remain intact as it drills through rock or reinforced concrete before setting off its 5,300-pound warhead. Air Force officials say it represents a “bridge” capability between existing bunker busters and nuclear weapons themselves.

The Pentagon doesn’t have an unlimited supply of MOPs: it initially bought 20, for $314 million. The Boeing-built weapon can only be carried by the Air Force’s B-2 stealth bomber. It’s also extremely shy: there are few photographs of the real thing. But the Air Force has released a pair of photographs of a MOP mockup. It’s a safe bet the mockup has been tweaked from the actual weapon to avoid betraying its precise design and dimensions.

After several upgrades, the Air Force has let it been known that there’s an operational stockpile of the world’s most powerful non-nuclear bombs at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. They’re not far from the B-2 bombers, ready to carry them 7,000 miles to Iran. That much is certain. Whether Obama thinks dropping them is worth the risk isn’t.

Pakistan Is Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons (Dan 7:7)

 

Watch Out, India: Pakistan Is Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons

Zachary Keck
July 8, 2015

Pakistan is ready to use nuclear weapons against India, a senior Pakistani official confirmed on Monday.

Appearing on the Pakistani television channel “Geo,” Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said that Islamabad is willing to use nuclear weapons to ensure its survival.

“We should pray that such an option never arises, but if we need to use them (nuclear weapons) for our survival we will,” Asif said, according to Geo’s website. His remark was widely reported by Indian media outlets.

Asif went on to accuse India of supporting anti-Pakistani terrorist groups in a proxy war against Islamabad. “Fuelling terrorism directly or indirectly is India’s proxy war in Pakistan,” Asif said. He singled out Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban, and Baloch separatists as two of the groups that India is allegedly supporting.

Asif’s statement about Pakistan’s willingness to use nuclear weapons is in line with Islamabad’s long-standing nuclear doctrine. In contrast to India and China, which both maintain no first use nuclear doctrines, Pakistan has always maintained that it could resort to nuclear weapons to blunt a conventional attack from India.

Nor is Asif the first high-level Pakistani official to threaten to use nuclear weapons. Former President Pervez Musharraf issued a similar threat (albeit, after he left office), when he stated: “We do not want to use nuclear capability but if our existence comes under threat, who do we have these nuclear weapons for?”

More tellingly, in an interview back in 2002, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the first head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, outlined four scenarios where Pakistan would consider using nuclear weapons against India:

If India conquers a large part of Pakistan;
If India destroys large parts of Pakistan’s army or air force;
If India tries to strangle Pakistan economically;
If India tries to destabilizing Pakistan politically, including by creating large scale internal subversion.

Notably, in his interview this week, Asif seems to suggest that India is doing the fourth scenario by supporting terrorist groups inside Pakistan.

Babylon Is Playing War And Mind Games With Iraq (Rev 13)

US airstrikes weaken ISIL but keep it as a viable threat

ZAYD ALISA 4 April 2015

The US Air Force stood idly by as ISlL swept towards Baghdad, but swiftly scrambled in August to launch airstrikes to halt an unexpected advance towards Irbil – capital of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).

Iraq more than three years after the US withdrawal and more than one year since ISIL or ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, which initially called itself Al Qaida in Iraq AQI – seized Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, is grappling with an increasingly menacing existential threat by a heavily armed and increasingly barbarous ISIL, which on Jun 10, last year surged towards Baghdad, seizing large swathes of territory, including Tikrit and Iraq’s second largest city Mosul.

Buoyed by the recent resounding victory in wresting control of the highly strategic province of Diyala, the Iraqi government launched, on Mar 1, a full-scale offensive to drive ISIL out of its vital stronghold of Tikrit, which undoubtedly has not only an immensely symbolic significance as the hometown of toppled dictator Saddam Hussein, but also crucially controls the highway linking Baghdad to Mosul. The Pro-Government Force (PGF) consists of army units, Sunni tribesmen and the increasingly powerful Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) – which includes Shia Militias and volunteers – making up the bulk of the anti-ISIL alliance.

The Pentagon’s highly unusual statement, explicitly emphasizing that the US was not providing any air power in support of the Tikrit operation left no doubt that the US has not only been fiercely against it, but trying its utmost to publicly distance itself from it. This came hard on the heels of another highly damaging public rift: when, alarmingly, on Feb 19, a senior Central Command (CentCom) official explicitly advertised that Iraqi forces backed by US air support intended to stage an all-out assault on Mosul in April or May. But, within a few hours CentCom declared that it would not be able to train enough men in time. It has become increasingly apparent that the US deliberately made the two announcements, aiming to thwart the Tikrit offensive by sending out the following unmistakable messages: First, the US adamantly refused to provide air support to an Iraqi force that it has not directly trained, let alone one spearheaded by PMF. Second, it was vehemently opposed to any attempt to drive ISIL out of the Sunni heartland by a force that is, not merely overwhelmingly dominated and spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shia militias, but far more alarmingly, guided by Gen. Qassem Suleimanni, the commander of the elite Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
And third, it was far too early to launch any major offensive in the Sunni-dominated provinces, such as Anbar, Ninevah and Salahuddin – whose capital is Tikrit. These unambiguous messages were principally designed to appease, not only the increasingly outspoken critics – from the Republican party, such as John McCain and Lindsey Graham – of Obama’s administration strategy on Iraq and Syria, demanding a more robust US involvement to forestall the mounting Iranian influence, but an even more vehement opposition to any US air support which in Saudi Arabia’s eyes would pave the way to what the Saudi Foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal, on Mar 5, forcefully described as Iran’s takeover of Iraq. Saudi Arabia joined the US-led coalition against ISIL, in September 2014, primarily seeking to cover its tracks in pumping a torrent of funding, arming, logistical support and salaries – which was acknowledged in Oct 2014 by the US Vice president Joe Biden – to extremist Wahhabi Salafi groups, such as Jabhat Al Nusra and ISIL. 

Gen Lloyd Austin, head of CentCom, explicitly confirmed, on Mar 26, that the US has indeed adamantly refused to provide any air support unless Iraq meets its preconditions: First, pulling back the PMF from the battlefield and even more essentially, routing it from leading the Tikrit operation. Second, establishing an Iraqi command. And third, implementing a new US plan. Clearly the US has been disingenuous in its response, claiming that it held off launching airstrikes until March 26 because the Iraqi government did not request assistance.

Although previous attempts by the Iraqi government to recapture Tikrit spectacularly failed, it is abundantly clear that this offensive by the PGF has made seismic headway in dislodging ISIL, not merely from its chief strongholds surrounding Tikrit, such as AL Dour village – hometown of Izzat Al Douri, Saddam’s right hand man –, Abu Ajeel village and Al Alam district, but more significantly advancing into Tikrit city, effectively confining ISIL to the city centre. And with ISIL’s back up against the wall, it is hardly surprising that it is tenaciously holding its ground. Therefore, it was highly premature for Gen. Austin to contend, on Mar 26, that the Tikrit operation has irrevocably stalled. After all, it is undeniable that it took the US in 2004, two strenuous attempts and far longer to oust AQI from Fallujah.

Ever since the end of the US occupation of Iraq in 2011, it has been steadfastly determined to shore up its waning influence by ensuring that Iraqi security forces remain inadequately equipped and thereby heavily reliant on US support and air cover. Even when ISIL seriously threatened Baghdad, in Jun 2014, the US showed absolutely no signs of urgency. Instead, Obama’s first response, on Jun 19, was to insist that any US assistance was contingent on forging a new broad-based inclusive government. Despite US groundless claims that its airstrikes halted ISIL’s advance, it was, however, beyond doubt the Shia volunteers and militias, who enthusiastically answered the Shia top religious cleric, Grand Aytollah Ali Al Sistani’s, call to arms, that ultimately stopped ISIL in its tracks.

While the US stood idly by as ISlL swept towards Baghdad, it swiftly scrambled, on Aug 8, to launch airstrikes to halt its unexpected advance towards Irbil – capital of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The US Air Force has worked hand in glove with the Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) to dislodge ISIL from Kurdish areas, such as Zumar, Sinjar and Kobani, in both Iraq and Syria. In stark contrast, even with the appointment of Haider Al Abadi as new Prime Minister and the formation of a new inclusive government, the US airstrikes over areas outside the Kurdish region – which began, on Sept 15 – have neither intensified nor gathered momentum, remaining to all intents and purposes mere window-dressing. All along, the US Air Force has deliberately stayed on the sidelines as the PMF clawed back control of strategic areas, such as Amerly, Jurf Al Sakar, and Diyala province.

But the Tikrit offensive has laid bare the fact that the US has consistently been aiming to weaken ISIL, while keeping it as a viable threat to accomplish the following: First, utilising it as a perfect pretext to ramp up and entrench its presence. Second, overhauling, if not utterly replacing the current Iraqi army – which it perceives as heavily infiltrated by the PMF. Third, fulfilling Saudi Arabia’s overarching goal in joining the US-led coalition: that is, practically preventing the PMF from clearing ISIL from Sunni-dominated provinces, especially Anbar, by formulating a purely Sunni force called the National Guard. This force would be ostensibly under the overall supervision of Abadi, who is Iraq’s commander-in-chief, but in reality – as Ahmed Al Mesari the head of the Sunni bloc in Parliament, the Union of Iraqi forces, forcefully stressed – Abadi’s role would be restricted to financing and arming, while the provincial councils would effectively oversee, not just the selection of fighters, but far more crucially, direct control. Hence, preparing the ground for a new purely Sunni Regional Government – identical to the KRG, which is indisputably an independent region in all but name – with not only its own army perilously threatening Baghdad, but above all a highly hostile foreign policy toeing the Saudi line.

As part of US frantic efforts to reassure Saudi Arabia, it dispatched Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Iraq on March 9. He ominously warned that Sunni Arab countries – led by Saudi Arabia – were profoundly outraged by the Abadi government’s glacial pace in empowering Sunnis. Adding, that unless Sunni alienation is swiftly addressed, the sustainability of the US-led coalition would be critically undermined. Yet, more strikingly, he asserted on March 7, that Abadi’s key task must be balancing Iran’s role in empowering Shia militias with Iraq’s partnership with the US – thereby, making no secret that Abadi had no option but to theatrically pretend to be requesting US assistance while in reality the US had already decided to intervene in the Tikrit offensive. US reasons for doing so are as follows. First, to wrest control of the leadership of the operation from Iran’s allies in the PMF. Second, to bolster its influence on the ground by ensuring that US-trained Iraqi units are leading the operation. Third, to snatch credit for any victory from the PMF. Fourth, to soothe the frayed nerves of its staunchest ally, Saudi Arabia. Fifth, to shore up the standing of increasingly US-leaning Shia political leaders, such as Abadi, Amar Al Hakim leader of the Islamic Supreme Council and even the once arch US enemy, Muqtada Al Sadr, all of whom feel increasingly threatened by the mounting popularity of their respective rivals: Nouri Al Maliki, the previous prime minister, Hadi Al Amiri ,leader of the powerful Badr organisation and Qais Al Khazaly, leader of the formidable Asaib Ahl Al Haq. Sixth, to safeguard its newly-established, yet vulnerable influence and military presence.

Surely, the PMF’s unequivocal decision on March 26, to flatly refuse to take part in any US-led offensive while also firmly holding their ground puts the US under considerable pressure to escalate its airstrikes as it strives to outperform their substantial accomplishments. But, given the intensifying internal uproar and a desperate need for highly motivated fighters, Abadi, on March 29, was forced to discretely back down, setting the stage for the final offensive, which has successfully cleansed Tikrit.
It is high-time for the US to learn from its ill-conceived campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Utilising Al Qaida and relying on Saudi Arabia to prop up its interests would spectacularly backfire, inevitably leading to terror outrages in New York, London, Paris, Brussels, Sydney, Baghdad and Damascus.