Antichrist To Take Advantage Of Al-Abadi’s Failures

  
Iraqi PM’s convoy pelted with stones after deadly blasts hit Baghdad

Agencies Sunday, 3 July 2016

A convoy carrying Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi who had come to tour the site of the deadly bombings was pelted with stones and bottles by residents, angry at what they felt were false promises of better security.

A refrigerator truck packed with explosives blew up in the central district of Karrada, killing 91 people and injuring at least 200. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement circulated online by supporters of the ultra-hard line Sunni group. It said the blast was a suicide bombing.
Video footage uploaded to social media showed the angry crowd, with people calling Abadi a “thief” and shouting at his convoy.

Eyewitness said the crowd pelted Abadi’s car with rocks, shoes and jerry cans.

Karrada was busy at the time as Iraqis eat out and shop late during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, which ends next week with the Eid al-Fitr festival.

Another video posted on social media showed a large blaze in the main street of Karrada, a largely Shiite district with a small Christian community and a few Sunni mosques.

Reuters TV footage taken in the morning showed at least four buildings severely damaged or partly collapsed, including a shopping mall believed to be the target, and gutted cars scattered all around.
The toll climbed during the day as rescuers pulled out more bodies from under the rubble and people succumbed from their injuries.

Until the government launched its Fallujah operation, the prime minister had faced growing social unrest and anti-government protests sparked, in part, by popular anger at the lack of security in the capital. In one month, Baghdad’s highly-fortified Green Zone – which houses government buildings and diplomatic missions – was stormed twice by anti-government protesters.

In Karada civilians expressed their frustration at the government’s failure to secure the capital.
“We are in a state of war, and these places are targeted. The security can’t focus on the war (against IS) and forget Baghdad,” Sami, the street vendor, said.

The UN envoy for Iraq, Jan Kubis, described the Karada attack as “a cowardly and heinous act of unparalleled proportions” and urged the Iraqi government to redouble its security efforts to protect Iraqis during celebrations for the Eid al-Fitr holiday, which marks the end of Ramadan.
(With Reuters, AP)

Last Update: Sunday, 3 July 2016 KSA 16:06 – GMT 13:06

ISIS Strikes Back for Fallujah (Daniel 8:4)

126 killed including 25 children in Baghdad attacks; ISIS claims responsibility

Car bomb attacks hit shopping districts in Baghdad

(CNN)For the third time in a week terrorists carried out a mass slaughter of civilians – with ISIS claiming responsibility.

The deadliest terror attack killed 125 people, including 25 children, Saturday evening in a busy shopping district in Baghdad.

Families had gathered there to break the Ramadan fast and watch the Euro 2016 soccer tournament in a cafe when a suicide car bomb exploded, ripping through a multi-level building that also housed stores and a gym.

At least 147 were injured.

A second bomb exploded Sunday at an outdoor market in the Shaab neighborhood of southeastern Baghdad, killing one person and wounding five others, police said.

“These acts of mass murder are yet another example of Da’esh’s contempt for human life,” said State Department John Kirby, using another term for ISIS. “From Baghdad to Istanbul, Brussels, Dhaka, and Paris, Da’esh terrorists murder the innocent to attract attention and recruits. They will not succeed.”

ISIS, also known as ISIL, acknowledged territorial losses to Iraqi forces in May as it promised an uptick in terror attacks during the holy month of Ramadan, which ends this week.
Bombing comes after Iraqi gains against ISIS

ISIS claimed responsibility for the Karrada attack in a statement posted on Twitter. The group claimed it was targeting Shiite neighborhoods. Karrada and Shaab are predominately Shiite.

It was the deadliest bombing in Iraq since 2007.

Many of the car bombers and suicide bombers who have plagued the capital for years are from Falluja, about an hour away. When Iraqi forces retook the city recently from ISIS, authorities assured Baghdad residents that the bombings would stop.

“Obviously this will reignite the anger of ordinary people who say we can’t even go out at night and enjoy life in our city,” according to CNN Senior International Correspondent Ben Wedeman.

The anger already manifested itself when Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and other officials attempted to survey the bomb damage.

Amateur videos posted on social media showed residents throwing objects at a convoy carrying al-Abadi in Karrada. The videos showed protesters yelling “thief!” and “get out!”

In a statement, al-Abadi said he understands the reaction in “that moment of grief” by the residents who threw objects at his convoy.

He said he came to Karrada to console families and “share their sorrow in this painful tragedy that happened.” He said ISIS tried to hijack the joy that Iraqis felt over recent victories against ISIS in Falluja.

Former Iraqi diplomat: Iraq is in political chaos

“This is a cowardly and heinous act of unparalleled proportions, to target peaceful civilians in the closing days of the holy month of Ramadan including shoppers preparing for the Eid-ul-Fitr holiday,” Ján Kubiš, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (SRSG) for Iraq, said in a statement Sunday.

The White house issued a statement saying: “These attacks only strengthen our resolve to support Iraqi security forces as they continue to take back territory from ISIL, just as we continue to intensify our efforts to root out ISIL’s terrorist network and leaders.”

UNICEF reacted to the death of 25 children in the attack.

“The killing and maiming of children is a grave violation under international humanitarian law,” the group said in a statement. “As violence across Iraq intensifies, children continue to pay the heaviest price.”

Baghdad has witnessed a surge in the number of deadly car bomb attacks in recent weeks, with ISIS claiming responsibility for many of them.

One of the deadliest incidents occurred in Sadr City on May 17, when a car packed with explosives detonated killing at least 24 people and wounding 71 others, according to security officials.
That was followed by two more explosions in the al-Shaab neighborhood in the north of the capital, which killed at least 19 people and wounded another 44. A female suicide bomber may have been responsible for one of the blasts, the Iraqi Interior Ministry said.

The Antichrist Pays A Heavy Price for Fallujah

Fallujah: Winning the land, but losing the people

By Marwan Kabalan, Special to Gulf News
17:04 June 30, 2016

Last Sunday, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi arrived in Fallujah and raised the Iraqi flag over the city hall. After five weeks of tense fighting, a broad coalition of Iraqi forces, supported by intensive United States air cover, was able to expel Daesh (the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) militants from the highly symbolic Iraqi city.

The role of the US was instrumental in Operation Inherent Resolve. The US military provided logistical and other multifaceted support in aid for the effort to defeat Daesh militants in Fallujah. Yet, initially, the US was reluctant to support any major offensive to retake Fallujah. After expelling Daesh militants out of Ramadi in December 2015, the US wanted the war effort to focus on Mosul. However, when some Iraqi political forces began an effort to bring down the Al Abadi government, Muqtada Al Sadr in particular, Al Abadi chose to divert the attention away from the political crisis, announcing the beginning of the battle for Fallujah in May 22.

The US administration of President Barack Obama, which expressed support for Al Abadi during the political wrangling in Baghdad, decided to go with the effort to retake Fallujah from Daesh. A victory in Fallujah was seen as instrumental in helping the ailing prime minister, hitherto seen as weak and lacking initiative, overcome a political crisis that has plagued him since last February. Yet, the support of the US was not unconditional. The US wanted the Shiite-dominated Popular Mobilisation Militia (PMM) to stay out of the battle for Fallujah.

Al Abadi knows that without US support, the war against Daesh will go nowhere. Indeed, it was US air support that enabled the Iraqi forces to expel Daesh militants out of Tikrit in March of 2015. As such, Al Abadi would have found it difficult to go against Washington’s will that the PMM should not take part in the battle for Fallujah. Yet, the Iraqi prime minister found it equally hard to resist the PMM’s insistence to participate in the fight for Fallujah, a city of unique strategic and symbolic value. Involvement in the battle to rid Fallujah of Daesh militants would give the PMM the political capital it needed to play a more active political role. A successful military campaign in Fallujah would also empower the PMM in its intra-Shiite political feuds.

Al Abadi tried to reach a middle ground between the US desire and that of the PMM. It was hence agreed that the PMM would be allowed to help in recapturing small towns in the environs of Fallujah, but would not be allowed to enter the city proper. Addressing the terms of this agreement, Hadi Al Ameri, head of the Badr Militia — the largest group within the PMM — stated that the PMM would only enter the city if a failure of government forces to take it back necessitated such a move. Even the US-led international anti-Daesh coalition was prepared to countenance the limited participation of PMM forces in military activities on the outskirts of Fallujah, as admitted by coalition spokesperson Col Steve Warren — who also claimed that the PMM would remain outside of the city limits.

Human shields

Once events began to unfold, however, it became clear that the role of the PMM was much bigger, and more sinister. The militia played a key role in the capture and detention of large numbers of Iraqi civilians who tried to flee the fighting. A number of international bodies had earlier estimated that the civilian population of Fallujah numbered between 50,000 to 90,000 people — many of whom were used as human shields by Daesh. Commenting on the situation, United Nations Human Rights Commissioner Zeid Ra’d Al Hussain expressed dismay at eyewitness accounts that “have described how armed groups operating in support of the Iraqi security forces are detaining civilians fleeing the fighting for ‘security screening’ … [which] in some cases degenerates into physical violations and other forms of abuse, apparently in order to elicit forced confessions”.

The behaviour of the PMM forces in the battle for Fallujah has served to underscore the PMM’s image as primarily a sectarian warhorse. It has also worked to depict the present battle for Fallujah not as a confrontation between the Iraqi state and the terrorist group, Daesh, but rather as one of a series of pitched sectarian battles across the country. Indeed, Al Abadi, citing concern for the safety of civilians in Fallujah, had been at times forced to take measures to slow down the intensity of the battle.

More worrying, and with longer-lasting impacts, are the repercussions of these policies for those who yearn to get rid of Daesh. These people cannot be expected to warmly welcome Baghdad’s forces if they feel that these are forwarding a sectarian agenda. In short, unless the Sunni-Arab communities of Iraq can be convinced that their government is not out to further a vendetta of sectarian revenge, then neither the reconciliation of the Iraqi population nor victory against Daesh will be possible.
Dr Marwan Kabalan is a Syrian academic and writer.

Antichrist Calls For Iraqi Shutdown (Revelation 13)

 
Shia cleric Sadr renews calls for Iraqi government to step down


Published June 26th, 2016 – 14:27 GMT via SyndiGate.info

Sadrist protesters outside of Baghdad’s Green Zone react to canisters of tear gas. (AFP/Ahmad Al-Rubaye)

Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has renewed calls for Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s government to resign.

“I call on the current Iraqi government to tender its resignation,” al-Sadr said in a statement on Saturday.

He went on to threaten that unless the government resigns, he “will join calls demanding the resignation of Iraq’s three presidencies (parliament, government and presidency).”

In April, al-Sadr decided to freeze the activities of his Ahrar bloc, which has 34 seats on the 328-member parliament, stumbling efforts by opposition lawmakers to reach quorum to vote on the ouster of the three presidencies in Iraq.

Iraq has suffered a deepening political crisis since March, when al-Abadi — under mounting pressure to reign in rampant state corruption — attempted to form a government of “technocrats” untainted by corruption or sectarian affiliations.

Iraq’s various political parties, however, including a number of Shia ones, have until now blocked the new “technocrat” government from being drawn up.

Supporters of the Shia cleric have been staging protests over the past four months to demand al-Abadi to replace his politically affiliated ministers with independent technocrats with a view to fighting rampant corruption in the country.

Iraq ranks 161st out of 168 countries on Transparency International’s “corruption perceptions index”.

The Antichrist’s Move Into Fallujah

Antichrist Promises Violence

Iraq’s flawed liberation of Fallujah

Anthony E. Deane, (c) 2016, Foreign Policy(c) 2016, Foreign Policy

Jihadists proclaim a caliphate! Can the terrorists be defeated? Anbar province is in ruins! These headlines from 10 years ago could easily appear today. As a battalion commander in Anbar’s provincial capital of Ramadi at the beginning of what would become known as the Anbar Awakening, I was on the front lines of the last fight against Sunni jihadists – and saw firsthand what it took to defeat al-Qaida in Iraq.

Iraq desperately needs to relearn the lessons from that era to win its war against the Islamic State. Today, Ramadi lies in ruins after a combination of Iraqi forces supported by U.S. airpower, some Sunni tribal fighters, and Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces wrested it from Islamic State control. The city of 400,000 people was destroyed in order to liberate it – and now Fallujah faces a similar fate, as Iraqi forces pushed farther into the city over the weekend. The limited reporting coming out of the area tells a story of atrocities against civilians from both the Islamic State and Shiite militias.
It shouldn’t have to be this way. Here are three lessons I learned in Ramadi that should inform the fight against the Islamic State today:

– Killing off terrorist leaders is only a short-term fix. The day my battalion took charge of the western approaches to Ramadi in June 2006, coalition forces killed the emir of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in an airstrike. Zarqawi was both ruthless and media savvy: In the months before his death, he posted videos of the beheadings of Westerners and Iraqis alike on the internet, striking fear into the Iraqi population and elevating the stature of his organization. Coalition forces had no answer to his media blitz, and success bred success. Jihadists worldwide flocked to al-Qaida in Iraq, throwing the country further into chaos

In Ramadi, we saw the enemy fighting us as divided between two groups. There were secular Iraqi Sunnis who had been disenfranchised by the Coalition Provisional Authority’s disastrous de-Baathification policies; we called this group the mujahedeen. Then there were the religiously motivated fighters drawn by the global jihad. By the time we arrived, the mujahedeen were under the control of the ruthless men of al-Qaida in Iraq. The locals were more scared of a Shiite-led and Iranian-dominated Iraqi government than rule by Sunni jihadists, and begrudgingly accepted the latter’s rule while looking for a way out of the situation.

Zarqawi’s successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, is remembered by history as a substandard evil mastermind. In his defense, however, his tenure as leader of al-Qaida in Iraq was wrecked by two events that nobody could have easily foreseen. First was the formation of the Anbar Awakening Council, under the leadership of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, which coalesced Sunni tribal leaders to confront the jihadists. This required rebuilding both political and security institutions, like the city’s broken police force, which proved exceptionally competent in rooting out terrorists. Abu Risha would speak to Iraqis in a tone that coalition forces were unwilling or unable to use, stiffening the people’s resolve by quoting the Quran and telling them the streets would run red with the blood of their enemies. The rhetoric of the Awakening Council helped rally the people of Ramadi, then Anbar province, followed by the nation – both Sunni and Shiite – around a vision of a more peaceful and democratic Iraq.

The second setback for al-Qaida in Iraq was “the surge” beginning in January 2007, when President George W. Bush increased the number of troops across Iraq when American popular opinion called for a pullout from the conflict. This new military offensive capitalized on the political success of the Anbar Awakening and reinforced it across the country. Masri and his organization would continue to fight coalition troops and terrorize Iraqis for three more years. But by the time of his death in 2010, the coalition’s price tag on Masri’s head had dropped from $5 million to a paltry $100,000. Al-Qaida in Iraq was on the run, with only a few true believers scattered throughout the country.

Fast-forward four years after Masri’s death, however, and al-Qaida in Iraq had become more lethal than ever. The organization captured Fallujah and Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, as part of a two-country blitz that would see their influence spread farther than ever before. Today, the successor organization’s new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has proven himself even more capable, more ruthless, and more media savvy than his mentor, Zarqawi.

The Iraqi government is now trying to retake Anbar without many of the tools that U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies possessed in 2006 and 2007. It lacks a strong counter-narrative to the jihadists, which the Awakening Council previously provided. Most critically, it lacks a strong local force of Sunnis supporting the government, due to the well-documented sectarian behavior of Iraqi leaders in Baghdad since 2011. While the Iraqi government may be successful in the short term in pushing back the Islamic State – and might even succeed in killing Baghdadi – these weaknesses suggest that it will struggle to contain whoever replaces him.

– Before there can be peace, there needs to be a political solution. In 2006, we had a lofty but clearly defined mission: to establish a democratic, safe, and secure Iraq. By operating from small combat outposts, working with local leaders, and re-establishing the Iraqi security forces, specifically the local police, we were able to turn the tide in Anbar Province. Within a year of our arrival, the provincial capital of Ramadi went from the most dangerous city in the world to being safe enough for Iraqis to run a five-kilometer race down Route Michigan, formerly called “IED Alley.”

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, however, would wreck the atmosphere of inclusiveness we had worked so painstakingly to create. The day after the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, Maliki repeated the worst of the CPA’s actions and began alienating the Sunni minority by trumping up charges against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, purging competent Sunni leaders from the military and government positions and sending the Iraqi Army into Anbar province to kill “terrorists” – which by his definition meant Sunnis. The rise of the Islamic State is directly attributable to Maliki’s ill-fated decisions during this period.

The beaten-down remnants of al-Qaida in Iraq seized the opportunity. The people of Anbar province again faced a choice: Side with an Iranian-controlled Shiite government in Baghdad they believed was hellbent on oppressing them, or throw in with the devil they knew – the Sunni jihadists.

Baghdadi and his followers expertly seized on regular citizens’ grievances to expand their power. When Fallujah fell to the Islamic State in January 2014, there were only a few hundred diehard jihadist fighters in the city. They were battling both the Iraqi government forces and Awakening Council tribal forces, who were amid a year-long, mostly peaceful rebellion against the Iraqi government. Sadly, some Sunni tribal forces – having grown impatient with the peaceful methods of the Awakening Council – later joined with the Islamic State to resist what they saw as an illegitimate government in Baghdad.

By the time Maliki resigned the following August, the Islamic State controlled large swaths of Iraq. The new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, came to power with the promise of creating a more inclusive government, but has been unable to alter the perception that the Baghdad government is unresponsive to the interests of Iraq’s ethnic minorities, especially Arab Sunnis. Judging from the way the followers of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr recently stormed the Iraqi Parliament, Abadi still has work to do in establishing his legitimacy among Iraq’s Shiite community, much less its Sunnis.
It’s telling that Abadi recently had the Iraqi military change course from expelling the Islamic State from Mosul, Iraq’s second-biggest city, to clearing Fallujah – a shift that isn’t a military necessity but seemingly an attempt by Abadi to shore up support with his Shiite base, which is bent on retribution against the Sunnis for centuries of oppression and fundamental religious differences.

– Bringing stability to Iraq is a long-term commitment. Iraq’s problems cannot be solved on the timeline of American election cycles. We have been attacking Iraq on and off for the past 25 years, starting with Operation Desert Storm and now with Operation Inherent Resolve.

Defeating the Islamic State is a worthy goal, but what happens then? An Iran-dominated Iraq will serve as a breeding ground for Sunni jihadism and help ignite a regional Sunni-Shiite sectarian war. Just as defeating al-Qaida in Iraq or killing Osama bin Laden only made the threat shift forms, the defeat of the Islamic State could only lead to a new jihadist group taking its place. After all, modern jihadism started with a half-dozen or so veterans of the Afghan war sitting around a table in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988 and has grown into a worldwide movement.

The United States needs to recognize that the jihadist problem is not going away. Defeating it will require a sustained commitment by an international coalition – specifically one that includes Muslim nations – to stop the cancer from growing. This is what happened on the micro-level in Ramadi in 2006 and 2007. Establishing a similar project across Iraq will take years – just as stabilizing Germany, Japan, Italy, and South Korea in the 20th century took decades.

Who Is The Antichrist? (Revelation 13)

Analysis: Sadrist Movement Seeking for What in Iraq?

June 21, 2016 – 12:58 PM
News Code : 761483Source : Al Waqt.

AhlulBayt News Agency – The Sadrist Movement is not new to Iraq, however, last month during the protests urging government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to eliminate bureaucracy and also sectarian sharing of government posts, the name of Sadrist Movement and its leader Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr called further attention in the country.

Who is Muqtada al-Sadr and what are his demands?

Muqtada al-Sadr is one of the Iraqi religious leaders who has a considerable number of supporters among the country’s Shiites population. The Ayatollah’s political actions after 2003, fall of Saddam Hussein, including forming out-of-government-control militia force or his parliamentary alliance have come under focus.

Although the Sadrist Movement has approved political principles of the parliamentary system, it was still a revolutionary force ready to return to military confrontation against the government any time. But there is another theory which suggests that the Sadrist Movement after crossing the militant confrontation stage through the Mahdi Army miltia and participation in the parliamentary election of 2009, it would act like a moderate political force.

Having these two theories in mind, the article aims to shed light on the historical place of the Sadr clergy in Iraq and the Sadrist Movement’s positions after 2003. Then it goes on to shed light on the Movement’s role and performance in the post-2003 period.

Place of Sadrist clergy among the Shiite Iraqis and Sadrist Movement’s positions after 2003

To focus on the place of Sadrist clergy among the country’s Shiites we first need to have a look at the history of the political leadership of the clergy in Iraq.

The roots of rise of sociopolitical leadership of the clergy in Iraq dates back to the rule of the Ottoman Empire. During the period, the Shiite clerics believed that the Ottoman caliph was in opposition to the Shiite people, seeking to impair their faith. So, they always incited people against the Ottoman rulers. But concerning the Sadrist Movement, there should be a focus on incidents that followed collapse of the Ottoman Empire and formation of the national Iraqi government in 1921 led by the Sunni minority.

In the years following 1921, Najaf and Karbala, the two holy cities for Iraq’s Shiites, were hubs for the protests against the rule of the Sunni government. In the initial decades of Iraq’s national government, Sayyed Mohammad al-Sadr, a prominent Shiite cleric, incited people against the central government’s dictatorship. Furthermore, in the years after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1997 up to 1990, Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, and the most respected Shiite cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the cousin of Muqtada al-Sadr, had a key role in leadership of Shiite citizens’ uprising against the central government. However, with the killing of the two Shiite leaders by Saddam Hussein, Muqtada al-Sadr rose to leadership of Sadr family.

Before 2003, Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr was almost unknown among the country’s prominent political figures. But after fall of Saddam Hussein, Muqtada al-Sadr, following his father’s emphasis, he highlighted the necessity of forming an Islamic government and showing opposition to the presence of the foreign forces in Iraq.

He reactivated the Sadr family-bound charities and offices in the country in a bid for entry to the country’s politics. Later, he laid the foundation of a military movement in the country with support offered to him by the Shiite forces from Baghdad’s Sadr City who respected his family so much.

As an initial declaration of stances, on August 14, 2003, Muqtada al-Sadr announced opposition to the UN Security Council’s resolution 1500 which upheld creation of temporary Iraqi Governing Council. According to al-Sadr, the UN resolution was invalid and illegitimate as it was adopted by the US and the Western countries. At the same time, Ayatollah al-Sadr came clean with his objection to Shiite clergy’s approving of the occupying foreign forces’ presence in the country. In this period, the Shiite leader majorly sought formation of an Islamic government in which the clergy were on top.
Muqtada al-Sadr in 2004 called on his fans to hold rallies. He in 2005 came against holding parliamentary election to form an official government in Iraq. His justification for the protest was that the election and government were under the influence and control of the Americans, so, they were invalid.

Generally, following 2003, al-Sadr tried to gain more political ground in the country through raising anti-corruption and anti-foreign forces’ presence agendas in the country. He repeatedly demanded the Iraqi military forces to cut off cooperation with the occupying US forces.

Founding Mahdi Army and al-Sadr’s military role in post-2003 Iraq

In the initial months of fall of Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein, in June 2003, Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr formed a militia force, dubbing it Mahdi Army. It included almost 1,000 fighters. In the country’s political scene, these fighters were known as Sadrist militia. Mahdi Army later expanded to include 10,000 fighters. According to the reports, the major funding sources of Mahdi Army were the energy resources around the capital Baghdad and some donations made by the Sadr’s supporters.

In the years following 2003, the US made efforts to detain the journalists and ban activities of pro-Sadr media. On August 20, 2003, an arrest order was issued for Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr. It failed to lead to detention of the strong religious and political leader, however. On March 28, 2004, a ban was imposed on a pro-Sadr newspaper by Paul Bremer, the head of occupational authority of Iraq.

Most of Sadrist Movement’s importance appeared after the Mahdi Army fighters launched two major assaults in April and August 2004 against the US forces in Najaf. Following the operation, an erosive battle was set in motion by the joint Iraqi and American forces against the Mahdi Army forces. It last up to 2008, the time when Mahdi Army was declared disbanded by Ayatollah Muqtada al-Sadr.

During the years following disbanding Mahdi Army, Baghdad’s Sadr City, Najaf and Karbala were scenes for demonstrations of pro-Sadrist Movement protesters who demanded withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq.

In August 2007, Ayatollah al-Sadr ordered a temporary cessation of military activities of Mahdi Army as the Iraqi government pledged starting fundamental reforms inside its body. But he asserted that as long as the foreign forces were camping in the country, his army would continue battling them. Generally, despite disbandment of Mahdi Army in 2008, the armed fighting against occupying forces kept ongoing on until the US withdrew forces from Iraq in 2011, although after 2009, when Ayatollah al-Sadr accepted to participate in provincial councils election, his loyalists’ military activities saw a major decline.

Sadrist Movement in election competitions

First participation of Sadrist Movement in the election in the country was in 2009. The Movement won 43 of total 440 seats of provincial councils in 14 of 18 provinces. But the large-scale triumph for Sadrist Movement took place in the parliamentary election of 2010. The Sadrist Movement participated as part of National Iraqi Alliance, led by Ammar al-Hakim, the leader of Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Muqtada al-Sadr. The Movement secured 40 of 70 parliamentary seats won by the National Iraqi Alliance to enter the parliament while standing as the strongest political party of the Alliance, and to prove it was a movement which held sway in the country.

Continuing its participation in the political process, Sadrist Movement on April 30, 2014, took part in the parliamentary election under the independent Al-Ahrar coalition. It managed to win 32 seats.

Between 2014 and 2016, Sadrist Movement has acted as a parliamentary bloc critical of the Iraqi government’s performance. But since early 2016, Sadrist Movement has mobilized its strength and influence to put strains on the PM Haider al-Abadi in a push for a presenting a cabinet of technocrats.

To push for his demands, in past few months Muqtada al-Sadr has assembled his protesting supporters in Baghdad’s Green Zone which is home to the parliament and the prime minister’s office. In April 30, his rallying supporters stormed and occupied the country’s parliament after crossing the security barrier ahead of them. During the incident, the protesters held hostages a number of members of parliament inside the parliament building. There were reports of assaults on the lawmakers.

The parliament was closed down following the incident. The Kurdish lawmakers return home to Kurdistan region north of the country, demanding the central government to guarantee safety for return to Baghdad.

On May 20, Sadrist Movement’s supporters repeated storming of the Green Zone, but this time the parliament was not the sole target; a number of the protestors attacked the residence of PM al-Abadi.

How This Mosque Saved The Antichrist

  
Centuries-old Kufa mosque still holds religious, political significance

KUFA, Iraq — The Great Mosque of Kufa (aka al-Sahla) is located in the city of Kufa (97 miles south of Baghdad) and is considered one of the earliest mosques in the Islamic world. Built in 638, it was the birthplace of the Shiite religious and political ideology.

Throughout Iraq’s tumultuous modern history, the mosque’s role changed according to the nature of the Iraqi regime. During the era of former President Saddam Hussein who fought political Islam, the Kufa mosque’s political significance was curbed, only to prosper after the fall of this regime in 2003 in the aftermath of the US invasion. The Kufa mosque was always an intellectual hub and a political starting point, but it became a center to oppose the US invasion of Iraq, then a platform for protests and sermons demanding the eradication of corruption.

The history of the Kufa mosque still resonates with the ideas that saw the light within its walls. In addition to being a place of worship, the mosque remained for decades a platform for political opposition and mobilizing the people.

In 1999, the Saddam regime closed down the mosque in an attempt to suspend the Friday prayers and gatherings attended by large numbers of Shiite Muslims, under the leadership of cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the regime on his way back from praying at the Kufa mosque before it was closed in February 1999.

Following the fall of the Baath regime in 2003, the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, chose the mosque to deliver his first speech following the US invasion. Since then, Shiite parties have been competing to stand on the mosque’s minbar (platform), but Sadr kept a firm grip on it, using it to escalate his attack on the US occupation.

Ever since, the mosque has become a platform for rivalries between Shiites, but Sadr clung to it because the supporters of his father (Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr) would attend the political and religious events in this mosque and meet him there. Besides, the mosque has religious and historic importance for Shiites.

In 2004, US forces besieged Sadr, who retreated to the mosque, preventing a possible raid on it.
Aware of the mosque’s significance for Shiite Muslims, Sadr kept delivering his Friday speeches with political purposes from Kufa mosque’s minbar.

On a visit to the mosque, Al-Monitor interviewed cleric Abul-Hasan Yaseri who performs his Friday prayer there, coming from his hometown of Babil, 80 kilometers (50 miles) away. Speaking about the significance of the mosque, Yaseri said, “Muslim Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib [599-661] said that praying at the Kufa mosque is rewarded as 1,000 prayers performed at other mosques.”

“The mosque is a place of great holiness for Muslims, especially Shiites,” Yaseri added, stressing “the importance of keeping political and party activities away from this historical mosque of special religious and historical significance.”

According to an information plate at one of the mosque’s entrances, the place can accommodate 50,000 people and stretches across an area of 12,000 square kilometers (4,633 square miles), with a 20-meter-tall (65-foot) perimeter wall supported by round-shaped pillars.

The Kufa mosque has a wealth of religious and historical remnants and monuments as evidence to the site’s historical significance. Yaseri pointed to an elevated place from which “the [Great] Flood originated, submerging Earth, during the time of the Prophet Noah.”

“It was in the mosque’s courtyard that the famous Noah’s Ark was built to save all living species on earth,” Yaseri explained.

On the tour, Al-Monitor came across several symbols relating to historical religious figures, including the shrines of Prophets Abraham and Adam at the center of the courtyard. Furthermore, several historical sources indicate that Prophet Muhammad stopped by the Kufa mosque to pray before ascending to heaven to speak with God.

In one of this vast mosque’s corners, dozens of visitors gathered at the place where Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib, who is also Prophet Muhammad’s cousin, was fatally wounded by a sword.

Living nearby the mosque, historian Makki Sultani spoke to Al-Monitor about what may be considered the most significant part of the mosque’s history. Sultani referred to the halls surrounding the mosque’s courtyard, saying, “This historical edifice saw the inception of the first teachings of the Shiite Jafari sect at the hands of Imam Jafar ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq [702-765], who conducted his Islamic teachings there.”

In regard to the scientific significance of the place, Sultani said, “It was here that the principle of Arabic nahu [grammar] was established by Abu al-Aswad al-Du’ali. Imam Ali himself also taught Islamic jurisprudence at this mosque.”

Sultani mentioned some of the incidents he has witnessed: “In 1958, former President Abdul Salam Mohammed Arif landed with his helicopter in the mosque’s courtyard, leading to death and injury of many as a result of the ensuing stampede.”

“The late cleric Muhammad al-Sadr held his Friday prayers as well as the large demonstrations he used to call for here. During the reign of Saddam, this mosque hosted the only platform in Iraq where the anti-regime movement was public,” Sultani added.

Sultani stressed, “Members of the opposition used to hold their gatherings and activities at the mosque, which led to several raids by security forces.”

Concerning the great significance of the Kufa mosque in the minds of Shiites, the head of Najaf’s provincial council, Khudayr Jabouri, told Al-Monitor, “What distinguishes the Kufa mosque is its proximity to the ruins of the Emirate Palace, the caliph’s palace during Imam Ali’s rule, as well as to Imam Ali’s family dwelling, which is still there. The provincial council is aware of the necessity of investing in this historical and religious site to promote religious tourism.”

Jabouri added, “The provincial council has been carrying renovation plans that include the mosque’s external gates, improving services, covering the mosque’s floor with stone and natural marble, and renovating Imam Ali’s mihrab [niche], to host the thousands of pilgrims who come here every month.”

Former Iraqi PM Maliki Plays With Fire

Former Iraqi PM Maliki leading political movement against Sadr
 
Nuri al-Maliki. Photo: AFP file photo

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region—Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki is leading a united political front aimed at stopping the Moqtada al-Sadr protest movement, especially now that Sadr is making threatens to attack the Green Zone and political party offices, confirmed a source from Maliki’s Daawa party.

“The Daawa party won’t be silent against the threats on its offices and we are not alone; the Badr, Fazila, Assaeeb and other parties are with us. We have even contacted some MPs from the Ahrar block as well,” an MP from the State of Law coalition, Jasim Jaafar Muhammed, confirmed to Rudaw.

“I do not think the State of Law will organize demonstrations against a certain party but will take other procedures and mechanisms. It is not acceptable in democratic Iraq to insult and take down the photos of great religious clerics and martyrs of the al-Hashd al-Shaabi,” Muhammed added, referring to Sadr supporters defacing images of Shia clerics from the Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi.

According to sources, Maliki is trying to convince the political leaders to put pressure on Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to enact tough measures to stop the Sadr protesters who threaten to attack the political party offices and the Green Zone. Maliki, via his close aides, is trying to convince Abadi to arrest the organizers of the protests.

Rudaw has learned that Maliki met with Ammar Al-Hakim, leader of Islamic supreme council, Fuad Maasum, President of Iraq, and Hadi Amri, leader of the Badr organization, to discuss this issue.
Last Friday Abadi condemned recent protests in the capital Baghdad, calling demonstrators’ attacks on public institutions and political party offices, including his Daawa Party in Najaf, “a criminal act.”
According to Abadi, the attacks on political party offices were carried out by “unknown armed men,” but the public protests have been largely organized by the Sadr movement and its leader Muqtada al-Sadr.

“We ask the political parties to condemn and reject the shameful acts and we ask the patriotic protesters to declare their innocence and not get involved in acts that lead to casualties and make people nervous and horrified,” said Abadi.

Last week, Maliki described the attack on political party offices in Najaf and other parts of the country including Baghdad as criminal, “and the work of gangsters.”

Antichrist’s Men Escalate Tensions

Tensions escalate between Iraqi protesters, security forces

The anti-government movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr along with secular young people seems to be headed for violence and clashes with the Iraqi security forces, especially if Haider al-Abadi’s government fails to meet the protesters’ demands that include appointing a technocrat government and eradicating corruption. The protesters have started preparing for a potential confrontation with riot police by buying gas masks, especially after security forces used tear gas to disperse protests May 21.

A number of young people posted photos on social media (the pages of which have been taken offline now) showing protesters wearing gas masks in a defiant message to the government after Iraqi riot police used tear gas to disperse a crowd May 27 as protesters tried to break into the Green Zone for the third time. They had already been successful on May 20 and in larger numbers on April 30 when they stormed the parliament building.

Protesters said that the security forces resorted to rubber and live bullets during the protests on May 21, claiming that four people were killed as a result of the security forces’ brutality.

Al-Monitor interviewed a young man in his early 20s from Sadr City who had acquired a gas mask. Revealing only his first name, which he said was Haider, he said that he regularly participates in the demonstrations held in Baghdad every Friday.

Like other demonstrators his age, Haider expressed his indignation toward the government for failing to provide Iraqis with adequate services and job opportunities.

In fact, Haider represents a large section of Iraqi young people — 40% of the total population — who have grown frustrated with the situation in the country. Their anti-regime sentiment can be heard in the streets, in cafes and on public transportation. They are part of the Iraqi community suffering from unemployment, poverty and inadequate services such as the delivery of electricity; power outages only add to the frustration with the government’s empty promises. Some say that such a state of despair could cause Haider and his peers to turn to violence as a last resort.

However, Rezan Shex Dler, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament, doubted this, saying, “Protesters are highly unlikely to resort to violence.”

Dler, a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), told Al-Monitor, “Protesters are keen on remaining peaceful.” He visited Tahrir Square in February to witness one of the demonstrations that have been ongoing since July 2015 and to listen to the people’s demands as a member of Iraq’s parliament. “The demonstrations are not likely to escalate,” he said.
The higher coordination committee organizing the protests, which includes secular Iraqis and Sadr followers, has already taken the decision to expand the rallies, announcing at a press conference June 6 that further demonstrations will be held after sunset during Ramadan on weekdays, in addition to those organized on Fridays.

Although Abadi and Hadi al-Amiri, a leader in the Popular Mobilization Units and the head of the Badr Organization, have called for postponing the demonstrations, the committee organizing the protests remained determined to continue the movement.

Abadi and Amiri are opposed to demonstrations because Iraqi forces are currently engaged in a fierce battle with the Islamic State (IS) in Fallujah, 62 kilometers (38 miles) from Baghdad. They argue that demonstrations will drain security forces who have to protect the protesters and fight IS at the same time. However, the demonstrations’ coordination committee considered in its statement June 6 that postponement is “an unacceptable evasion of responsibility.”

In an interview with Al-Monitor, a member of the security committee at the Baghdad Provincial Council, Saad al-Muttalibi, said, “Demonstrators have clearly started rioting. Violent discourse is growing among the protesters.”

He added, “By monitoring the protesters’ social media posts and press statements, one can easily discern violence or the decision to resort to it.”

But cleric Iyad al-Kaabi, a Sadrist student at the Shiite seminary of Najaf and one of the Islamic leaders of the demonstrations, told Al-Monitor, “Protesters are armed with flowers, peaceful expressions [on their faces] and Iraqi flags.” However, he added, “These demonstrations might turn into a general revolution if the government continues to ignore the people’s demands.”

Still, referring to the protesters’ response to the potential future use of violence by security forces who have already used brutal actions to disperse the protests, Kaabi said, “The demonstrations will remain peaceful.”

Jassim al-Hilfi, a member of the high coordination committee, deplored “the security forces’ recent use of violence against protesters. The authorities think that violence can bring an end to protests. … But we believe that it cannot solve anything.”

He told Al-Monitor, “Imposing tighter security measures will only complicate the issue. The authorities’ use of violence would justify any recourse to it by the crowds who would then be convinced that their peaceful demonstration is ineffective.”

Hilfi said, “The country is already plunged in violence. … Violence is in nobody’s best interests. The government must be aware of the stakes and understand the people’s indignation.”

The Iraqi government must take the protesters’ demands into account and prevent any recourse to violence by the security forces in this wave of demonstrations, as that could open the door to further violence and counterviolence, dragging the country into the unknown.

No Noble Cause From the Antichrist (Revelation 13)

Iraq’s Fake Populism and Anti-sectarianism

KIRK H. SOWELL Tensions among Haider al-Abadi, Muqtada al-Sadr, and their rivals result from power struggles, not real disputes over reform. Thursday, June 9, 2016

عربي
A mob loyal to Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr sacked Iraq’s parliament on April 30, exacerbating the country’s seemingly permanent political crisis and bringing the tenure of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to a new low. The government’s political paralysis is severe even by Iraqi standards, with parliament struggling to make quorum, and the legal legitimacy of its leadership in question. While a new military operation to free Fallujah from terrorist control has temporarily grabbed media attention, Iraq’s political crisis continues.

Several misconceptions surround the origins of this paralysis—including that Abadi’s efforts to create a cabinet of technocrats were a reaction to Sadrist protests, that these demonstrations can be broadly identified with last summer’s anti-corruption protests, and that the fight between Abadi and rival figures within the political elite is substantially related to his efforts to push anti-corruption reforms. Rather, while both the Abadi and Sadr “reform” initiatives failed, the current crises facing both the parliament and Abadi’s cabinet result from a struggle for power and all sides’ disregard for the rule of law.

Abadi had announced various reforms in response to popular protests in August 2015, but the only one that was actually implemented and had wide-ranging impact was his August 16 decree deleting four ministries, merging eight other ministries into four, and effectively firing eleven cabinet members.1 Abadi did not submit a request to parliament but simply took the action by decree. All other parliamentary blocs correctly argued that this was unconstitutional—according to Article 75, the prime minister can remove ministers only with parliament’s approval—and uniformly opposed it.
By the beginning of 2016, recognizing that popular support for him had collapsed—in part because his few concrete “reforms” were just austerity measures, such as public sector downsizing and salary reform, resulting from the state’s lack of funds—Abadi tried to restart his tenure with a new “technocrat government” initiative. First he hosted a Three Presidencies meeting on January 28 with President Fuad Masum and Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri that concluded with vague rhetoric of cooperation, unity, and reform. But then he went out on his own, and declared on February 9 that he would present his own cabinet to implement reforms. Because ministers in the current cabinet—as in previous governments—are senior political figures in the blocs that dominate parliament, Abadi was in effect asking them to hand total control of the government over to him.
Only after Abadi announced a new technocratic cabinet did Sadr launch his current initiative during a speech on February 13. The essence of it was to turn himself into a popular leader—a leader of the masses transcending a specific political party or sectarian group—supporting reform on behalf of “the people” and not just the Sadrist current. He put forward 26 reform demands and said that his bloc would support Abadi’s effort to form a technocrat government, though he would call for a no-confidence vote in this government if Abadi failed to deliver within 45 days. Yet of Sadr’s 26 items, all but one—the replacement of Abadi’s acting appointments, which are de facto permanent appointments that bypass parliamentary confirmation—overlapped with Abadi’s stated agenda. Most were widely supported general statements to “promote investment,” fight corruption, and the like. Nor should the no-confidence threat be taken seriously: Sadr has always viewed Abadi as a balance against former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, his true rival, and when pressed on the issue his political representatives have never indicated a desire to remove him.

Sadr followed this speech with a series of escalating protests in Baghdad that turned into a sit-in encampment outside the Green Zone. On February 26, he spoke before the Baghdad crowd, breaking precedent by appearing in person. He adopted an increasingly demanding tone, and went from signing off as “a demander of reform” (talib al-islah) in his February 13 speech to declaring himself “the overseer of reform” (ra‘i al-islah).

Even though figures in Sadr’s parliamentary bloc repeatedly insisted they were attempting to strengthen Abadi, the protests in fact made it harder for Abadi to restructure the cabinet. The presence of such a huge crowd, protected by Sadr’s own militia, highlighted Sadr’s effort to make himself the sole arbiter of what constituted reform or not. This created a crisis within the Shia bloc and ensured that no slate he backed could pass, because passing it would make him successful and establish his supreme authority over them. Factions that had their own militias were visibly disturbed, and the official Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd) leadership, which is dominated by the Badr Organization and other rival militias, issued a highly unusual statement warning against what they viewed as the Sadrists’ attempt to impose their will on government. Even those without militias, such as the Islamic Dawa Party–Iraq Organization, criticized the Sadrists strongly, making it unlikely that any initiative Sadr supported could pass parliament.

Furthermore, neither Abadi nor Sadr are making any real effort to fight corruption. Abadi appointed Hassan al-Yasseri, a member of his own Dawa Party, as head of the anti-corruption Integrity Commission, so unsurprisingly there has not been a single prosecution of a political insider from any Shia Islamist or Kurdish faction, or even from any Sunni Arab faction on good terms with Baghdad. Even if he wanted to work with parliament to pursue more reforms, as a consensus pick for prime minister who did not run at the head of a political bloc, Abadi has no electoral mandate or even a governing coalition in parliament. Other bloc leaders are actively blocking tangible reforms. Maliki and the militias backing him have actively attempted to undermine him by spreading false stories of military negligence. Former prime minister Iyad Allawi criticizes Abadi incessantly and has refused to support what reform measures he has produced. And Osama al-Nujaifi, head of the largest Sunni Arab bloc, has eschewed support for structural reforms and instead focused on Sunni communal demands and his own autonomous region agenda. Likewise, though Abadi acted unilaterally on his one serious structural measure (a public sector compensation bill), the mess he made of this left his reform effort dead last November.

Sadr, similarly, is not the outsider he is now portraying himself to be, as in two successive governments the Sadrists held several ministries. Nor does he represent the Iraqi people outside of his one, notable share of the Shia population. Though the seats won by his electoral list increased from 30 seats in 2005 to 40 in 2010, parliament had also increased in size, and Sadr’s share took from the competing Sadrist Fadhila Party. In 2014 Sadr’s candidates won 34 of 328 seats, edging out the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) 31 seats but well behind Maliki’s 95. Despite rhetoric about non-sectarianism, this list never won a seat in a Sunni-majority area. Thus Sadr is “revolting” against a corrupt, sectarian establishment of which he is an integral part.

Overestimating their own weight, the Sadrists tried to establish Muqtada as the “popular leader” he has always sought to become. During three chaotic sessions of parliament from April 12 to 14, they first demanded that Speaker Salim al-Jaburi present Abadi’s March 31 technocrat slate for a vote though it had no chance of passing. When Jaburi refused, Sadrists joined with MPs loyal to Maliki and Allawi in a sit-in of parliament itself aimed at removing Jaburi, Abadi’s main Sunni ally. In a farcical event, they “impeached” Jaburi on April 14 even though it was clear from video of the proceedings that only 131 MPs were present, short of the legal quorum of 165. The sit-in effort was doomed from the start because the three main components—the Sadrists, Maliki loyalists, and Allawi loyalists—were each in it for the mutually exclusive goal of making their own chief the country’s paramount political leader.

What followed was a second, more damaging Sadrist effort at pressure politics. When parliament again met on April 26, voting to replace five ministers with Abadi nominees, prominent Sadrist MP Hakim al-Zamili ominously stated during debate that protesters—in fact a Sadrist mob—were waiting outside to storm the Green Zone if the vote failed. Thus Abadi’s cabinet victory legitimized mob rule. When parliament refused to meet to remove the remainder of the cabinet on April 30, Sadr gave a speech in which he declared that he awaited “a popular revolution,” and at that his supporters broke into parliament. Despite a broad backlash across the political spectrum, Sadr remained undeterred, and on May 20, Friday protests led to cabinet administration offices being vandalized.
Abadi’s announcement of the operation to liberate Fallujah came two days later, allowing him to give speeches surrounded by military officers—and even tour forward bases wearing a military uniform—to try to create a “rally around the flag” effect. Yet the crisis of institutions remains, and only on June 7 was he again able to get a majority of ministers to attend cabinet meetings and indisputably establish legal quorum. Parliament, now in recess, has likewise made quorum only once since April 26, with Jaburi’s status as speaker presently under legal challenge. The Sadrists, meanwhile, retreated from the fore after the May 20 mob event led to fatalities among protesters, and the country’s population has rallied around the military effort in Fallujah, if not Abadi personally. It remains unclear whether Abadi can use the current breathing space to get political institutions back on track.