Nebuchadnezzar Builds Up Babylon’s Nuclear Arms (Ezekiel 17)

A Trident II D5 missile built by Lockheed Martin for the Navy is tested.

Obama Backs Biggest Nuclear Arms Buildup Since Cold War

Loren Thompson, Contributor

National security is shaping up to be the top issue in next year’s presidential election. The media are awash in worries about terrorism and cyber attacks, with President Obama generally getting low marks for his handling of threats. Republican presidential candidates say he has no coherent strategy for dealing with the danger posed by radical jihadists, and complain that he has deprived the military of the funding needed to protect America.

However, there is one facet of national security — arguably the most important one — where President Obama is turning out to be a real hardliner. That area is nuclear weapons. Obama has backed investment in new nuclear delivery systems, upgraded warheads, resilient command networks, and industrial sites for fabricating nuclear hardware that, when added to the expense of maintaining the existing arsenal, will cost $348 billion between 2015 and 2024. At least, that’s what the Congressional Budget Office estimated earlier this year. If the Obama plan continues to be funded by his successors, it will be the biggest U.S. buildup of nuclear arms since Ronald Reagan left the White House.

This isn’t what most observers expected from Obama. A longtime supporter of nuclear disarmament, he gave a speech shortly after being inaugurated in 2009 highlighting “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He backed up that commitment with concrete actions. When his administration completed the third post-Cold War review of America’s nuclear posture in April of 2010, it called for “a multilateral effort to limit, reduce, and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide.” A nuclear arms pact signed with Russia the same year called for cutting the number of warheads in the strategic arsenal to a quarter of the level agreed to in 1991 — about 1,500. The New York Times reported early the following year the administration wanted to cut the warhead count yet again to 1,000.

That doesn’t sound like much of an arsenal for a country that had over 30,000 nuclear warheads the year Obama began elementary school. Granted, there are several thousand additional warheads in storage or not counted by the 2010 pact, but the general trend in inventory levels has been down, down and down, and the Obama Administration began its time in office planning to stay on that vector. So what changed?

What changed was that the White House ceased believing it could work with Russia at a time when much of the Cold War nuclear arsenal was reaching an advanced state of decay. With prospects for further arms reduction agreements rapidly receding, the administration decided it had to move forward with modernization of the entire nuclear enterprise. Although plans to sustain a nuclear “triad” of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and long-range nuclear bombers had been endorsed by the 2010 posture review, the White House initially appeared ambivalent about spending the money needed to revitalize the nuclear arsenal. But any resistance to “recapitalizing” the arsenal disappeared after Russia began threatening Eastern Europe, and conducting nuclear exercises seemingly aimed at scaring the West.

So now Barack Obama, the longtime proponent of nuclear disarmament, finds himself presiding over a vast reconstruction of the nation’s strategic force, not to mention the introduction of new aircraft and weapons for conducting tactical nuclear operations in places like Europe. The basic goal is to dissuade any enemy from nuclear aggression by fielding a resilient retaliatory force that can survive a surprise attack, and then destroy the assets that matter most to the aggressor. The strategy is called deterrence, and in the absence of active defenses capable of intercepting a nuclear attack, it is the main bulwark America has against a threat that could destroy the Republic in a single day. Here are the key elements of the Obama buildup.

A new ballistic missile submarine. The U.S. Navy’s 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable part of the nuclear triad, but the subs will begin retiring at the rate of one per year toward the end of the next decade. To have a replacement ready, the Obama Administration is pushing ahead with the Ohio Replacement Program which will commence construction of a new class of subs in 2021. There will be twelve such vessels, each carrying 16 ballistic missiles equipped with multiple warheads. General Dynamics GD -0.72% Electric Boat division, builder of the Ohio class, is leading development of the next-generation subs, and will likely perform most of the construction. A separate Navy program is extending the life of the Lockheed Martin LMT -0.93% D5 missiles carried on the Ohio class, and at least initially on its successor. Both the missiles and their improved warheads will be operational for another 30 years.

A new strategic bomber. The airborne part of the nuclear triad currently consists of 76 aged B-52 bombers and 20 newer B-2s, both of which also perform non-nuclear missions. However, a senior Air Force officer told Congress earlier this year that the bombers “are becoming increasingly vulnerable to modern air defenses,” so last month the service awarded a contract to Northrop Grumman for development of a “Long Range Strike Bomber” that will provide 80-100 very stealthy successors beginning in 2025 (loser Boeing is protesting the award). Meanwhile, all of the nuclear missiles and gravity bombs carried on the bombers are being upgraded to extend their lives, improve their accuracy, and assure their safety. A new air-launched cruise missile is also planned, but the administration is taking no chances, pouring billions of dollars into enhancing the performance and connectivity of the existing fleet.

A new intercontinental ballistic missile.  The third leg of the nuclear triad consists of 450 Minuteman III missiles deployed in hardened silos at three bases in the western U.S.  The Air Force is spending $7 billion to modernize the propulsion systems, guidance, warheads and other elements of the Minuteman force, but the force’s projected service life only extends to 2030.  In 2014, the command responsible for managing the missiles conducted an analysis of alternatives for developing a next-generation “Ground Based Strategic Deterrent,” meaning a new ICBM.  InsideDefense.com reports that the Air Force will begin operating the new missile in 2027.  Missile silos and launch control centers, which have become quite decrepit, will be renovated for decades of additional service.  A parallel effort is under way to upgrade the warheads carried on ICBMs, substituting more powerful weapons from the retired MX missile.

An enhanced command, control & communications network.  Credible deterrence requires a resilient command system that can ride out a surprise attack and then execute appropriate responses (there are numerous retaliatory options in nuclear war plans).  The network of assets supporting this system includes sensors that can detect an attack, flying command posts, hardened underground operations centers, secure communications satellites, and a complex array of links between them.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that administration plans for modernizing the nuclear command and control system will cost $52 billion between 2015 and 2024, with the biggest outlays going to Boeing for flying command posts, Lockheed Martin for satellites, and Northrop Grumman for sensors and networks.  Raytheon will also likely be a key player in nuclear-related sensors and networks.

New tactical nuclear systems.  Although the Obama nuclear posture has sought to minimize the role of nuclear weapons outside the area of strategic deterrence, the administration faces a practical problem in countering thousands of tactical nuclear systems that Russia has deployed in Europe.  Under the doctrine of “extended deterrence,” the U.S. must have credible retaliatory options for dealing with the regional threat that these weapons pose in order to reassure its overseas allies.  The administration therefore plans to equip at least some Lockheed Martin F-35 fighters with a capability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons, and is upgrading the inventory of nuclear munitions suitable for conducting such operations.

A revitalized nuclear weapons industrial base.  Much of the responsibility for supporting the U.S. nuclear posture resides not in the Department of Defense, but in the Department of Energy.  DoE is expected to spend $121 billion between 2015 and 2024 on its nuclear-weapons functions, over a third of the $348 billion spent on the nuclear enterprise during that period.  A big chunk of that money will go to the laboratories and industrial facilities involved in researching, refurbishing, modifying or demilitarizing nuclear devices.  Although the U.S. no longer builds new nuclear warheads, it is constantly reclaiming nuclear material from old devices and enhancing the features of warheads already in the stockpile.  That requires extensive investment in revitalizing the plant and equipment at facilities that often trace their origins to the dawn of the Cold War.

Some might quibble with using the word “buildup” to characterize this sprawling effort, since the Obama Administration does not plan to exceed weapons levels specified in arms reduction agreements.  However, the reality is that President Obama is backing efforts to upgrade and replace every nuclear delivery system in the U.S. arsenal, plus the warheads they carry, plus the command networks and industrial base that supports them.  None of his recent predecessors undertook nuclear efforts this ambitious — the Arms Control Association says the life-cycle cost of the new submarine alone will be over $300 billion through 2080 — and whether the arsenal shrinks or grows will be left to his successors.  So for all of the criticism about Mr. Obama being weak on defense, when it comes to the most fearsome weapons humanity has devised, he will be remembered as the president who kept America on top.

(Disclosure: All of the companies mentioned here have contributed to my think tank at one time or another; some are consulting clients.)

Nebuchadnezzar and Babylon The Great (Ezekiel 17)

We Got the President We Deserve

1 day ago | Updated 2 hours ago

Paul Heroux State Representative, Massachusetts

In the aftermath of the war in Iraq, in 2008, nearly 53 percent of American voters elected Barack Obama on a message that he will pull us out of Iraq and restore our image in the world as a benevolent superpower. Yet, Obama has been criticized for the growth of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the increasingly unstable situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the nuclear deal with Iran. There is also a growing chasm between the US and its traditional allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Recently, President Obama has come under increased scrutiny for not becoming more involved in Syria.
All of this was foreseeable and the American people got the government they deserve.
Obama’s Middle East Strategy

Taking a moment to look at some of the major countries in the region and the recent activity in each of the countries, we can see a pattern.

Concerning Iraq, Obama campaigned on the pledge to withdraw from Iraq and that is exactly what he did. The Obama administration inherited a timetable for withdrawal from the Bush Administration. The American people wanted us to withdraw. The Iraqi government and people also wanted us to withdraw. And the world wanted us to withdraw. Since then Iraq has lost several sections to ISIS, and its own government is increasingly aligned with Iran. This was all to be expected.

Concerning Iran, in 2007 president Obama was criticized by Hillary Clinton for saying that he would talk to Iran without preconditions. Consequently, for the first time since 1979, the US had high-level talks with Iran over its nuclear program. Without the nuclear deal, the IAEA and the world would have no eyes on Iran’s nuclear program and it would be progressing unchecked. The entire world supported this deal except for three groups – the rightwing in the US and Iran, and Israel’s government.

Concerning Syria, in the aftermath of the quagmire in Iraq, it would be expected that president Obama would not want to put boots on the ground. If the US were to put massive numbers of troops in Syria it could and would likely easily become a proxy war against Iran and Russia. Russia and Iran have different goals in Syria than does the US. The US’s goal has been to topple Assad and use the Syrian opposition fighters to aid in the endeavor. On the other side of the equation, Iran and Russia are trying to keep Assad in power and there are reports that they are not always fighting ISIS but are taking on the Assad’s opposition. But alas, Obama has been forced to deal with the reality that without US leadership, ISIS is likely to remain a troublesome force in Syria and the refugee crisis from the civil war with Assad will continue.

Concerning Saudi Arabia, candidate Obama said that he wanted to decrease dependence on Middle East oil. The US does not need to have the same geopolitical strategy. With the discovery of fracking in the US, the US is poised to become one of the largest exporters of natural gas and petroleum in the world, eliminating the need for dependence on Saudi Arabia. The shift from natural resources to counterterrorism has shifted what the US needs from Saudi Arabia.

Concerning, Israel, the very thing that Obama said he would pursue, i.e., “securing all nuclear weapons and materials from terrorists and rogue states” became a point of contention. President Obama has estranged his administration from that of the Netanyahu administration in Israel. There have been several reasons but none as controversial as the Iran deal. Israel was opposed to any negotiation with Iran so it didn’t matter what came out of the talks between the EU3+3 as Israel was never going to concede that a deal could be achieved and could push back an Iranian bomb for over a decade.

Many critics have said that Obama does not have a Middle East strategy. I disagree. The pattern that can be detected is one where President Obama is ‘pulling back’ where necessary, as Simon and Stevenson suggested. Yet Obama has also engaged with Iran as he said he would do when he was a candidate. We need to keep in context the president that we elected. Americans wanted to get out of the Middle East.

Conclusion

In our system of government, we always get the government we deserve, for better or for worse. We have no one to blame or congratulate but ourselves for who we elect. And by ‘we’ I mean the collective we.

What should we expect from a strategy of pulling back from the Middle East? More or less enemies? Time will tell.

Paul Heroux is a state representative from Massachusetts on the Joint Committee on Public Safety and Homeland Security. He lived and worked in the Middle East and has a master’s in international relations from the London School of Economics, and from the Harvard School of Government. He can be reached at paulheroux.mpa@gmail.com.

Nebuchadnezzar Passes Buck To Next Administration

The US is reportedly willing to make another huge nuclear concession to Iran

Armin Rosen Tomorrow at 5:57 AM

They’re this close to a deal — if the US stomachs another big concession.

The outline of a landmark nuclear deal between a US-led group of countries and Iran is coming into focus.

According to the AP, Iran will be able to keep 6,500 uranium enrichment centrifuges under a final agreement. This would allow Iran to achieve one nuclear weapon’s worth of uranium enrichment in between six months and a year (depending on the amount and enrichment level of low-enriched uranium the country’s allowed to have hand), and to keep as many as 5,500 more centrifuges than the minimum needed to run a “demonstration cascade” that would allow Iranian scientists to maintain a basic mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Even before the AP article was published on February 22, the 6,500 number had been reported in Israeli media and partly corroborated by the New York Times. But the AP includes news of a second and equally significant US concession.

The nuclear deal will apparently include a 15-year sunset, with certain restrictions on Iranian uranium enrichment lifted after 10 years and Iran permitted to keep somewhere in the neighbourhood as 10,000 centrifuges at the moment the deal expires. As the AP explains, the US had initially wanted a 20-year deal going into the latest round of talks, which means that the full, as-yet unknown set of restrictions will be in place for anywhere between one quarter one half the amount of time American negotiators were aiming for.

Why are US negotiators willing to stomach this concession? While a 10-15 year sunset is far from ideal, it at least freezes the amount of uranium Iran can possess and produce for a decade or more. It would keep Iran under a strict inspection regime and give the US and its allies a long lead-time to build support for another round of sanctions if Tehran evinced plans to further develop its nuclear program or otherwise buck the international system.

There’s another reason for accepting a short deal. As David Ignatius explained in a February 19th column in the Washington Post, the Israelis believe that the US is willing to accept a shorter agreement because the administration “wants to tie Iran’s hands for a decade until a new generation takes power there.”
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been ill recently. The Islamic Republic’s founding generation is dying out, and US negotiators hope that Iran will be a much different place in 10-15 years, with a government willing to draw down the more threatening aspects of its program even after a nuclear deal has expired. It’s probably also hoped that a nuclear agreement and Iran’s resulting reintegration with the international mainstream may even push the country towards this more pragmatic course.
But justifications have one troubling thing in common: They both make huge assumptions about the future nature of Iran’s relationship with the US and the rest of the world.

A security official stands in front of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, 1,200 km (746 miles) south of Tehran, August 21, 2010.

Under a short deal, the international community must re-implement sanctions if Iran decides to pocket its concessions and restart its program once the deal expires — something Tehran will be able to easily do, since the deal the AP describes would allow it to keep significant aspects of its nuclear infrastructure.

But it might be a huge leap to think that in 2030 the world will have any appetite for a second Iranian nuclear standoff, especially after economic and diplomatic ties have been fully restored for a decade or more under the preceding deal.

The current round of sanctions took substantial time and US political capital to implement. The global leaders of the future may wonder whether it’s worth doing it all over again to resolve an issue that they may feel has already been settled.

A short deal might also transform Iran’s nuclear calculus. When a 15 year deal expires, Tehran would be justified in figuring that it had been able to lift the international sanctions regime while being able to keep as many as 10,000 centrifuges. With sanctions gone and much of the country’s nuclear infrastructure in place, the Iranian leaders of 2030 will have little incentive to negotiate a second deal, should the US consider such a deal necessary.

The sunset clause’s assumptions about the Iranian regime’s future moderation may be wishful as well. The Islamic Republic has vacillated between reform and retrenchment for much of the past two decades. In 1997, the reformist Mohammad Khatami was elected Iran’s president. But ten years ago, the newly-elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made headlines for denying the Holocaust and expounding on the importance of destroying the state of Israel.

A short deal gambles on an opaque and highly compartmentalized regime transforming itself by a specific future date. This is a strange basis for an epochal diplomatic agreement in the Middle East or any other part of the world.

A mural in Tehran

Finally, a short nuclear deal reflects a kind of short-term thinking that’s disconcertingly out of keeping with the actual challenges of nuclear proliferation. This is partly a structural problem. Presidential administrations last between four and eight years. Nuclear weapons, however, may be with humanity for the rest of the species’ existence, and once a country goes nuclear it seldom if ever crosses back over the threshold.

The ephemeral timetable of American political leadership at least makes it comprehensible that US political leaders wouldn’t be approaching the Iranian nuclear issue on a 50-or 100-year scale. But there was a 26-year lag between the inauguration of Pakistan’s nuclear program in 1972 and its first test of a nuclear weapon in 1998. North Korea attempted its first nuclear test in 2006, 12 years after signing the Agreed Framework with the US.

Determined nuclear proliferates understand that even long delays are meaningless so long as a capability is eventually established. The only countries that have lost their nuclear weapons have either destroyed or exported them voluntarily; once you’ve got the bomb, you’ve got it for good. And Iran, which has built illicit plutonium and a uranium programs while laboring under strict international sanctions, has been incredibly determined.

A 10-15 year sunset clause seems oblivious to some of the dangers of approaching the Iranian nuclear issue as a short-term matter that can be solved in a single go — rather than an question that could dog successive US administrations for decades or even centuries to come.