Pakistan’s New “Conventional” War (Revelation 16)

Pakistan’s mini-nukes won’t guarantee security, only annihilation

Pakistan believes that dropping low-yield nukes on India will counter a conventional attack and yet the war will remain limited. This is stupid.

Pervez Hoodbhoy

That Pakistan may first use nuclear weapons in a future war with India was announced recently by Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry. Coming just two days before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s visit to the United States in the last week of October, this could be considered a reiteration of the army’s well-known stance. But, significantly, it came from the Foreign Office rather than Army General Headquarters or Strategic Plans Division. Coming from both ends of the power spectrum, this confirms that Pakistan has drastically shifted its nuclear posture.

In the late 1980s, Pakistan had viewed nuclear weapons very differently: they were the last-ditch means to deter a possible nuclear attack by India. But Pakistan now says it intends to use low-yield nuclear bombs, also called tactical nuclear weapons, to forestall the possible advance of Indian troops into Pakistan under India’s Cold Start operational doctrine.

Floated by Gen Deepak Kapoor in 2010, Cold Start calls for cutting Pakistan into “salami slices” as punishment for hosting yet another Mumbai-style terrorist attack inside India. It assumes that this limited action would not provoke a nuclear exchange. India strenuously denies that such a doctrine is official or that it has been made operational.

This denial cut no ice across the border. In 2011 a successful test of the Nasr “shoot and scoot” short-ranged missile was announced by Inter Services Public Relations, the Pakistan military’s official voice. Ensconced inside a multiple-barrelled mobile launcher, the four 60-kilometre-range missiles are said to be tipped with nuclear warheads each roughly one-tenth the size of a Hiroshima-sized weapon. Pakistan says these tactical weapons will not destabilise the current balance or pose significant command and control problems, a claim that many believe as incorrect.

Grave escalation

Pakistan is not the first country tempted by nuclear force multipliers. Nor, as claimed by ISPR, is making small warheads a significant technical feat. In fact in the 1950s, the Americans had developed even smaller ones with sub-kiloton yields, and placed them on the Davy Crockett recoilless guns deployed at forward positions along the Turkey-USSR border. The nuclear shell, with a blast yield that would be dialled as required, could be fired by just two infantrymen. This was a tempting alternative to artillery but the Americans were eventually unnerved by the prospect of two soldiers setting off a nuclear war on their own initiative. The weapon was withdrawn and decommissioned after a few years.

Wars are fought to be won, not to be lost. So how will Pakistan’s new weapons help us win a war? This fundamental question is never even touched. But let us assume their use in a post Mumbai-II scenario. For every (small) mushroom cloud on Pakistani territory, roughly a dozen or more Indian main battle tanks and armoured vehicles would be destroyed. After many mushrooms, the invasion would stop dead in its tracks and a few thousand Indian troops would be killed. Pakistan would decisively win a battle.

But then what? With the nuclear threshold crossed for the first time since 1945, India would face one of two options: to fight on or flee. Which it will choose is impossible to predict because much will depend upon the extant political and military circumstances, as well as the personalities of the military and political leaders then in office.

Official Indian policy calls for massive retaliation. In 2013, reacting officially to Pakistan, Shyam Saran, the head of the National Security Advisory Board, declared that, “India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective”.

Simply stated: whether struck by a micro-nuke or mini-nuke or city-buster, and whether on its own soil or outside its borders, India says it will consider itself under nuclear attack and react accordingly.

A tit-for-tat exchange

This is plain stupid. It violates the principle of proportionate retaliation and pushes aside the barriers to hell. But could the National Security Advisory Board be bluffing? It may be that if push comes to shove, India will not actually launch its large nuclear weapons. The sensible instinct of self-preservation might somehow prevail, and the subcontinent live to see another morning.

More likely is that in the heat of the moment, reckless passions will rage and caution will take a backseat. A tit-for-tat exchange could continue until every single weapon, small and large, is used up on either side. It is difficult to imagine how any war termination mechanism could work even if, by some miracle, the nuclear command and control centres remain intact. At the end both India and Pakistan would win, having taught the other a terrible lesson. But neither would remain habitable.
The subcontinent’s military and political leaders are not the first to believe that a nuclear war can remain limited, and perhaps even won. President Ronald Reagan puzzled over the possibility of Armageddon, uncertain whether or not God was commanding him to destroy earth or to leave it in His hands. Allen Dulles, the first CIA director, had repeatedly railed against the stupidity of those Americans, “who draw an ‘artificial’ distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons and cannot realise that atomic bombs should be treated like bullets”.

Tactical nukes will not make Pakistan more secure. This dangerous programme should be immediately abandoned. Nukes may win a battle for us but at the cost of losing Pakistan. Instead our security lies in ensuring that Pakistan’s territory is not used for launching terror attacks upon our neighbours. We must explicitly renounce the use of covert war to liberate Kashmir – a fact hidden from none and recently admitted to by Gen Pervez Musharraf.

As for India: your security depends upon adopting a less belligerent attitude towards Pakistan, stopping a menacing military build-up that is spooking all your neighbours, and realising that respect is earned through economic rather than military strength.

These are tall orders for both countries. Any optimism is currently unwarranted.

Iran Will Go Nuclear, The Question Will Be Who To Blame (Rev 15)

Benjamin Netanyahu Tells Congress Current Deal Guarantees Iran Nuclear Weapons

Jessica Schulberg

Posted: 03/03/15 12:55 PM ET Updated: 03/03/15 01:59 PM ET

WASHINGTON — Capping his most controversial trip here, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared before Congress on Tuesday morning to convince lawmakers that the current trajectory of nuclear negotiations with Iran would not prevent the nation from getting a nuclear bomb, which could ultimately destroy Israel.

He told a packed House chamber that the negotiations between Iran and six world powers known as the P5+1 — the U.S., Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France and Germany — would inevitably yield an unacceptable deal, though he didn’t offer much in the way of a realistic solution.

“That deal will not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. It would all but guarantee that Iran gets those weapons, lots of them,” he said.

As lawmakers escorted him onto the House floor, Netanyahu was greeted by cheers, whistles, and a standing ovation that lasted almost four minutes.

Netanyahu stated the moral obligation he felt to speak out about an issue that threatened the state of Israel and the Jewish people. He traced the threat back to biblical times, comparing a “powerful Persian viceroy named Haman,” who plotted to destroy the Jewish people over 2,000 years ago, to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Jewish Queen Esther ultimately thwarted Haman’s plot, according to the Bible, and saved the Jewish people. Netanyahu implied that a modern-day Esther is needed to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

And what better modern-day Esther than the U.S. Congress?

Describing Congress as “the most important legislative body in the world,” the prime minister thanked the lawmakers for their enduring support of Israel, adding, “We appreciate all that President Obama has done for Israel,” too. His recognition of Obama, who was not in attendance, was met with weak applause and a standing ovation by roughly half of those on the floor.

Netanyahu’s decision to ultimately present his remarks was in bold defiance of the Obama administration, which had said the speech was a breach of diplomatic protocol since it was orchestrated by Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Ron Dermer, without White House approval.

On Tuesday, Netanyahu said he took issue with what he called “a very bad deal” for three reasons. He said he opposes leaving Iran’s nuclear structures intact, relying on international inspectors to monitor Iran’s compliance, and the fact that an agreement would ultimately allow Iran to obtain the status of any other member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

“The foremost sponsor of global terrorism could be weeks away from having enough enriched uranium for an entire arsenal of nuclear weapons and this with full international legitimacy,” he declared.

He described an apocalyptic scenario that would follow the deal being crafted by the P5+1. “[Iran’s] voracious appetite for aggression grows with each passing year,” Netanyahu said. “Will Iran be less aggressive when sanctions are removed and its economy is stronger? How many more countries will Iran devour once sanctions are lifted?”

This, he said, would lead to the Middle East becoming a “nuclear tinderbox,” with the entire region racing toward nuclear weapons. He failed to mention that this would require most countries in the region to forfeit the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

“This deal won’t be a farewell to arms, it will be a farewell to arms control,” he said.

While the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 have focused on the scientific, technical elements of Iran’s nuclear program, Netanyahu said he required a deal based on political reform. Namely, he called for Iran to halt aggression against neighbors in the Middle East, renounce support for terrorism and stop threatening to annihilate Israel, which he described as the only democracy in the Middle East.

“If Iran wants to be treated like a normal country, let it act like a normal country,” he said, prompting another emphatic standing ovation from the audience.

Repeating the refrain that Iran needs a nuclear deal more than the U.S. does, he encouraged lawmakers to “make them want it more” by increasing sanctions.

Obama has repeatedly insisted that increased sanctions would derail the nuclear negotiations and prompt Iran to unfreeze the elements of its nuclear program that have been halted for over a year under the current interim agreement. Supporters of a Senate bill that would slam Iran with more sanctions have been lobbying for support from Democratic lawmakers in order to secure a veto-proof vote.

Though the prime minister has suggested military action against Iran in the past, he emphasized that the alternative to the current deal under negotiation is not war. “The alternative is a much better deal,” he said. “A deal that allows Israel to live, literally.”

Netanyahu received criticism both in the U.S. and in Israel, where even conservative Likud political party members feared that his speech would weaken the alliance between Israel and its top source of financial and diplomatic support.

Prior to his visit to the House floor, Netanyahu made a less controversial stop at the annual conference hosted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, where he tried to dispel the notion of a U.S.-Israeli crisis of relations.

“Our alliance is sound, our friendship is strong,” Netanyahu said Monday at AIPAC, describing the public spat between the two nations as the type of disagreement that is to be expected among family members.

With Israeli elections two weeks from now, Netanyahu’s political opponents described the speech as a campaign tactic, echoing his rhetoric that his main opponent, Isaac Herzog, is too weak to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. The speech was shown on a five-minute delay in Israel, in an effort to prevent propaganda from being broadcast in the lead-up to the elections.

Despite the boycott of nearly 60 members of Congress, the House floor was nearly full. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who had voiced reservation about the speech, ultimately decided to attend. Also spotted was the prime minister’s wife, Sara Netanyahu, who was seated next to Nobel Prize winner and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel.

In a reference to Wiesel, Netanyahu said, “I can only urge the leaders of the world not to repeat the mistakes of the past.”

In a not-so-subtle effort to discourage attendance, the White House invited House Democratic aides to a trade meeting Tuesday, scheduled at a time that would coincide with Netanyahu’s speech.

IAEA Is Not Equipped To Police An Iran Deal

The IAEA can’t guarantee any nuclear program is peaceful

By Yousaf Butt
January 8, 2015

Having failed to reach an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear accord in November, Tehran and the six world powers set a new deadline — July 1, 2015. The diplomats are to meet again on Jan. 18, though prospects for a rapid breakthrough remain thin. One big roadblock is that the International Atomic Energy Agency has set for itself the impossible goal of verifying the “purely peaceful” nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

The agency, however, cannot do this. Not for Iran — not for any country. By holding Iran to this impossible standard, the agency undercuts the likelihood of a nuclear deal.

No matter how stringent the agency’s oversight, for example, some Iranian scientist or engineer could always idly doodle bomb designs — with or without the knowledge of the government. So no one can prove that all nuclear activities in Iran are purely peaceful.

As long as actual nuclear materials are not involved, such weapons research is not against the letter of the law. Even running computer simulations of nuclear bombs would be consistent with the (rather lax) requirements of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement.

Yet after the previous round of talks ended, the head of the agency, Yukiya Amano, said on CNN that his group “cannot yet give the assurance that all nuclear activities in Iran are for peaceful purposes.” By repeating the phrase four times in the short interview, he suggested this is a key role of his agency. But it is not.

Amano also failed to mention that Iran is not unique in this. The agency cannot vouch for the purely peaceful nature of nuclear activities in Argentina, Brazil and 51 other states as well.

The agency has admitted that its “legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons-related activity is limited” unless nuclear material is involved. The organization can seek the voluntary cooperation of a signatory state to go beyond this standard. But it does not have either the legal basis or the technical capability to verify that “all nuclear activity” is peaceful in any nation.
Former U.N. arms inspector Hans Blix speaks during a lecture in Hamburg
A former agency director, Hans Blix, recently explained this point. “There could always be small things in a big geographical area that can be hidden,” Blix said, “and you can never guarantee completely that there are no undeclared activities.”

The atomic energy agency was designed as an apolitical technical organization. It was set up to take regular accounting of member states’ nuclear materials, ensuring that none is diverted to weapons use. The agency has executed this mission well. Over the decades, for example, it has repeatedly confirmedthat declared nuclear material in Iran has not been diverted to any military program.

Contact with member states is governed by bilateral safeguards agreements, whose sole purpose is to confirm this nuclear material accountancy. But nowhere does it state the agency’s job is to monitor “all nuclear activities,” or that it is responsible for ensuring the purely peaceful nature of any nation’s nuclear program.

The reason is simple: The agency also does not have the manpower, budget and specialized technical skills to carry out nuclear-weapons investigations in signatory states.

By suggesting it can prove all Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful, the agency is overselling its capabilities. There are actually few nuclear-weapons experts at the agency, and those few are banned by Iran from working on its inspections file.

So the agency’s material-accountancy experts are trying to make technical judgments on weaponization work they are unfamiliar with. And they appear to be getting things wrong.
After the latest round of talks ended in November, for example, Iran provided evidence that supported its claims that the agency’s reports describing the “possible military dimensions” of its nuclear program are “full of errors.” There may be technical merit to Tehran’s assertion.

My assessments of these charges show that either the agency is concerned about hardware that has legitimate civil (or conventional military) uses or else it seems to be doing poor technical analysis. It doesn’t help that a hawkish Washington think-tank is also painting Iran as having violated its interim nuclear agreement.

A major bone of contention between Iran and the atomic agency is about access to the military site at Parchin, where the agency has looked twice and found nothing of concern. But the agency now says an anonymous source has informed it that a conventional explosive-containment chamber — possibly relevant to nuclear weapons research – is on that site. So it wants to revisit Parchin.

Whatever happened in the past, however, U.S. Intelligence Director James Clapper has confirmed he has a “high level of confidence” that Tehran is not now weaponizing.

In addition, a former inspections director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Robert Kelly, who is a 35-year veteran of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, has found weaknesses in the agency’s reasoning. He criticized the organization’s refusal to take up Iran’s offer to inspect another site where the agency alleges Iran also may have conducted nuclear weapons-relevant research.

Blix is also skeptical of the agency’s handling of intelligence. He noted that there is “as much disinformation as information” in the reports on Iran’s alleged weaponization efforts.

The fact is that the agency is skilled at nuclear-materials accountancy, but not properly outfitted for the nuclear-weapons investigations it is being called on to conduct. Meanwhile, its rhetoric has influenced leaders worldwide that Iran deserves to be singled out because it alone has a nuclear program that cannot be proven to be purely peaceful.

Consider, for example, that President Barack Obama in his 2010 address to the United Nations General Assembly said, “Iran is the only party to the NPT that cannot demonstrate the peaceful intentions of its nuclear program.”

If deeper investigations into possible past nuclear weapons research in Iran — or any other country — are desired, the world powers should form an organization that has the technical nuclear weapons knowledge, as well as the legal mandate, to be able to do this.

The IAEA now has neither.