The Australian and American Nuclear Horns Join Forces: Daniel 7

 

Australia, U.S. Teaming to Develop High-Tech Cruise Missiles

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

The United States and Australia have joined forces to build air-launched hypersonic cruise missiles that could shift the military balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

Defense officials see hypersonics as potentially game-changing weapons. Their ability to travel at speeds greater than Mach 5 with extraordinary maneuverability could provide U.S. and allied forces a new quick-strike option capable of overwhelming enemy defenses, experts say.

The new U.S.-Australian project known as the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment, or SCIFiRE, is an Allied Prototyping Initiative that was formally announced by the two nations in December. The aim is to advance air-breathing hypersonic technologies into full-size prototypes that are cost-effective and provide “a flexible, long-range capability, culminating in flight demonstrations in operationally relevant conditions.”

“This initiative will be essential to the future of hypersonic research and development, ensuring the U.S. and our allies lead the world in the advancement of this transformational warfighting capability,” Michael Kratsios, U.S. acting undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said in a press release.

High-ranking Australian officials are also touting the bilateral effort.

“The SCIFiRE initiative is another opportunity to advance … our Air Combat Capability Program to support joint force effects to advance Australia’s security and prosperity,” said Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld, chief of the Royal Australian Air Force.

“Working with our defense scientists here in Australia and our partners in the U.S. Air Force and across the U.S. Department of Defense … we are maximizing our learning during development to better define the capabilities and needs as the system matures,” he added.

While Pentagon officials have made no bones about the fact that developing and fielding hypersonics is a top priority to keep pace with China, Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update only went so far as to say that the government’s plans to acquire advanced strike capabilities would “potentially” include hypersonic weapons.

However, the technology is also a high priority for Canberra, even though the language in the document was “somewhat vague,” said Malcolm Davis, a senior defense analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a prominent think tank.

“The way Australia does policy, I think maybe it’s a little bit more cautious in its public pronouncements than the U.S. is,” he said. “But when you look beneath the surface and you speak to people in defense, it’s a very different picture. They are very focused on this. They are very clear in where they’re going.

“The very fact that we’ve now signed this agreement with the United States a mere few months after the release of the defense strategic update should tell you that we are very committed to developing hypersonic weapons,” he added.

Concerns about China are motivating Canberra’s push for new long-range strike capabilities.

Although the defense strategic update doesn’t explicitly name China as a threat, “everyone understands that’s what the document is about,” Davis said.

The Pentagon has a number of other hypersonics projects underway such as the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, also known as ARRW or “Arrow,” which would utilize rockets to boost the systems into their glide phase.

However, SCIFiRE’s pursuit of air-breathing propulsion technology could offer an advantage by enabling hypersonic missiles to be carried by a broader array of tactical aircraft than the rocket-propelled systems.

“Scramjet technology in cruise missiles allows us to make hypersonic weapons that are cheaper and smaller — small enough to be able to go onto our fighter inventory,” U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Will Roper told reporters during a Defense Writers Group event. “As we look to [aircraft] programs like F-15EX that can carry quite a lot of weapons externally, having something that can be a hypersonic strike platform closer in creates another conundrum for an adversary.”

Davis said the systems could be carried by Australia’s F/A-18F Super Hornets, and perhaps by robotic wingmen that are being designed to accompany fighter jets into battle.

Boeing Australia has already built an Airpower Teaming System drone, and the U.S. Air Force has its own robotic wingman program known as Skyborg.

Jim Faist, the Pentagon’s director of defense research and engineering for advanced capabilities, noted that digital engineering tools will be used to explore options.

“We’re trying to build digital twins of these systems,” he said in an interview. “The hope is that through digital twins, we can accelerate the transition onto many different types of platforms. … It’s part of the design work on SCIFiRE. We’ll be looking at that ease of integration on disparate platforms that we have in the services.”

While the new cruise missiles will initially be deployed on aircraft, Davis envisions the technology evolving over time into sea-launched or ground-launched systems.

“It’s an air-launched hypersonic strike weapon for attacking ground targets or maritime targets, but it also blazes the trail for much more capable, longer-range weapons systems down the track,” Davis said.

Notably, both countries intend for the weapons to remain conventional and not be armed with nuclear warheads.

Pentagon officials see a number of benefits in partnering with Australia.

The U.S. treaty ally was previously a major contributor to a long-running joint research initiative known as the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation, or HIFiRE, program, which explored the fundamental science of the technology and its potential for next-generation aeronautical systems.

Building the new prototypes and putting them through their paces will require complex infrastructure such as wind tunnels for the development cycle as well as ranges that can accommodate full-scale flight tests, Faist noted.

Australia has “world-class” flight-testing capabilities, he added, including a facility in Woomera.

The Australians also bring a lot of know-how to the table, U.S. officials say.

“They really are excellent in the science and technology of hypersonics and … they have worked closely with us for a long time. And we like working with them,” said Robert Joseph, the U.S. Air Force’s chief scientist.

Additionally, the Asia-Pacific ally will bear an “equitable” portion of the costs of the SCIFiRE project, Faist said. “They do have tremendous investment in this program.”

Canberra’s force structure plan released in 2020 allotted $9.3 billion for high-speed long-range strike and missile defense, including hypersonic development, test and evaluation. The Pentagon is also investing billions of dollars in its hypersonics portfolio.

Faist declined to say how much funding the two sides are allocating for SCIFiRE specifically, but noted that it will be a “larger budget” R&D effort.

There is also an intention to pursue co-production of the systems, which could help drive down costs.

When might the new weapons be battle ready?

“I expect over the next few months as we share our technical data we’ll have a better sense of how quickly we’ll be able to get to fielding, but I’m not predicting long,” Roper told reporters in December.

“Scramjet [propulsion technology development] is moving faster than I expected,” Roper said. “I predicted it would take longer to get those hypersonic engines matured. And thanks to some stellar approaches to manufacturing, the acceleration period is compelling us to go ahead and start thinking through future programs of record.”

The ARRW program started in 2017, and production could kick off as early as 2021, he noted. “I think we can go just as fast on scramjet.”

Faist said flight testing will be completed by 2025, but officials hope to accelerate that timeline.

For Australia, “the aim is to get this sort of capability operational in this decade, because this is the decade of danger where we are going to face the greatest risks from China,” Davis said.

It’s possible that a new weapon could be ready in the next few years, he said.

“We’ve been doing this research now for some time in the university sector,” he noted. “We’ve got that deep background, that foundation of scientific research and development and understanding, and I think that should hopefully accelerate the process of them taking that from essentially a science experiment to an operational piece of capability much more quickly than if we were starting afresh now.”

Steps are being taken to help the technology make it across the so-called “Valley of Death” between R&D and large-scale production.

Faist said there is a commitment by both nations to transition to a program of record if the project is successful.

Although Faist’s office launched the Allied Prototyping Initiative, the Air Force’s Life Cycle Management Center and program executive officer for weapons are responsible for executing SCIFiRE. The same office will also be responsible for overseeing the follow-on effort once the prototyping and flight testing wrap up, Faist noted.

“That was the other part of the decision on where to do this program,” he said. “It made sense to really build up on the Air Force program management side the internal ability to manage and execute on SCIFiRE, so that then the same team can move out on the program of record.”

Faist said source selection for SCIFiRE had not been completed, but generally speaking the Pentagon would like to have multiple suppliers. A follow-on program of record would be re-competed, he noted.

The weapons will likely be purchased in large quantities on par with other tactical air-launched cruise missiles, Faist said.

“Typically you’re going to get a higher number of production buys on these because of affordability,” he said. “This is a big game-changer for a lot of providers to get into the hypersonic business area, whether as a prime or a supplier.”

The Growing Australian Nuclear Horn: Daniel 7

Australia, US to develop hypersonic missiles to counter China

Australia’s defence minister says ‘game-changing’ project with US will help deter aggression against its interests.

Australia and the United States will jointly develop hypersonic cruise missiles, the Australian defence minister announced on Tuesday, pledging to invest in “advanced capabilities” that will give the country’s military “more options to deter aggression” against its interests.

Both China and Russia are developing similar missiles.

The weapons are capable of travelling at more than five times the speed of sound and the combination of speed, manoeuvrability and altitude makes them difficult to track and intercept.

Linda Reynolds, the Australian defence minister, called the bilateral project with the US a “game-changing capability”, but did not reveal the cost of developing the missiles or when they would be operational.

“Investing in capabilities that deter actions against Australia also benefits our region, our allies and our security partners,” she said.

“We remain committed to peace and stability in the region and an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”

The United States’ Acting Under Secretary of Defense Michael Kratsios said the project, officially known as the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE), builds on 15 years of collaboration between the US and Australian military.

“This initiative will be essential to the future of hypersonic research and development, ensuring the US and our allies lead the world in the advancement of this transformational warfighting capability,” he said in a statement.

 

Australia had set aside up to 9.3 billion Australian dollars ($6.8bn) this year for high-speed, long-range missile defence systems, including hypersonic research.

In July, Australia said it would boost defence spending by 40 percent over the next 10 years to acquire longer-range strike capabilities across air, sea and land as it broadens its military focus from the Pacific to the Indo-Pacific region.

 

Australia’s collaboration with the US on missile development, however, could inflame tensions with China.

The relationship between both countries has been tense after Australia discovered what it said were Chinese influence campaigns, and has deteriorated further this year after Canberra asked for an inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 pandemic.

Beijing has introduced a string of economic sanctions on Australian goods, and relations hit a new low on Monday after a senior Chinese official posted a fake image of an Australian soldier holding a blood-covered knife to the throat of an Afghan child.

China has deployed, or is close to deploying, hypersonic systems armed with conventional warheads, according to defence analysts.

Russia deployed its first hypersonic nuclear-capable missiles last year, while the Pentagon, which tested a similar hypersonic missile in 2017, has a goal of fielding hypersonic war-fighting capabilities in the early to mid-2020s.

The Sydney Morning Herald newspaper said on Tuesday that Australia hopes to begin testing prototypes of the air-launched, long-range missiles within months.

The hypersonic missiles will be designed to be carried by the Australian air force’s existing fleet of aircraft including Growlers, Super Hornets, Joint Strike Fighters as well as unmanned aircraft including drones, the newspaper reported.

The Australian nuclear horn: Daniel 7

315 nuclear bombs and ongoing suffering: the shameful history of nuclear testing in Australia and the Pacific

November 2, 2020 2.07pm EST

AP/AAP

November 2, 2020 2.07pm EST

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people should be aware this article contains the name of a deceased person.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons received its 50th ratification on October 24, and will therefore come into force in January 2021. A historic development, this new international law will ban the possession, development, testing, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately the nuclear powers — the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Russia, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea — haven’t signed on to the treaty. As such, they are not immediately obliged to help victims and remediate contaminated environments, but others party to the treaty do have these obligations. The shifting norms around this will hopefully put ongoing pressure on nuclear testing countries to open records and to cooperate with accountability measures.

For the people of the Pacific region, particularly those who bore the brunt of nuclear weapons testing during the 20th century, it will bring a new opportunity for their voices to be heard on the long-term costs of nuclear violence. The treaty is the first to enshrine enduring commitments to addressing their needs.

From 1946, around 315 nuclear tests were carried out in the Pacific by the US, Britain and France. These nations’ largest ever nuclear tests took place on colonised lands and oceans, from Australia to the Marshall Islands, Kiribati to French Polynesia.

The impacts of these tests are still being felt today.

All nuclear tests cause harm

Studies of nuclear test workers and exposed nearby communities around the world consistently show adverse health effects, especially increased risks of cancer.

The total number of global cancer deaths as a result of atmospheric nuclear test explosions has been estimated at between 2 million and 2.4 million, even though these studies used radiation risk estimates that are now dated and likely underestimated the risk.

The number of additional non-fatal cancer cases caused by test explosions is similar. As confirmed in a large recent study of nuclear industry workers in France, the UK and US, the numbers of radiation-related deaths due to other diseases, such as heart attacks and strokes, is also likely to be similar.

The British conducted seven nuclear test explosions in Maralinga, South Australia. But there they also did over 600 ‘minor’ trials for bomb development, responsible for most of the ongoing contamination. NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA/AAP

‘We all got crook’

Britain conducted 12 nuclear test explosions in Australia between 1952 and 1957, and hundreds of minor trials of radioactive and toxic materials for bomb development up to 1963. These caused untold health problems for local Aboriginal people who were at the highest risk of radiation. Many of them were not properly evacuated, and some were not informed at all.

We may never know the full impact of these explosions because in many cases, as the Royal Commission report on British Nuclear Tests in Australia found in 1985: “the resources allocated for Aboriginal welfare and safety were ludicrous, amounting to nothing more than a token gesture”. But we can listen to the survivors.

The late Yami Lester directly experienced the impacts of nuclear weapons. A Yankunytjatjara elder from South Australia, Yami was a child when the British tested at Emu Field in October 1953. He recalled the “Black Mist” after the bomb blast:

It wasn’t long after that a black smoke came through. A strange black smoke, it was shiny and oily. A few hours later we all got crook, every one of us. We were all vomiting; we had diarrhoea, skin rashes and sore eyes. I had really sore eyes. They were so sore I couldn’t open them for two or three weeks. Some of the older people, they died. They were too weak to survive all the sickness. The closest clinic was 400 miles away.

His daughter, Karina Lester, is an ambassador for the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons in Australia, and continues to be driven by her family’s experience. She writes:

For decades now my family have campaigned and spoken up against the harms of nuclear weapons because of their firsthand experience of the British nuclear tests […] Many Aboriginal people suffered from the British nuclear tests that took place in the 1950s and 1960s and many are still suffering from the impacts today.

More than 16,000 Australian workers were also exposed. A key government-funded study belatedly followed these veterans over an 18-year period from 1982. Despite the difficulties of conducting a study decades later with incomplete data, it found they had 23% higher rates of cancer and 18% more deaths from cancers than the general population.

An additional health impact in Pacific island countries is the toxic disease “ciguatera”, caused by certain microscopic plankton at the base of the marine food chain, which thrive on damaged coral. Their toxins concentrate up the food chain, especially in fish, and cause illness and occasional deaths in people who eat them. In the Marshall Islands, Kiritimati and French Polynesia, outbreaks of the disease among locals have been associated with coral damage caused by nuclear test explosions and the extensive military and shipping infrastructure supporting them.

Pacific survivors of nuclear testing haven’t been focused solely on addressing their own considerable needs for justice and care; they’ve been powerful advocates that no one should suffer as they have ever again, and have worked tirelessly for the eradication of nuclear weapons. It’s no surprise independent Pacific island nations are strong supporters of the new treaty, accounting for ten of the first 50 ratifications.

Pacific island nations make up 10 of the first 50 countries to ratify the treaty. Laisa Nainoka/Youngsolwara, Author provided (No reuse)

Negligence and little accountability

Some nations that have undertaken nuclear tests have provided some care and compensation for their nuclear test workers; only the US has made some provisions for people exposed, though only for mainland US residents downwind of the Nevada Test Site. No testing nation has extended any such arrangement beyond its own shores to the colonised and minority peoples it put in harm’s way. Nor has any testing nation made fully publicly available its records of the history, conduct and effects of its nuclear tests on exposed populations and the environment.

These nations have also been negligent by quickly abandoning former test sites. There has been inadequate clean-up and little or none of the long-term environmental monitoring needed to detect radioactive leakage from underground test sites into groundwater, soil and air. One example among many is the Runit concrete dome in the Marshall Islands, which holds nuclear waste from US testing in the 1940s and 50s. It’s increasingly inundated by rising sea levels, and is leaking radioactive material.

Runit Dome in the Marshall Islands is leaking nuclear waste from US testing in the 1940s and 50s. US Defense Special Weapons Agency/Wikimedia Commons

The treaty provides a light in a dark time. It contains the only internationally agreed framework for all nations to verifiably eliminate nuclear weapons.

It’s our fervent hope the treaty will mark the increasingly urgent beginning of the end of nuclear weapons. It is our determined expectation that our country will step up. Australia has not yet ratified the treaty, but the bitter legacy of nuclear testing across our country and region should spur us to join this new global effort.

Why Australia Will Go Nuclear (Daniel 7)

Defence update signals Australia’s waning faith in US extended deterrence | The Strategist

Rod Lyon

Australia’s defence strategic update is not recommended reading for the faint-hearted. It depicts a starkly divided world in which the prospects of conflict are growing. In this post, I’ll explore only one small part of the document, namely paragraph 2.22. It contains only three sentences. But those sentences carry weighty implications.

Let’s begin with the paragraph itself:

Only the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia. But it is the Government’s intent that Australia take greater responsibility for our own security. It is therefore essential that the ADF grow its self-reliant ability to deliver deterrent effects.

If the first sentence sparks a sense of déjà vu, that’s because readers have—probably—seen it before. It’s a sentence lifted from the 2016 defence white paper. There it was part of paragraph 5.20, outlining the benefits which flowed to Australia from its close association with the US:

Australia’s security is underpinned by the ANZUS Treaty, United States extended deterrence and access to advanced United States technology and information. Only the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia. The presence of United States military forces plays a vital role in ensuring security across the Indo-Pacific and the global strategic and economic weight of the United States will be essential to the continued effective functioning of the rules-based global order. [Emphasis added.]

In its 2016 role, the sentence underlined the contribution made to Australia’s security by US extended nuclear deterrence.

The 2013 defence white paper, released by the Gillard Labor government, contained a similar reference, although not in exactly the same terms. Paragraph 3.41 of that document reads:

Finally, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia. Australia is confident in the continuing viability of extended nuclear deterrence under the Alliance, while strongly supporting ongoing efforts towards global nuclear disarmament.

Similarly, the Rudd government’s 2009 defence white paper made clear the importance of US extended nuclear deterrence—and of its possible failure. See paragraph 6.34:

It also means that, for so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia. Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance. That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.

So the first sentence of paragraph 2.22 of the 2020 update seems to stand duty as a reference point for a long tradition of Australian acknowledgement of the importance to Australia of US extended deterrence. Remember the metric involved here: what offers ‘effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia’? Unsurprisingly, only US conventional and nuclear capabilities offer such an assurance. So at this point the reader of the update might reasonably expect a form of words underlining the growing importance of US extended deterrence in more difficult times. Right?

Wrong. There’s nothing in the update about US extended deterrence—which is hard to interpret as anything other than signalling by omission. The update, in short, suggests a loss of faith in US extended deterrence among Australian policymakers. We might speculate about the causes of that. President Donald Trump’s eccentricities have undoubtedly been aggravated by a longer-term shifting global balance. But what matters is the outcome. In a document freighted with growing threats, extended deterrence is horribly absent.

Indeed, let’s go back to paragraph 2.22. The second and third sentences head off in a different direction. The second sentence even begins with the word ‘but’, one of those conjunctions that ties the subsequent thoughts to the previous judgement:

But it is the Government’s intent that Australia take greater responsibility for our own security. It is therefore essential that the ADF grow its self-reliant ability to deliver deterrent effects.

It’s hard to read those sentences as anything other than a claim for greater self-reliance in the deterrence of nuclear threats against Australia. Further, it’s hard to accept that the government believes that an Australia armed solely with conventional weapons can deter an adversarial nuclear-armed great power. After all, it has just said it doesn’t believe that even a US armed solely with conventional weapons can deter such threats: go back and read the first sentence again.

What’s the conclusion? A simple—and tempting—conclusion is that either there’s been some grievous infelicities of meaning in the drafting process, or the update is an attempt to signal the possibility of a future nuclear-armed Australia. But that conclusion places a great deal of weight on three sentences, and on what they don’t say as much as on what they do. The premise of a future Australian nuclear arsenal shouldn’t be based on words that aren’t there.

I suspect something more complex is happening. An Australian government, busily revalidating both the importance of deterrence in national strategic thinking, and the importance of offensive strike to deterrence, is probably arguing here that improving conventional technologies, allied to more capable missile defences, do offer some prospects for offsetting nuclear threats.

That’s a challenging argument to unpack—especially in circumstances where we’re uncertain about how much we can rely on US assistance. Still, those complexities seem to offer a more credible explanation for paragraph 2.22 than the simple, tempting one

The Australian Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

Deal for US to store weapons at Tindal was made years ago

Chris McLennan

June 3 2020 – 10:48AM

TOUCH DOWN: United States Air Force 90th Fighter Squadron Commander Lieutenant Colonel David Skalicky and Wing Commander Andrew Tatnell at Tindal in 2017.

Several residents have questioned the Katherine Times on the building of magazines at Tindal.

What ordnance the magazines might contain is being kept secret.

The weapons storage areas and a new jet “fuel farm” at Tindal have been planned for more than a decade as part of joint training programs between the US and Australia.

While COVID-19 restrictions have stopped most joint exercises this year, the Tindal base’s runway is being extended so KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport can use it and it can accept bigger US military aircraft like B-52 Stratofortress bombers.

Other “joint initiatives” for Tindal are also being planned, a Defence Department spokeswoman said.

The United States Naval Facilities Command Pacific has announced a $15.01 million contract for the building of earth covered magazines at Tindal.

The magazines “will be used by the US in accordance with Force Posture Agreement”, the spokeswoman said.

“The project will construct two Earth Covered Magazines and a production area that will include a munitions assembly conveyor shelter to support United States and Australian military joint training activities.”

In a prepared statement late last week, the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific announced the building program.

“The NAVFAC Pacific Team is excited to extend our strategic partnership with the Australian Government and US Air Force three hours south of Darwin to the city of Tindal,” NAVFAC Pacific operations officer Capt. Tres Meek said.

“United in purpose, we will deliver increased warfighting capability through our trusted construction community in the defense of freedom. Let’s start building!

“This Asia-Pacific Resiliency project provides adequately sized, structurally sound, and safe munitions storage capacity in the form of earth covered magazines.

“This project supports plans outlined by the bilateral United States/Australia Force Posture Agreement and enables Bilateral Enhanced Air Cooperation missions.”

The Force Posture Agreement is a post ANZUS military treaty signed between the US and Australia in 2014 following an announcement made during the visit of then US President Barack Obama and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard in November 2011.

Then PM Gillard said: “… we have agreed (to) greater access by US military aircraft to the Royal Australian Air Force facilities in our country’s north. This will involve more frequent movements of US military aircraft into and out of northern Australia.”

More than $1.6 billion is being spent upgrading Australia’s premier air base in the north just outside Katherine in the NT.

“It will mean that we are postured to better respond together, along with other partners in the Asia Pacific, to any regional contingency, including the provision of humanitarian assistance and dealing with natural disasters,” Ms Gillard said.

The Force Posture documents sate: “With full respect for Australian sovereignty and the laws of Australia, United States Forces and United States Contractors shall have unimpeded access to and use of Agreed Facilities and Areas for activities undertaken in connection with this Agreement. Such activities may include: training, transit, support, and related activities; refuelling of aircraft; bunkering of vessels; temporary maintenance of vehicles, vessels, and aircraft; temporary accommodation of personnel; communications; prepositioning of equipment, supplies, and materiel; deploying forces and materiel; and such other activities as the Parties may agree.”

In regards to what the Tindal magazines might contain.

“Procedures on what capabilities visiting forces may or may not have in Australia is covered by government procedures,” the Defence spokeswoman said.

“Defence will continue to comply with government interpretation of Australia’s obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the non-proliferation treaty.”

Building of the Tindal magazines are expected to complete by February 2022.

The China Nuclear Horn and the Race to the End

China nuclear threat: US expert fears ‘unnecessary arms race’ | World | News | Express.co.uk

PUBLISHED: 08:00, Sat, Apr 25, 2020

Frank O’Donnell fears a “dangerous arms race” (Image: GETTY)

THE increasingly fractious relationship between China and the United States, with Washington last week accusing Beijing of carrying out a series of nuclear tests last year,could result in an unpredictable and dangerous arms race between the world’s three superpowers, an US expert has warned.

Frank O’Donnell, a nonresident fellow in the Stimson Center South Asia Program, was speaking after a report published by the US State Department about possible breaches of a “zero yield” standard for test blasts in related to activities at China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site throughout the course of 2019. The document claims: “China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round, its use of explosive containment chambers, extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur and a lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities raise concerns regarding its adherence to the zero yield standard.”

China subsequently denied the allegations, with foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian insisting his country was committed to a moratorium on nuclear tests.

He added: “China has always adopted a responsible attitude, earnestly fulfilling the international obligations and promises it has assumed.

“The US criticism of China is entirely groundless, without foundation, and not worth refuting.”

The report suggested tests of the nature outlined in the report would represent a breach of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Both nations have signed the CTBT, but neither has so far ratified it.

Mr O’Donnell is sceptical about the claims outlined in the US report. He told Express.co.uk: “China’s aggressive expansionism in the East and South China Seas and continuing lack of transparency around the origins and current status of coronavirus infections within its borders remain concerns for global security.

“However, there is still no solid proof that China is changing its positions on the different issue of its nuclear policy and posture.

“In the US State Department’s recent report, strongly alleging that China has resumed supercritical nuclear testing at the Lop Nur facility, the supporting evidence provided for this allegation renders it little more than conjecture.

“In sum, the evidence presented is that, firstly, the facility has been recently augmented, including a claim that this includes ‘explosive containment chambers’.

“However, the terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty permit subcritical explosive tests, which “simulate aspects of nuclear explosions using chemical explosives.

“But since a subcritical mass of plutonium (or a surrogate material) is used, no actual nuclear explosion occurs.”

Mr O’Donnell pointed out: “The US, Russia, UK, and probably China have all conducted subcritical tests.

“It is telling that the US State Department reference to ‘explosive containment chambers’ does not specify the truth that such chambers could be utilised for such subcritical testing, and that such activities are consistent with regular practice by other nuclear weapons states, not least the US.”

Mr O’Donnell added: “If the Trump administration is truly concerned with Chinese nuclear testing activities and transparency, it should ratify the CTBT, as China has stated that it will ratify the Treaty following US ratification.

“Following this ratification, it could seek to negotiate an agreement with China and Russia regarding inspections of test facilities to determine that only subcritical tests are being conducted.

“That the US State Department seeks to generate these allegations, instead of pursuing these specific arms control and confidence-building initiatives as part of its diplomacy toward these states, indicates that it seeks to generate a general aura of a mushrooming Chinese nuclear threat.

“This serves to justify its recent departure from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, probable looming departure from the New START Treaty, and continuation of an unnecessary nuclear arms race with China and Russia.”

China Fires Back At Babylon the Great

‘Inconsistent with facts’: China hits back at US accusation of ‘lowering the standards’ of nuclear non-proliferation

24 Apr, 2020 12:37

FILE PHOTO: The construction of a nuclear reactor at the Taishan Nuclear Power Plant in Taishan, China. October 2013. © Reuters / Bobby Yip

China’s foreign ministry has slammed the US for “politicizing” the way other nations work on civilian nuclear power projects.Washington had earlier claimed China is undermining global non-proliferation safeguards.

“In recent years, the United States has been using various pretexts to discredit and suppress the normal cooperation in nuclear energy between other countries,” the ministry’s spokesperson, Geng Shuang, told reporters at a daily briefing on Friday.

Some senior US officials even publicly stated that cooperation in nuclear energy should be used as a geopolitical tool. China strongly opposes this way of politicizing cooperation in nuclear energy.

Geng was answering a question about the recent policy report by the US Nuclear Fuel Working Group, whose members include Energy Secretary Dan Brouillette and Interior Secretary David Bernhardt. In their report, published on Thursday, the officials accused Beijing and Moscow of not holding their trading partners to the “same high standards” as the US does, and of using “lower standards as a selling point.” It was further claimed that Chinese and Russian companies allow foreign countries to import nuclear technology “without the same non-proliferation safeguards required by the United States and its allies.”

Dismissing the report’s claims as “completely inconsistent with the facts,” Geng said that Beijing has always promoted the use of civilian nuclear power in a “responsible manner.”

He stressed that China will continue to “strictly abide by its international non-proliferation commitments” and to conduct cooperation with foreign states “on the basis of mutual respect and to mutual benefit.”

Last week, the US State Department expressed concern over China allegedly violating the ‘zero-yield’ standard during its underground nuclear tests in 2019. ‘Zero yield’ refers to a nuclear test without an explosive chain reaction that would be similar to the one caused by a nuclear warhead. Beijing said that these allegations were “entirely groundless” and reiterated that the country is fulfilling all of its obligations under international law.

Why Australia Will Go Nuclear (Daniel 7)

Op-Ed: What is Paul Dibb’s real question about Australia’s defence?

KEY ENABLERS

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08 APRIL 2020

By: Dr John Bruni

In the 15 March edition of The National Interest, renowned Australian strategist Professor Paul Dibb, AM, in his piece, ‘How Australia Can Defend Itself Against China’s Military’, raised two main points – both of which pose the question – what is meant by ‘Australian defence?’ asks Dr John Bruni of SAGE International.

The centrality of ANZUS

It is a given that Australia has long sheltered under the ANZUS Treaty in order to ward off opportunistic military forays against the country’s national interests in its immediate region. When ANZUS was founded in 1951, the types of threat Australia worried about were communist bloc or aligned countries seeking to harm Australia in traditional military ways.

Back then there was no cyber war, no drones, no battlefield robots, virtual or augmented reality. The high frontier of space, so central to all military operations today and to international commerce, would not be conquered until the 1956 launch of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik satellite.

Most military planners believed that war, any war would resemble World War II, but with the possible addition of nuclear weapons.

Between 1951 and 2020, the price all Australian governments have and continue to pay to maintain ANZUS is to lend support to American military activities.

As recent history has shown, Australian governments have lent their support to American military operations even if these were deemed unpopular by the Australian public. ANZUS is Australia’s equivalent of nuclear deterrence. No belligerent country could ever be entirely sure if the US would intervene on Australia’s behalf in a state-on-state war.

For 69 years this strategic ambiguity has served Canberra well.

However, since the election of Donald Trump as President in 2016, old certainties are less clear as the US is seen to be moving toward a more transactional and less sentimental approach in foreign policy.

As the US is currently in an election year, four more years of a Trump presidency would certainly present problems to all treaty allies of the US. However, the likely alternative of a Joe Biden presidency does give some hope for a partial restoration of old alliance values and solidarity.

For Australia, a Biden presidency might jolt the country out of its current strategic navel-gazing and return it to the country’s more natural role of strategic complacency.

Many would breathe a sigh of relief were this to happen, but the one silver lining of President Trump has been in making Australian policymakers think hard about what Australia’s role in the world would be like without any guarantee of US strategic commitment.

The Dibb prognosis

According to Dibb, at the crux of his article are two major points, firstly:

“A $1.1 billion upgrade to the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Tindal, which is about 300 kilometres south of Darwin, to lengthen the runway so that US B-52 strategic bombers as well as our own KC-30 air-to-air refuelling aircraft can operate from there.”

And secondly:

“The announcement by the US State Department that Australia has been cleared, at a cost of about $1.4 billion, to purchase 200 AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles (LRASM), which can be fired from our F/A-18 Super Hornets and the F-35s when they are delivered.”

Dibb’s piece is interesting in that central to these two points assumes that whoever the incumbent is in the White House, post-November 2020, Australia’s national security policy will maintain a strongly American focus.

The problem for Australian policymakers is that in this new age we are living through, it won’t matter how pro-American the Canberra elite is, if a US administration does not think an Australian strategic problem aligns with American interests – Australia may not have Washington’s support.

Furthermore, there is an assumption that the presence of USAF aircraft on Australian soil would be enough of a deterrent to prevent any form of Chinese or Russian hybridised military action against Australian interests along archipelagic south-east Asia and the south Pacific.

But these foreign, though allied, aircraft will not be under the sovereign direction of the RAAF or the Australian government. They will be under the authority of the US government. Here the decision to use them in support of Australian defensive measures stops with Washington.

While the signalling of American strategic support for Australia is important to keep the ANZUS Treaty relevant, for the Australian government, American support should never be taken for granted.

After all, if NATO and its much-vaunted ‘Article 5’ whereby an attack on one is considered an attack on all is currently being questioned among many NATO member states – ANZUS – which does not have a similar mechanism for automatic mutual support, should give Australian authorities pause for thought.

So, let us look at the known strategic threats to Australia.

The Lucky Country

From a state-on-state level, Australia remains the lucky country. Canberra has good, pragmatic relations with many regional states. Australia’s position as a farm and a mine for Chinese industry means that it is highly unlikely that the PRC would deliberately use force against Australia under any rational circumstance.

However, as an American staging base, Australian territory hosting US facilities may come under PRC attack should the destruction of these facilities be accorded a high priority by Beijing. This would only happen should a conventional war break out and rapidly escalate between Chinese and American forces over touchstone issues like Taiwan or the South China Sea.

For more peripheral hybridised operations directed against Australian interests, potentially sparked by non-state actors along Australia’s arc of strategic interest, from archipelagic south-east Asia to the south Pacific, the upgrading of RAAF Tindal to host US strategic bombers is less about Australian defence and more about America building-up power projection redundancy should its forward positions in South Korea and Japan decline for political reasons.

Does this add to or diminish Australian security? It is a polarising topic.

For defenders of ANZUS, any increase in US personnel flowing through to Australia increases the country’s defensibility under any and all circumstances. This is the public line of their argument, and it makes sense to maintain the close US-Australian relationship since being close to the US does give Australia access to critical technologies and intelligence.

Making Australia relevant to America therefore is a rational action to take in spite of any known gaps. From an Australian perspective, the commitment of ‘penny packet’ forces to protracted and unpopular American military missions to the Middle East or elsewhere is a small price to pay for keeping Australia as a steadfast ally foremost in the minds of American politicians and policymakers.

Fear of abandonment is strong among the Canberra political and policy-making elite.

For sceptics of ANZUS, any increase in US personnel or facilities in Australia limits our foreign policy options and damages the Australian brand among countries whom it trades with but who are not enamoured with US strategic and foreign policy.

Furthermore, sceptics have a far darker assessment of America’s commitment to Australian defence. For them, the US will do what the US does in order for it to advance its own interests – even at the expense of its ‘enabling’ allies.

But like with most polarising topics, the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. And it is up to Canberra to navigate between its sovereign needs and requirements and those of its primary ally and trading partners. Not an easy task by any stretch. Made worse by the fact that Australia has no clear strategic narrative.

So, upgrading RAAF Tindal for USAF strategic bombers can be seen both as a net strategic gain for Australia and a net detriment, depending on where one sits on the ANZUS Treaty.

Increasing the base’s capacity to host domestic KC-30 air-to-air refuelling aircraft is important, not so much for the sovereign defence of Australia though there is that element to it, but for in-flight refuelling of RAAF fighter planes escorting USAF strategic bombers in long-range missions designed to ‘signal intent’ or to conduct harassment of PRC maritime traffic in the South China Sea.

The second point, the purchase of 200 AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles again can be seen as a way for the RAAF to better defend Australia against seaborne conventional naval threats.

Is this purchase based on a need to hedge against localised naval developments along Australia’s strategic arc?

Yes, but only at the very outside of likely scenarios. A country always has to hedge against fast-changing circumstances. But modernising and building a fleet of warships and fighter planes to alter the regional balance of power and threaten Australia is not something that any state in south-east Asia or the south Pacific can do easily, stealthily or affordably.

And, whatever these states have in their existing orders of battle are neither of the numbers nor of the quality that Australia has to worry about.

So, the purchase of these long-range anti-ship missiles again is more likely to keep the RAAF technologically up to fighting alongside the USAF in anti-PRC missions should an outbreak of war take place between China and the US.

And what of the threat from China to Australia? Is it a military threat or something else?

The China question? 

China has run intelligence operations against the Australian government by attempting to buy influence through the country’s politicians and political parties. It has run cyber operations against Australian businesses.

But China lacks the capacity for sustained long-range probing flights or a sustained naval presence in or near Australian waters. Much of China’s military is deployed close to its coastline and to countries that are in close geographic proximity to it.

Long-range (naval) missions are usually limited to occasional short-duration forays towards Alaska or Queensland. The country’s strategic ballistic missile fleet is also limited in size and capacity.

The level of threat to Australia from Chinese physical assault is therefore small, but manageable. The threat China poses to American facilities in Australia is a larger concern. And it is a concern that squarely puts Australian territory in harm’s way.

For instance, a Chinese ballistic missile strike against Pine Gap with either conventional high explosive, nuclear or EMP warheads could degrade or destroy a significant American intelligence outpost in a relatively unpopulated part of Australia.

Casualties would be low, but the facility’s loss would cause immeasurable shock to the US and Australian governments. Operationally, much of Pine Gap’s intelligence-gathering capacities might be re-routed to other American facilities, however, if the US were fighting Chinese forces, in a fast-moving war where real-time and near real-time intelligence is of the essence, the loss of Pine Gap would hurt US warfighters and their allies.

A similar attack on RAAF Tindal would put the Australian government in an even greater quandary. While Pine Gap is a US facility on Australian soil, RAAF Tindal is a sovereign Australian military facility, hosting American strategic air assets. How would Canberra react to the loss of this critical forward base in northern Australia?

If Australia were actively assisting American forces in a hot war with the Chinese over the South China Sea, RAAF Tindal might be considered a viable target by Chinese strategic missile forces, eager to roll back the reach of American aircraft.

Returning to Dibb’s two points, successive Australian governments have made it clear that it sees its continuing interest in keeping the US as the indispensable strategic partner, while at the same time keeping the PRC close as an economic partner.

The peculiar nature of this balancing act is not lost on some commentators who have observed that in this case, you can’t have your cake and eat it too. Australia will never abandon the US for fear that no other Western country will be in a position to replace the US as Australia’s senior strategic ally.

China on the other hand is a ‘work-in-progress’. With China, Australia can make hay while the sun shines until the PRC milch-cow dries up or changes into something completely different. It is dispensable.

Made all the more because of the PRC’s cultural and political divergences from Australia in its human rights record, its politics and the heavy-handed social practices of the CCP.

Unless or until Australia’s politics and society adapt to CCP norms and conditions, a highly unlikely event,these divergences will never be breached making communist ruled China a country to be economically exploited but never truly trusted.

So, can Australia defend itself against the Chinese military? This is perhaps the wrong question.

For contemporary Australia, the PRC is an intelligence threat first and foremost.

The country’s efforts should therefore be marshalled to counter PRC influence operations, commercial espionage, cyber attacks and spying activities. This would make Australia safe from Chinese encroachments and manipulations.

Australia’s geographic distance is still the country’s greatest strategic asset.

The fact that China needs Australian raw materials and agricultural products to fuel and feed its industries makes Australia indispensable in keeping the Chinese economic juggernaut and autocracy alive.

Ironically in spite of the great leverage it holds over the PRC, Australia in a very tepid way believes itself to be a ‘middle power’ but usually acts like a small power.

If on the other hand the question is asked, can Australia help defend American interests located in Australia against the Chinese military? This is another point entirely and will depend on whether the Chinese military is actively targeting American facilities in Australia and Australian sovereign facilities harbouring American strategic assets.

If we assume that this is the case, then lengthening RAAF Tindal’s runway and purchasing 200 long-range anti-ship missiles will only be relevant to Australia’s ‘defence’ if it is part of a planned American offensive against the PRC.

And that can only mean that an Australian government’s ability to choose not to engage in such a US offensive is highly constrained, further undermining Canberra’s exercise of sovereignty in its own defence.

If Australia’s defence is really part of an American offensive posture, Dibb’s points may make Australia capable of slipstreaming into a planned US attack on Chinese forces. It does not mean that Australia’s sovereign defensive capabilities are any stronger because:

1. Australia is acting as a facilitator and enabler of American power in the Indo-Pacific.
2. US bases on Australian territory expose Australia to the risk of a pre-emptive Chinese ballistic missile strike against them, should regional tensions between Washington and Beijing escalate to open warfare.

What people are now suggesting is that Canberra invest in Patriot anti-ballistic missile/anti-aircraft batteries in order to plug the obvious gap in American military asset protection in Australia. The central question becomes, who should be responsible for this? The Australian or American governments?

SAGE International Australia (SIA) is an independent, not-for-profit think tank dedicated to deepening the understanding of global strategic and political issues.

SAGE International Australia aims to advance knowledge on international security trends and conflict resolution by providing high-quality research, analysis and policy debate and advice. SIA aims to deepen conversation with government, academia, civil society and the media on key political and security issues that contributes to local, national and global stability, peace and prosperity.

Dr John Bruni, author of ‘On Weapons Decisions’, is the founder and chief executive of SAGE International Australia, a South Australia-based online think tank and consultancy operating out of Adelaide since 2008. 

Dr Bruni is also on the board of directors of the Royal United Services Institute of Defence & Security Studies Australia (RUSIDSS-A), an institution he has been involved with for well over two decades.

Dr Bruni has long-term experience in teaching international relations, politics and security. He is a researcher and analyst who has worked for IHS Jane’s, London and the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies & Research (ECSSR), Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Dr Bruni has written extensively on national security and defence related issues including the Northeast Asian balance of power. He is also member of the MAST Technical Conference Committee.

The Raging China Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

China may have conducted low-level nuclear test blasts, U.S. says | Article [AMP] | Reuters

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – China may have secretly set off low-level underground nuclear test explosions despite claiming to observe an international pact banning such blasts, the U.S. State Department said in a report on Wednesday that could fuel U.S.-Chinese tensions.

The finding, first reported by the Wall Street Journal, may worsen ties already strained by U.S. charges that the global COVID-19 pandemic resulted from Beijing’s mishandling of a 2019 outbreak of the coronavirus in the city of Wuhan.

U.S. concerns about Beijing’s possible breaches of a “zero yield” standard for test blasts have been prompted by activities at China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site throughout 2019, the State Department report said.

Zero yield refers to a nuclear test in which there is no explosive chain reaction of the type ignited by the detonation of a nuclear warhead.

“China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round, its use of explosive containment chambers, extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur and a lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities … raise concerns regarding its adherence to the zero yield standard,” the report said, without providing evidence of a low-yield test.

Beijing’s lack of transparency included blocking data transmissions from sensors linked to a monitoring center operated by the international agency that verifies compliance with a treaty banning nuclear test explosions.

The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) allows activities designed to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons.

A spokeswoman for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, which verifies compliance with the pact, told the Wall Street Journal there had been no interruptions in data transmissions from China’s five sensor stations since the end of August 2019 following an interruption that began in 2018.

The Chinese embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

A senior U.S. official said the concerns about China’s testing activities buttressed President Donald Trump’s case for getting China to join the United States and Russia in talks on an arms control accord to replace the 2010 New START treaty between Washington and Moscow that expires in February.

New START restricted the United States and Russia to deploying no more than 1,550 nuclear warheads, the lowest level in decades, and limited the land- and submarine-based missiles and bombers that deliver them.

“The pace and manner by which the Chinese government is modernizing its stockpile is worrying, destabilizing, and illustrates why China should be brought into the global arms control framework,” said the senior U.S. official on condition of anonymity.

China, estimated to have about 300 nuclear weapons, has repeatedly rejected Trump’s proposal, arguing its nuclear force is defensive and poses no threat.

Russia, France and Britain – three of the world’s five internationally recognized nuclear powers – signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which still requires ratification by 44 countries to become international law.

China and the United States are among eight signatories that have not ratified it. But China has declared its adherence to its terms, while the United States has observed a unilateral testing moratorium since 1992.

(Reporting by Jonathan Landay; Editing by Arshad Mohammed, Jonathan Oatis and Richard Chang)