Prepare For A Long Chess Match

 

 Pitfalls lie ahead in the Iran nuclear talks

Ali Ansari

Though almost a week has passed since President Obama unveiled the framework understanding with Iran, the casual observer may be confused as to its value. And little wonder. The president has said it could be a game-changer – a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see whether or not we can at least take the nuclear issue off the table”. But the stated parameters of this framework are already fraying at the edges. So where do we stand?

On the face of it, this is a good deal, a very good deal indeed. Supporters on either side have understandably spared no time in heralding it as a “historic breakthrough” achieved against the backdrop of negotiations that appeared agonisingly close to failure. There is nothing like a prolonged period of tension to generate euphoria when the precipice is avoided and success snatched from the jaws of defeat. Much the same happened with the announcement of the interim agreement in 2013 – also hailed as a historic breakthrough. The difference is that this framework “understanding” gives us a much-needed peek at the light at the end of what has seemed like a very long tunnel. After myriad leaks, we have a sense of what the final agreement may look like.

But there is some way to go, and the journey is unlikely to be smooth. That much is clear if one examines the US state department fact sheet issued to complement the announcement made by the Iranian foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and the EU high representative for foreign affairs, Federica Mogherini. The formal announcement was somewhat vague, representing a collective attempt to satisfy all parties, but the fact sheet was more precise, containing specific details about the reduction in the number of centrifuges and the nature and pace of sanctions relief as well as the extent of the “unprecedented” inspections regime that Iran would face for up to 25 years. Anyone who feared the United States was giving too much away would have had those fears allayed. Not only would sanctions relief be phased subject to verifiable compliance by Iran of its obligations, but sanctions would “snap back” if at any time Iran was seen to have reneged. Meanwhile, UN security council sanctions – a particularly sore point with the Iranians – would be lifted with the completion by Iran of nuclear-related actions addressing all the key concerns.

The problem is that this fact sheet was not part of any agreement. It has similarities with the appendices that appeared on the Iranian foreign ministry website, but there are also significant differences. Zarif himself was quick to denounce the fact sheet as American “spin”, rejecting any notion of phased relief of sanctions, which Iranian officials have repeatedly stressed must be lifted on the first day of the implementation of the agreement. He said he had protested to the Americans, and that the agreement was effectively an “understanding” with no legal force whatsoever other than to indicate the direction of travel (thus taking care to fall in line with the supreme leader’s injunction that there be no two-stage agreement). From the Iranian point of view, the great achievement was not just that they had achieved official recognition of enrichment on Iranian soil, but that – according to their understanding – not a single nuclear activity would be suspended or closed.

Here there is much scope for disagreement. The Iranian position clearly conflicts with the mooted reduction in centrifuges and has since been softened.

The most obvious symbol of difference is the Arak heavy water reactor, 320km south of Tehran. While the Iranians claim the reactor will be modified and “updated” with international assistance under the management of Iran, the fact sheet states categorically that the current reactor will be redesigned and rebuilt subject to specifications agreed by the P5+1, and the original core “will be destroyed or removed from the country”. The Iranian documentation envisages a 10-year limit on the enrichment of uranium at the Natanz nuclear facility in central Iran, but otherwise there is little detail on time frames envisaged or the proposed inspections regime, and there is no reference to the reduction in the stockpile of enriched uranium.

We may not have the whole picture. There may be private agreements held back by both sides for domestic political purposes. But the public statements suggest a great divergence of opinion beyond the niceties of diplomatic interpretation,that each has endorsed the deal in accordance with how they perceive it. The cautious support by Friday prayer leaders – said to reflect the views of the supreme leader – are unlikely to have been for the American version of what transpired.

There is a path, but there are also pitfalls, and in establishing a narrative to suit the domestic agenda – a narrative enthusiastically reinforced by much of the western media – the Americans may have made life a little harder for their Iranian interlocutors.

Moreover, the irony will not have been lost on congressional critics that Iranian parliamentarians have insisted, and have received assurances, that they will have to ratify any final agreement. Diplomats on both sides have seized on the re-energised mood to stress that the June deadline can be met. But if experience is any guide, there is a good deal of work to be done. It is not at all clear that we will be witnessing a sprint to the finish.

Third Horn Of Pakistan Ready To Become Armed (Daniel 8:8)

Taliban’s attack on school a wake-up call for Pakistan

BY S. AMJAD HUSSAIN
BLADE COLUMNIST

 

PESHAWAR, Pakistan — It has been three weeks since terrorists stormed a school here and slaughtered at least 148 people, nearly all of whom were children. The Pakistani Taliban took responsibility for the massacre, saying it was in retaliation for army action in the Taliban stronghold of Waziristan.

Pakistan reacted with revulsion to the school attack. There was almost unanimous consensus among political parties and civic groups that this act broke the patience of the nation. Pakistanis are demanding, in a loud and clear voice, that the government tackle the menace of religious terrorism.
Although most of the country is united in this demand, the conduct of religious political parties has been anything but reassuring. Most of these parties condemned the massacre, but claimed it was a reaction to what the Pakistani army has been doing to the Taliban and their families in Waziristan. They are speaking from both sides of their mouths.

Pakistani religious parties have a checkered history. They opposed the creation of Pakistan on religious grounds. Since the creation of the country in 1947, they have been trying to turn Pakistan into a theocracy where power will shift to the mosques rather than rest with state institutions.
And while they do not talk openly about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, controlling these weapons fits with their dream of global dominance.

Whether the Pakistani Taliban function in concert with other terrorists is open to conjecture. Although its sympathies are with terrorist outfits such as Islamic State, it is not part of a global network.
Some prejudiced people blame the teachings of Islam for the terrorist activities of some Muslims. An occasional beheading of a Western man by ISIS aside, most religious violence has been directed against Muslims themselves. In the Taliban’s narrow and self-serving interpretation of Islam, anyone who does not subscribe to its version is not a Muslim.

The seeds of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan were sown during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan starting in 1979. Pakistan was pushed into becoming a front-line state during the decade long conflict.

American and Western foreign aid flowed into the country. So did Arab petrodollars and the puritanical Wahhabi version of Islam.

Thousands of religious schools sprang up in border areas of Pakistan, where poor boys were indoctrinated in virulent Wahhabi Islam and sent to fight the Soviet infidels across the border in Afghanistan.

The United States and Saudi Arabia promoted this culture of religious intolerance. The Soviets were eventually forced out of Afghanistan, but the culture stayed.

The lure of fighting a religious war brought thousands of young men from around the world — including the United States — to Pakistan. After the war, many of these young men, who were not wanted in their countries of birth, married and settled in tribal areas of Pakistan. A second generation of foreigners is working with the Pakistani Taliban to wreck havoc on the country.

The toll on Pakistan has been enormous. Since 2001, close to 50,000 people — including more than 15,000 army personnel — have been killed by terrorists in Pakistan. The economic losses have been substantial.

Why haven’t Pakistani governments tackled this menace? They fear religious parties that have twisted government intentions as anti-Islamic.

For many years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has urged Pakistan to clean up sanctuaries in Waziristan, from which Afghan Taliban fighters attacked NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan. Because of its appeasement of the Pakistani Taliban and its long-term interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan did not follow through.

It has taken the massacre of innocent schoolchildren to wake Pakistanis up.

Dr. S. Amjad Hussain is a retired Toledo surgeon whose column appears every other week in The Blade.

Contact him at: aghaji@bex.net

2014: Iranian Horn Makes Babylon The Great Look Like Suckers

2014: P5+1 and Iran’s Nuclear Negotiations

Kerry and Iranian Policy

Majid Rafizadeh | Huff Post
12/23/14 06:22 PM ET

The 2014 nuclear negotiations marked one of the most contentious issues in Iran’s domestic politics and foreign affairs alike. The partial diplomatic headways, two failures to meet the extended nuclear deadlines, and the possibility of the historic comprehensive nuclear deal highlighted progression and setbacks with respect to the nuclear negotiations for both the Islamic Republic and the six world powers known as the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). At the beginning of the year, Iran and the P5+1 began the process of implementing the Joint Plan of Action, which was proposed by Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif. Parallel with the nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran, the IAEA began its frequent inspection and monitoring of the Iranian nuclear program in order to ensure that Tehran was complying with the November 11 framework agreement. The first IAEA report revealed that Iran was complying with some of the articles of the provisional nuclear deal. The Islamic Republic ceased enriching uranium at the high level, 20 percent, which is a technical step away from developing weapons-grade uranium. Tehran stopped major activities at the Arak heavy water and plutonium reactor. Iran began diluting, and converted its highly enriched uranium, continuing its nuclear research and development within the framework of the interim nuclear deal. Iran promised to build a plant which would convert the newly 5 percent enriched uranium into an oxide, which cannot be utilized for further enrichment. In addition, according to the initial IAEA report, Iran provided “additional information and explanations,” that Tehran has conducted tests on explosive detonators for “a civilian application.”
In return, the United State and European Union began suspension of some of the economic sanctions on Iran, particularly in the automotive sector, gold and precious metals trade, plane parts, and petrochemical exports. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic began receiving approximately $7 billion in sanctions relief, in which $4.2 billion were from the Iranian oil sales revenue in frozen accounts.

President Rouhani appeared to improve the domestic economy, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Islamic Republic progressed in stabilizing its economy and the appreciation of its currency (Rial). In August, Iran failed to meet five spectrums of the requirements in the interim nuclear deal. Unable to bridge the differences, the six world powers and the Islamic Republic failed to reach a comprehensive agreement. However, both sides agreed to extend the nuclear talks for additional four months. In November 24, for the second time, the P5+1 and Iran failed to strike a final nuclear deal. Secretary of the State, John Kerry, proposed a 7 months extension, which was welcomed by Zarif. The gaps appeared to be deep too bridge between the P5+1 and Iran. In addition, no clear agenda was presented to overcome the main stumbling blocks and gaps for the next round of negotiations. Domestic Criticism and Challenges Although President Rouhani and his technocrat team appeared to be successful in making some diplomatic headway with respect to the nuclear negotiations and receive a limited amount of sanction relief, Rouhani’s administration was faced with a series of criticism from hard line media and prominent hardliners, including Mohammad Hossein Karimi-Ghadoosi, a crucial political figure in the hard-line Islamic Endurance Front and a member of the Iranian parliament, Majlis. The main criticisms of Iran’s hardline circle have been linked to the compromising and weak position of the President Rouhani and his negotiating team. In addition, the hardliners demand immediate removal of all economic sanctions and confirming Iran’s right to enrich uranium. President Rouhani reaffirmed Iran’s right by drawing “red lines” and stating “For us there are red lines that cannot be crossed. National interests are our red lines that include our rights under the framework of international regulations and [uranium] enrichment in Iran.” Nevertheless, President Rouhani remains to enjoy the blessing of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to continue with the nuclear talks. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s policy anchored in marinating a balance between and appeasing both the hardliners and the moderates (or centrists). After the second failure to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal, Ayatollah Khamenei pointed out, “We are not opposed to the extension of the talks, for the same reason that we weren’t opposed to the talks in the first place. Of course we will accept any fair and reasonable agreement, but we know that it’s the US government that needs an agreement and will suffer if no agreement is reached. If these nuclear talks do not achieve any results, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not lose anything.”

Stumbling Blocks and Gaps

The seven months extension did not specifically lay out the framework upon which the gaps between Iran’s policies on its nuclear program vis a vis the six world powers’ position would be adequately and efficiently addressed. The major stumbling blocks and crucial gaps remained:

1. The phases through which sanctions will be lifted. The Islamic Republic continues to demand swift lifting of all economic sanctions after a final nuclear deal is struck. The Western countries propose a gradual removal of sanctions as Iran shows signs of fulfilling the comprehensive agreement.

2. Information on Iran’s previous activities with regards to exploding detonators and the military dimension of the nuclear program is another crucial stumbling block.

3. The next issue is whether the Islamic Republic will accept to reduce the volume of its stockpile of uranium. The Western countries attempt to increase the “breakout” timeline, Tehran’s capacity to develop weapon-grade uranium, to at least a year.

4. The time for implementation of the final nuclear deal and lifting of all economic sanction. The Islamic Republic demands much shorter time than the 20 years suggested by the Western members of the P5+1

5. The number of centrifuges that Iran can retain. The Islamic Republic currently holds approximately 19,000 centrifuges. Despite some of the diplomatic headways that President Rouhani and his negotiating team made and despite some of the limited sanction reliefs that Iran has received, the gaps between the six world powers and Iran remain to be deep to bridge. In addition, the extension of nuclear talks continue to ratchet up domestic criticism to Rouhani’s administration, particularly from the hard line circle of Iran’s political spectrum.
—
Majid Rafizadeh, an American scholar and political scientist, is president of the International American Council on the Middle East. He is originally from Islamic Republic of Iran and Syria.
This post first appeared on Al Arabiya.

Ukraine’s Big Lesson: Don’t Give Up Your Nukes

World War 3: Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Threat Has Ukraine Discussing Restoring Nukes

Posted in: Politics Posted: September 14, 2014

 

Ukraine is apparently preparing for the possibility of World War 3, with Ukraine’s defense minister responding to Russia’s nuclear weapons threats by claiming they may consider restoring Ukraine’s nuclear weapons programs.In a related report by The Inquisitr, Vladimir Putin has been escalating tensions lately with the announcement of a Russian nuclear weapon test launch of an ICBM from a nuclear submarine. Putin has also promised the Western world that there will be “corresponding countermeasures” to any sanctions, and is already working hard on improving Russia’s nuclear weapons programs.
Due to recent world events, Catholic leader Pope Francis has declared that World War 3 has already begun in a “piecemeal” fashion in Ukraine, Iraq, Syria, Gaza, and Africa.

“War is madness,” Pope Francis declared. “Even today, after the second failure of another world war, perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction. War is irrational; its only plan is to bring destruction: it seeks to grow by destroying. Greed, intolerance, the lust for power. These motives underlie the decision to go to war and they are too often justified by an ideology.”

It’s not only the Western world that fears World War 3 is around the corner. A recent poll in China showed that a majority of the Chinese believe World War 3 will happen relatively soon.

Ukraine’s Nuclear Weapons Program Restored?

Under the Clinton administration, Ukraine was urged to give up its nuclear weapons it had retained from the former Soviet Union. The Budapest Memorandum obligated the United States, England, and the newly formed Russian Federation to respect Ukraine’s border in return for Ukraine’s agreement to give up the Soviet nuclear weapons. If any party were to violate Ukraine’s territory, or to provide “threat or use of force” or “economic coercion,” the Budapest Memorandum obligated each party to “seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine.”

According to Vestnik Kavkaza, Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valerii Heletei claimed earlier today during a press conference that Russia is threatening Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons.

“I am drawing attention to Russia’s threatening Ukraine with the use of tactical nuclear weapons,” Heletei noted. “If we fail to defend Ukraine today, if the world does not help us, we will have to get back to the creation of such weapons, which will defend us from Russia.”

Fortunately, Ukraine will not restore the development its own nuclear weapons immediately, but it is being considered as an option for the future. Heletei stressed that Ukraine’s nuclear weapons programs would only be an option if NATO member states do not provide weapons, especially from member states like the United States and England.

According to BBC News, Heletei also claimed that some NATO countries have begun sending Ukraine weapons.

“I have no right to disclose any specific country we reached that agreement with. But the fact is that those weapons are already on the way to us – that’s absolutely true, I can officially tell you,” he said.

Defense officials representing the United States, Italy, Poland, and Norway have already denied there any plans to send weapons to Ukraine.

So far, the Ukraine war has resulted in 2,600 deaths in the last five months of conflict with pro-Russian forces. According to NATO, Russia’s military has about 1,000 troops in eastern Ukraine, while an army of about 20,000 more are stationed near the border. Russia denies sending direct military aid to the rebels, insisting any Russian soldiers are “volunteers” fighting in the war.

Do you think the Ukraine war could potentially escalate into World War 3? How do you think the world’s leaders should resolve the conflict?

What Are We Doing? Hell on Earth (Revelation 15:2)

Our Nuclear (Dysfunctional) Family

Nuclear Arms Race

 

Pressing Issues⋅Greg Mitchell

Every year, the venerable Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists publishes a country-by-country survey for the world’s nuclear weapons stockpiles and sites.  I’ve been following this for over 30 years.  It always makes for fairly depressing reading, as one may assume, from the lack of media attention lately, that those stockpiles have been drastically reduced, approaching zero, in recent years.  That’s hardly the case.

Their summary this week in the new report:

As of mid-2014, the authors estimate that there are approximately 16,300 nuclear weapons located at some 98 sites in 14 countries. Roughly 10,000 of these weapons are in military arsenals; the remaining weapons are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Approximately 4,000 are operationally available, and some 1,800 are on high alert and ready for use on short notice. The largest concentrations of nuclear weapons reside in Russia and the United States, which possess 93 percent of the total global inventory. The United States today stores nuclear weapons at 18 sites, including 12 sites in 11 states in the United States and another six sites in five European countries. There is considerable uncertainty about the number of Russian nuclear weapons storage sites, but the authors estimate that Russia today stores nuclear weapons permanently at 40 domestic locations. 

Of course, especially on this subject, the devil is in the details.   For example:

The United States is the only nuclear-armed state that deploys nuclear weapons in other countries [5 in Europe]. Approximately 180 non-strategic nuclear bombs are stored in underground vaults beneath 87 aircraft shelters at six bases in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) for delivery by US and NATO fighter-bombers.

And:

Pakistan has a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal of 100 to 120 warheads and an increasing portfolio of delivery systems.

Anything on Israel is always interesting because 1) they won’t even admit they have long had nuclear weapons 2) from media coverage you’d think they didn’t and thus would be at the mercy of Iran if the latter did gain some warheads.  So here:

Israel is a wild card because of the opacity of its nuclear weapons program. Like other nuclear-armed states, however, Israel has been modernizing its nuclear arsenal and probably also its storage facilities. Israel’s nuclear weapons are not believed to be fully operational under normal circumstances, but are estimated to include 80 to 85 warheads.