A New Crisis Looming On The Horizon (Daniel 8:8)

An Inevitable War

The Nuclear Crisis Nobody Mentions

Posted: 05/07/2015 12:17 pm EDT Updated: 05/07/2015 12:59 pm EDT 

 

Those congressmen beating the war drums against Iran have reached new heights of hypocrisy considering their total disregard for the more dangerous, more immediate problems created by Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. It is noteworthy and also downright strange that no one else–from any political persuasion–is paying attention.

The trouble is, Pakistan may become a failing state. We can’t know this for certain. The fact, however, that the possibility can be raised gives pause. A failing state with over a hundred nuclear weapons, building more as fast as it can, miniaturizing new weapons, and having perpetually hostile relations with its neighbor, India, also a nuclear power, presents risks far beyond regional security.
How, for example, should the world respond to a state that proliferates nuclear weapons but denies doing so and that might not even be able to control its proliferation? As a count of its nuclear arsenal edges toward several hundred, and as it increasingly deploys tactical nuclear weapons near its border, Pakistan’s government faces extraordinary challenges of command and control.

Hypothetically, suppose that during a future crisis with India a failing Pakistani government delegates control over tactical nuclear weapons to dozens of forward commanders. Suppose further one or two weapons are ‘lost.’ Conceivably, nobody we consider to be in authority would know what had happened, or would admit knowing. If later on a terrorist group obtained such a weapon they would attempt to detonate it. A smallish nuclear artillery shell, for example, could be sailed up the Thames to London on a yacht.

The point is, if Pakistan starts to ‘lose’ nuclear weapons the world has no ready response. And if a ‘loss’ produced a catastrophic event it is reasonable to think that the world would not wait for a second event before forcibly removing the threat. To be blunt, that is the war on Iran that hawks keep talking about, except much worse.

What are the odds? We can make a not unreasonable guess in terms of orders of magnitude. Over the middle term is the chance of Pakistan failing one in ten, one in a hundred, or one in a thousand? One in a thousand seems too low. One in ten (perhaps) too high. One in a hundred also seems low but among our choices it’s the best fit. Furthermore, we can assume a failing state with nuclear weapons would lose a few. But the probability regarding how many doesn’t change our order of magnitude approximation.

We routinely like to insure homes, businesses and property against damage from events with less than one in a hundred chance of happening. Surely we should do something similar about the potential danger of a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists.

After Pakistan’s first test detonations in 1998 the smart thing would have been to make nuclear arms control on the subcontinent a priority. That that never happened reflects badly on American leadership. Despite occasional alarms sounded by experts at the upper reaches of the national security establishment–Rolf Mowatt-Larrsen, for example, says “there is a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world”–American officials vacillate between fear of a nasty scrap and hope that the problem will just disappear.

Rationalizations for doing nothing hold sway. Washington reflexively defers to Riyadh, Pakistan’s chief ally. From the outset the Saudis, as a matter of religious zeal, have been keen for Pakistan to develop an “Islamic bomb.” And since 1991 Washington has been greatly preoccupied by the war in Afghanistan–too often finding itself at the mercy of Islamabad for assistance combating insurgents. Domestically, what purport to be well-intended incentives of arms shipments in practice create political blowback from American corporations hungry for billions in sales. The result is, leaning hard on Pakistan seems insane even if it makes perfect sense.

Nevertheless, it remains mysterious that so few in or out of government worry about the risks. It’s not as if the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons brings previously unknown tensions to the surface. In the 1980s, for example, the U.S. stationing of Pershing II missiles in Germany was perceived to be so destabilizing that it led to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik and thereafter to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. To this day the great powers find theater nuclear weapons a highly vexatious diplomatic issue. Nor are problems of command and control unfamiliar–as recently as 2007 six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles effectively went missing for a day and a half from Minot Air Force Base. The Secretary of the Air Force then resigned and a group of senior officers were disciplined. Hopes, therefore, that a substantial enlargement of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear capabilities might not increase instability has little foundation in experience or common sense.

Since the early 1990s–for more than two decades–hawks have been talking up a war against Iran. Meanwhile, barely a word is said about Pakistan. The difference may be due partly to Israel’s outsized influence. But it feels like something else is going on.

To hazard a more intuitive guess, bluster over Iran comes cheap whereas disarming Pakistan is the real deal. And if negotiations didn’t work does America go to war over the potential threat? A war that devastates Pakistan could be the result. Yet without diplomacy the very same war, the one the establishment doesn’t expect, could be the one we can’t avoid. Maybe it isn’t so surprising after all that we don’t talk about the stuff of nightmares.

It’s never too late for diplomacy but it’s imprudent to cut it so close.

Pakistan: The New Nuclear Terrorist Threat

In Pakistan, domestic threats begin to overshadow India

Pakistan’s Nuclear Terrorism

By Yelena Biberman January 6 at 8:30 AM

The Peshawar school massacre has sparked unprecedented societal and political mobilization against terrorism in Pakistan. From televised debates to private conversations, there is now an unmistakable demand for policy reorientation toward domestic sources of insecurity. However, three big questions remain: Is India still the main enemy? Is Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the perpetrator of the deadliest terrorist attack in Pakistan’s history, the only domestic militant group threatening Pakistani security? What will replace TTP in the unstable tribal region bordering Afghanistan?

For more than three generations, Pakistan’s security policy and the dominant national narrative have positioned India as the primary and existential threat to Pakistan. The two countries fought four wars (in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999), with the last in the shadow of nuclear missiles. Pakistan’s army built up its capacity in response to India’s military power at the expense of the country’s economic development. The very idea of Pakistan is tied to the perception that India is a dangerous place for Muslims.

The Peshawar massacre offers India and Pakistan an opportunity to recast their relationship. Following the attack, Indian schools across the country and the parliament observed silence for the victims, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reached out in a 12-minute phone conversation to his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif. Nevertheless, many Pakistanis remain skeptical about the recently elected Hindu nationalist leader. They cite periodic confrontations along the Line of Control, which separates Pakistan- and India-controlled parts of Kashmir. Modi’s cancelation of August talks between the two countries’ foreign secretaries, in response to a meeting between Pakistan’s envoy in New Delhi and Kashmiri separatist leaders, also made a strong impression. Reimagining Islamist militants, and not Hindu nationalist-controlled India, as the chief threat to Pakistan after nearly 70 years of animosity between the two states is a tough sell.

Pakistan also has had a special connection to the Taliban. The latter has ostensibly allowed the former to maintain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan against India during the 1990s, after the United States withdrew from the region. The strategic depth doctrine hinges on the calculation that, in case of an enemy offensive, Pakistani military commanders would have space to withdraw, regroup and respond. After the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan’s intelligence agency (ISI) secretly sheltered and provided logistical support to the (Afghan) Taliban. Some of the local Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, who spent years in the company and service of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, became radicalized. In 2007, following the Pakistani forces’ bold Lal Masjid confrontation with the Islamists, the latter joined forces under the TTP banner. The TTP’s stated goal is to oppose the NATO forces in Afghanistan and wage a defensive jihad against the Pakistani forces. However, the TTP’s active involvement in organized crime (e.g. bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom and smuggling) makes it more a criminal than an insurgent outfit. Destroying the TTP will require not only a military, but also a law enforcement solution. In addition to its involvement in organized crime, the TTP has made large investments in Karachi-based businesses.

The TTP represents the blowback effect from Pakistan’s “proxy-fication” of the Taliban. However, it is unlikely that the lesson from the Taliban will be applied to the no less powerful Kashmir-oriented militant outfits. Organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are still largely viewed as the “good” jihadis. This is because, as one insider explained, they have not yet done anything against the Pakistani state. They are oriented against India. Lashkar-e-Taiba is responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, which were no less traumatic for India as was the Peshawar massacre for Pakistan. Lashkar’s sprawling compound is near Lahore, Pakistan’s cultural capital. Pakistanis often cite the United States’ extensive use of proxies. However, unlike the United States, Pakistan has employed proxies either inside or dangerously close to the country’s borders. Playing with fire so close to one’s home is far more hazardous than in someone else’s neighborhood. Or, as Hillary Clinton put it, “you can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors.” Significant gains over domestic terrorist organizations will require a more comprehensive and sober approach, one that applies to proxies the same realpolitik foresight usually reserved for other countries.

Finally, there is the question of what will replace the TTP in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have been by and large neglected since the British colonial period. The current military crackdown on the TTP needs to be complemented with long-overdue “state-building” measures. If Pakistan does not significantly invest in the governance and economic development of the region, grievances will continue to deepen and multiply. The region will then serve as an even more fertile ground for terrorist organizations.

Third Horn Of Pakistan Ready To Become Armed (Daniel 8:8)

Taliban’s attack on school a wake-up call for Pakistan

BY S. AMJAD HUSSAIN
BLADE COLUMNIST

 

PESHAWAR, Pakistan — It has been three weeks since terrorists stormed a school here and slaughtered at least 148 people, nearly all of whom were children. The Pakistani Taliban took responsibility for the massacre, saying it was in retaliation for army action in the Taliban stronghold of Waziristan.

Pakistan reacted with revulsion to the school attack. There was almost unanimous consensus among political parties and civic groups that this act broke the patience of the nation. Pakistanis are demanding, in a loud and clear voice, that the government tackle the menace of religious terrorism.
Although most of the country is united in this demand, the conduct of religious political parties has been anything but reassuring. Most of these parties condemned the massacre, but claimed it was a reaction to what the Pakistani army has been doing to the Taliban and their families in Waziristan. They are speaking from both sides of their mouths.

Pakistani religious parties have a checkered history. They opposed the creation of Pakistan on religious grounds. Since the creation of the country in 1947, they have been trying to turn Pakistan into a theocracy where power will shift to the mosques rather than rest with state institutions.
And while they do not talk openly about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, controlling these weapons fits with their dream of global dominance.

Whether the Pakistani Taliban function in concert with other terrorists is open to conjecture. Although its sympathies are with terrorist outfits such as Islamic State, it is not part of a global network.
Some prejudiced people blame the teachings of Islam for the terrorist activities of some Muslims. An occasional beheading of a Western man by ISIS aside, most religious violence has been directed against Muslims themselves. In the Taliban’s narrow and self-serving interpretation of Islam, anyone who does not subscribe to its version is not a Muslim.

The seeds of militancy and terrorism in Pakistan were sown during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan starting in 1979. Pakistan was pushed into becoming a front-line state during the decade long conflict.

American and Western foreign aid flowed into the country. So did Arab petrodollars and the puritanical Wahhabi version of Islam.

Thousands of religious schools sprang up in border areas of Pakistan, where poor boys were indoctrinated in virulent Wahhabi Islam and sent to fight the Soviet infidels across the border in Afghanistan.

The United States and Saudi Arabia promoted this culture of religious intolerance. The Soviets were eventually forced out of Afghanistan, but the culture stayed.

The lure of fighting a religious war brought thousands of young men from around the world — including the United States — to Pakistan. After the war, many of these young men, who were not wanted in their countries of birth, married and settled in tribal areas of Pakistan. A second generation of foreigners is working with the Pakistani Taliban to wreck havoc on the country.

The toll on Pakistan has been enormous. Since 2001, close to 50,000 people — including more than 15,000 army personnel — have been killed by terrorists in Pakistan. The economic losses have been substantial.

Why haven’t Pakistani governments tackled this menace? They fear religious parties that have twisted government intentions as anti-Islamic.

For many years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has urged Pakistan to clean up sanctuaries in Waziristan, from which Afghan Taliban fighters attacked NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan. Because of its appeasement of the Pakistani Taliban and its long-term interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan did not follow through.

It has taken the massacre of innocent schoolchildren to wake Pakistanis up.

Dr. S. Amjad Hussain is a retired Toledo surgeon whose column appears every other week in The Blade.

Contact him at: aghaji@bex.net

Like Israel, Pakistan At An Existential Point

Pakistan at an existential point

Harlan Ullman

January 01, 2015

Make no mistake: Pakistan is at an existential point in its almost 70-year history. The ghastly killing of nearly 150 students and adults in Peshawar earlier this month was more than an atrocity. This act of terror orchestrated by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has forced Pakistan and Pakistanis to confront the most critical question since partition in 1947: is Pakistan to be a democracy under the rule of law or a pseudo-state serving as a shell and shill for breeding extremism, terror and threats to humanity? While the jury is out, the indications are that unless and until Pakistanis realise the precariousness and danger of the current situation, do not bet on democracy. Indeed, while still an outside wager, do not discount the prospect of the TTP fomenting civil war and unseating any semblance of a democratic government.

Of course, Pakistanis were so sufficiently outraged six years ago when a videotape of the Taliban beating a young girl went viral that the army could be sent to Swat to clean out these ‘miscreants’. But a great deal has happened since to change perceptions. First, for too many Pakistanis, the US has superseded the Taliban as the enemy. Drone attacks and collateral damage, however small, provoked understandable resentment. The Abbottabad raid that killed Osama bin Laden is still seen as an attack against Pakistani sovereignty. The Raymond Davis case in which two Pakistanis were gunned down in more or less cold blood and then Davis was freed accelerated anti-US sentiments. And former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mike Mullen’s parting shot calling the Afghan Taliban a “veritable arm” of the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) brought the relationship to a nadir.
Over the last year, as time passed, the relationship with the US improved. However, fundamentalism has spread and more Pakistanis have turned to tolerate, if not accept, extremism. Nearly a decade ago, then President and General Pervez Musharraf mightily tried to close down extremist clerics and thousands of madrassas that fostered this distorted interpretation of Islam. He failed. No one has tried since.

Four years ago this January, Punjab’s Governor Salmaan Taseer was brutally murdered by one of his bodyguards for challenging the blasphemy laws. Judges and courts are terrified of trying the assassin who was viewed as a hero by large numbers of the public, including lawyers. Two years ago, when asked by then Senator John Kerry as to why Pakistan would not take on the Haqqani network, a senior diplomat replied: “If we did, they would burn my house down!” About 80,000 Pakistanis and soldiers have died so far in this battle against extremism. The assault into North Waziristan earlier this year was long overdue although the army has been overstretched. Meanwhile, the TTP are consolidating and plotting.

While Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has promised that distinctions between ‘good’ (i.e. Afghan) and ‘bad’ (i.e. Pakistani) Taliban no longer exist, the government lacks the stomach, backbone and brains to neutralise these extremists and their fellow travelling criminal organisations such as the Haqqanis and others. The formation of military courts to try terrorists because civilian courts cannot be trusted to dispense justice is an understandable but further strain on the constitution and democracy.

What can be done? First, the US and other external powers have little leverage. However, in the case of the US, removing textile tariffs on Pakistani cotton goods is long overdue. Such a step will have greater psychological and political benefit than economic. But that is essential to enhance US influence in other areas. Second, outside states can move Pakistan to closer dialogue with India and Afghanistan. Given the new leadership in both neighbours, the time was never riper for fruitful diplomatic initiatives. Given the TTP’s intent on launching another Mumbai-like attack to generate a crisis and possibly war between India and Pakistan, both nuclear armed, pre-emptive steps must be taken now to prevent such a crisis. Third, Pakistan also needs an additional 100,000 or so in the police force. Outside aid and assistance to help fund this force is essential.

A further list of actions is too lengthy to repeat, ranging from dealing with grave water, electricity and food shortages to de-radicalisation and providing jobs and hope for the 80 to 90 million young Pakistanis who are without both. Many will argue that Pakistan will muddle through. Tragically, the Peshawar massacre contradicts that expectation. It is up to Pakistan and Pakistanis. Do they wish Pakistan to be a liberal democracy or a haven for terror, violence and terrorists? The choice is theirs.