Could Isil actually detonate a nuclear ‘dirty bomb’ in Britain?
HAMISH DE BRETTON-GORDON 5 APRIL 2016 • 11:53AM
Last week’s Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC put the threat of Isil using some sort of fissile or radioactive material in the media spotlight.
If Isil could build an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) or a “Dirty Bomb” they would certainly use it, and all the better for them if were able to use it in London, Paris or New York.
It would appear that the Isil terror attacks in Belgium two weeks ago were originally planned to have some sort of nuclear element, but through good intelligence-gathering and some luck this nightmare scenario was avoided, for now.
It is possible that some of the 15,000 or more nuclear warheads quoted by Eric Schlosser in his recent book Gods of Metal may be poorly guarded and could fall into terrorist hand, but it is highly improbable. At the end of the Cold War, international efforts were made to secure the most vulnerable storage locations, including the removal of 600 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium under Project Sapphire from Kazakhstan to the US.
“15-20 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium…could yield a blast equivalent to 2000 tonnes of TNT, which would be enough to flatten several blocks”
But beyond this, having been involved in nuclear security in the UK, I am acutely aware of the challenges and hurdles required for a terror group to successfully smuggle a viable device to a suitable target location and then override the numerous safety features to detonate such a weapon. It’s all very unlikely.
In my opinion the real areas of concern in future are, firstly, the development of North Korea’s nuclear capability and its “apparent” intercontinental ballistic missile programme; secondly, the possibility of highly enriched, weaponised isotopes falling into terrorist hands through the black market or dark web to build an IND; thirdly, using commonly available radiological sources to create a dirty bomb. These are in ascending order of likelihood.
I am relatively confident that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and in particular the US, are keeping a very close eye on North Korea and would take offensive action if it appeared that this country was about to launch some kind of nuclear-tipped missile. It would appear that this is still some way off at the moment.
The next concern is the possibility that nuclear weapons-grade viable material is acquired by Isil and fashioned into an IND. 15-20 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), with a simple “gun-gadget” initiation device, could yield a blast equivalent to 2000 tonnes of TNT, which would be enough to flatten several blocks. This is probably within the capabilities of Isil’s scientists in Iraq and Syria, technically. But I very much doubt they could explode this type of weapon in any P5 member – except perhaps Russia.
It is here that Isil would most likely get the HEU, and it is Chechen jihadists who appear to be at the heart of Isil’s chemical, radiological and nuclear weapons programmes. It is the Russians who are the Chechens’ greatest enemy, and indeed Chechen militants have used fissile material before to attack the Russian State. With this in mind it is somewhat surprising that President Putin decided to boycott the Nuclear Summit, which aims to prevent such an attack.
What the public appear most afraid of, and what is most likely, is a “dirty” bomb. But this fear is misguided. The only immediate casualties of such an attack would probably be from the blast rather than radiation, which would be unlikely to have many short or long term medical effects. Though radiological material is relatively easy to source, the UK’s sophisticated counter-terrorist apparatus would make it extremely unlikely that Isil could detonate such a bomb here.
In sum, the threat to the UK from an Isil nuclear device is extremely low, and only slightly higher for a dirty bomb attack. Still, the psychological impact would outweigh the physiological by many times to 1. Pre-warned and prepared is the best form of defence in this case.
