Iran Is The First Nuclear Horn (Daniel 8:3)

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Don’t ignore threat Iran poses to global security

By Jacob Goldberg

5 p.m.March 28, 2015

 

For months, President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have repeated a mantra about nuclear negotiations with Iran: “no deal is better then a bad deal.” But when Obama is asking rhetorically “what’s the alternative,” he contradicts the mantra, indicating that the U.S. seeks an agreement at any cost.

An examination of Iran’s nuclear record shows that the ayatollahs changed their conduct only on two occasions. In 2003, they suspended the military nuclear project because of U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fear of an American strike; and in 2013, they agreed to negotiate because of stringent sanctions imposed by Congress and European powers.

Asking “what’s the alternative,” Obama practically gives up the two leverages over Iran — a credible military deterrent and debilitating sanctions. He leads the ayatollahs to conclude that Washington is more eager than Tehran to reach an agreement.

The emerging deal creates a 12-month “breakout” period, should Iran race to the bomb, enough time for the U.S to respond. But, this assumption is predicated on U.S. intelligence being able to detect such “breakout,” an ability challenged by a Pentagon study. Stating that “U.S. intelligence is neither organized nor equipped to detect development of nuclear weapons,” it concludes that “the detection abilities in cases like Iran are inadequate or nonexistent.” This conclusion removes the rug from under the basis of the agreement. Indeed, the woeful U.S. record in detecting development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, North Korea and Syria clearly refutes the assumption.

In addition, a “sunset clause” in the agreement would allow Iran, “legally,” to develop nuclear weapons. The administration’s claim that an Iranian violation would result in reimposition of sanctions is unrealistic. Having spent billions of dollars in Iran, are big corporations likely to sacrifice their investments?

The emerging deal is flawed not only due to its contents, but also because of its omissions. No reference is made to Iran’s “nuclear weaponization” program, as well as to its development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which only serve nuclear weapons.

The Iranians cite India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as reasons for their decision to go nuclear. But this analogy is deceptive: neither India nor Pakistan developed ICBMs; both use nuclear weapons only as a means of mutual deterrence.

Also, the agreement does not require Iran to desist from threatening its Arab neighbors, to stop financial support of and involvement in worldwide terrorism, to avoid calling for Israel’s annihilation, and to remove the battle cry of the Islamic regime — “Death to America.”

The net result of the agreement would be to institutionalize Iran’s status as a nuclear threshold state. It would not lead the Ayatollahs to tone down their revolutionary zeal; just the opposite: a nuclear umbrella would embolden their aggressiveness.

This will adversely affect U.S. national security. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are determined to acquire or develop their own nuclear deterrent. This would destroy a major pillar of U.S. foreign policy: preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

A nuclear threshold Iran would also be able to prevent a future decline in oil prices. While Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies ignored Iranian demands to lower production and keep prices high, they are unlikely to dare ignore similar threats by a nuclear Iran.