Going nuclear at sea
Written by Iskander Rehman | Posted: March 19, 2015 4:11 am |
Almost
six years ago, in Visakhapatnam, Gursharan Kaur, wife of then Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh, cracked a coconut on the hull of India’s first
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Subsequently named
the INS Arihant or “destroyer of enemies”, the vessel was the result of
decades of efforts by India’s nuclear scientists. For many years,
bureaucratic languor, technical challenges and chronic difficulties in
nuclear reactor miniaturisation appeared to ensure that progress would
be painstakingly slow. Indeed, at one stage, it became unclear whether
the project would see the light of day.
In
August 2013, when the Arihant’s nuclear reactor finally went critical,
the event was thus widely hailed, both in India and abroad, as a major
technological and symbolic milestone. Currently undergoing sea
trials, the Arihant is destined to be the first vessel in a flotilla of
up to five indigenously produced SSBNs, and it has been reported that a
sister vessel, the INS Aridhaman, is nearing completion. Since the
Pokhran-II series of nuclear tests in 1998, the Indian government has
repeatedly iterated its desire to attain a credible minimum nuclear
deterrent, structured around what nuclear
strategists refer to as a triad, that is, a mixture of aircraft,
land-based mobile missiles and naval assets. India’s nuclear doctrine
states that it is a no-first-use power, and it is in this light that one
must view the importance attached to the sea-based leg of its nuclear
deterrent.
Indeed,
the survivability and overall resiliency of India’s nuclear arsenal has
become a growing concern for military planners in New Delhi,
particularly as Beijing continues to make rapid advances in missile,
space and cyber technology. Nuclear submarines, provided they are
sufficiently quiet, are still considered to be the most survivable of
nuclear platforms, due to their mobility and discretion. Placing nuclear assets underwater puts them at a safer distance from a crippling first strike.
The development of the Arihant and its successors therefore constitutes
the next logical step in Delhi’s quest for an assured retaliatory
capability.
It
is important to note, however, that while the launch of India’s first
indigenous SSBN constitutes a great accomplishment, it is also only the
first step in what promises to be a long and onerous process. India’s
naval nuclear journey has only just begun.
Going
forward, the Indian navy will face three sets of nuclear challenges.
The first set is in the technological domain, as the navy struggles to
acquire the capability for continuous at-sea deterrence. The second set
of difficulties will need to be addressed within the navy itself, as its
officers begin to grapple with the importance of their service’s new
nuclear role. Finally, Indian
naval planners will also have to contend with their Pakistani
counterparts’ development of what can best be described as a “naval
nuclear force-in-being”.
When
the Arihant is finally commissioned, it will be fitted with 12 Sagarika
K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Sagarika,
however, only has a strike radius of about 750 to 800 km, which many
analysts rightly consider inadequate. Indeed, with such a short range,
the Arihant could not reach Islamabad, let alone China’s strategic
centres. The DRDO is currently working on two longer-range SLBMs: the
3,500-km range K-4, which recently underwent a successful test launch
from an underwater pontoon, and the 5,000-km range K-5, which is still
in the design phase. According to sources, the Arihant is fitted with
four universal tube launchers, which can each carry either three K-15
missiles or one K-4 missile. Observers have raised questions, however,
over the compatibility of the K-4’s height with the submarine’s 10.4-m
hull. If the length of the K-4 cannot be shortened, the Arihant may need
to be retrofitted with a hydrodynamic outer development, or “bump.”
Even if the DRDO’s engineers do succeed in squeezing the K-4 aboard, the
missile’s range remains somewhat unsatisfactory. It would require
India’s nuclear submariners to operate on the northeastern fringes of
the Bay of Bengal in order to effectively target China’s major
metropolises, rather than within the more sanitised waters abutting
India’s eastern seaboard. The K-5 is rumoured to stand at a height of
about 12 m, which rules out its deployment aboard the Arihant. The
second major technological limitation is that of the Arihant’s nuclear
reactor. Reportedly based on first- or second-generation Soviet
technology, the 83-megawatt pressurised water reactor has a short
refuelling cycle, thus limiting the length of the Arihant’s deterrent
patrols.
In
short, in order to enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent with regard
to China, India will need to deploy larger SSBNs with greater missile
carriage capacity and more powerful nuclear reactors. The fourth planned
submarine in the series is projected to possess such characteristics,
but it may take more than a decade for it to be successfully developed
and launched, and even longer for it to be commissioned. While
India’s submarine fleet has been taking shape, Delhi has also conducted
a series of test firings, starting in 2000, of Dhanush-class
short-range ballistic missiles from surface ships. For the time
being, however, it appears that the Dhanush programme is merely a
stopgap measure until the SSBN fleet comes into full fruition.
Second,
history has shown that all newly nuclear navies face some difficult
tradeoffs. As India’s SSBN fleet gradually grows in size and importance,
the challenge will be to ensure that the navy’s new nuclear role
develops alongside, rather than to the detriment of, its conventional
missions. As in all nuclear navies, a debate will no doubt unfold within
the service as to how many resources and platforms should be devoted to
the ballistic missile submarine fleet’s protection. Tough decisions may
need to be made, particularly if India’s underwater environment becomes
more contested. India’s nuclear command and control procedures will
also almost certainly undergo a revision, as the SLBMs will be
canisterised and ready for launch, rather than de-mated.
Finally,
India’s naval and nuclear planners will also have to contend with the
progressive materialisation of a nuclearised Pakistani navy — albeit one
with much less orthodox characteristics and undergirded by a very
different nuclear posture. Indeed, Islamabad aims to eventually
disperse nuclear-tipped cruise missiles across a variety of naval
platforms, ranging from surface ships in the short term to conventional
diesel-electric submarines in the long term. Unlike India, Pakistan’s
naval nuclear ambitions are fuelled primarily by the sense of a growing
conventional imbalance in the maritime domain. By nuclearising — or by
appearing to nuclearise — a large portion of their fleet architecture,
Pakistani military planners hope to neuter India’s growing naval power,
inject ambiguity and acquire escalation dominance in the event of a
limited conflict at sea. Since Independence, Indian naval officers have
been accustomed to operating within a purely conventional maritime
setting. Dealing with such a prospective adversary will no doubt
necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the navy’s operational concepts.
Perhaps more importantly, it will also require an effort on the part of
both countries to further institutionalise the maritime component of
their relations so as to ensure that in future, isolated incidents don’t
spiral out of control.
The
writer, a nonresident fellow in the South Asia Programme at the
Atlantic Council, is author of the report ‘Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear
Dynamics in the Indian Ocean’.
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