What Nobel Peace Prize?
Jonathan Tobin
What do a few particles of uranium tell us about the future of President Obama’s signature foreign-policy achievement? Nothing good, especially for those that would like to put the debate about the Iran nuclear deal behind us and assume, as the administration claims, that it precludes Tehran’s ability to create a weapon. These particles at Iran’s Parchin facility are the clues that confirm much of what critics have been saying since the deal was concluded last year—not only about Iran’s
untrustworthiness but also the assumptions about its ability to “break out” to build a bomb. Above all, what those particles tell us is that the United States and its allies still have no firm idea of how close Iran is to building a viable weapon should it decide to cheat on the agreement or even if it simply waits a decade to expire. Parchin is the proof that the deal is more of a prayer than the guarantee Obama promised.
As the Wall Street Journal reports, the traces of man-made uranium at the Parchin facility last October during an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency weren’t enough to give the West a firm idea of exactly what the Iranians had been doing there. But it does prove that the regime’s nuclear project was military in nature. Parchin is a weapons development site. As I noted here last December when the IAEA report regarding the inspections was first released, that knowledge alone confirms that Iran has been lying all along about its active efforts to build a bomb. The Journal’s reporting now makes it clear that Obama administration officials have confirmed that judgment.
But these same people also say they are sure Iran halted its work on a bomb in 2003 and that the particles date from that time. Their hope is that the discovery is merely an indication of past bad behavior and that it shouldn’t figure into any discussion of whether Iran is complying with the terms of the agreement. As one anonymous official told the Journal, “What’s important is that they can’t do it again.”
But one of the many problems with the deal was that the inspections process is limited to known nuclear sites. Since Parchin is a military base, it is not covered by the main agreement; it was dealt with in a side agreement whose terms have never been fully revealed. Inspectors went to Parchin last year, but they have no plans to return.
Any further investigation of the site is complicated by the fact that construction has been going on there and will make it even harder to learn more about its past. As to worries that Iran might use the immunity the deal gave military sites, the State Department had this to say:
“Parchin is an active military facility, and construction there does not necessarily indicate any nuclear-related activity,” said a State Department official. “At this time, we have no information that would lead us to believe that there is undeclared nuclear activity taking place anywhere in Iran.”
If true, that would be reassuring. But since inspectors can’t go there or any other military site how could the administration know? It can’t.
Contrary to the promises made by Secretary of State John Kerry and other administration figures, there was no comprehensive accounting of all of Iran’s past work on possible military dimensions of nuclear research. That’s why Tehran’s ability to cover up what happened at Parchin is so important. The U.S. needed that information because without it there could be no firm idea of how close the Iranians might be to building a bomb if it were to assemble the necessary nuclear materials. The assumption underlying the deal is that the restrictions on Iran’s activity lengthened that “break out” time to at least a year. Such a period of time would supposedly give the West enough time to discover the violations and then react before Iran could build its bomb.
However, the presence of those uranium particles confirms both Iran’s mendacity and the West’s ignorance. Break-out time could be much less than a year, for all we know. Moreover, since there will be no “anytime, anywhere” inspections in Iran, as was originally promised, even optimists must admit that the U.S. won’t really know if a breakout is occurring until it is probably too late to do anything about it.
And it’s actually worse than that—since, as the IAEA revealed in March, its inspectors won’t even bother trying to monitor whether any military research is being conducted. It will only stick to the agreed inspections of known nuclear sites.
All the talk that the deal ended the Iranian threat has been exposed as empty and meaningless. If the administration’s spin about Iran becoming more moderate—a claim made most recently by Deputy National Security Director Ben Rhodes in an interview with the New York Times last month—were true, this might not matter. But since everything that has happened in Iran since the conclusion of the deal shows that the regime is just as radical and dedicated to aggression and terrorism as it ever was, the Parchin clues are ominous signs of the danger that lies ahead.
What do a few particles of uranium tell us about the future of President Obama’s signature foreign-policy achievement? Nothing good, especially for those that would like to put the debate about the Iran nuclear deal behind us and assume, as the administration claims, that it precludes Tehran’s ability to create a weapon. These particles at Iran’s Parchin facility are the clues that confirm much of what critics have been saying since the deal was concluded last year—not only about Iran’s
untrustworthiness but also the assumptions about its ability to “break out” to build a bomb. Above all, what those particles tell us is that the United States and its allies still have no firm idea of how close Iran is to building a viable weapon should it decide to cheat on the agreement or even if it simply waits a decade to expire. Parchin is the proof that the deal is more of a prayer than the guarantee Obama promised.
As the Wall Street Journal reports, the traces of man-made uranium at the Parchin facility last October during an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency weren’t enough to give the West a firm idea of exactly what the Iranians had been doing there. But it does prove that the regime’s nuclear project was military in nature. Parchin is a weapons development site. As I noted here last December when the IAEA report regarding the inspections was first released, that knowledge alone confirms that Iran has been lying all along about its active efforts to build a bomb. The Journal’s reporting now makes it clear that Obama administration officials have confirmed that judgment.
But these same people also say they are sure Iran halted its work on a bomb in 2003 and that the particles date from that time. Their hope is that the discovery is merely an indication of past bad behavior and that it shouldn’t figure into any discussion of whether Iran is complying with the terms of the agreement. As one anonymous official told the Journal, “What’s important is that they can’t do it again.”
But one of the many problems with the deal was that the inspections process is limited to known nuclear sites. Since Parchin is a military base, it is not covered by the main agreement; it was dealt with in a side agreement whose terms have never been fully revealed. Inspectors went to Parchin last year, but they have no plans to return.
Any further investigation of the site is complicated by the fact that construction has been going on there and will make it even harder to learn more about its past. As to worries that Iran might use the immunity the deal gave military sites, the State Department had this to say:
“Parchin is an active military facility, and construction there does not necessarily indicate any nuclear-related activity,” said a State Department official. “At this time, we have no information that would lead us to believe that there is undeclared nuclear activity taking place anywhere in Iran.”
If true, that would be reassuring. But since inspectors can’t go there or any other military site how could the administration know? It can’t.
Contrary to the promises made by Secretary of State John Kerry and other administration figures, there was no comprehensive accounting of all of Iran’s past work on possible military dimensions of nuclear research. That’s why Tehran’s ability to cover up what happened at Parchin is so important. The U.S. needed that information because without it there could be no firm idea of how close the Iranians might be to building a bomb if it were to assemble the necessary nuclear materials. The assumption underlying the deal is that the restrictions on Iran’s activity lengthened that “break out” time to at least a year. Such a period of time would supposedly give the West enough time to discover the violations and then react before Iran could build its bomb.
However, the presence of those uranium particles confirms both Iran’s mendacity and the West’s ignorance. Break-out time could be much less than a year, for all we know. Moreover, since there will be no “anytime, anywhere” inspections in Iran, as was originally promised, even optimists must admit that the U.S. won’t really know if a breakout is occurring until it is probably too late to do anything about it.
And it’s actually worse than that—since, as the IAEA revealed in March, its inspectors won’t even bother trying to monitor whether any military research is being conducted. It will only stick to the agreed inspections of known nuclear sites.
All the talk that the deal ended the Iranian threat has been exposed as empty and meaningless. If the administration’s spin about Iran becoming more moderate—a claim made most recently by Deputy National Security Director Ben Rhodes in an interview with the New York Times last month—were true, this might not matter. But since everything that has happened in Iran since the conclusion of the deal shows that the regime is just as radical and dedicated to aggression and terrorism as it ever was, the Parchin clues are ominous signs of the danger that lies ahead.
