Commentary: World must tame the nuclear monster
By Paul Findley
In recent months, nuclear warheads have surfaced ominously in news reports from the Middle East, Russia and North Korea.
A rumor stated that Saudi Arabia might secure a nuclear weapon. Asked for comment, the government of Saudi Arabia made no response.
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin recently reminded the world that his government possessed nuclear weapons. He announced he had taken several bombs out of storage. North Korea demonstrated it can launch a nuclear bomb aboard an intercontinental rocket.
Taken together, these revelations are reasons for concern.
All three nations in effect say yes to nuclear bombs. Their recent announcements make it clear they see them as national assets. A few other nations also say yes. Among them are the United States, Great Britain, China, France, Israel, Pakistan and India.
Many other nations disagree. 190 governments have clearly said no to nuclear weapons. Each has signed an agreement, the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Of these, two governments, Argentina and Brazil, deserve special accolades. They have fortified their no vote on nuclear weapons with a remarkable, truly historic bi-national pact.
Years ago, they had a checkered, sometimes fierce, relationship in nuclear affairs. Today, they are observing 25 years of friendly nuclear cooperation. The harmony began with their compliance in a bi-national accord 13 years in the making. It gives both nations the right to make on-site inspections of the other nation’s nuclear facilities without advance notice. It is the ultimate in diplomatic transparency, the first bi-national nuclear pact in world history.
Each nation has 50 nuclear inspectors at work. They are organized under a bi-national group called the Argentine-Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. Scientist Odilon Marcusso Do Canto is general secretary. The anniversary is being observed in several seminars arranged by ABACC. During the inspection process, the ABACC works closely with representatives from the UN’s International Agency on Atomic Energy, based in Austria.
Through happenstance a short term but unique role in this great drama came my way. It began in mid-August 1977, when I was a member of a U.S. congressional group touring South America’s major capitals. We began in Panama, then proceeded to Ecuador, Peru and Chile.
Discussions at each capital focused on the danger of competition between Argentina and Brazil that might lead to a nuclear arms race. No one wanted that to happen, but a recent military government in Brazil secretly started a nuclear process that would produce nuclear explosives, an episode that caused continuing apprehension over the future.
The basic problem between the two nations was distrust. As our group continued its calls, a suggestion came to mind: The two governments should jointly pledge renunciation of nuclear explosive devices and each government should permit nuclear scientists from the other government to inspect without advance notice all its places of nuclear activity.
Argentina’s Atomic Energy Commission chairman, Adm. Castro Madero, and other officials responded favorably. Two days later in Brazil, our last stop, Deputy Foreign Minister Geraldo Holanda Cavalcanti and his staff said it needed more study.
When our group landed in Washington, I decided to present my personal proposal for public discussion. A news conference yielded coverage in the Washington Post. Two days later, the Post published my detailed commentary. In a fortunate coincidence, the capital was preparing for the arrival of Latin American leaders for ceremonies in which the U.S. government deeded the Panama Canal Zone to the government of Panama. This should assure a good audience for my publicity.
Learning that Brazil’s vice president, Gen. Pereira dos Santos, had arrived in Washington, I secured an appointment with him and delivered a lengthy letter presenting my proposal. Although courteous, he displayed no interest in my letter.
The next day, I returned to my duties on Capitol Hill. In all, I spent about two weeks on the nuclear peacekeeping project. From that day, I did nothing to promote it.
On Capitol Hill, I faced one political crisis after another, putting totally out of mind my experience in South America.
That is, until the phone rang in late November 2011.
The call was from Brazil. On the phone were two historians studying nuclear developments in South America, Dr. Carlo Patti of Brazil and Rodrigo Mallea of Argentina. Working together in archives of the Brazilian government, they discovered the original letter I wrote to the vice president of Brazil on Sept. 6, 1977. The historians wanted to know the background of the letter.
Momentarily, I was taken aback. South America had been totally out of my mind for more than three decades. When the historians mentioned the letter, details came flooding back.
Patti summarized the long but ultimately successful journey of my proposal through 13 years of diplomatic discussion. He said it seemed completely dormant for the first six of those years. Then he found documents proving that in 1983 President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of state, George Schultz, brought my plan back to life. Making preparations for an official visit to Brazil, he sent an unusual request through diplomatic channels. He expressed hope that his hosts would be able to report progress on implementing the plan I proposed in 1977. I was astounded at that revelation, because it was my first evidence that the U.S. State Department approved my proposal. Schultz’s request must have revived consideration, because my plan began to receive sporadic consideration during the next seven years. Patti told me several officials kept pressing for action.
Toward the end of our phone conversation, Patti said a number of documents did not mention my name but contained phrases taken verbatim from my letter to Brazil’s vice-president.
As we talked, I felt a warm inner glow. His report was a gratifying and exciting revelation. During my long career in public life, the 20 eventful days in August-September 1977 were the closest I came to qualifying as a success in peacemaking. Marcusso wrote: “Your seeds germinated and grew up in a beautiful plant, and we Brazilians and Argentinians are very proud of it.”
The historic bi-national pact was ratified in 1991. It was signed by the two presidents — Carlos Mnem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil — in a ceremony in Guadalajara, Mexico. These two men deserve the credit. They tamed the nuclear monster in their neighborhood. They executed a remarkable act of statecraft that helps keep South America free of nuclear bombs.
In time, I trust, other world leaders will act as resolutely. Argentina and Brazil were the first — and today still the only — countries to achieve this pinnacle of mutual nuclear comity and cooperation in history.
All leaders must face the truth about nuclear warheads. They are far too terrible for use as instruments of war, even in a desperate defensive crises. They no longer serve as deterrents to attack. Every one of them is a liability, not an asset.
Today, not all governments agree warheads are too dangerous to keep. The list of such nations is short but impressive: United States, Russia, China, North Korea, Israel, Pakistan, India, Great Britain and France. Except for North Korea, all consider nuclear warheads useful only to repel a nuclear attack.
Argentina and Brazil lead the way. They say no to nuclear warheads. Perhaps India and Pakistan, often rivals, will start their own on-site inspection pact and disable all their nuclear warheads. That would be another giant step toward a safe and sane world.
My concern about nuclear warheads began in October 1945 when, as a U.S. Navy officer, I visited Nagasaki, Japan, just a few weeks after a relatively small nuclear bomb was dropped by a U.S. Air Force plane, burning to instant death at least 60,000 humans in a single gigantic blast. The experience was shocking and deeply troubling. The vast area pulverized convinced me nuclear warheads must be prohibited worldwide. Hoping to advance that goal was one of the reasons I later sought election to Congress.
In his recent address to congress Narendra Modi , prime minister of India,offered to extend India’s leadership in the region.
A suggestion. Modi is uniquely situated to tame the nuclear monster to a higher level. All he needs is the cooperation of the president of Pakistan, Mamnoon Hussain. Perhaps he and Modi are already convinced that nuclear warheads are a liability, not an asset.
A pie in the sky? A dream, yes, but more than that, a dream that can become reality when two people see the hand of destiny.
Then others will follow. The monster will then be dead, not just maimed.
Paul Findley of Jacksonville served as a Republican Congressman from 1961 to 1983. He is the author of six books, the latest of which is titled “Speaking Out.”
