Sound bytes: ‘ Pakistan is engaged in nuclear competition’
Sadia Tasleem
|
Dawn
got in touch with Sadia Tasleem, Robin Copeland Memorial Fellow for
non-proliferation and lecturer at the department of defence and
strategic studies, Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, via email to
discuss Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear programme.
Q.
Pakistan recently test-fired nuclear-capable surface-to-surface
ballistic missile Shaheen III. Why did it do so when Pakistan adheres to
minimum credible deterrence policy?
A. The ISPR statement explains the recent testing as a step that will further strengthen Pakistan’s deterrence capability. The
recently tested Shaheen III with a declared range of approximately
1,700 miles has the ability to hit the farthest parts of India. In
Pakistani perception, increasing India’s vulnerability would help
strengthen deterrence.
As far as “minimum credible deterrence” is concerned, it is important to know how Pakistan defines it.
Pakistan
considers minimum credible deterrence as a dynamic as opposed to a
quantitatively definable concept. It implies that Pakistan will keep
calculating its nuclear deterrence requirements based on the Indian
nuclear related developments. This not only affects the criteria for
what is minimum yet credible but also often makes “minimum” and
“credible” irreconcilable.
Q.
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence policy seems to be India-centric. Is
India’s nuclear deterrence policy apparently Pakistan-centric?
A. India has larger objectives in the region and beyond. Its nuclear policy is aimed at multiple actors.
Q. India continues to increase its nuclear arsenal. Does that mean Pakistan will also continue to do so and not set a bar?
A.
What Pakistan will or will not do will in the long run depends not only
upon its willingness or unwillingness to do certain things but also
upon many other variables including the availability of resources,
infrastructure and national priorities. However,
as long as Pakistan perceives each Indian development as destabilising,
it will continue to make an effort to respond to them. Current trends
suggest that Pakistan is deeply concerned about Indian developments and
it is trying to, if not, match to at least counter them in whatever ways
possible.
Q.
Is Pakistan doing the right thing in terms of its national security
strategy by test-firing Shaheen-III and to quote the ISPR “strengthening
the country’s deterrence capability”?
A.
The answer to this question largely depends on our worldview and
understanding of the concept of deterrence. Anyone who looks at
diversity of weapon systems and nuclear-armed missiles as a fundamental
requirement for making deterrence credible would approve of decisions
like test-firing of missiles with different ranges. However, those who
look at deterrence as largely a psychological phenomenon in which even
the rudimentary capabilities would make as much or as little difference
as more weapons would consider such actions redundant. The question that
may follow then is, should Pakistan pay the cost of redundancy?
Q. Are we engaging in a nuclear arms race?
Q. Will adding more nuclear-capable missiles increase the quality of stability of the country?
A.
The answer to this question also varies depending on how deterrence and
stability are defined. In my view, however, adding more nuclear capable
missiles may not necessarily increase stability. We need to carefully
analyse if the introduction of a new weapon system strengthens
deterrence only in an abstract sense or does it make any concrete
difference in the perception (and behaviour) of the actor we intend to
deter.
Published in Dawn, March 15th, 2015
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