As a reader of
Khomeinist global strategies since the early 1980s, and as I have argued over decades in books and articles, Tehran’s regime possesses a
much larger nuclear strategy than the simple acquisition of
mass destruction weapons. Over the last few years, the United States and its Western allies have been led to focus on the visible part of the
Iranian buildup,
missing the much greater construct undertaken over several generations
of rulers of the same Iranian regime. Since the so-called “Iran nuclear
deal” was inked last fall, Washington acts as if it has somewhat halted
(or at least slowed) the strategic program of Tehran and thus has been
rewarding the Ayatollahs, but the reality flies in the face of this
assumption and agreement. Iran’s regime is employing a much larger
strategy in order to reach the level of an armed nuclear power, and –
perhaps ironically – one of the regime’s strategic policies is to
mislead the international community, particularly the U.S., in its
campaign to irreversibly transform itself into a nuclear power.
The “dome” is a complex integration of Iranian foreign policy: Terrorism backing, using financial luring, exploiting Western weaknesses while at the same time expanding influence.
The Iranian global construct can be perceived as a “
Khomeinist Dome.”
Iran’s strategy has been twofold—and sustained over decades, not simply
implemented over the past few years and months. The regime has two
simultaneous goals. One is to create a defensive sphere over the
forthcoming strategic weapon before it is unveiled, and two is to
suppress any internal opposition to the regime’s policies. The
“dome”
is a complex integration of Iranian foreign policy: Terrorism backing,
using financial luring, exploiting Western weaknesses while at the same
time expanding influence in the region so that by the time the greater
shield is established, most U.S. and allied measures will be useless.
The regime knew all too well, years ago, that if they produced
one atomic weapon
(or even two) without being able to protect it, they would run into the
almost certainty of military action by the West and/or by Israel to
disable it. They were unable to circumvent this strategic theorem for
decades, at least since the end of the Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1987. The
issue for them was not about obtaining the nuclear weapon, but how to
deter their enemies from destroying it. Iran did not have the
geopolitical or economic capacities, nor the international stature of
either India or Pakistan, to produce
large scale numbers of bombs and later announce them the way south Asia’s
nuclear powers
detonated their devices in 1999. Hence Iran’s grand strategy to equip
itself with the ultimate weapon was different—and thus far successful.
After the Soviet collapse, Tehran knew Israel, or possibly a U.S. administration, would bomb the
nuclear installations,
not to mention the location of a potential weapon. The Israeli raid on
Osirak in 1981 was clear evidence of Western determination to strike at a
nuclear weapon in the hands of a dangerous regime. The Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait and the coalition’s massive response in 1990-1991 also told
the Khomeinists that a post-Cold War West is more assertive than under
the previously bipolar world. Finally, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003 brought two powerful and hostile armies to
Iran’s two borders. Tehran’s reading of the landscape change was so
nervous that it declared itself as abandoning its
nuclear ambitions,
almost simultaneously with Muammar Qaddafi. The fear of being toppled
by outside military forces pushed Iran to hide its nuclear ambitions
while awaiting the outcome of the regional evolution.
Full steam ahead
By 2005, as the U.S. offensive in the Middle East came to a halt, the
Iranian regime displayed its hardliner face with the coming of Mahmoud
Ahmedinijad to power. From then on, the grand strategy of the
atomic conquest went full steam ahead. On one track, Iran activated the
production of nuclear material,
making Bushehr and its sister sites the center of international focus.
Washington responded with targeted sanctions, well-crafted but aiming at
pressuring Tehran to halt the project. The failure of the
sanctions-only policies to exert a full strategic halt was caused by the
inability of the West to support a strong and organized Iranian
opposition inside the country with a significant presence in neighboring
Iraq. Sanctions to pressure, without a real resistance movement to push
the regime into a corner, were doomed to fail and they did.
But the Iranian regime’s wider strategy was to
create a shield for the nuclear weapons
as they were produced. In fact, the Ayatollahs calculated that they
would only unveil the weapon if and when it is protected. Hence, while
the U.S. focused primarily on the fissile material, the fast track
production of missiles was never stopped. The greater dome strategy includes missiles, anti-aircraft systems, geopolitical space and
terrorism.
A large missile force, which would target a wide spectrum of cities
and sites, has been under construction for years. In addition, the
regime has been attempting to obtain advanced anti-aircraft missile
systems to protect the potential offensive missiles. And when the two
structures are fully ready it will be a greater challenge to eliminate
the entire network as it would be
armed with nukes and other WMDs while also surrounded with a vast AA system; all the while, the
uranium production
is moving forward. In parallel, Tehran has been expanding its reach in
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Arabian Peninsula and parts of East Africa
with its influence and through
terror networks. Once the combination of all the above systems is in place,
the bomb will come, but not before.
Unstoppable power
The Khomeinist dome is
about preparing for the nukes before they are displayed and claimed. It
is about signaling to the West that once the greater Iranian power is
asserted, there will not be a first indefensible bomb. Rather, Iran will
jump to the level of unstoppable power with a vast network of
retaliation as deterrence will have been achieved. Unfortunately,
Western posture towards Tehran has only helped in the building of the
dome: sanctions worked but were limited, all Iran’s other military
systems were unchecked, and its interventions in the region unstopped.
Worse, a
nuclear deal with the U.S. injected time and energy into the regime’s veins.
At this point, the regime is out to complete the buildup of its strategic shield while offering to slow down its
fissile material production.
Once the dome is complete, the nuclear material production will speed
up, and by the time the West realizes the maneuver, the Middle East will
have changed forever.
________
Dr. Walid Phares serves as an advisor to members of Congress on the
Middle East. He is the author of the newly-released The Lost Spring:
U.S. Policy in the Middle East and the Catastrophes to Avoid, as well as
Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America and The
Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad. He has served on
the Homeland Security Board of Advisors and the National Security
Council Task Force on Nuclear Terrorism. Dr. Phares taught at the
National Defense University since 2006.
