IRAQ AFTER RAMADI: SAVING THE ANTI-ISIL STRATEGY
Douglas A. Ollivant
June 3, 2015 · in Commentary
The seizure of Ramadi on May 17 by the Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) was a tactical defeat for the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi
government, and — by extension — the U.S.-led coalition. ISIL had a good
day; Iraq and its allies had a bad day. Losing Ramadi makes the task
ahead more difficult. There is no sugarcoating this fact, and therefore
the latest round of self-examination is appropriate, if often
misinformed.
There are three policy goals that the United States has — or should
have — in Iraq. First, it needs to help facilitate the defeat, if not
destruction, of ISIL in Iraq (as a first step to its wider defeat in the
region). Second, it needs to keep Iraq unified so that the gains of
ISIL’s destruction can be held. Finally, it needs to ensure that this
unified Iraq is as Western-oriented as possible. While the first of
these goals is the most immediate, it is the last two that are most
important, and to which too little attention is being paid.
Defeating ISIL
The coalition (and we all know this is a fig leaf for simply saying
“American”) strategy for defeating ISIL is primarily a military one. The
coalition has other official lines of effort — countering foreign
fighters and countering threat financing, for example — but the military
line is the most immediate. This military support appears to come in
four areas — training, equipping, providing intelligence, and air
support.
The political reasons for this strategy are obvious. There is no
political will to do otherwise. To explain this to any politically aware
U.S. reading audience is superfluous. And while it is easy to blame the
current administration, one must be aware that they are responding to a
deeply held mass political preference to get and keep U.S. troops out
of Iraq. But often lost in the U.S. political debate is the Iraqi end of
the equation. There are no U.S. combat troops on the ground in Iraq for
two reasons — the United States has not offered them, and the
government of Iraq has not requested them. The reason for this is quite
simple — there are significant factions inside the Iraqi polity who have
made it clear they will see the introduction of U.S. forces on the
ground as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty, and therefore an invading
force. And strictly speaking, this would be legally correct in the
absence of a United Nations mandate or an agreement with the government
of Iraq.
The Sadrist factions
(meaning all those who follow the teachings of Muqtada al-Sadr’s late
father, not simply those under Muqtada’s banner) would probably react
accordingly, and it is not too strong to say that any U.S. forces
introduced might be fighting in two directions. The Sadrists by no means
represent all Shia, whether in the Iraqi Army or the Popular
Mobilization Units (PMUs), but their numbers are not insignificant.
Therefore, an indirect strategy to enable partner forces on the ground
is — far and away — the most prudent alternative.
Further, when we look hard at the recent failure in Ramadi, the issue
appears to be less a problem with the strategy, and more a problem with
the execution of the strategy. At the time of their defeat, the Iraqi
troops in Ramadi had been fighting against ISIL and allied militants and
taking significant casualties for about 18 months (say what you want
about “will to fight”), so any training failures cannot be fairly
attributed to the coalition. However, other problems remain.
For example, there was clearly a failure to properly equip the Iraqi
Army forces in Ramadi since the summer of 2014 when the anti-ISIL
coalition went operational and Washington committed to strengthening
Iraqi forces. That ISIL has been using car bombs with suicide drivers
(Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, or SVBIEDs, in
military vernacular) as part of their complex attacks is well-known. As
any infantryman with service in Iraq can tell you, the proper defensive
tactic against an SVBIED is an anti-tank missile. The Kurds have been
using this tactic to great success in the north. So in Ramadi we have a
known ISIL tactic in the SVBIED, we have a known countermeasure in the
anti-tank missile, and yet there were no anti-tank missiles available in
Ramadi, leaving the Iraqi Army helpless against these weapons, many of
which were of the same size and construction as that used by Tim McVeigh
in the Oklahoma City bombing. This is not a lack of “will to fight.”
This is a lack of adequate equipment. Any force — even the U.S. Army or
Marines — faced with multiple SVBIEDs, and lacking any ability to defend
against them would likely break and withdraw, regardless of their
numerical superiority.
It is unclear where the fault lies. Did the missiles not make it to
Iraq? Were the missiles in Iraq but not in Ramadi? Did the Iraqi Army
headquarters (and their U.S. advisors) think there were missiles
available in Ramadi when there were not? Was there a failure in the
Ministry of Defense or in the Iraqi logistics network? Was the danger of
the SVBIED and the appropriate countermeasure not disseminated? We do
not know the answers to these questions, but if there is blame to be
allocated, it appears that at least some of it goes to the U.S. advisory
effort led by the Pentagon and CENTCOM, and not to any lack of will
among the Iraq frontline units who were defeated in Ramadi. And again,
this is not a problem with the strategy. The United States should have
done everything it could to get these missiles to Ramadi. It did not,
but this is a problem of execution, not of strategy formulation. The
fact that the sub-state Kurdish Regional Government, which has
complained loudly through their Washington lobbyists about their lack of
weapons, has these missiles while the Iraqi Army does not is the height
of irony.
Another aspect of the U.S. strategy is to provide airpower support to
the Iraqi forces engaged in combat on the ground. There is now wide
criticism of the rules of engagement limiting the use of U.S. airpower
by both airpower advocates and politicians. While the limitations of any
weapons system can often be difficult for the uninitiated to
understand, the anecdotal evidence of ISIL convoys moving unmolested,
while the main ISIL supply routes run through what was once Syrian and
Iraqi territory, does raise eyebrows and make one wonder if there is not
more the United States could be doing with airpower.
So in short, rather than call for a new strategy, one might instead
call for a more effective execution of the one that currently exists. It
appears that — while issues with the Iraqi Army and other security
forces certainly remain — the decisive factor in the fall of Ramadi was
the absence of a weapon system that our strategy should have ensured was
on hand. This is a failure of tactics, and not of strategy, and
therefore a failure of the Pentagon, and not the White House (again,
without dismissing real issues, and the possibility of political
interference, there as well).
Unified Iraq
A unified Iraq is a key U.S. interest because the alternative is unthinkable.
Many columnists like to write about the breakup of Iraq or advocate
that it should break apart, but it is not clear that they understand for
what they are calling. The breakup of Iraq would be a humanitarian
disaster of epic proportions. The borders between Iraq’s various
ethno-sectarian groups are not clean ones, and the dividing lines
between Shia and Sunni (Baghdad, Sal-a-Din, Diyala) and Sunni Arabs and
Kurds (Diyala, Mosul, Kirkuk) would be bloody ones, particularly for the
various minority groups (Turkmen, Christians, Yezidi, etc). The
partitions of countries have historically always involved further war,
death, and destruction (see India in 1947, Yugoslavia in the 1990s, or —
more recently — Sudan). Should this worst case occur, the world should
expect to see wars within, and not only between, Iraq’s various
ethno-sectarian groups. Iraq’s Sunni are divided, particularly between
the Anbaris and the northern groups in Sal-a-Din and Mosul. Anyone
maintaining that there would be a coherent “Sunni-stan” in a divided
Iraq does not understand the internal dynamics of Iraq. One could see
further divisions within Iraq’s other groups as well, and a rekindling
of civil war between Kurdish factions is far from unthinkable, as is a
splintering of Iraq’s south between the southernmost oil-rich provinces
and the more resource-poor provinces of Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and
Baghdad.
My friend Joel Rayburn and I disagree about most aspects of the
conflict in Iraq, and in particular on the likelihood of Iraq’s breakup
(which he sees as somewhere between likely to inevitable) but on the
point of the consequences of Iraqi state dissolution, we are in
agreement. A warning he wrote about the breakup of Iraq deserves to be
quoted in full:
[A]s we are likely to find out in the coming years, there is no way
for Iraq to be divided into three homelands for Shiites, Kurds and
Sunnis without experiencing exactly the massive human misery that [Joe]
Biden, [Leslie] Gelb and others hoped partition might forestall. No
clean ethno-sectarian lines already exist in Iraq, meaning that the
boundaries of the various statelets would have to be fought over. The
populations of northern and central Iraq in particular are so
intertwined that separating people into sectarian enclaves would
immediately prompt violent sectarian cleansing on a scale sure to exceed
that of Yugoslavia. At least a quarter of a million non-Sunnis would
probably be forced to leave Sunni-majority territories, while more than
half a million Sunnis would probably be expelled from the greater
Baghdad region, with those Sunni Baghdadis that remain herded into
ghettos in and around the city.
There would also be millions of Iraqis caught in limbo. What would
become, for example, of the large minority population that is not Sunni,
Shiite or Kurd? And what would become of Iraq’s more than 1 million
Turkmen? What would become of the millions of Iraqis in intermarried
families of Shiite and Sunni or Arab and Kurd? The fragmenting of the
country into sectarian cantons would leave these millions with no clear
place to go.
Keeping Iraq together is in the
U.S. national interest, as the last thing this volatile region needs is
another failed state analogous to Syria. Fortunately, it appears most
of Iraq’s citizens realize the dangers of state failure as well, so true
breakup — while still a terrifying possibility — remains a
low-probability event.
Despite the recent defeat in Ramadi, the war against ISIL is still
one in which the Iraqi government and pro-government forces are on the
offensive. But there remains a danger that once ISIL is ejected and Iraq
is kept together, that Iran will emerge as the greatest beneficiary,
with its allies and proxies enjoying increased status in Iraq. Were the
United States to increase Iranian influence in Iraq as a result of
saving Iraq, this would be the most subtle of snares.
The United States has a huge narrative problem when it comes to the
bulk of the Iraqi population. In the past month, the Iraqis have heard
one congressional committee call for the breakup of their country,
another congressional committee call for the reoccupation of their
country, and a cabinet secretary impugn the “will to fight” of their
army. Taken in concert, it is not difficult to see why Iraqi citizens
might think that the United States intends to use the ISIL crisis to
dismantle their country, re-occupy their country, or both. Public
statements such as these are not helpful, and — to be blunt — aid and
abet Iran in their campaign to build political support in Iraq.
I am sure this sounds ungrateful to most U.S. citizens after the
blood and treasure expended in Iraq, but it is something that is
necessary to understand if we wish to extend influence. Most
importantly, we need to understand how what is said in the United States
is heard in Iraq; not what we intend to say, but how it is heard.
Particularly when more rational and informed voices are urging us to
keep calm and not panic, these statements are deeply counterproductive.
Political leaders in the United States should be in the business of
bolstering our allies, not making it more difficult to be a friend of
the United States.
We have in the current Iraqi government perhaps the best arrangement
of political leaders we could hope for under the circumstances, each
representing the best and most moderate tendencies among their
ethno-sectarian group. President Fouad Masum, of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, appears to be replicating the calming influence previously
exercised by the now-incapacitated Jalal Talibani. Prime Minister Haider
al-Abadi is exercising power as the Western-educated technocrat that he
is, albeit in very difficult circumstances. And Parliament Speaker Dr.
Salim al-Jabouri, a Sunni, continues to try to calm his constituency as
the Iraqi government works to find ways to further compromise with its
Sunni Arab minority — a very difficult balancing act.
The United States should weigh all its actions — military to
rhetorical — through the lens of supporting this government. By this
measure, U.S. actions have in past weeks been counterproductive. The
fight against ISIL in Iraq is Iraq’s before it is ours. If Washington
undercuts its primary ally in this fight, the United States puts itself
in the unique and unenviable position of giving unintended support to
both ISIL and Iran.
The U.S. strategy of supporting Iraq remains sound, but further
refinement of its execution — particularly but not exclusively along the
lines of equipping and air support — appears to be called for. But
equally important, U.S. policymakers need to perform a “sanity check” on
their actions and statements, thinking about how these will be received
by our ally — both in the capital and “on the street.” We are in
competition with Iran for influence in Iraq. U.S. policymakers should
not further handicap that competition. As I have argued before in these
pages, it would be tragic were the United States to succeed in helping
Iraq eject ISIL, only to have Iran’s allies in Iraq take the political
credit, and cement an Iranian-friendly government through democratic
means. All actions taken in or with regard to Iraq should be weighed to
avoid contributing to this possibility, so that one of the precious few
democratic states in the region does not end up in the orbit of a U.S.
rival.
Dr. Douglas A. OIlivant is a Managing Partner and the Senior Vice
President of Mantid International, a global consulting firm with offices
in Beirut, Baghdad and Washington D.C., which has financial interests
in Baghdad and southern Iraq. He is also an ASU Senior Fellow in the
Future of War project at New America. Follow him on Twitter at
@DouglasOllivant.
