After Nuclear Deal, Iran’s Hard-liners Assert Power
Hopes dim that accord would open the Islamic Republic more widely to the outside world
An
Iranian demonstrator in Tehran holds a photo of Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while another shows a scrawled slogan in support
of him on her hand, at protests Wednesday marking the 36th anniversary
of the seizure of the U.S. Embassy. Photo: Associated Press
But now the agreement has been reached, they are increasingly losing another battle that perhaps is even more important: opening the Islamic Republic more widely to the outside world. Iranian conservatives opposed to any relaxation in the regime’s traditional hostility to the U.S. are pushing back strongly, both at home and abroad.
“This is the beginning of Rouhani’s end. What we’ll now see, inside and outside the country, is an Iran that will pursue a more adversarial policy while the nice, smiling face of Iran is going to fade,” said Mehdi Khalaji, an Iran expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Already, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps has dramatically stepped up its direct involvement in the Syrian war, a deepening commitment highlighted by the rising number of Iranian military casualties, including senior IRGC officers, in recent weeks. Iran also tested a new, long-range precision-guided ballistic missile last month—a move that, according to Washington, may have violated a United Nations Security Council resolution.
Recent high-profile arrests inside Iran, meanwhile, seem to be designed to thwart Mr. Rouhani, whose powers over Iran’s judiciary and IRGC are limited.
Last month, Iranian authorities arrested a visiting American-Iranian businessman, Siamak Namazi, who was seeking to promote business ties between Iran and the West. In September, they detained a Washington-based Lebanese information-technology expert, Nizar Zakka, who had been invited by Mr. Rouhani’s vice president to address an international conference in Tehran. Iranian state TV described him as a spy.Several Iranians with connections to reformist circles have also been rounded up in recent days, prompting Mr. Rouhani himself, in a speech posted Wednesday on his Instagram page, to criticize the unfolding crackdown as a political ploy by his conservative foes.
“This is part of the pushback. The Rouhani administration doesn’t benefit from this, and doesn’t want this to happen. This is a good way for the hard-liners to say: ‘We are the ones in control, not you,’” said Dina Esfandiary, a fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies of King’s College London.
The decisive voice in this power struggle belongs to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He provided crucial support to Mr. Rouhani during the nuclear negotiations but since then has frequently spoken out against the notion that the deal between Iran, the U.S. and five other world powers would become a stepping stone toward a broader détente with the West.
“The slogan ‘death to America’ is backed by reason and wisdom,” Mr. Khamenei said this week at a meeting with Iranian students on commemorating the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. “The truth is that U.S. objectives regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran haven’t changed at all, and they wouldn’t spare a moment if they could destroy the Islamic Republic, but they can’t.”
The head of the IRGC, Maj.-Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, told another gathering with Iranian students this month that Iran must confront a wave of “sedition” that calls for “trusting the West and believing in liberalism” following the nuclear deal. He also reaffirmed that Tehran will continue backing President Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the Houthi movement in Iran that is battling a Saudi-led coalition.
In Iran’s system, the final say over matters of state resides with Mr. Khamenei, not the elected president or parliament. Mr. Khamenei and the religious establishment can also sway the elections themselves, including by disqualifying candidates.
While Mr. Rouhani’s term runs until 2017, he and his fellow reformers face a critical test already in February, when Iranians go to the polls to elect a new parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a body that is supposed to pick the a successor to the 76-year-old Mr. Khamenei after he dies or steps down from the post.
Though the lifting of international sanctions after the nuclear deal is likely to boost the Iranian economy, this dividend won’t immediately be felt by the public. And, if oil prices stay low or decline even further, the impact of cheap oil may drown out the benefits of sanctions relief altogether. This, in turn, is likely to strengthen those hard-liners who already say Mr. Rouhani has sacrificed the country’s nuclear program for nothing.
“The Rouhani administration promised people that, after the compromise on nuclear issues, the economic situation will be better,” said Mohammad Eslami, an Iranian commentator and a fellow at Mofid University in Iran. “But before the parliamentary election, people won’t see any real change in the economic situation. This means that it would be hard for people to vote for the candidates who are in favor of the Rouhani administration and in favor of negotiations with the Western countries.”
These domestic constraints make it very difficult, if not impossible, for Mr. Rouhani and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, to show much flexibility in coming months, particularly in the recently started negotiations with other global and regional powers to end the Syrian war.
“They cannot make any obvious concessions,” said Andrey Kortunov, director-general of the Russian International Affairs Council, who recently met with Iran’s leaders. “They have enough problems at home as it is after the nuclear deal, and they don’t want to offer a trump card to those who are already preparing to gobble them up.”
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
