What The Iran Framework Really Means (Eze 17)

The Iran nuclear deal, translated into plain English

Updated by Max Fisher on April 2, 2015, 3:41 p.m. ET @Max_Fisher max@vox.com
International negotiators assembled in Switzerland have announced the broad terms of the Iranian nuclear deal. Here they are, based on what we know, translated into plain English.

Important : the deal is not yet finalized, and it is not particularly detailed. Thursday’s announcement is only for the basic framework. Negotiators will continue to meet over the coming months to develop a complete, detailed agreement based on these terms. The deadline is June 30, but negotiations could collapse before then. However, this is a major step toward reaching a full agreement and thus potentially ending the world’s yearslong standoff with Iran over its nuclear program.

What follows is each of the items mentioned in the deal, along with a simple translation into plain English and a brief description of why it matters:

Centrifuges

Term: Iran will be allowed about 6,000 centrifuges: 5,000 at its Natanz facility and 1,000 at Fordow. It can only use first-generation IR-1 centrifuges, and has to give up other models.

Plain English: Centrifuges are pieces of equipment you use to enrich uranium, a natural ore, into nuclear fuel. If you enrich uranium long enough in centrifuges, it can be used to make a nuclear bomb. Iran currently has about 20,000 centrifuges, so it will have to give most of them up. It will also be allowed to use only its very old, first-generation centrifuges.

Why it matters: This means Iran will have a much smaller nuclear program, in terms of its ability to create nuclear fuel or, potentially, nuclear material for a bomb. It will also be restricted to its oldest, slowest, least capable centrifuges. The US had earlier hinted it might allow 6,500 centrifuges, so this is a favorable outcome for the US.

Uranium enrichment

Term: Iran will be allowed to enrich uranium to only to 3.67 percent.

Plain English: Iran will be allowed to turn raw uranium into the kind of fuel that can be used for a nuclear power plant. But nothing more.

Why it matters: Iran can have nuclear fuel, and it can make nuclear fuel, but it has to stop way, way short of making or having anything that could be used for a nuclear bomb (about 90 percent enriched).

Stockpile

Term: Iran will be required to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms.

Plain English: Iran has to give up a stunning 97 percent of its nuclear stockpile.

Why it matters: This is very favorable for the US, but it punts on a really important question: how will Iran get rid of this stockpile? The US and Iran had disagreed sharply over how to do it. It looks like they still haven’t found an answer.

Sanctions relief

Term: The US and European Union will suspend sanctions after IAEA inspectors confirm that Iran has completed its requirements under the deal. United Nations Security Council sanctions will be lifted once Iran completes all actions addressing nuclear concerns. US sanctions related to non-nuclear matters, such as Iran’s state-sponsored terrorism, will remain in place. Sanctions will snap back on Iranian violation.

Plain English: The US, Europe, and UN Security Council will remove their sanctions after Iran fulfills its end of the deal. But it is still very unclear how exactly that gets determined, when that happens, or whether it means the sanctions are lifted all at once, or over time. If Iran breaks its end, the sanctions will all come back (in theory).

Why it matters: Sanctions relief was a huge fight: Iran wanted all the sanctions off right away, the US and others wanted to remove them gradually. Some are reading this as Iran getting its demand, but it’s just not clear at this point. It is true that once European or United Nations sanctions come off, it will be difficult to re-impose them — even if Iran does cheat.

Nuclear facilities


Term: Iran will be allowed to use its nuclear facility at Natanz for enrichment. It can also use its facility at Fordow for research as a nuclear physics lab, but no fissile material will be allowed there.

Plain English: Iran will be allowed to keep using its once-secret “hardened facilities” — big structures with heavy blast walls to protect from attack — at sites known as Natanz and Fordow. Iran can keep using the one at Natanz to make nuclear fuel. It can keep using the facility at Fordow for what sounds like fairly limited nuclear research.

Why it matters: Iran really wanted to keep access to these facilities, partly as a matter of national pride. International inspectors will have access, so they won’t really function as covert nuclear facilities anymore. And the stuff Iran gets to do with them is pretty limited.

Plutonium plant at Arak

Term: Iran will be required to rebuild its plutonium plant at Arak such that it will only make energy-grade plutonium, and will ship out its spent plutonium. It is barred from heavy-water reactor use.

Plain English: Iran had built a facility at Arak for making and storing potentially weapons-grade plutonium. Now, it will repurpose the facility to only make nuclear fuel.

Why it matters: You can make a nuclear bomb with one of two fuels: uranium or plutonium. Theother parts of the deal limit and restrict what Iran can do with uranium. This part of the deal removes weapons-grade plutonium from the equation and only allows fuel-grade plutonium for powering a power plant.

Inspections

Term: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors will have access to Iran’s nuclear sites, the uranium mines and mills, centrifuge plants, and supply chains. It will monitor dual-use technologies. It can access “suspicious sites.”

Plain English: Inspectors will be regularly checking out all of the known places that Iran would use for any kind of nuclear work, and even many things related to nuclear work. It can also investigate anything suspicious that pops up.

Why it matters: Inspectors, by gaining access to not just the core nuclear sites but also secondary things like uranium mills and centrifuge plants, will be in a really good position to make sure Iran isn’t cheating on a deal or trying to build another secret facility somewhere. If Iran does try to cheat, the world will be much more likely to know.