Why Pakistan Is Staying Out of Yemen
On
March 25, a Saudi-led coalition of ten Arab states began an aerial
bombing campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen, who had taken control
of the capital, Sana’a. The Houthis were steadily progressing to the
port city of Aden, where the Saudi-backed Yemeni president, Abd Rabbuh
Mansur Hadi, had fled. Codenamed “Operation Decisive Storm,” the move
has been widely viewed as an effort by the Saudis and their allies to
preserve Sunni control of their volatile southern neighbor against the
Zaidi Shi’a Houthis, supported by Iran.
As the parties attempt to reach a settlement after
the month-long campaign, one key Saudi ally is still missing from its
coalition: Pakistan. After a week of heavy debate, Pakistan’s Parliament
unanimously passed a resolution on April 10 declaring that the country
would remain “neutral” in the Yemen conflict, signifying a sharp break
between the two long-time partners.
Pakistan’s
decision not to join the Saudi-led intervention against Houthi rebels
in Yemen may signal a serious cooling in relations between Islamabad and
Riyadh, long built on complementary capacities and shared strategic interests.
Pakistan,
on the one hand, has benefitted enormously from Saudi largesse in the
form of cheap oil and cash infusions during times of need. The Saudis,
meanwhile, have called on Pakistan’s generously-funded army, one of the
strongest in the region, to support its military objectives. The
resolution calling for neutrality passed by Pakistan’s parliament, while
far from signaling a complete shift away from its longtime patron, is a
sign that Islamabad is responding to an evolving strategic landscape. U.S. leaders, in formulating regional policy, would do well to bear in mind the factors contributing to this decision as they navigate the delicate environment at the intersection of South Asia, Iran, and the Arab World.
Historical Relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
Examples of
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia’s remarkably close reciprocal
relationship date to the early phases of the Cold War, when both
countries acted as key pillars in the U.S. strategy to contain Soviet
expansion as American allies. In 1969, for instance, Pakistan provided pilots to repel advances by communist South Yemeni forces into Saudi Arabia and
stationed tens of thousands of troops in the kingdom throughout the
1970s and 1980s, as well as during the First Gulf War. Pakistani forces
remain stationed in Saudi Arabia, where they regularly participate in
training exercises with Saudi troops.
The Saudis, meanwhile, funded the Afghan Mujahedeen (in
coordination with the United States and Pakistan) that repelled the
1979 Soviet invasion, and Saudi religious institutions continue to build
mosques and support Pakistan’s network of madaris, strengthening
cultural ties between the two countries. In
1998, when Pakistan faced the possibility of international sanctions
for conducting nuclear tests, the Saudis offered 50,000 free barrels of
oil to help cushion the blow, leading many to speculate that a
quid-pro-quo may exist between the two countries in which Pakistan would
provide the Saudis with nuclear technology in the event that they
should feel such a need. As recently as 2014, Saudi Arabia boosted Pakistan’s weak reserves with a $1.5 billion “gift” after Islamabad reversed its policy of neutrality in the Syrian Civil War, reportedly agreeing
to provide weapons to Syrian rebel forces. This month, as Shia Houthi
rebels advanced against Yemen’s primarily Sunni government, Riyadh once
again called on their Pakistani allies to provide military assistance.
The Yemen Resolution in Context
This
time, however, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government introduced a
resolution to Parliament asserting Pakistan’s neutrality in the
conflict, which was subsequently passed unanimously. The decision by
Pakistan not to join their Saudi allies should be viewed by American
observers as a welcome departure from the past for several reasons.
First, the clear voice with which members of parliament expressed their
opposition to military involvement in Yemen sends an important message
as to the capacities of a government which had been
previously weakened by protests that continued throughout the latter
half of 2014.
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s decision to keep out of Yemen’s ongoing civil war, at least for now, represents a departure
from the historical Saudi-Pakistan relationship. This shift is the
result of a revised strategic calculus by Islamabad built on both
domestic and international considerations. The former includes strains
within Pakistan’s heavily burdened military, as well as growing domestic
sectarian violence. The latter appears to be based on optimism
regarding a comprehensive nuclear
deal with Iran and a desire to better position itself to effectively
capitalize on the opportunities improved relations with its neighbor to
the east could provide, particularly in oil and gas imports.
While
the negotiations process is still young, this fledgling strategic shift
may be an early sign of greater regional integration, which will be
essential to future stability and should be facilitated by American
policymakers. Energy cooperation between Iran and Pakistan could provide a boost to tepid trade negotiations between Islamabad and New Delhi, contributing, over time, to greater regional political and energy security. India’s relationship with Iran is warm, if complex, and closer Iran-Pakistan ties may
open new avenues of collaboration between the three countries. Given
the recent rebound in India-U.S. relations, as well as India’s concerns
with balancing a growing China, American officials should be able to
promote these ties without provoking New Delhi’s ire, provided Indian
officials remain informed. U.S. leaders, in the event of successful
nuclear negotiations with Iran, ought to embrace energy collaboration between Tehran and Islamabad as a potential stabilizing factor, despite the ambivalence many officials will no doubt feel in collaborating with a longtime opponent.
Key
U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and Israel, will keep a close eye
on any developments they view as indicating a rapprochement between
Washington and Tehran. While these partnerships continue to be vital
elements of American foreign policy, a U.S. rebalance to Asia (in
addition to our continuing interests in Afghanistan) will, by
definition, entail putting greater weight on the importance of stability
and economic integration in the subcontinent. Iran, as an adjacent
regional power, will inevitably play a role in these developments, and
sooner rather than later if a nuclear agreement is completed
successfully. The question will be how much of a say the United States
has in the orientation of potential new trade and energy agreements.
Warming
relations between Pakistan and Iran may complement efforts by China,
another long-time ally of Pakistan, to expand its influence in the
region. This was exemplified in the April 20 announcement that Beijing, will be investing $46 billion in the country to promote its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,
designed to provide the Chinese with friendly and reliable access to
the Indian Ocean. The United States cannot, and should not get into a
bidding war with China for influence in Pakistan. Such an effort would
be a foolish waste of resources. China and Pakistan have long been
linked by a mutual desire to balance India, and although Washington
shares some important goals for Pakistan with the Chinese—namely,
counter-terrorism and political stability—China’s greater willingness to
turn a blind eye to the means by which these goals are achieved (such
as military governance or human rights abuses) help make it a more
appealing partner to many of Pakistan’s leaders. Beijing’s larger goal,
as evidenced by its move to fund an Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline,
is to facilitate regional linkages in pursuit of energy diversification
and greater regional influence. The United States would do well to
offer its own alternatives, beyond the TAPI pipeline, to ensure its
goals of stabilizing Afghanistan and rebalancing to the region are met.
That
being said, American officials can allay concerns amongst its allies in
the Middle East by rightly pointing out that promoting regional
cooperation by no means indicates attempts at a U.S.-Iran alliance or
the abandonment of current U.S. allies. As Robert Kaplan writes,
“détente is a major adjustment of policy, not a complete negation of
it,” and U.S. diplomats in Riyadh and Jerusalem will play a vital role
in reassuring our allies during this period of adjustment.
These
are, admittedly, preliminary steps—and Islamabad may very well
backtrack should the diplomatic winds shift. If, for instance, nuclear
negotiations were to collapse, and/or tensions between Iran and Pakistan
were to re-emerge, analysts could expect to see Pakistan attempt to
rebalance toward Riyadh. On the other hand, should successful nuclear
negotiations with Iran allow for greater economic and political
integration and should Pakistan continue to see closer relations with
Iran as in its interest, it is likely that the Saudi-Pakistan relationship (and, indeed, Pakistan’s relationship with much of the Sunni Arab World) will continue to cool.
In the meantime, policymakers should not underestimate the significance
of this break with history, and be prepared to do some reevaluating of
their own.
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