Russian Nuclear Horn Grows Louder (Dan 7:7)

As Tensions With West Rise, Russia Increasingly Rattles Nuclear Saber

Bellicose rhetoric has soared since start of Ukraine conflict to rival Cold War levels

By PAUL SONNE
April 5, 2015 12:00 p.m. ET

MOSCOW—It wasn’t an ordinary Valentine’s Day for the students from across Russia arriving at a military institute outside Moscow. Their date was with a Topol, the intercontinental ballistic missile at the heart of the country’s nuclear arsenal.

The new event was part of an initiative to promote careers in Russia’s missile forces, and it also reflected another phenomenon: the rising boastfulness about nuclear weaponry in public life here.

Amid the wave of bellicose rhetoric that has swelled in Moscow since the start of the conflict in Ukraine, officials as high up as President Vladimir Putin have been making open nuclear threats, a public saber-rattling with weapons of mass destruction largely unseen even in the days of the Cold War.

Remarks about Russia’s nuclear strength play well to Mr. Putin’s domestic constituency, hungry for a restoration of lost military might.

They also come at a time when Russia has grown more reliant on nuclear weapons, as the imbalance with Western conventional forces has widened. During the Cold War, Warsaw Pact conventional forces outnumbered NATO’s in Europe, leading the West to depend heavily on its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent.

These days, Russia has fewer soldiers, poorer weaponry and scarcer allies. The inferiority and isolation have changed its defense strategy.

“It’s not just a difference in rhetoric,” said Bruce G. Blair, a research scholar at Princeton University and nuclear weapons expert. “It’s a whole different world.”

Recent Russian military exercises have included nuclear elements, and the Kremlin has vowed a full overhaul of Russia’s land-based nuclear arsenal in the next five years.

In a recent documentary on Russian state television, Mr. Putin said he prepared to put Russia’s nuclear forces on alert as the Kremlin moved ahead with retaking Crimea from Ukraine last year.

“The fact that this nuclear option was on the table for consideration is a very clear indication that there’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t exist during the Cold War,” said Mr. Blair, who described Mr. Putin’s actions as the riskiest among Kremlin leaders since Cuban missile crisis.

At the same time, Russia has engaged in a series of military encounters with European and U.S. aircraft and other targets in the past year, raising the likelihood of mishaps that could lead to dangerous escalation.

Twice last year Russian military aircraft turned off their transponders to avoid detection and almost collided with passenger planes taking off from Denmark. An armed Russian fighter jet flew within 100 feet of a U.S. reconnaissance plane, and Russian aircraft conducted aggressive flybys on U.S. and Canadian warships. Russian maneuvers also simulated attacks on Europe.

It was the misinterpretation of military exercises that almost led the world to the brink of nuclear war in 1983, when top Soviet officials briefly thought a NATO simulation of a nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. was a ruse to mask a real one.

In 1995, President Boris Yeltsin was handed the Russian equivalent of the “nuclear football”—the satchel carrying launch codes that follows the U.S. president—after Russian officials suspected a rocket launched from Norway to study the aurora borealis was in fact a U.S. ballistic missile. A tap of the buttons would have launched a nuclear strike.

“We know, historically, that as crazy as it seems, one thing led to another,” said Graham Allison, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. “Just because it would be nuts, it doesn’t mean it couldn’t happen.”

For most of the Cold War, Soviet rhetoric generally presented the U.S.S.R. as a peace-loving nation that would turn to nuclear weapons only as a final defense. The actions of Soviet officials notwithstanding, public statements and broadcasts tended to glorify the military’s capability to repel a nuclear attack or accuse the West of nuclear warmongering. Public nuclear threats were considered largely taboo.

“This whole notion that ‘you don’t want to test how far we’ll go’—that was never part of Soviet propaganda,” says Pavel Podvig, an expert on Russia’s nuclear forces. “The Soviet propaganda was, ‘If you attack us, we are ready, we are here.’ It wasn’t anything like, ‘We dare you.’ ”

That has changed. In a Danish newspaper in March, the Russian ambassador to Denmark threatened to target Danish ships with nuclear weapons if Copenhagen were to support construction of a U.S.-backed missile defense shield in Europe.

“It is best not to mess with us when it comes to a possible armed conflict,” Mr. Putin warned at a pro-Kremlin youth camp last August. “I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.”

At a December news conference, Mr. Putin described Russia’s nuclear capabilities as the teeth and claws of a bear that the meddlesome West is trying to defang and declaw. “If they’re removed, the bear won’t be needed at all. They’ll stuff him and that’ll be the end,” he said.

The more heated nuclear talk extends to state television. Last year, as Russia annexed Crimea, a top anchor threatened to turn the U.S. into “radioactive ash.” In February, state television hosted a nationalist politician known for his extreme statements who called on air for Moscow to nuke Washington, prompting a robust round of applause.

After the U.S. and European Union sanctioned Russia last year over the crisis in Ukraine, patriotic T-shirts appeared in Moscow reading: “A Topol isn’t afraid of sanctions.”

One risk is that such casual talk changes public opinion about the appropriateness of issuing nuclear threats. In a Levada Center poll, half of Russians approved of Mr. Putin threatening nuclear weapons use in Crimea, agreeing that the West would understand only tough talk.

The freeze in relations has stalled progress on any new arms control measures between Moscow and Washington, jeopardizing advances that grew out of Cold War crises.

“Putin stresses the nuclear dimension as a warning to the West to stay away,” said Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London and a longtime authority on nuclear strategy. “How much he means it, who knows? But that’s what he does.”