As nuclear talks between
Iran and six world powers head into a new phase, one of the key bones of
contention will involve monitoring and safeguards—those measures
designed to ensure that Tehran is complying with international
obligations, declaring all of its nuclear activities, and refraining
from weaponization. The foreign powers argue for more transparency,
while Iran retorts that its nuclear program is already subject to the
most intrusive inspection regime in the world and thus it should not
have accept more.
So who is right? Are current inspections by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) enough? Or should Iran allow its nuclear program to
be subject to more monitoring?
The goal of safeguards. IAEA
safeguards serve as an early warning mechanism, aimed at verifying that
countries are abiding by their international obligations under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are meant to reassure
the international community that any non-nuclear-weapon state that is
party to the NPT, and has or is developing a nuclear energy program,
doesn’t use its facilities or material for military purposes. Materials
subject to safeguards include highly enriched uranium (HEU) and
separated plutonium, as well as thorium and depleted, natural, and
low-enriched uranium (LEU).
The IAEA conducts verification in a number of ways, including
monitoring facilities by installing surveillance cameras and
tamper-indicating seals, taking environmental samples, and checking
inventories of nuclear material. Before all this can happen, though,
a state needs to have concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, as required under the NPT.These agreements typically
entitle the IAEA to, at a minimum, the three most common kinds of
access: First, ad-hoc inspections to verify the state’s initial
declaration. These usually require one week’s notice, but in the case of
trying to verify certain international transfers, the IAEA may provide
only 24-hour notice. Second, routine inspections, as suggested by their
name, provide the most frequent type of access. Depending on the type of
facility, they are generally announced to the government in advance.
Again, the notice period is usually one week, but in some cases the IAEA
conducts them without advance notification. Third, there are special
inspections. The IAEA may use special inspections if it believes that
the state has failed to provide adequate information for it to perform
its obligations under the agreement.
Under comprehensive safeguards agreements, if the IAEA is unable to
verify that nuclear material isn’t being diverted, or the country is
found to be in non-compliance—for instance, it is allowing nuclear
material to be diverted for prohibited purposes, or failing to declare
all material and facilities—
the IAEA may report the matter to the United Nations Security Council.
Iran and the IAEA differ in their interpretation of the comprehensive
safeguards agreement text. In a June 2014 communiqué to the IAEA,
Tehran argued that the IAEA is only required to verify that no declared
material is diverted.
Its mandate doesn’t include verification of “the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a Member State.”
Likewise, the IAEA’s access to open source information doesn’t
“authorize it to require a Member State to provide information or access
beyond its safeguards agreement.” In other words, according to Tehran,
the IAEA has to verify that the information provided by a state is “correct,” but not that it is “complete.”
The IAEA argues that it is, in fact, authorized to verify completeness,
citing text from Article 1 of the comprehensive safeguards agreements
(including the one signed between Iran and the IAEA), which reads, “The
Government of Iran undertakes … to accept safeguards, in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable
material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory.”
Where Iran stands. Iran was one of the original
signatories of the NPT. It became a member of the IAEA in 1959 and
concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement in 1974, which it has
been implementing ever since. Tehran—and many others—say that the
inspection regime in Iran is among the most intrusive in the world.
That’s not necessarily true, though, as some of the most comprehensive
safeguards are implemented in Japan. In particular, an IAEA inspector is
on site at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant 24 hours a day. Iran claims
that based on the number of days inspectors spend in the country, it is
subject to the most intrusive inspections, but that reasoning is flawed,
as time spent in-country is not a measure of intrusiveness. Much of the
time the IAEA inspectors spend there is to monitor activities, and
while this is important, it does not increase the international
community’s knowledge about the content and scope of the nuclear
program.
In fact, despite
having spent years in the country, the IAEA is still unable to verify
the correctness and completeness of the information Tehran has provided.
In 2003, the IAEA began to release what has since become a regular
report on the implementation of the safeguards agreement by Iran. Since
Tehran and the world powers (China, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Russia, and the United States) concluded their Joint Plan of Action in
November 2013, the IAEA’s reports have also provided information on the
status of Iran’s compliance with its additional undertakings under the
deal.
Many in Iran, but also elsewhere, view the comprehensiveness of the
IAEA inspections in Iran as an indication of bias. But Tehran did
legally bind itself to the NPT and its safeguards agreement and has
sometimes fallen short of providing the necessary information for the
IAEA to verify the “completeness and correctness” of its declaration.
This in turn means that the Agency has not been able to verify Tehran’s full compliance with its international obligations. As
a result, Iran has been subject to an inspections regime more intrusive
than those normally found in other states with comprehensive safeguards
agreements.
Under Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, it is required to
grant the IAEA access to its nuclear facilities and material. Currently,
the IAEA has access to all of the declared Iranian facilities,
including the most controversial and technologically sensitive ones,
such as the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities. In short, the IAEA
has access to many nuclear activities undertaken in the country. Tehran
also grants access to the IAEA to verify some of the measures it has
taken under the interim deal, including the downblending of uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) that had been enriched up to 20 percent. All these
activities are monitored and detailed in the IAEA reports. (The IAEA
would certainly want to verify downblending if it occurred in other
countries; what is different with Iran is that it has promised to
downblend.)
Failures to report. Iran has agreed under its
comprehensive safeguards agreement to provide design information
relating to new facilities “as early as possible” and before any nuclear
material is introduced. In 1993, it agreed to provide such information
as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction of a
facility is taken. The submission of design information has been a
source of contention in the past. Some facilities, including those at
Natanz and Arak, were first revealed to the world by dissident groups or
Western sources, and only later declared by Tehran to the IAEA. Tehran
also failed to report a couple of tons of uranium it received from
China, its own uranium conversion activities, and the use of some of
these materials in laser enrichment installations and centrifuge testing
at the Kalaye Electric Company in the 1990s.
The Joint Plan of Action between Iran and its negotiating partners
provides for some “enhanced monitoring” measures, which manifest
themselves in more “frequent and intrusive inspections as well as
expanded provision of information to the IAEA,” in the US State
Department’s understanding. Consequently, since the deal was signed in
November, 2013, the IAEA and Iran have updated some monitoring
procedures, permitting inspectors to review surveillance information on a
daily basis, which would shorten detection time for any non-compliance.
But this is only useful for activities that can be seen using
surveillance cameras; anything else could go undetected. These
facilities also remain subject to other additional measures, including
daily inspection of the surveillance records for the enrichment
facilities at Natanz and Fordow. (Natanz had previously been inspected
biweekly and Fordow weekly.) The utility of these daily inspections has
been questioned: While a continuous presence is important at a
reprocessing plant, such as Rokkasho, it may not be necessary at
enrichment facilities, where the quantity of material is not as
significant. Daily inspections could, however, constitute a
confidence-building measure.
The Joint Plan of Action also provides for managed access to the
country’s centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production
workshops, and storage facilities, as well as to uranium mines and
mills. Additionally, Tehran has provided information about its plans for
nuclear facilities (16 power plants, 10 enrichment facilities, and one
light water reactor); all of the existing buildings on these sites; and
the uranium mines (Gachine and Saghand) and mills (Ardakan). It has also
provided design information that the IAEA had been seeking.
Possible military dimensions. All
of the measures described above apply only to Iran’s declared nuclear
activities, undertaken as part of its regular nuclear energy program.
Tehran’s negotiating partners, the IAEA, and the world are also
concerned about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear
program. The evidence, they argue, suggests that Iran has carried out
weaponization-related activities, some of which, the IAEA believes, may
be ongoing. Trying to settle the question, the
IAEA requested that it be permitted to visit the military site Parchin, not normally subject to the Agency’s authority.
Tehran granted access to inspectors in 2005. But the visit didn’t
satisfy the IAEA, which has been requesting a visit to areas of Parchin
that its inspectors didn’t see before. Iran argues that the IAEA is not
entitled to access the facility, given that it’s a conventional military
complex where sensitive yet non-nuclear-related activities are carried
out.
What Iran can do. There are several measures Iran
could take to build confidence in its peaceful intentions. For instance,
in 2003 it signed an additional protocol to the NPT safeguards
agreement saying that it would provide the IAEA with an “expanded
declaration” of its nuclear activities, as well as more access to its
nuclear sites, but it only briefly implemented the protocol from 2003 to
2006. Undertaking more obligations while the talks are ongoing would be
difficult for President Hassan Rouhani’s government. However, at least
implementing the additional protocol, pending its entry into force—that
is, voluntarily applying its measures—would further consolidate Iran’s
claims that its nuclear program is strictly peaceful. It would also help
undermine arguments to the contrary.
Iran’s relationship with the IAEA has had ups and downs in the past
few decades. Some in Iran believe that the agency hasn’t always acted
within its mandate, that it has disclosed confidential information to
other states, and has, at times, acted with bias, in the interest of
other states. The IAEA for its part has said that it hasn’t been able to
verify that Iran’s nuclear program is purely peaceful. Nevertheless,
the country continues to implement its comprehensive safeguards
agreement and additional measures under the Joint Plan of Action. With
the talks between Iran and the world powers continuing over the next few
months, Tehran’s ability to work with the agency will be crucial to the
continuation of the negotiating process and the possibility of reaching
a comprehensive deal on its nuclear program. Ideally, Iran would ensure
that the additional protocol enters into force. This would be a tough
sell domestically in the current climate. Once a deal is reached,
however, Iran should both implement the additional protocol and begin to
provide more information on possible military-related issues to the
IAEA.
Doing so will help launch a new chapter in the country’s nuclear
program with a cleaner slate. It will be particularly helpful if the
country plans to build an industrial-scale nuclear program with a number
of reactors on its territory, as it has said it will. By voluntarily
disclosing some military-related information, the country would restore
trust in its nuclear ambitions and be able to proceed with fewer
obstacles in the future. In other words, what critics in Iran may
perceive as concessions could, in fact, be conducive to long-term gains,
facilitating the development of its nuclear program.
