As some see Muqtada Al Sadr as both a political and militant proxy of
Iran, his recent political revival may seem as though Iran sees to
further expand its influence in Iraqi politics for strategic purposes.
Yet seeing Sadr’s recent political revival, his re-establishment of his
former Jaish Al Mahdi, or The Mahdi Army, now renamed Saraya Al Salaam
(The Peace Brigades), it seems as though his political motives now
revolve around exposing the corruption of the Iraqi government and
essentially demanding an increase of transparency. Having mobilized his
supporters to protest the Iraqi parliament, this demonstrates the
strength and relevance of his influence in the Iraqi political sphere
even after going into exile and disbanding his previous militia. By
criticizing Haidar Al Abadi’s government,
this consolidates Al Sadr’s political power among his Shia supporters
and even challenges the power of other Shia political and militant
factions as well.
Although Muqtada Al Sadr may have great influence over his Shia constituents and allies,
sectarian tensions may still potentially be reignited once again by
that very same influence. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Muqtada
Al Sadr established what was then known as Jaish Al Mahdi, or The Mahdi
Army, in an attempt to combat the US invasion and coalition forces.
What was initially meant to be a group dispensing security to Shi’ite
communities across Iraq drastically transformed into a sectarian death
squad ethnically cleansing Baghdad and other cities of their Sunni
inhabitants. This essentially accelerated the sectarian violence that
would overshadow Iraq in the following years. Now that The Mahdi Army
has been recreated and renamed to The Peace Brigades, it has been
reported that Al Sadr is seeking to find a new approach in dealing with
sectarianism. In one report according to Al Jazeera English, Muqtada Al
Sadr is hoping to orchestrate a committee consisting of “secular, Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurdish intellectuals and academics entrusted with the task of suggesting government reforms”.
By appealing to the people and their discontent of the Iraqi
government, Al Sadr will attempt to transcend above sectarian tensions
and tend to the wounds of the economically marginalized or so it seems.
Reviving and rebranding The Mahdi Army as the Peace Brigades may
have its newly intended implications, yet at the same time sectarian
violence may be inevitable especially when taking the fight against ISIS
into consideration. As Sunni rebel groups in Syria struggle against
ISIS as well, creating a collaborative effort alongside Shi’ite militias
would still be very unlikely considering the opposing interests all the
different groups may ultimately have. With The Mahdi Army’s history of
sectarian violence, Sadr’s current Peace Brigades may possibly evolve
from what was meant to initially be a peace keeping force partaking in
the fight against ISIS into a mercenary-like militia aimed at targeting
those who differ politically and religiously, in essence a reincarnation of rogue elements of The Mahdi Army. Most recently in the winter of 2015 the Peace Brigades participated in the offensive against ISIS recapturing
of the Jurf al-Sakhar region and began to secure the city of Samarra in
the Salah Al Din province of Iraq. In the process Shii’te militias
carried out attacks against Sunni civilians and Al Sadr decided to
remove his newly formed militia from the fight for fear of accusations
of sectarian violence. The militia still remains adamant, however,
regarding its stance on resistance against what it deems as foreign
aggressors. Whether or not this includes Iran as a foreign aggressor due
to its creeping hegemony remains ambiguous.
Despite Al Sadr’s skeptical criticisms of Iran and even renouncing its clerical and political influence in Iraq, his militia, like many other Shi’ite militias may possibly be receiving training from Iran. At
the same time it may possibly be unlikely considering the Peace
Brigades suspicions of foreign entities. The fight against ISIS has not
solely been dependent upon Iraqi clerical and political mobilization
efforts alone, rather those who have taken up the fight against the
radical organization have indeed made a collaborative effort with Iran
on both a political platform as well as clerical. So how can Al Sadr
continue to resist Iranian political and clerical hegemony despite its
overriding influence in Iraq? How can he continue to reject a strong
Iranian regional presence while the fight against ISIS continues?
With Sadr’s current ambitions for the nation, this might mean
distancing Iraq from Iranian influence and agency thus decolonizing Iraq
of Iranian creeping hegemony.
