A Nuclear South Korea
By Christopher Lee
Nearly a month since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test and a few days after its long-range missile launch, South Korea’s interest in Kim Jong-Un’s nuclear aspiration continues to be lukewarm. This is mainly because South Koreans know through a decade of personal experience and academic examination of the Kim Family Regime, North Korea has demonstrated these two actions in pairs. Since 2006, nuclear weapons tests and kinematic provocations have followed each other under the Kim Family Regime. Living in Seoul among South Koreans for the past few years, it seems to me that they are more concerned with untidy domestic politics and domestic economic concerns than North Korea’s predictable behavior.
Pundits have also downplayed the significance of this nuclear test and questioned the hermit kingdom’s nuclear capability. A recent U.S. congressional report extrapolated that the fourth nuclear test could have been merely a detonation of a boosted fission weapon or simply a conventional nuclear bomb. Regardless of the authenticity of the supposedly hydrogen bomb, both the Obama and the Park Geun-Hye governments’ stances on opposing the proliferation of South Korea’s nuclear weapons need to be reexamined and consider all alternatives.
After a joint declaration to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free, the U.S. withdrew nuclear weapons from South Korea in the early 1990s. However, this turned out to be a costly decision that backfired on everybody, especially South Korea. North Korea presumably developed nuclear bombs using the materials it extracted from the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. What is more, Kim Jong-Un announced that his country had succeeded in making these nuclear warheads small enough to fit on a missile ready to be launched towards South Korea at any time. With this understanding or even the potential veracity of these claims, both countries must seriously reexamine their policy and approach of employing nuclear weapons in South Korea.
South Korean officials like other government representatives across the world have observed President Obama’s nuclear weapons policy in the Middle East – the latest being the P5+1 agreement with Iran – and recognized it will not work with North Korea. Understandably, the U.S. does not want Iran to have enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear bomb, but why not South Korea, one of our biggest allies in Asia who lives under a persistent nuclear threat? Even before Obama’s ongoing “rebalance” or “pivot” towards Asia, under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, America has been committed to defend and protect South Korea at all cost. 28,500 United States Forces Korea (USFK) troops are ready to fight tonight alongside our South Korean brethren, and the U.S. nuclear umbrella theoretically guarantees peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula.
Notwithstanding, the nuclear umbrella, also known as extended deterrence, seems quite imprecise. Should South Korea be threatened by regional nuclear powers (China, North Korea, and Russia), America would trade-off Los Angeles for Seoul and New York City for Busan. As outrageously as aforementioned, the extended deterrence is erroneous and perplexed. For the past decade, America and South Korea have continued their commitment to costly and precarious conventional arms races with China and North Korea respectively.
A week after the fourth nuclear test, President Park revealed that her administration is genuinely reviewing plans to deploy U.S. advanced missile interceptor, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Amid growing concerns over South Korea’s ballistic missile defense system in the wake of North Korea’s latest nuclear test, deployment of the THAAD system is becoming a hot-button issue again. Yet, this is another conventional force buildup and not a solution to a militant Kim Jong-Un. Deploying THAAD may enhance the U.S.-ROK Security Alliance, boost South Korea’s ballistic missile defense system, but the situation on the Korean Peninsula may never be resolved.
Deploying the THAAD system would not singlehandedly change North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship. Each THAAD system is comprised of five major components: interceptors, launchers, a radar, a fire control unit, and THAAD-specific support equipment. Out of the five, THAAD’s X-Band radar is the most important component to South Korea. The radar, which can only see in a 90-degree arc, would be directed at North Korea to pick up short and medium range ballistic missiles. Nonetheless, as North Korea proceeds with its development of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), there’s a possibility that North Korea will launch a missile from seas surrounding South Korea. Clearly, Kim Jong-Un is also serious about developing SLBMs that would pose a greater threat to South Korea. These SLBMs would be outside the X-Band radar range, accordingly, to counter the SLMB threat, South Korea would need to position THAAD that could defend the population, troops, and critical infrastructure from any of the sea areas around the peninsula. Along the same lines, this would drastically increase the cost of missile defense against North Korea.
For the past few years, a flyby of a B-52 bomber, or deployment of long-range strike capabilities forces have been the U.S. Department of Defense’s response against a belligerent North Korea. These methods are both non-effective and costly. Billions are already being spent by America to guarantee peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but spending more on other conventional capabilities will not affect North Korean nuclear threat.
There is a much better and inexpensive way to provide security and stability in South Korea for both nations. The U.S. should allow South Korea to procure its own nuclear weapons. President Obama should encourage President Park Geun-Hye to consider this unconventional means. Mr. Chung, Moon-Joon, a renowned seven-term lawmaker of South Korea, is demanding that his country be granted the right to procure nuclear weapons in order to counter the North Korean nuclear threat. By having its own nuclear capabilities, South Korea will not only be able to protect itself from Pyongyang’s bullying, but Seoul would also achieve equivalent status.
South Korea has already proven to be one of the world’s wealthiest nations and technologically advanced enough to procure and maintain sophisticated armaments. A nuclear force in South Korea would be the great equalizer against North Korea. Through the Cold War, we have seen that peace and stability can only be maintained by countering nuclear threats with nuclear weapons. What we have on the Korean Peninsula is a similar case of a Cold War, consequently a strong means are necessary when corresponding to a nuclear threat.
A nuclear umbrella is not cheaper for South Korea, and it surely cannot stop a sporadic nuclear launch by North Korea. The sojourn of provocative nuclear tests and missile launches will continue as long as South Koreans do not have its own nuclear weapons. South Korea should now acknowledge the inadequacy in its military and adapt to changes in the 21st century security environment while considering the limited effect of U.N. sanctions and Beijing’s lackadaisical commitment to stop Pyongyang. The capable and enduring USFK troops will remain the foundation of the U.S.-South Korea security relationship, a nuclear South Korea would not likely undermine it. Rather, their joint defense efforts would evolve and, perhaps, push the South Korean government towards taking a greater role in its own national defense. Moreover, it may convince President Park to review her options under Article X of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty which stipulates that “Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”
Along with the U.S., South Korea has worked relentlessly for years toward a resolution of concerns regarding North Korea’s compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty; however, efforts have failed to succeed. Bilateral and multilateral talks with North Korea remain hopeless, support of the International Atomic Energy Agency and U.N. Security Council actions are non-effective, and implementation of U.N. and domestic sanctions to compel Kim Jong-Un have become just a formality to fulfill its obligations.
Pyongyang’s actions clearly validate that a conventional arms race has lost its significance against North Korea’s nuclear threat. A more logical and cost effective means of providing security and stability in the Korean Peninsula exists in the form of providing South Korea access to its own arsenal of nuclear weapons. In order to do so, President Park should immediately withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursue acquiring her own nuclear deterrence. Simply, as a nuclear state, South Korea can achieve peace and self-defense in the Korean Peninsula. President Park is wasting time, money, and resources by pursuing other conventional weapons while issuing no clear response to North Korea’s latest provocation. As her administration continues their efforts to denuclearize North Korea, the situation will further deteriorate and the nuclear threat will, conceivably, never be fixed.
Christopher Lee is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. He holds a B.S. from West Point and an M.A. from Columbia University. He is currently pursuing his Ph.D. in International Cooperation from Yonsei University (South Korea). He has served for eight years as an intelligence officer, and is currently serving as a Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region. Chris can be reached via Twitter @chrislee733.
