Iraq Horn Prepares For More Sectarian Violence
Brett Fetterly
As if Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi does not already have a unique set of challenges testing his leadership ability, he will now be forced to guide his country—if, indeed, Iraq can still be realistically identified as such—through the regional political aftershocks of the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic split and the likely re-ignition of sectarian tensions caused by Saudi Arabia’s execution of the Shiite cleric Nemer al-Nemer. Given the current state of the region, it is easy to expect things to go from bad to worse in Iraq because of the events over the weekend, but that may be a hasty conclusion that ignores the weight of Prime Minister Abadi’s role as “reconciler” and a common regional enemy in ISIL. That is, at least, where Prime Minister Abadi seems to be hedging his bet.
Iraq has, for decades, held the unfortunate position of being situated in the heart of the sectarian divide of the Middle East, but not since the execution of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, has the death of such a high profile political and religious leader sparked such an outrage. Saddam, although not a cleric, became a martyr for the Sunni cause. Following his execution Shia crowds taunted Sunnis and chanted the name of Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric and militia leader whose troops regularly attempted to expel the U.S. military from Iraq during the Iraq war. Tensions were further exacerbated when videotape of that execution surfaced on the internet. Sunni protests broke out in places like Samarra, where the bombing of a Shiite shrine ten months prior to his execution led to a significant escalation in sectarian violence which had already been affecting the country following Saddam’s removal from power. It would take another couple of years and a surge in the U.S. military presence before Sunni-Shia violence could be stamped down.
While the comparison to Saddam may not be a perfect fit, Nemer was, nonetheless, considered a “second-tier political player” who surfaced as a principal force behind Shiite protests in the Shia majority regions of Saudi Arabia during the Arab Spring. Arrested in 2012 and sentenced to death in 2014 for disobeying the ruler, provoking sectarian discord, and taking up arms against the kingdom, he was executed on January 2. In Iraq, Nemer’s execution led Shiite religious, political and militia leaders to call for street protests and the severance of diplomatic relations with the kingdom. Thousands of Shiites reportedly gathered in central Baghdad, and Muqtada al-Sadr called for a protest outside of Baghdad’s Green Zone, where foreign offices and embassies—including the recently reestablished Saudi embassy—are located.
Additionally, over the weekend three Sunni mosques south of Baghdad were bombed and a Sunni muezzin, a person appointed to recite the call to prayer, was shot dead. While both criminal gangs and ISIL have been blamed for the bombings, the incidents invoke clear memories of the widespread reciprocal kidnappings, torture and killings that plagued the country between 2005 and 2008 and took the lives of thousands of Iraqi civilians.
The rise of ISIL, the Syrian civil war, mass migration, the proxy war being waged in Yemen and the expected resurgence of Iranian influence in the region following the implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement has elevated sectarian tensions to new heights. Iraq will likely, yet again, become a temperature gauge for how hot sectarian violence will burn. The expectation for heightened levels of sectarian violence in Iraq and consequently the undermining of larger regional cooperative efforts to defeat ISIL, is what most of the reporting on Iraq seems to focus on today.
There are, however, a couple reasons why the fallout over the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic split may not result in widespread sectarian violence.
First, the man in charge. Prime Minister Abadi, who has held office for almost a year and a half now, has come to power seeking to rebuild trust between Baghdad and the country’s minority Sunnis and Kurds. The rise of ISIL as a threat to the stability of not only his state but also regional stability has necessitated that Abadi, himself a Shiite, attempt to rewrite the wrongs of his predecessor Nouri al-Maliki and reconcile with the Sunnis. Last fall, Abadi announced political reforms that are designed to limit the influence of sectarian political parties in the capital. Indeed, this was a welcome change from the alienating policies of Maliki, yet Iraq’s minority groups fear that this step just opens the door for increased Shiite majority dominance in the government. It also remains unclear whether he will be able to actually implement them without provoking his Shiite base.
Today, Abadi has attempted to act as a mediator between Riyadh and Tehran, sending Foreign Minister Jaafari to Tehran. Fearing that the deepening diplomatic and sectarian rupture will undermine his campaign to defeat ISIL and to reestablish control over the Iraqi state, he is attempting to walk a tenuous line between Tehran and Riyadh, whose physical and material support he requires. His military campaign against ISIL achieved its most significant success to date last month, when Iraqi security forces recaptured Ramadi without the assistance of Shiite militias. The gradual exclusion of the Iranian-backed Shiite militias, that Abadi initially relied on when he first came to office, coupled with his reform agenda and appeals to the middle ground between the regional powers, however, may end up proving too much for his Shiite base in the heightened sectarian environment.
Second, a common enemy. Every actor in the region opposes the existence of ISIL, but each prioritizes its destruction differently. The safe haven the Islamic State has carved out for itself in the Levant absorbs the human and material resources of regional actors that would otherwise be directed towards the larger strategic concerns of its various actors. For the Iraqi state, however, regaining control over its territory ranks as a primary concern.
Abadi’s reaction to the news of the execution of Nemer was a plea to “avoid division and sectarianism that serves only Daesh.” His time as prime minister almost completely mirrors the declared existence of the caliphate. Additionally, he has called 2016 to be the year of “final victory” over ISIL. If that is to happen, he must engage in a heroic diplomatic effort to keep regional powers focused on the insurgents that stoke sectarian rivalry both within his country and throughout the region.
What remains uncertain is whether the Shiite militias, who already have significant influence across Iraq will fall in line behind Abadi or rather, do Tehran’s bidding. The militias may decide that he is not pursuing enough of a hard line against Riyadh and is using the fight against another Sunni enemy, ISIL, as the scapegoat.
The larger Saudi-Iranian rivalry has always been an underlying concern for the stability of post-ISIL Iraq and post-Assad Syria, but in the wake of the fallout of the execution of Nemer, it has become a preeminent concern once again. If long-term regional rivalry fears continue to drive short-term decision-making by regional actors, as seems to be the recent regional trend, then it appears that Abadi’s challenge is far more monumental than it already is. His attempts at regional power mediator may lend insight into whether he is also capable of securing a unitary Iraq.
