Wishful Thinking: Curbing Babylon The Great (Dan 7)

 

New report argues for narrowing role of nuclear weapons in US policies, diplomacy and forces

May 17, 2015 | By Dibya Sarkar

The United States should minimize the role that nuclear weapons play in its security policy because they add few military options and provide “false hopes” that can be costly geopolitically as well as in human lives, according to a new report from the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank.

The report (pdf) released May 14 recognizes that nuclear weapons are “indispensable” to deter other nations from attacking the U.S. and allies with such weapons, but they offer no other advantage over the conventional military superiority that the U.S. enjoys over every other nation.

The report’s co-authors are Barry Blechman, a national security expert and co-founder of the Washington, D.C.-based think tank, and Russell Rumbaugh, who is a special assistant in the Defense Department.

“These false hopes that nuclear weapons can play a range of political and military roles in U.S. security policy cause the United States to mistakenly pursue a nuclear strategy that is costly – not only in material terms, but also in geopolitical terms,” they write. “In the worst case scenarios, this strategy could be catastrophic in terms of human lives and the nation’s future.”

The authors outline in greater detail why nuclear weapons offer no military or political benefit beyond nuclear deterrence by examining U.S. conventional military superiority and offering an alternative that would serve U.S. interests better.

They write that the U.S. should fashion its diplomacy, nuclear policies and force posture – meaning current force capabilities – around pursuing negotiated arrangements to create a “verifiable international regime eliminating nuclear weapons globally.” The U.S. should also adopt policies declaring the U.S. belief of the “narrow utility” of such weapons and focus its “force structure solely on maintaining a secure, second-strike capability.”

“After seventy years of indulging fantasies of what nuclear weapons can do, it is high time to acknowledge that they do very little and adapt US nuclear policy, strategy, and forces to those facts,” concluded Blechman and Rumbaugh.

Babylon The Great Expands Her Nuclear Arsenal (Daniel 7:7)

It’s Decision Time for the Air Force’s New Nuclear Cruise Missile

 

LRSO

The question is—does the military need it?

by JAMES DREW

This year, lawmakers must decide whether to approve the Obama administration’s plan to spend billions of dollars on new nuclear weapons, including a stealthy cruise missile.

The Pentagon calls it the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, or LRSO for short, and it would replace the outdated Air-Launched Cruise Missile your grandfather’s warbird—the 50-year-old B-52 Stratofortress—still carries on bomber runs over the Pacific and Europe to deter a preemptive attack on America and her allies.

The Air Force’s budget request for fiscal year 2016 calls for around $1.8 billion in spending on the missile during the next five years. There will be two versions—one to carry an updated W80 thermonuclear warhead, and another packed with conventional explosives for non-nuclear attacks.

We’re talking about weapons that, if used, means the world is already half way to oblivion—and there’s no turning back.

LRSO will not be some new smart bomb or another bunker-busting munition, but a high-yield nuclear device capable of great destruction from an equally great distance.

Because what’s special about this weapon is its range—around 1,500 to 3,000 miles or greater, a relatively easy achievement given today’s engine technology. There are few weapons in the Air Force’s arsenal with that kind of reach.

Combine the missile with a smart, radar-evading flight system, and you have a very powerful weapon that is extremely difficult to shoot down.

The Navy has its own sea-based cruise missile—the Tomahawk. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 explicitly forbids the use of ground-launched cruise missiles.

If Congress approves funding, lawmakers will make a long-term investment in this type of weapon, ensuring its survival well past the 2030s when the United States’ aging ALCM nuclear-armed cruise missile is due to retire.

Arms race

But some in Washington are already calling for the Air Force to terminate—or at least delay—the project. Lawmakers argue the flying branch has not properly justified the missile’s mission objectives, and that it goes against the spirit of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Others contend that having a conventional and nuclear-tipped cruise missile could increase the chances of strategic miscalculation during times of heightened tensions.

With both conventional and nuclear versions, nobody except the U.S. would know which type of missile any particular bomber has on board. This creates uncertainty—which is dangerous when dealing with potential Armageddon.

The Pentagon argues this program is necessary to keep the U.S. nuclear stockpile modern and capable against potential peer and near-peer adversaries like Russia and China.

Plus, the Air Force argues that it already employs a conventional version of the ALCM, known as the CALCM.

Then there’s the question whether another nuclear cruise missile is necessary. The U.S. maintains a nuclear “triad” of bombers, submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles. There’s a broad consensus in Washington to keep all three legs of this triad.

But far fewer politicians have made up their mind about weapons on the fringes, like cruise missiles, which are nice to have but expensive to keep—and not required for the strategic deterrence mission, since most bombers already carry B61 nuclear gravity bombs.

Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert for the Federation of American Scientists, said the Air Force needs to make a more compelling case for buying the LRSO than simply arming the president with more “strike options,” as the Air Force describes it.

He said other far-reaching weapons like land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, Tomahawks, and even conventional Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles already cover the mission area.

“Even if there were a unique mission need that cannot be performed with other capabilities, what would be the mission?” Kristensen said in an email.

“Would it be limited use in regional escalation strategies, would it be to counter-deter Russian air-launched cruise missiles or Chinese cruise missiles, or would it be to shoot holes in air-defense systems?”

“There are some who see the LRSO as an ‘in-between’ weapon that gives the president strike options that escalate from use of nuclear gravity bombs but avoid escalating to use of nuclear ballistic missiles,” he added.

“This is a good old Cold War era tit-for-tat escalation scenario that is not essential against Russia and China and not needed against smaller regional adversaries.

The generals in charge of the U.S. strategic forces, however, argue there is a “capability gap” that only an air-launched cruise missile can fill. The Air Force detailed this gap in a classified review of alternatives submitted to the Pentagon in 2013.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense obviously agreed, since it found space in the latest budget request for LRSO. But the only real argument put forward since the project’s inception in 2011 is that a new air-launched cruise missile could punch through modern integrated air-defense systems, keeping strategic bombers out of harm’s way.

Gen. Stephen Wilson, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, said during a January event in Washington that he wants to replace the ALCM, which he described as a “terrific weapon system.”

“It was designed in ’70s, built in the ’80s, and was designed to last 10 years,” Wilson said. “Today, we’ll use the current ALCM through 2030 … At some point we have to be able to design a new standoff missile that provides the president with options.”

“I’m going to need a missile that will be able to penetrate any of the most sophisticated air-defense systems going forward,” Wilson added.

U.S. Strategic Command chief Navy Adm. Cecil Haney argues that the nation’s nuclear stockpile is at a critical point and needs upgrades, and that’s why the Pentagon is pressing so hard for LRSO and a new ICBM the Air Force wants funded in 2016.

“I don’t have an option,” the admiral said at a Feb. 6 event in Washington. “It’s not an area that we can wish away—we have to invest in those kinds of capabilities.”

Price tag

If the Air Force gets congressional approval, work on the cruise missile could start almost immediately. Four companies — Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon—are already involved in technical studies.

In fact, the Air Force planned to begin the project this year, but pushed it back in favor of more spending on a guided tail-kit assembly for the B61 tactical nuclear bomb.

The Air Force wants $37 million in seed money for 2016 to scale up the program and to hold a competition for the first phase of development. The service has solid enough preliminary designs to jump straight into modeling, simulation and early aircraft integration work, according to budget documents.

Wilson confirmed at a Feb. 12 Air Force Association conference in Orlando that LRSO is not tied to the development of the Long-Range Strike Bomber, which the service wants to purchase at $550 million apiece. This is important, because it means the cancellation of one wouldn’t necessarily harm the other.

At the same conference, Air Combat Command chief Gen. Herbert Carlisle said he welcomes the development of a new conventional cruise missile, and has created an office to coordinate those activities with the service’s Global Strike Command.

“I’m often asked whether there will be a conventional variant of that, and I say absolutely,” Wilson said in January.

“Just like we have the CALCM that was a spinoff for the ALCM, we see going forward that there will be a Long-Range Standoff Missile and there will be a conventional variant that will follow to be able to buy it in numbers and reduce the cost,” the general added.

There are more than 1,500 ALCMs and CALCMs in the Air Force’s storehouse. Each B-52 can carry 20 of the weapons—12 under the wings and eight on a rotary dispenser in the bomb bay. The ALCM has a range of 1,500 miles, but is slow and easy to detect.

The Pentagon junked the more stealthy Advanced Cruise Missile in 2012 to comply with the New START Treaty Pres. Barack Obama signed with Russian Pres. Vladimir Putin.

The Air Force is responsible for the cruise missile “delivery vehicle,” but the National Nuclear Security Administration has responsibility for the warhead. According to the agency, the cruise missile will carry a life-extended version of the W80 warhead used on the ALCM and Tomahawk.

NNSA considered the B61 warhead, but it was too heavy. It looked at the W84 from the decommissioned Gryphon ground-launched cruise missile, but there are too few of those, so last year the agency formally decided on the W80.

The first production unit of the updated W80, designated W80–4, will enter service around 2025. The entire project is worth an estimated $10 billion to $20 billion, according to some analysts.

Obama Using Force Against Iran Is Wishful Thinking

Obama must be ready to use force against Iran to end nuclear standoff

Ayatollah Khamenei must learn that he does not hold all the cards – a more credible threat of American military action is the only way to make that happen

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Photo: AFP

By Tom Rogan | The Telegraph

7:00AM GMT 26 Nov 2014

President Rouhani is the face, Ayatollah Khamenei is the master. When negotiating with a theological absolutist, excessive flexibility is not a good idea. And yet abundant flexibility is the cornerstone of Barack Obama’s present negotiating strategy. On Monday evening in Vienna, John Kerry announced a seven-month extension to the nuclear negotiations. He claimed it’s the common-sense approach.

It’s not. It’s a grievous error.

With another deadline expired, Khamenei is empowered. Recognising President Obama’s desperation, Khamenei has realised that waiting will bring no new penalties, and he is refusing to authorise Rouhani to make real concessions. And while some claim the negotiations are making progress, the record suggests otherwise. Iran continues to obstruct the IAEA by concealing its weaponisation programmes and demanding retention of its plutonium facility at Arak. Iran insists it be allowed to keep tens of thousands of centrifuges after any deal, and that the sanctions be removed immediately rather than progressively. Iran refuses a robust inspections regime.

There’s only one way this recalcitrance can be resolved: President Obama must alter Ayatollah Khamenei’s strategic calculations. To do so, he needs to escalate his military threats against the Islamic Republic.

The military option against Iran is inherently complicated. Much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is hardened against aerial attack. This means that any operation would, at best, only degrade Iran’s nuclear capability for three to four years. Still, that doesn’t mean the military option is false. The US military has highly advanced bunker penetration munitions and could launch multiple attacks. Of course, air strikes would also risk Iranian retaliation through missile attacks, small boat attacks in the Persian Gulf, or terrorism from the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and proxy networks.

Yet the risks of a nuclear armed Iran are far greater.

Were Iran to gain nuclear weapons, its violent revolutionary project would go radioactive. Today’s political situations in Lebanon and Iraq attest to what this would mean. Because in Beirut, Baghdad and beyond, Iran uses a toxic mix of violence and brutal political blackmail to advance its sectarian agenda: the expansion of Khomeini’s “jurist guardianship” ideology. With nuclear weapons, however, Iran’s hardliners would have the security umbrella to redouble these efforts. In basic terms, that would mean increased terrorism and a greatly destabilising arms race across the Middle East. After all, made paranoid by Iran’s Shia expansionism, the Sunni Arab monarchies would almost certainly pursue their own nuclear weapons. Middle Eastern political instability would thus find thermonuclear expression. And an emboldened nuclear Iran would also pose a greatly increased threat to the west. Consider that in 2011, in an action approved by senior officials, Iran tried to blow up a Washington DC restaurant. In short, a nuclear armed Iran must be prevented.
And if Mr Obama escalates his military threats, it can be.

While Iran’s hardliners are bold, they’re also realistic. Take Qassem Suleimani, Revolutionary Guards commander of Iran’s covert-action Quds Force. At present, Suleimani is pictured nearly every day in Iraq, where he’s leading Iran’s action against the Islamic State. He’s also responsible for many attacks on US and British forces in Iraq. In every sense, he’s a hardliner. But he’s also alert to the reality of US military power. And that reflects an underlying truth. Where Isil are frothing thugs, Iran’s rulers are masters of calculation, making strategy in view of the opportunities and risks of each moment. If Mr Obama is willing to increase his pressure on the hardliners, they will be deterred.

In that regard, President Obama should immediately deploy two more carrier strike groups to the Arabian Sea. Joining the current on-station group, the USS Carl Vinson, these forces would establish a US air dominance capability joined to robust fleet protection. At present, the US only has two carrier groups deployed globally. This broadcasts absent resolve. Complementing the new deployments, President Obama should also express his impatience with Iran’s diplomatic games. Abandoning his previous equivocation, in explicit language, Obama should state that he’ll use force against Iran’s nuclear program if a deal isn’t reached. Finally, Obama should explain that if Iran responds to any US action with major retaliation, he will respond with overwhelming force against Iranian military forces in the Persian Gulf and regime targets in Tehran. This is crucial; at the moment, Iran’s leaders think they’ve deterred the military option.

Witnessing Mr Obama’s change of tone and its physical substance, Iran’s hardliners would quickly take notice. Coupled to continued economic sanctions and Iran’s reduced government revenue from lower oil prices, Obama’s tangible threats would challenge Iran to reconsider its strategic calculations.

To be sure, serious diplomacy offers by far the best solution to this crisis. I supported last November’s six month negotiating window and I concede that any deal with have to allow Iran a low-enrichment baseline. Nevertheless, Khamenei must learn that he doesn’t hold the cards. For the cause of peace, Iran must find renewed contemplation of American military power.

Obama Using Force Against Iran Is Wishful Thinking

Obama must be ready to use force against Iran to end nuclear standoff

Ayatollah Khamenei must learn that he does not hold all the cards – a more credible threat of American military action is the only way to make that happen

Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Photo: AFP

By Tom Rogan | The Telegraph

7:00AM GMT 26 Nov 2014

President Rouhani is the face, Ayatollah Khamenei is the master. When negotiating with a theological absolutist, excessive flexibility is not a good idea. And yet abundant flexibility is the cornerstone of Barack Obama’s present negotiating strategy. On Monday evening in Vienna, John Kerry announced a seven-month extension to the nuclear negotiations. He claimed it’s the common-sense approach.

It’s not. It’s a grievous error.

With another deadline expired, Khamenei is empowered. Recognising President Obama’s desperation, Khamenei has realised that waiting will bring no new penalties, and he is refusing to authorise Rouhani to make real concessions. And while some claim the negotiations are making progress, the record suggests otherwise. Iran continues to obstruct the IAEA by concealing its weaponisation programmes and demanding retention of its plutonium facility at Arak. Iran insists it be allowed to keep tens of thousands of centrifuges after any deal, and that the sanctions be removed immediately rather than progressively. Iran refuses a robust inspections regime.

There’s only one way this recalcitrance can be resolved: President Obama must alter Ayatollah Khamenei’s strategic calculations. To do so, he needs to escalate his military threats against the Islamic Republic.

The military option against Iran is inherently complicated. Much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is hardened against aerial attack. This means that any operation would, at best, only degrade Iran’s nuclear capability for three to four years. Still, that doesn’t mean the military option is false. The US military has highly advanced bunker penetration munitions and could launch multiple attacks. Of course, air strikes would also risk Iranian retaliation through missile attacks, small boat attacks in the Persian Gulf, or terrorism from the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and proxy networks.

Yet the risks of a nuclear armed Iran are far greater.

Were Iran to gain nuclear weapons, its violent revolutionary project would go radioactive. Today’s political situations in Lebanon and Iraq attest to what this would mean. Because in Beirut, Baghdad and beyond, Iran uses a toxic mix of violence and brutal political blackmail to advance its sectarian agenda: the expansion of Khomeini’s “jurist guardianship” ideology. With nuclear weapons, however, Iran’s hardliners would have the security umbrella to redouble these efforts. In basic terms, that would mean increased terrorism and a greatly destabilising arms race across the Middle East. After all, made paranoid by Iran’s Shia expansionism, the Sunni Arab monarchies would almost certainly pursue their own nuclear weapons. Middle Eastern political instability would thus find thermonuclear expression. And an emboldened nuclear Iran would also pose a greatly increased threat to the west. Consider that in 2011, in an action approved by senior officials, Iran tried to blow up a Washington DC restaurant. In short, a nuclear armed Iran must be prevented.

And if Mr Obama escalates his military threats, it can be.

While Iran’s hardliners are bold, they’re also realistic. Take Qassem Suleimani, Revolutionary Guards commander of Iran’s covert-action Quds Force. At present, Suleimani is pictured nearly every day in Iraq, where he’s leading Iran’s action against the Islamic State. He’s also responsible for many attacks on US and British forces in Iraq. In every sense, he’s a hardliner. But he’s also alert to the reality of US military power. And that reflects an underlying truth. Where Isil are frothing thugs, Iran’s rulers are masters of calculation, making strategy in view of the opportunities and risks of each moment. If Mr Obama is willing to increase his pressure on the hardliners, they will be deterred.

In that regard, President Obama should immediately deploy two more carrier strike groups to the Arabian Sea. Joining the current on-station group, the USS Carl Vinson, these forces would establish a US air dominance capability joined to robust fleet protection. At present, the US only has two carrier groups deployed globally. This broadcasts absent resolve. Complementing the new deployments, President Obama should also express his impatience with Iran’s diplomatic games.

Abandoning his previous equivocation, in explicit language, Obama should state that he’ll use force against Iran’s nuclear program if a deal isn’t reached. Finally, Obama should explain that if Iran responds to any US action with major retaliation, he will respond with overwhelming force against Iranian military forces in the Persian Gulf and regime targets in Tehran. This is crucial; at the moment, Iran’s leaders think they’ve deterred the military option.

Witnessing Mr Obama’s change of tone and its physical substance, Iran’s hardliners would quickly take notice. Coupled to continued economic sanctions and Iran’s reduced government revenue from lower oil prices, Obama’s tangible threats would challenge Iran to reconsider its strategic calculations.

To be sure, serious diplomacy offers by far the best solution to this crisis. I supported last November’s six month negotiating window and I concede that any deal with have to allow Iran a low-enrichment baseline. Nevertheless, Khamenei must learn that he doesn’t hold the cards. For the cause of peace, Iran must find renewed contemplation of American military power.