Discriminatory Politics Of Global Non-Proliferation Regime In South Asia – Analysis
By Hafsa Khalid*
Traditionally, the Non-Proliferation Regime has stood on two essential components; first only those nuclear states (NWS) are considered legitimate that declared the weapons before 1967 while the rest non-nuclear states (NNWS) hold the right to exercise nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Second, the NWS bears an obligation to decrease and eventually to abolish their nuclear stores. As Pakistan, India and Israel made their nuclear bombs after 1967, they remained isolated from the mainstream nuclear regime.
Until 2005, India was perhaps the most vocal opponent of the inherent discriminatory nature of the regime where only five major powers were given the right to possess nuclear weapons. However, the credibility of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime received a major blow after the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005 since Indian accommodation meant subverting the regime’s fundamental trade-offs. After a little arguing, the US successfully persuaded both IAEA and NSG to alter their norms and criteria to adjust India into the regime. Consequently, India-specific waivers and safeguards were introduced and the member countries of the non-proliferation regime were encouraged to carry out nuclear trade with India. Presently, America is also struggling hard to persuade NSG members to grant India’s entry into the cartel and it is being reported that almost four of five declared NWS have shown a soft corner for New Delhi.
After India first tested its nuclear bomb in 1974, the international nuclear community feared the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology to other non-nuclear weapons states. For this reason the nuclear club joined hands to further tighten the norms and guidelines of the Non Proliferation Regime, and the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) emerged and strict actions were taken against the suspected nuclear proliferators. Despite of the stringent international economic and technological sanctions, Pakistan and India went nuclear in 1998 and faced stern criticism especially from the American policy makers. India, Pakistan and Israel, being non-signatories to NPT, were kept isolated and deprived from any kind of nuclear trade from the member states of the Non-Proliferation Regime while North Korea, later, joined the unprivileged group.
Until the end of President Clinton’s government in 2001, the core objective of US nuclear policy revolved around attaining a “nuclear restraint regime” in the South Asian region. However, the world witnessed a major shift in American foreign policy after the Bush administration decided to engage India in peaceful nuclear trade by offering an agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2005, thereby, starting a new debate in the Non-Proliferation system and questioning the relevancy and legitimacy of the entire regime.,
In early 2006, President Bush paid a visit to India where both sides worked out a plan for separating the Indian civilian nuclear facilities from the military ones. Furthermore, they agreed to restrict the advancement of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and also to support FMCT. Subsequently, the “Henry Hyde Act” was signed by President Bush on December 18, 2006 which helped in constructing a legal capacity for resuming nuclear cooperation with India. After the series of agreements another technical agreement, known as the 123 Agreement, was endorsed by both states. The agreement clearly identified the terms and conditions of nuclear cooperation where India was required to obtain approval from IAEA and NSG. Consequently, the 123 Agreement was unanimously passed in the US Senate and House of Representatives and was finally enforced in December 2008.
Pakistan, with few others, hoisted serious reservations against the Indian-specific agreement since the reprocessing and enrichment facilities, research reactors like Dhruva and CIRUS, certain heavy water facilities and different military nuclear plants were totally left out in the separation design. However, the IAEA’s top management welcomed the deal and described it as an “umbrella agreement” where rather than discussing separate agreements for different plants India itself volunteered to put additional reactors under IAEA’s inspection. India can also put its enrichment facilities under inspection if it desires to do so, but it is not mandatory.
Islamabad has been concerned over the time that has been granted to India for detaching its military and civilian plants from each other. Pakistan fears that since the deal became active in 2008 and various countries have offered nuclear cooperation with New Delhi, India might continue enhancing its aggressive nuclear program by “voluntary” offering only those civilian plants to IAEA safeguards that it deems useless or obsolete.
Also, India has been permitted to endorse preemptive measures to warrant continuous fuel supply if any cooperating party fails to fulfill its pledges. Again, the clause is unidentified, vague and gives India a chance to interpret it in any direction, depending on its interests. It seems that by all means India is the key beneficiary of the deal while Pakistan remains on the disadvantageous side.
Similarly, the India-specific arrangement would not help advance the very purpose of the non-proliferation regime as the safeguards acknowledge Indian nuclear design and offer India complete authority to continue its nuclear agenda “unhindered” and “uninterrupted”.
Also the measures that must be taken for physical protection and the accountability and checks on all items under the recommendations established in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 have mainly been left out on India. This makes Pakistan suspicious regarding the possible nuclear pilfering, fuel trafficking and an increased likelihood of material diversion to defensive purposes. Furthermore, there is also no such clause of unilateral withdrawal in the India-specific safeguards since the termination of the agreement depends on mutual decision of the two parties; IAEA cannot make the withdrawal decision on its own.
The discriminatory behavior of non-proliferation regime and India’s adjustment can also be analyzed by examining the strategic and commercial interests of global powers. It has been argued that commercial aspect led by ideological and materialistic factors made the powerful states to construct a “tipping-point” supporting India’s accommodation and deteriorating the regime’s established norms and criteria. The leading states were successful in persuading the weaker ones and the later were left helpless and followed the bandwagon.
The world sees India as an economic hub, a rising power and an indispensable alternate to China’s growing potential. Therefore, to reap the maximum advantage of Indian potential to curb China’s progress, it was deemed necessary to bring India into the mainstream non-proliferation regime. Scholars and leading political commentators attribute India’s acceptance as mainly a result of the Chinese factor. Being an Asian power, India is perceived as a significant player in a rising multi-polar world.
The biggest expected benefit that the leading economies can get out of the Indo-US deal could be the NSG waiver that was particularly planned to unlock nuclear commerce with India. The powerful states, possessing advanced nuclear markets, had a strong incentive to endorse the Indian exemption since India is a growing market for international investors especially in the nuclear sphere. The West sees blooming trade opportunities worth over $30 billion as India aspires to construct around 20 more nuclear plants. France, that had been a strong proponent of India-specific arrangements, has already struck an agreement with India that permits it to export nuclear technology while one of its nuclear industries, Areva, signed a $7 billion contract with the Indian buyers. A formal nuclear trade also started between London and New Delhi in 2010, where two British companies, Rolls Royce and Serco, have reportedly been involved in the development of India’s largest nuclear plant.
In fact, India’s persuasive argumentation and material benefits along with the powerful countries’ sympathetic attitude towards India contributed in the emergence of India-specific exemption in the global non-proliferation system. The international powers reinforced India’s argumentation of entering the regime and undermined those who opposed it. The same attitude was reflected in discussions with the IAEA and NSG and no room was given to the weaker states to be heard.
About the Author
* The author holds an M. Phil degree in Peace and Conflict Studies and is an Islamabad based researcher.
Traditionally, the Non-Proliferation Regime has stood on two essential components; first only those nuclear states (NWS) are considered legitimate that declared the weapons before 1967 while the rest non-nuclear states (NNWS) hold the right to exercise nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Second, the NWS bears an obligation to decrease and eventually to abolish their nuclear stores. As Pakistan, India and Israel made their nuclear bombs after 1967, they remained isolated from the mainstream nuclear regime.
Until 2005, India was perhaps the most vocal opponent of the inherent discriminatory nature of the regime where only five major powers were given the right to possess nuclear weapons. However, the credibility of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime received a major blow after the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005 since Indian accommodation meant subverting the regime’s fundamental trade-offs. After a little arguing, the US successfully persuaded both IAEA and NSG to alter their norms and criteria to adjust India into the regime. Consequently, India-specific waivers and safeguards were introduced and the member countries of the non-proliferation regime were encouraged to carry out nuclear trade with India. Presently, America is also struggling hard to persuade NSG members to grant India’s entry into the cartel and it is being reported that almost four of five declared NWS have shown a soft corner for New Delhi.
After India first tested its nuclear bomb in 1974, the international nuclear community feared the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology to other non-nuclear weapons states. For this reason the nuclear club joined hands to further tighten the norms and guidelines of the Non Proliferation Regime, and the Nuclear Supplies Group (NSG) emerged and strict actions were taken against the suspected nuclear proliferators. Despite of the stringent international economic and technological sanctions, Pakistan and India went nuclear in 1998 and faced stern criticism especially from the American policy makers. India, Pakistan and Israel, being non-signatories to NPT, were kept isolated and deprived from any kind of nuclear trade from the member states of the Non-Proliferation Regime while North Korea, later, joined the unprivileged group.
Until the end of President Clinton’s government in 2001, the core objective of US nuclear policy revolved around attaining a “nuclear restraint regime” in the South Asian region. However, the world witnessed a major shift in American foreign policy after the Bush administration decided to engage India in peaceful nuclear trade by offering an agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2005, thereby, starting a new debate in the Non-Proliferation system and questioning the relevancy and legitimacy of the entire regime.,
In early 2006, President Bush paid a visit to India where both sides worked out a plan for separating the Indian civilian nuclear facilities from the military ones. Furthermore, they agreed to restrict the advancement of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and also to support FMCT. Subsequently, the “Henry Hyde Act” was signed by President Bush on December 18, 2006 which helped in constructing a legal capacity for resuming nuclear cooperation with India. After the series of agreements another technical agreement, known as the 123 Agreement, was endorsed by both states. The agreement clearly identified the terms and conditions of nuclear cooperation where India was required to obtain approval from IAEA and NSG. Consequently, the 123 Agreement was unanimously passed in the US Senate and House of Representatives and was finally enforced in December 2008.
Pakistan, with few others, hoisted serious reservations against the Indian-specific agreement since the reprocessing and enrichment facilities, research reactors like Dhruva and CIRUS, certain heavy water facilities and different military nuclear plants were totally left out in the separation design. However, the IAEA’s top management welcomed the deal and described it as an “umbrella agreement” where rather than discussing separate agreements for different plants India itself volunteered to put additional reactors under IAEA’s inspection. India can also put its enrichment facilities under inspection if it desires to do so, but it is not mandatory.
Islamabad has been concerned over the time that has been granted to India for detaching its military and civilian plants from each other. Pakistan fears that since the deal became active in 2008 and various countries have offered nuclear cooperation with New Delhi, India might continue enhancing its aggressive nuclear program by “voluntary” offering only those civilian plants to IAEA safeguards that it deems useless or obsolete.
Also, India has been permitted to endorse preemptive measures to warrant continuous fuel supply if any cooperating party fails to fulfill its pledges. Again, the clause is unidentified, vague and gives India a chance to interpret it in any direction, depending on its interests. It seems that by all means India is the key beneficiary of the deal while Pakistan remains on the disadvantageous side.
Similarly, the India-specific arrangement would not help advance the very purpose of the non-proliferation regime as the safeguards acknowledge Indian nuclear design and offer India complete authority to continue its nuclear agenda “unhindered” and “uninterrupted”.
Also the measures that must be taken for physical protection and the accountability and checks on all items under the recommendations established in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 have mainly been left out on India. This makes Pakistan suspicious regarding the possible nuclear pilfering, fuel trafficking and an increased likelihood of material diversion to defensive purposes. Furthermore, there is also no such clause of unilateral withdrawal in the India-specific safeguards since the termination of the agreement depends on mutual decision of the two parties; IAEA cannot make the withdrawal decision on its own.
The discriminatory behavior of non-proliferation regime and India’s adjustment can also be analyzed by examining the strategic and commercial interests of global powers. It has been argued that commercial aspect led by ideological and materialistic factors made the powerful states to construct a “tipping-point” supporting India’s accommodation and deteriorating the regime’s established norms and criteria. The leading states were successful in persuading the weaker ones and the later were left helpless and followed the bandwagon.
The world sees India as an economic hub, a rising power and an indispensable alternate to China’s growing potential. Therefore, to reap the maximum advantage of Indian potential to curb China’s progress, it was deemed necessary to bring India into the mainstream non-proliferation regime. Scholars and leading political commentators attribute India’s acceptance as mainly a result of the Chinese factor. Being an Asian power, India is perceived as a significant player in a rising multi-polar world.
The biggest expected benefit that the leading economies can get out of the Indo-US deal could be the NSG waiver that was particularly planned to unlock nuclear commerce with India. The powerful states, possessing advanced nuclear markets, had a strong incentive to endorse the Indian exemption since India is a growing market for international investors especially in the nuclear sphere. The West sees blooming trade opportunities worth over $30 billion as India aspires to construct around 20 more nuclear plants. France, that had been a strong proponent of India-specific arrangements, has already struck an agreement with India that permits it to export nuclear technology while one of its nuclear industries, Areva, signed a $7 billion contract with the Indian buyers. A formal nuclear trade also started between London and New Delhi in 2010, where two British companies, Rolls Royce and Serco, have reportedly been involved in the development of India’s largest nuclear plant.
In fact, India’s persuasive argumentation and material benefits along with the powerful countries’ sympathetic attitude towards India contributed in the emergence of India-specific exemption in the global non-proliferation system. The international powers reinforced India’s argumentation of entering the regime and undermined those who opposed it. The same attitude was reflected in discussions with the IAEA and NSG and no room was given to the weaker states to be heard.
About the Author
* The author holds an M. Phil degree in Peace and Conflict Studies and is an Islamabad based researcher.
