Japan and South Korea May Soon Go Nuclear
The longtime status quo is crumbling and plutonium stockpiles are rising.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, May 7, at the ruling party’s first congress in 36 years.
By Henry Sokolski
May 8, 2016 4:21 p.m. ET
On Friday North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un praised his country’s recent hydrogen bomb test and satellite launch as “unprecedented” achievements that will “bring the final victory of the revolution.” Such rhetoric is nothing new, but North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program and a growing sense that security arrangements with the U.S. aren’t sufficient has eroded the Japanese taboo against nuclear weapons. On April 1, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ’s cabinet announced that Japan’s constitution did not ban his country from having or using nuclear arms.
Meanwhile, South Korea’s ruling-party leaders have urged President Park Geun-hye to stockpile “peaceful” plutonium as a military hedge against its neighbors. A Feb. 19 article in Seoul’s leading conservative daily, the Chosun Ilbo, went so far as to detail how South Korea could use its existing civilian nuclear facilities to build a bomb in 18 months.
Japan and South Korea are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Tokyo’s antinuclear-weapons stance dates to 1945 and the nuclear devastation the U.S. wreaked on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that won’t necessarily stop either country from joining the nuclear club—or at least positioning themselves to do so quickly—if they feel the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” is folding.
Japan already has stockpiled 11 tons of plutonium, separated from fuel used in its nuclear-power reactors. A bomb requires roughly five kilograms (or 1/200th of a ton). The old shibboleth, popular with the nuclear industry, that such “reactor-grade” plutonium is unsuitable for weapons, is essentially irrelevant for a technologically advanced country. Japan also has built—but not operated—a large reprocessing plant of French design that can separate about eight tons of plutonium a year.
The shutdown of Japan’s power reactors following the 2011 Fukushima disaster means there are no reactors online that can use this plutonium. But Japan says it will proceed with reprocessing anyway, putatively to keep open the distant possibility of fueling a new generation of so-called fast-breeder reactors. Japan’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington allows it to do this with U.S.-origin fuel. South Korea’s agreement prohibits this without U.S. approval, something Seoul chafes at. It sees itself the equal of Japan. Should Japan operate Rokkasho, as it plans to do late in 2018, it will be impossible politically to restrain South Korea from following suit.
China, meanwhile, is negotiating with France to build a reprocessing plant similar to Japan’s. One might discount the security significance of this; Beijing already has nuclear weapons. But a large reprocessing plant would allow it to expand its nuclear arsenal far beyond its present size. The Chinese are clearly aware of the military significance of nominally civilian plutonium. Consider their loud and repeated complaints about Japan’s plutonium stocks.
The Asian goal of stockpiling plutonium to launch a new generation of plutonium-fueled fast-breeder reactors is one shared with nuclear enthusiasts in the West. But fast reactors are so much more expensive than conventional uranium-burning reactors that they, and the reprocessing of spent fuel they require, have never made economic sense. In Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing there are government officials and advisers who understand this and the security risks of commercializing plutonium. But their concerns have been trumped by nationalistic demands not to fall behind in plutonium technology.
The obvious fix, which would be economically beneficial for Japan, South Korea and China, is a collective pause in the rush toward civil plutonium. For the U.S. to credibly broker this, Capitol Hill needs to support the Energy Department’s February decision to terminate the construction in South Carolina of a plutonium plant designed to fuel U.S. power reactors that is billions over budget and years behind schedule.
An Asian-U.S. plutonium pause has support within the administration and Congress. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz recently told the Journal’s Beijing office: “We don’t support large-scale reprocessing.” He said a large commercial Chinese reprocessing plant “certainly isn’t a positive in terms of nonproliferation.”
At a March hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sens. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.) and Ed Markey (D., Mass.), both backed a “time out” on East Asian plutonium recycling. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman agreed: “I would be very happy to see all countries get out of the plutonium reprocessing business.” In the House a plutonium timeout has been championed by Reps. Brad Sherman (D., Calif.), Jeff Fortenberry (R., Neb.) and Adam Schiff (D., Calif.).
They understand that a collective plutonium timeout would calm East Asia and save our Asian allies, China and the U.S. hundreds of billions of dollars. President Obama, with less than a year in office to make a lasting contribution to nuclear nonproliferation, should feel comfortable backing this proposal.
Mr. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of “Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future” (Strategic Studies Institute, 2016).
