Is Muqtada al-Sadr Good for Iraq?
May 2, 2016
The
latest storming of the Iraqi parliament is one of the most significant
political events in Iraq since Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown in
2003. This process, which culminated in the weekend’s dramatic events,
began in March of this year when the Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr turned a
flagging protest movement into a major national force, by virtue of his
personal intervention. By the end of March, at the head of this
movement, Sadr himself successfully walked into the Green Zone, where
security forces welcomed him with open arms. Rather than reprimanding
him for what would otherwise be considered trespassing, the Iraqi
general in charge of security kissed his hand — a symbolic gesture of
submission. Sitting in the Green Zone, he pushed Abadi to pursue a
cabinet re-shuffle and set a 10-day ultimatum.
In April, the prime
minister failed three times to pass a technocratic cabinet in
parliament. With each failure, the protest movement grew increasingly
impatient. Following Abadi’s second failed attempt, which was heavily
influenced by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Sadr ordered his
MPs, who make up the Ahrar bloc, to stage a sit-in inside parliament.
This sit-in, which Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish MPs later joined,
administered an extra-ordinary parliamentary session and obtained enough
votes to sack speaker Salim al-Jabouri. However, Jabouri returned to
his seat to administer a third attempt for cabinet reshuffle on April
30. Still, the parliament again failed to pass Abadi’s list of names for
a technocratic cabinet and instead adjourned for a 10-day recess. At
this point, an impatient Sadr determined it was time for a drastic show
of force, resulting in the weekend’s storming of the parliament, where
protestors, carrying Iraqi flags rather than guns, were welcomed and
kissed by Green Zone security.
Sadr champions the protest movement’s demands, namely to move beyond the system of ethno-sectarian communal quotas (Muhasasa Ta’ifiya).
His message to the political establishment demands immediate change.
His power comes not from institutional privileges but from his popularity among millions of Iraqis, who are willing to mobilize on his call and who are increasingly impatient.
How did we get here and what does this mean for the future of Iraq? Can it be that Sadr, once the bête noire
of American interests in Iraq, may actually be a force for good? This
is a question that few, if any, would have countenanced until recently,
and for a number of reasons. Among these are Sadr’s short-lived attempt
to take over Iraq by force and impose an Islamic theocracy shortly
following the invasion in 2003. During this period, he established the Mehdi Army (jaysh al-mehdi), which became the largest Shia militia and fought to disrupt the post-2003 U.S.-led state-building project.
His militiamen seized control of public buildings and police stations,
administered death squads that murdered Sunnis through torture, notably
with electric drills, and kidnapped local residents and foreigners.
Individuals affiliated with his movement assassinated senior leaders
like Shia cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei in April 2003. Sadr’s willingness
to travel the path of political violence led many commentators to
conclude that Sadr is a “thug” or firebrand cleric and as such is not good
for Iraq. His militias were involved in some of the worst sectarian
excesses of the bloody civil war between 2006 and 2008. Today, many
Iraqi commentators remain wary of Sadr’s political ideology, which is
fiery, anti-Western, anti-secular, and rooted in political Islam.
Sadr’s relations with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the clerical leadership (marja’iyya) in Najaf are also problematic. He broadly criticizes Sistani’s strict adherence to the quietist school (Al-hawza al-samita),
which calls for non-interference by clerics in politics. In contrast,
Sadr, similar to his father, believes a cleric can be politically
involved and outspoken (al-hawza al-natiqa). Beyond ideological
differences, Sadr has also at times politically challenged Sistani. In
the early days following the 2003 invasion, he tried to usurp Sistani
directly as a theocratic ruler. In 2004, Sistani had to negotiate a
truce between the Mehdi Army and the United States, and in return,
called for Sadr to disband his courts in Najaf. Although Sadr must
follow the marja’yya, he has been vocal in sharing his thoughts and has
at times attempted to contest the order.
Nonetheless, there are
grounds for optimism when it comes to Sadr’s place in the Iraqi
political sphere. He has matured as a leader; and controversial figures
have been removed from his ranks, including Qays al-Khazali,
Akram al-Kabi, Abd al-Hadi al-Darraji and Mahmud al-Hasani al-Sarkhi.
The first three are now senior leaders in Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (the League
of the Righteousness), which has engaged in violence that “may amount to
war crimes.”
Following his defeat to
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Operation Knight’s Charge in
2008, Sadr left for Iran. His self-imposed exile had considerable impact
on Sadr’s political thinking. According to personal conversations with
Sadr sources, when Sadr arrived in Iran he was expecting a hero’s
welcome as the military leader who fought against American occupation.
On the contrary, senior Iranian clergy and political elites viewed and
treated him as a lower cleric. Sadr had difficulties meeting with senior
officials, including Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Little else is known about his time in Qom and he returned to Iraq in
2011 with a reinvigorated drive to reshape his movement and, by
extension, Iraq. His message emphasized an almost xenophobic Iraqi
nationalism, beyond the anti-Americanism and anti-foreigner tropes seen
after 2003. It even included anti-Iranian sentiments. At the same time,
this was combined with a concerted effort to establish links with
surrounding states and foreign movements as well as European capitals
and businesses.
Sadr has since undergone a rebranding process. He
disbanded the notorious Mehdi Army and later established Saraya
al-Salam (the Peace Brigades), which semantically has a less aggressive
and non-sectarian tone. Last year, in a battle against the Islamic
State, Sadr withdrew his paramilitary fighters as soon
as allegations emerged of crimes committed by his men. Moving away from
strictly a sectarian militia, his fighters are also fighting alongside
Sunni tribes, such as the Albu Nimr in Anbar, against the Islamic State.
Moreover, members of his paramilitary have welcomed the idea of
integration into the Iraqi state, but only when the government’s
security apparatus is perceived as effective and legitimate.
Many analysts criticize
Sadr for hypocrisy, claiming to fight corruption while sending
individuals from his own ranks to become government officials. His
officials have been part of the very problem of corruption that Sadr
claims to oppose. However, Sadr is increasingly cautious about who he
sends to represent his voice in government. Under accusations of
corruption, he has on occasion removed the bad apples and blessed the
courts’ legal proceedings. For instance, when Abadi issued legal
proceedings against Sadrist Deputy Prime Minister Baha Araji, Sadr
issued a statement ordering Araji to resign and forbade him from leaving
the country prior to completion of the judicial procedures.
As we argued two years
ago, Sadr’s involvement in domestic politics may be a precondition for
Iraq’s return to stability. In an environment already marred by a
security (the Islamic State) and economic (drop in oil price) crisis,
some commentators are criticizing Sadr for what they see as holding
Abadi and democratic Iraq for ransom. Others have argued that Sadr is trying to carry out a coup.
From a different vantage
point, Sadr’s influence could positive. Street politics are an
oft-integral part of any functioning democracy, as long as they remain
largely peaceful. In this case, both the protesters and the government
(the Green Zone’s security detail) refrained from
violence — a remarkable feat given the wider regional context. More
importantly, although Sadr has alluded to violence in “storming and
breaching the perimeter of the Green Zone,” Sadr’s protestors entered to
a large extent peacefully. The typical behavior of disturbing
authority, people, and property associated with mob violence, which
includes disorganized groups, occurred but was minimal. The security
guards, who very clearly supported the movement, kissed the protestors,
as we noted. Both sides even shared a bite of watermelon. Throughout the
storming of the parliament, Sadrist leaders kept calling for the
protestors to not harm others and to not damage government property.
In another positive
development, Sadr says he is willing to compromise. During the lead-up
to Abadi’s cabinet re-shuffle, he led one of only three committees that
sent a list of names to the prime minister (the other two being led by
Abadi himself and al-Maliki). Although Sadr sent some 90 names
to Abadi, an al-Ahrar source told the author that Abadi only took
three of these when he named 14 new ministers. Having not been awarded
enough seats in Abadi’s new proposed cabinet, Sadr still supported
the outcome and in fact called for quick parliamentary
ratification. According to a personal conversation with a
senior Sadrist official, ensuring that the reforms are implemented
is more important than having his choice of technocrats.
Sadr’s approach to politics has taken an Iraq-first turn, which is yet another encouraging trend. In recent Sadr-led protests, the slogan has been “na’am na’am l-al-Iraq” (Yes, Yes, to Iraq),
which is an interesting twist on the far more negative “No, no, to
America, no, no, to Israel, no, no, to Satan.” The only flags visible
are Iraqi flags — a far cry from other Iraqi political gatherings that
include the flags of political parties, paramilitaries, or regional
actors. Sadr increasingly transcends sectarian calculations. Today, his
fiercely independent Iraqi nationalism, based in popular values, is
critical of foreign intervention, be it Iranian, American, or any
international actor. He remains outspoken against leaders such as
Maliki, Hadi al-Ameri, and his former
colleague Khazali, precisely because he believes they are too close to
Tehran. Following the storming of the parliament, protestors throughout
the south of Iraq chanted “Iran, Barra Barra” (“Iran ,out out”). This is a remarkable turn for a man once depicted as a tool of the Iranians.
Given that the Iraqi
government is currently engulfed in a battle to liberate its cities from
the self-proclaimed Islamic State, some commentators question whether
this is the right time to incite chaos and turn Iraqi governance upside
down. The battle against the Islamic State, however, requires not only
military action, be it air strikes or ground forces, but also political
efforts. To defeat the jihadist group, the people of Mosul and elsewhere
that currently support or express indifference to the Islamic State
need to be convinced to trust and re-engage with the central government.
Without ending the crisis of representation, the sect-based quotas, and
corrupt practices that hamper the voice of many citizens, it is
difficult to envisage the total defeat of the group. As such, Sadr’s
move to shake up Iraqi governance, whilst Abadi keeps the security
ministries (defense and interior) for the ongoing war, can be viewed as a
positive development in reshaping the system of representation in Iraq
and winning back different disenfranchised populations. In short, Sadr is opening the political front in the war against the Islamic State rather than hindering it.
One of us had a conversation about Sadr with Prime Minister Abadi, who agreed that deep down Sadr is a nationalist wanting the best for Iraq.
The problem is how he goes about it and the unintended consequences of
acts that may be poorly thought out. Some Iraqi writers have questioned
Sadr’s seeming ability to operate “above the law.” Indeed, this remains
problematic for any state-building project. During this era of
transition, however, Sadr occupies a necessary and unique role that no
other can play. As a semi-peripheral figure who circumvents the elitist
political process that serves the strong to the detriment of the weak,
Sadr appeals to the common man.
Sadr clearly has his own
agenda: advancing a populist, nationalist cause that benefits his
movement and his status in the domestic political and social sphere. But
for the moment, this entails bringing about positive outcomes for Iraq
on the whole. Sadr knows only too well from his personal experience that
his best option is to be part of a system in which he himself
represents the change.
However, it is misleading
to depict the Sadrist storming of parliament as a revolutionary call to
dissolve the institution. On the contrary, Sadr wants parliament to remain and to function effectively without delays
– unlike leaders such as Maliki, who want parliament to delay reforms
and to dissolve if necessary because of the power vacuum that it could
produce.
Despite
uncertainties, the latest developments in Iraq demonstrate that Sadr can
be a positive force in the Iraqi political scene. Rather than taking
advantage of a weak Abadi-cabinet, he in fact worked with Abadi, who was
also keen on moving forward with a cabinet reshuffle. For the prime
minister, this is an opportunity to minimize the influence of his
largest opponents, namely al-Maliki, Ameri, and Khasali – the very same
officials who Sadr is working against today. In Iraq, Sadr has become a
counter-balancing force to provide checks and balances against powerful
elites, such as Maliki, who have been ruling undemocratically and
unconstitutionally for many years.
Renad Mansour an
El-Erian Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a
Senior Fellow at the Iraq Institute for Strategic Studies. He holds a
PhD from the University of Cambridge. Michael David Clark is a Research
Associate at the Department of Politics and International Studies,
University of Cambridge. His doctoral research comparatively analyses
foreign policy formulation in the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi
Sadrist Movement, in particular towards the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Syrian
Civil War.
Image: Made from Alexander Augst and Darwinek, CC
