Shining a light on Britain’s nuclear state
Debates over Trident and energy policy are rarely joined up. But are there deeper links between Britain’s nuclear deterrent and its commitment to nuclear power?
Johnstone and Andy Stirling
Friday 7 August 2015 06.58 EDT
Two momentous issues facing David Cameron’s government concern nuclear infrastructure. The new secretary of state for energy, Amber Rudd, recently confirmed her enthusiasm for what is arguably the most expensive infrastructure project in British history: the Hinkley Point C power station. At the same time, a decision is pressing on a similarly eye-watering commitment to renew Britain’s nuclear deterrent.
Ostensibly distinct, both of these issues are intensely controversial, extremely expensive, agonisingly protracted, and often accompanied by vicious political rhetoric. Yet commentators rarely ask how these decisions might be connected. Could such links help to explain the strength of the UK’s nuclear lobby? Britain remains one of only a handful of countries committed to a “nuclear renaissance”, with senior government figures asserting the manifest falsehood that there is “no alternative” to nuclear power. Meanwhile, support for renewables and energy efficiency has been cut.
It seems that Whitehall is in denial about the widely acknowledged performance trends of nuclear power and renewables. The reality is that renewables manifestly outperform nuclear power as low carbon energy sources. Successive UK and international studies show they are already more competitive than nuclear. And renewables costs continue to fall. Yet after more than half a century of development (and far greater levels of cumulative public support), nuclear costs keep rising. The performance gap just keeps on growing.
Nor is there any good excuse for ignoring such overblown nuclear promises. Problems of reactor safety, nuclear waste and weapons proliferation remain unsolved. Nuclear security risks are uniquely grave. With finance in question and technical difficulties mounting, the deteriorating prospects of the Hinkley project are the latest episode in a familiar pattern.
So why is the UK so persistent in pursuing new nuclear power? If the nuclear lobby is driving this, why have other countries with stronger nuclear industries nonetheless developed far more sceptical positions? In the case of Germany, this has meant the country with the world’s most successful nuclear industry and a less attractive renewable resource than the UK, nonetheless undertaking a wholesale shift from one to the other.
One striking factor is an apparently strong correlation between those countries most eager to construct new nuclear with those expressing a desire to maintain nuclear weapons. But care is needed before jumping to conclusions. Historically, links between enthusiasms for nuclear power and nuclear weapons are well-explored. Almost all the attention here has focused on possibilities for diverting nuclear weapons materials like highly enriched uranium and plutonium. These connections were crucial in early nuclear developments, and remain so in contemporary proliferation threats. But it is highly doubtful they explain the UK situation. An elaborate global nuclear safeguards regime introduces formidable barriers. And the UK has since the end of the Cold War maintained enormous gluts of key weapons materials.
There are other more neglected questions. What if the links are less to do with the weapons themselves and more to do with wider technological systems required to run the associated nuclear submarines? It is, after all, these amazing feats of engineering whose range, capacities and undetectability aspire to make nuclear deterrence credible. As emphasised in debates during the general election, this infrastructure relies on very particular kinds of design expertise, engineering skills, supply chains and regulatory capabilities.
Are there worries that loss of national civilian nuclear capacities will erode the capabilities required to make the UK’s nuclear deterrent credible? By analogy with other countries, is there something akin to a UK ‘deep state’ fearful of losing the cherished elite identity on the world stage conferred by nuclear deterrence? After all, a distinctive British “warfare state” has been shown by the historian David Edgerton to exercise strong influence on national technology strategies.
The obscure provisions of the US/UK memorandum of understanding concerning transfer of nuclear submarine technology make it hard to answer these questions. But it seems the UK is committed to maintaining its own independent nuclear submarine supply chain – precluding the kind of foreign dependency (on France, China and others) now pervading the civilian nuclear industry.
This might help to explain the resounding official silence on this matter. The separation between civilian and military nuclear activities is one of the most sacrosanct principles in global politics. It forms one of the most imminent threats of war. And – like other nations – the UK is bound by numerous treaty commitments which are foundational to the international order. So, it would be naïve to expect too much candour.
Yet there may be other clues. Looking back to the New Labour era, one may lie in the remarkable flurry of activity that immediately followed a rare and brief loss of control, in which the 2003 energy white paper firmly concluded nuclear power was “unattractive” – instead backing renewables and energy efficiency.
This exercise was driven by an unusual and temporary innovation in UK policymaking, in which the newly-formed Cabinet Office Performance and Innovation Unit broke with normal practice, by recruiting external experts on independently-evaluated merit. When this allowed an independent look at nuclear power within government, the ‘deep state’ evidently developed a rare breach.
What followed was one of the most spectacular U-turns in recent British politics. After only three years, a cursory further energy review was completed in 2006. Despite unchanged conditions and no new arguments, this reinstated a strongly pro-nuclear policy. Although the 2006 paper was itself overturned by judicial review on the grounds of being too superficial, the Blair government retorted that any further appraisal “won’t affect the policy at all”.
Since then, UK nuclear commitments have once again dug in deep. But no government – including the present one – has ever properly explained why.
What has not been examined until now is the intense policy commotion behind the scenes during this same period on the arcane topic of submarines. By 2004, the well-funded Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC) was underway. Run by a consortium of nuclear industry, trade union and nuclear-dependent local authorities, this was among the country’s most effective lobby groups. Aiming to maintain a UK nuclear submarine industry, KOFAC’s activities were not confined to the military sector. It also engaged enthusiastically in energy policy consultations, highlighting the importance of a shared skills pool for the military and civilian nuclear sectors.
Evidently commissioned following the off-piste 2003 nuclear white paper, a report was produced for the ministry of defence in 2005 by RAND Europe. This detailed the risks posed to UK nuclear submarine capabilities, and the deterrent more broadly, by a depleted workforce and skills base. Aided by KOFAC, the RAND study triggered a series of related documents from MoD and other security institutions. Defence select committee inquiries were undertaken and a new white paper was produced, reaffirming the commitment to a submarine-based nuclear deterrent. At the same time, anxious parliamentary briefings appeared, new research programmes were initiated – and regulatory agencies joined the clamour on the civilian side to “keep the nuclear option open”.
Joining these efforts, submarine producer BAE Systems set up a key suppliers group to improve co-ordination among nuclear contractors. This culminated in 2009, with the government launching the Nuclear Skills Institute whose remit again quietly spans the linkages between crucial skills across civilian and defence sectors.
So the links between UK civilian nuclear power and military interests in nuclear submarines run deep. What is remarkable is the complete lack of discussion these provoke in the media, public policy documents, or wider critical debate. Yet the stakes are very high. Does the commitment to a submarine based nuclear deterrent help to explain the intensity of high-level UK support for costly, risky and slow nuclear power, rather than cheaper, quicker and cleaner renewable technologies?
If so, the conclusions are not self-evident. For some supporters of a nuclear deterrent, the additional burdens of nuclear power may seem entirely reasonable. But the almost total silence on these connections raises crucial implications for democracy. Imminent decisions that the government must take over nuclear power and the nuclear deterrent are hugely significant. There is a responsibility on all involved to be open and accountable. Otherwise, it will not just be electricity consumers and taxpayers that pay the price, but British democracy itself.
Phil Johnstone is a research fellow and Andy Stirling is a professor of science and technology policy at the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University of Sussex.
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