The villains of the second nuclear age
Even as Pakistan accelerates its nuclear weapons programme, there seems to be all-round silence about its activities
Recent reports suggest Pakistan is accelerating its nuclear weapons programme. A US-based think-tank, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), released a report along with photographs that says external construction of the Khushab complex’s fourth reactor is complete and that it has “become operational.” Khushab is a nuclear complex in Pakistan’s Punjab province where its plutonium generation and processing activities are carried out. The first nuclear reactor there was activated in 1996. ISIS estimates in the report “the power of the original heavy water reactor to be about 50 MWth while reactors 2, 3, and 4 are believed to generate double or more the power of the first one, and are thus capable of producing more than double the amount of weapon-grade plutonium per year”. The report also states, “images show that some new construction activity is taking place in the south-west corner of the Khushab site, south of reactors 2, 3, and 4. It is not yet clear what this activity is. One possibility that cannot be ruled out is that this activity could be for the construction of another reactor”. The number of Pakistan’s nuclear transgressions is so large that by now, any report suggesting a new violation is consumed wearily. The result, however, is a strange silence. There has been no noise from the US administration; no angry news reports and certainly no reaction from the non-proliferation lobby in the US. It is as if Pakistan stepping up the pace of its nuclearization is a routine development and nothing to be worried about. Nuclear offenders This is in sharp contrast to how concerned western countries, especially the US, are about nuclear instability in Asia. Reports and research that focus on the nuclear arms race between India, Pakistan and China, tend to consistently imply that the race is being led or caused by India and not by Pakistan or China. Consider, for example, a November 2014 report by the Council on Foreign Relations (Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, Gregory D. Koblentz). Koblentz estimates that “by 2020, Pakistan could have a fissile material stockpile sufficient to produce more than two hundred nuclear weapons”. Yet, at various points in the report are arguments such as these: 1) While Pakistan is focused predominantly on the threat posed by India, it is reportedly also concerned by the potential for the United States to launch a military operation to seize or disarm Pakistani nuclear weapons. (page 18) (after the Abbottabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden) 2) China’s…modernization of its nuclear forces and development of antisatellite (ASAT) and missile defense capabilities, has triggered a reaction from India, which causes grave concern in Pakistan. (page 21) 3) The size and composition of Pakistan’s nuclear forces appear increasingly dictated by India’s growing conventional military capabilities. (page 27) 4) …changes in China’s nuclear force posture aimed at maintaining an assured retaliation capability against the United States could trigger a reaction by India and therefore Pakistan. (page 29) In all these arguments, Pakistan’s nuclear reaction is seen to be the result of concern for its safety and security. In three out of the four cases mentioned above, it is seen as the direct result of India strengthening its abilities that will necessarily trigger a reaction from Pakistan. Both Pakistan and China (see 1, 2 and 4), under perceived threats from the US, are free to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenal, but India’s response to a perceived Chinese or Pakistani threat is seen as increasing instability. According to 3, Pakistan’s decisions are based on India’s expansion of its conventional military capabilities. The truth is that India’s security challenges are now far more complex, spanning both unconventional (terrorist and non-state actors) and conventional threats. India’s nuclear programme is not opaque and after the signing of an additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its military and civilian nuclear programmes are clearly demarcated. Reports such as the one issued by CFR describe what is going on—the continuing arms race in Asia, Pakistan’s aggressive acquisition of nuclear material and China’s modernization of its arsenal—but they don’t get to the root of the problem: what is driving this race? In Pakistan’s case, any outside observer can understand its security dilemmas—an inimical neighbour to the East and a porous and insecure border to the West. But what explains its breakneck generation of plutonium far beyond what is necessary for a credible nuclear deterrent, one that it already has? One answer could be that it does not understand the role of nuclear weapons. These weapons cannot be seen from the prism of more weapons implying greater security. Because they cannot be used in the way other military equipment is used, acquiring a greater number does not make sense. The other way to look at the Pakistani nuclear problem is the fear of these weapons being snatched by India and the US. Even this is hard to believe. By now, Pakistan has so many nukes that it is impossible to carry out a snatch operation to grab every single weapon. The new nuclear reactor at Khushab, the breakneck pace at which plutonium and other nuclear materials are being generated and the security of all these materials in a country with extreme insecurities—terrorists often strike at will anywhere, including military facilities—are all disturbing issues. The world should sit up and take notice. India should for sure. Global Roaming runs every Tuesday to take stock of international events and trends from a political and economic perspective.Read more at: http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/XaOv1ZhlkApXkxlEf2y32O/The-villains-of-the-second-nuclear-age.html?utm_source=copy
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