The prophecy is more than seeing into the future. For the prophecy sees without the element of time. For the prophecy sees things as they were, as they are, and as they always shall be.
A US military photo of the Hiroshima atomic bomb blast on 6 August 194.
‘There is ample evidence that the doctrine of national security does
not encompass the security of the population.’ Photograph: A Peace
Memorial Museum handout/EPA
If some extraterrestrial species were compiling a history of homo
sapiens, they might well break their calendar into two eras: BNW (before
nuclear weapons) and NWE (the nuclear weapons era). The latter era, of
course, opened on 6 August 1945, the first day of the countdown to what
may be the inglorious end of this strange species,
which attained the intelligence to discover the effective means to
destroy itself, but – so the evidence suggests – not the moral and
intellectual capacity to control its worst instincts.
Day one of the NWE was marked by the “success” of Little Boy, a simple atomic bomb. On day four, Nagasaki experienced the technological triumph of Fat Man,
a more sophisticated design. Five days later came what the official Air
Force history calls the “grand finale,” a 1,000-plane raid – no mean
logistical achievement – attacking Japan’s cities and killing many
thousands of people, with leaflets falling among the bombs reading
“Japan has surrendered”. Truman announced that surrender before the last
B-29 returned to its base.
Those were the auspicious opening days of the NWE. As we now enter
its 70th year, we should be contemplating with wonder how we have
survived. We can only guess how many years remain.
Some reflections on these grim prospects were offered by General Lee Butler, former head of the US strategic air command (Stratcom),
which controls nuclear weapons and strategy. Twenty years ago, he wrote
that we had so far survived the NWE “by some combination of skill,
luck, and divine intervention, and I suspect the latter in greatest
proportion.”
Reflecting on his long career in developing nuclear weapons
strategies and organising the forces to implement them efficiently, he
described himself ruefully as having been “among the most avid of these
keepers of the faith in nuclear weapons”. But, he continued, he had come
to realise that it was now his “burden to declare with all of the
conviction I can muster that in my judgment they served us extremely
ill”. He asked: “By what authority do succeeding generations of leaders
in the nuclear-weapon states usurp the power to dictate the odds of
continued life on our planet? Most urgently, why does such breathtaking
audacity persist at a moment when we should stand trembling in the face
of our folly and united in our commitment to abolish its most deadly
manifestations?”
He termed the US strategic plan of 1960, which called for an
automated all-out strike on the communist world. “the single most absurd
and irresponsible document I have ever reviewed in my life”. Its Soviet
counterpart was probably even more insane. But it is important to bear
in mind that there are competitors, not least among them the easy
acceptance of extraordinary threats to survival. Survival in the early cold war years
According to received doctrine in scholarship and general
intellectual discourse, the prime goal of state policy is national
security. There is ample evidence, however, that the doctrine of
national security does not encompass the security of the population. The
record reveals that, for instance, the threat of instant destruction by nuclear weapons
has not ranked high among the concerns of planners. That much was
demonstrated early on, and remains true to the present moment.
In the early days of the NWE, the US was overwhelmingly powerful and
enjoyed remarkable security: it controlled the hemisphere, the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans, and the opposite sides of those oceans as well. Long
before the second world war, it had already become by far the richest
country in the world, with incomparable advantages. Its economy boomed
during the war, while other industrial societies were devastated or
severely weakened. By the opening of the new era, the US possessed
around half of the world’s total wealth and an even greater percentage
of its manufacturing capacity.
There was, however, a potential threat: intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads.
That threat was discussed in the standard scholarly study of nuclear
policies, carried out with access to high-level sources – Danger and
Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years by McGeorge
Bundy, national security adviser during the Kennedy and Johnson
presidencies.
Bundy wrote: “The timely development of ballistic missiles during the
Eisenhower administration is one of the best achievements of those
eight years. Yet it is well to begin with a recognition that both the
United States and the Soviet Union might be in much less nuclear danger
today if [those] missiles had never been developed.” He then added an
instructive comment: “I am aware of no serious contemporary proposal, in
or out of either government, that ballistic missiles should somehow be
banned by agreement.” In short, there was apparently no thought of
trying to prevent the sole serious threat to the US: the threat of utter destruction in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union.
Could that threat have been taken off the table? We cannot, of
course, be sure, but it was hardly inconceivable. The Russians, far
behind in industrial development and technological sophistication, were
in a far more threatening environment. Hence, they were significantly
more vulnerable to such weapons systems than the US. There might have
been opportunities to explore these possibilities, but in the
extraordinary hysteria of the day they could hardly have even been
perceived. And that hysteria was indeed extraordinary. An examination of
the rhetoric of central official documents of that moment like National Security Council Paper NSC-68
remains quite shocking, even discounting secretary of state Dean
Acheson’s injunction that it is necessary to be “clearer than truth”.
Churchill and Stalin at Yalta Conference
Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Photograph: PhotoQuest/Getty Images
One indication of possible opportunities to blunt the threat was a
remarkable proposal by the Soviet ruler Joseph Stalin in 1952, offering
to allow Germany to be unified with free elections on the condition that
it would not then join a hostile military alliance. That was hardly an
extreme condition in light of the history of the previous half-century
during which Germany alone had practically destroyed Russia twice,
exacting a terrible toll.
Stalin’s proposal was taken seriously by the respected political
commentator James Warburg, but otherwise mostly ignored or ridiculed at
the time. Recent scholarship has begun to take a different view. The
bitterly anti-communist Soviet scholar Adam Ulam has taken the status of
Stalin’s proposal to be an “unresolved mystery”. Washington “wasted
little effort in flatly rejecting Moscow’s initiative,” he has written,
on grounds that “were embarrassingly unconvincing”. The political,
scholarly, and general intellectual failure left open a “basic
question,” Ulam added: “Was Stalin genuinely ready to sacrifice the
newly created German Democratic Republic on the altar of real
democracy,” with consequences for world peace and for American security
that could have been enormous?
Reviewing recent research in Soviet archives, one of the most
respected cold war scholars, Melvyn Leffler, has observed that many
scholars were surprised to discover “[Lavrenti] Beria – the sinister,
brutal head of the [Russian] secret police – propos[ed] that the Kremlin
offer the west a deal on the unification and neutralisation of
Germany,” agreeing “to sacrifice the East German communist regime to
reduce east-west tensions” and improve internal political and economic
conditions in Russia – opportunities that were squandered in favor of
securing German participation in Nato.
Under the circumstances, it is not impossible that agreements might
then have been reached to protect the security of the American
population from the gravest threat on the horizon. But that possibility
apparently was not considered, a striking indication of how slight a
role authentic security plays in state policy. The Cuban missile crisis and beyond
John Kennedy in USSR
John F. Kennedy arriving in the USSR for talks with
Nikita Khrushchev. Photograph: Hank Walker/Time & Life
Pictures/Getty Image
That conclusion was underscored repeatedly in the years that
followed. When Nikita Khrushchev took control in Russia in 1953 after
Stalin’s death, he recognised that the USSR could not compete militarily
with the US, the richest and most powerful country in history. If it
ever hoped to escape its economic backwardness and the devastating
effect of the last world war, it would need to reverse the arms race.
Accordingly, Khrushchev proposed sharp mutual reductions in offensive
weapons. The incoming Kennedy administration considered the offer and
rejected it, instead turning to rapid military expansion, even though it
was already far in the lead. The late Kenneth Waltz, supported by other
strategic analysts with close connections to US intelligence, wrote
then that the Kennedy administration “undertook the largest strategic
and conventional peacetime military build-up the world has yet seen …
even as Khrushchev was trying at once to carry through a major reduction
in the conventional forces and to follow a strategy of minimum
deterrence, and we did so even though the balance of strategic weapons
greatly favoured the United States”. Again, harming national security
while enhancing state power.
US intelligence verified that huge cuts had indeed been made in
active Soviet military forces, both in terms of aircraft and manpower.
In 1963, Khrushchev again called for new reductions. As a gesture, he
withdrew troops from East Germany and called on Washington to
reciprocate. That call, too, was rejected. William Kaufmann, a former
top Pentagon aide and leading analyst of security issues, described the
US failure to respond to Khrushchev’s initiatives, in career terms, as
“the one regret I have.”
As the crisis peaked in late October, Kennedy received a secret
letter from Khrushchev offering to end it by simultaneous public
withdrawal of Russian missiles from Cuba and US Jupiter missiles from
Turkey. The latter were obsolete missiles, already ordered withdrawn by
the Kennedy administration because they were being replaced by far more
lethal Polaris submarines to be stationed in the Mediterranean.
Kennedy’s subjective estimate at that moment was that if he refused
the Soviet premier’s offer, there was a 33% to 50% probability of
nuclear war – a war that, as President Eisenhower had warned, would have
destroyed the northern hemisphere. Kennedy nonetheless refused
Khrushchev’s proposal for public withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba
and Turkey; only the withdrawal from Cuba could be public, so as to
protect the US right to place missiles on Russia’s borders or anywhere
else it chose.
It is hard to think of a more horrendous decision in history – and
for this, he is still highly praised for his cool courage and
statesmanship.
Ten years later, in the last days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Henry
Kissinger, then national security adviser to President Nixon, called a
nuclear alert. The purpose was to warn the Russians not to interfere
with his delicate diplomatic manoeuvres designed to ensure an Israeli
victory, but of a limited sort so that the US would still be in control
of the region unilaterally. And the manoeuvres were indeed delicate. The
US and Russia had jointly imposed a ceasefire, but Kissinger secretly
informed the Israelis that they could ignore it. Hence the need for the
nuclear alert to frighten the Russians away. The security of Americans
had its usual status.
Ten years later, the Reagan administration launched operations to
probe Russian air defenses by simulating air and naval attacks and a
high-level nuclear alert that the Russians were intended to detect.
These actions were undertaken at a very tense moment. Washington was
deploying Pershing II strategic missiles in Europe with a five-minute
flight time to Moscow. President Reagan had also announced the strategic
defence initiative (“star wars”) programme, which the Russians
understood to be effectively a first-strike weapon, a standard
interpretation of missile defence on all sides. And other tensions were
rising.
Naturally, these actions caused great alarm in Russia, which, unlike
the US, was quite vulnerable and had repeatedly been invaded and
virtually destroyed. That led to a major war scare in 1983. Newly
released archives reveal that the danger was even more severe than
historians had previously assumed. A CIA study entitled
A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare concluded that US
intelligence may have underestimated Russian concerns and the threat of a
Russian preventative nuclear strike. The exercises “almost became a
prelude to a preventative nuclear strike,” according to an account in
the Journal of Strategic Studies.
It was even more dangerous than that, as we learned last September, when the BBC reported that
right in the midst of these world-threatening developments, Russia’s
early-warning systems detected an incoming missile strike from the
United States, sending its nuclear system onto the highest-level alert.
The protocol for the Soviet military was to retaliate with a nuclear
attack of its own. Fortunately, the officer on duty, Stanislav Petrov,
decided to disobey orders and not report the warnings to his superiors.
He received an official reprimand. And thanks to his dereliction of
duty, we’re still alive to talk about it.
The security of the population was no more a high priority for Reagan
administration planners than for their predecessors. And so it
continues to the present, even putting aside the numerous
near-catastrophic nuclear accidents that occurred over the years, many
reviewed in Eric Schlosser’s chilling study Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety. In other words, it is hard to contest General Butler’s conclusions.
Survival in the post-cold war era
The record of post-cold war actions and doctrines is hardly
reassuring either. Every self-respecting president has to have a
doctrine. The Clinton doctrine was encapsulated in the slogan
“multilateral when we can, unilateral when we must”. In congressional
testimony, the phrase “when we must” was explained more fully: the US is
entitled to resort to “unilateral use of military power” to ensure
“uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic
resources.” Meanwhile, Stratcom in the Clinton era produced an important
study entitled Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence, issued well
after the Soviet Union had collapsed, while Clinton was extending
President George Bush Sr’s programme of expanding Nato to the east in
violation of promises to Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev – with
reverberations to the present.
That Stratcom study was concerned with “the role of nuclear weapons
in the post-cold war era”. A central conclusion: that the US must
maintain the right to launch a first strike, even against non-nuclear
states. Furthermore, nuclear weapons must always be at the ready because
they “cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict”. They were, that is,
constantly being used, just as you’re using a gun if you aim but don’t
fire one while robbing a store (a point that Daniel Ellsberg has
repeatedly stressed). Stratcom went on to advise that “planners should
not be too rational about determining … what the opponent values the
most”. Everything should simply be targeted. “[I]t hurts to portray
ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed… That the US may become
irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a
part of the national persona we project”. It is “beneficial [for our
strategic posture] if some elements may appear to be potentially ‘out of
control’,” thus posing a constant threat of nuclear attack – a severe
violation of the UN charter, if anyone cares.
Not much here about the noble goals constantly proclaimed – or for
that matter the obligation under the non-proliferation treaty to make
“good faith” efforts to eliminate this scourge of the earth. What
resounds, rather, is an adaptation of Hilaire Belloc’s famous couplet
about the Maxim gun (to quote the great African historian Chinweizu):
“Whatever happens, we have got, the atom bomb, and they have not.”
After Clinton came, of course, George W Bush, whose broad endorsement
of preventative war easily encompassed Japan’s attack in December 1941
on military bases in two US overseas possessions, at a time when
Japanese militarists were well aware that B-17 Flying Fortresses were
being rushed off assembly lines and deployed to those bases with the
intent “to burn out the industrial heart of the empire with fire-bomb
attacks on the teeming bamboo ant heaps of Honshu and Kyushu”. That was
how the prewar plans were described by their architect, air force
general Claire Chennault, with the enthusiastic approval of President
Franklin Roosevelt, secretary of state Cordell Hull, and army chief of
staff General George Marshall.
Then comes Barack Obama, with pleasant words about working to abolish
nuclear weapons – combined with plans to spend $1trn on the US nuclear
arsenal in the next 30 years, a percentage of the military budget
“comparable to spending for procurement of new strategic systems in the
1980s under President Ronald Reagan,” according to a study by the James
Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies. Barack Obama in control room of US operation to capture Osama bin Laden. Photograph: PETE SOUZA/AFP/Getty Images
Obama has also not hesitated to play with fire for political gain.
Take for example the capture and assassination of Osama bin Laden by
navy Seals. Obama brought it up with pride in an important speech on
national security in May 2013. It was widely covered, but one crucial
paragraph was ignored.
Obama hailed the operation but added that it could not be the norm.
The reason, he said, was that the risks “were immense”. The Seals might
have been “embroiled in an extended firefight”. Even though, by luck,
that didn’t happen, “the cost to our relationship with Pakistan and the
backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory
was … severe.”
Let us now add a few details. The Seals were ordered to fight their
way out if apprehended. They would not have been left to their fate if
“embroiled in an extended firefight”. The full force of the US military
would have been used to extricate them. Pakistan has a powerful,
well-trained military, highly protective of state sovereignty. It also
has nuclear weapons, and Pakistani specialists are concerned about the
possible penetration of their nuclear security system by jihadi
elements. It is also no secret that the population has been embittered
and radicalised by Washington’s drone terror campaign and other
policies.
While the Seals were still in the bin Laden compound, Pakistani chief
of staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was informed of the raid and ordered the
military “to confront any unidentified aircraft,” which he assumed would
be from India. Meanwhile in Kabul, US war commander General David
Petraeus ordered “warplanes to respond” if the Pakistanis “scrambled
their fighter jets”. As Obama said, by luck the worst didn’t happen,
though it could have been quite ugly. But the risks were faced without
noticeable concern. Or subsequent comment.
As General Butler observed, it is a near miracle that we have escaped
destruction so far, and the longer we tempt fate, the less likely it is
that we can hope for divine intervention to perpetuate the miracle.
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